Design Methods and Practices for Fault Prevention and Management in Spacecraft
Integrated Systems Health Management (ISHM) is intended to become a critical capability for all space, lunar and planetary exploration vehicles and systems at NASA. Monitoring and managing the health state of diverse components, subsystems, and systems is a difficult task that will become more challenging when implemented for long-term, evolving deployments. A key technical challenge will be to ensure that the ISHM technologies are reliable, effective, and low cost, resulting in turn in safe, reliable, and affordable missions. To ensure safety and reliability, ISHM functionality, decisions and knowledge have to be incorporated into the product lifecycle as early as possible, and ISHM must be considered as an essential element of models developed and used in various stages during system design. During early stage design, many decisions and tasks are still open, including sensor and measurement point selection, modeling and model-checking, diagnosis, signature and data fusion schemes, presenting the best opportunity to catch and prevent potential failures and anomalies in a cost-effective way. Using appropriate formal methods during early design, the design teams can systematically explore risks without committing to design decisions too early. However, the nature of ISHM knowledge and data is detailed, relying on high-fidelity, detailed models, whereas the earlier stages of the product lifecycle utilize low-fidelity, high-level models of systems and their functionality. We currently lack the tools and processes necessary for integrating ISHM into the vehicle system/subsystem design. As a result, most existing ISHM-like technologies are retrofits that were done after the system design was completed. It is very expensive, and sometimes futile, to retrofit a system health management capability into existing systems. Last-minute retrofits result in unreliable systems, ineffective solutions, and excessive costs (e.g., Space Shuttle TPS monitoring which was considered only after 110 flights and the Columbia disaster). High false alarm or false negative rates due to substandard implementations hurt the credibility of the ISHM discipline. This paper presents an overview of the current state of ISHM design,and a review of formal design methods to make recommendations about possible approaches to enable the ISHM capabilities to be designed-in at the system-level, from the very beginning of the vehicle design process.