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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Successes and Failures of Metal Additive Manufacturing for Rocket Engines

NASA has been developing additive manufacturing (AM) for various technical and programmatic advantages for complex rocket engine and aerospace components. This maturation has focused on various AM processes, new alloys, characterizing material properties, developing standards, producing demonstrator parts, and integrating AM hardware in liquid rocket engines through test-fail-fix cycles, as well as application and dissemination of lessons learned of the AM lifecycle. The importance of proper AM processing was made evident in the failure of a Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF) copper-alloy combustion chamber during a hot-fire test due to a degraded material quality. The hot-fire test aimed to demonstrate high duty cycle under a risk-tolerant development project, where consequences of component failure would be minimal. However, the unintentional component failure emphasized the necessity of robust material characterization and rigorous process control procedures for the safe use of AM components in critical applications. This presentation provides an overview of the development failure, a discussion on the evaluation of the failed chamber and supplemental chambers produced at the same time, a representative material samples that included intentional build witness lines, and a summary of the key results and recommendations from the evaluations. NASA continues to approach AM processes and designs with a level of risk and acceptance of failures that is appropriate for the project objectives, with the overall goal of safe implementation of AM technology and transferring AM technology into commercial space applications. This presentation with provide critical awareness to the community lessons learned on proper implementation of AM.

Additive Manufacturing↗
NASA NTRS1975

Corona-vacuum failure mechanism test facilities

A nondestructive corona-vacuum test facility for testing high-voltage power system components has been developed using commercially available hardware. The facility simulates operating temperature and vacuum while monitoring coronal discharges with residual gases. Corona threshold voltages obtained from statorette tests with various gas-solid dielectric systems and comparison with calculated data support the following conclusions: (1) air gives the highest corona threshold voltage and helium the lowest, with argon and helium-xenon mixtures intermediate; (2) corona threshold voltage increases with gas pressure; (3) corona threshold voltage for an armature winding can be accurately calculated by using Paschen curves for a uniform field; and (4) Paschen curves for argon can be used to calculate the corona threshold voltage in He-Xe mixtures, for which Paschen curves are unavailable.-

Lalli, V. R.↗
NASA NTRS2008

An Alternative Method Of Specifying Shock Test Criteria

Shock testing of aerospace vehicle hardware has presented many challenges over the years due to the high magnitude and short duration of the specifications. Recently, component structural failures have occurred during testing that have not manifested themselves on over 200 Space Shuttle solid rocket booster (SRB) flights (two boosters per flight). It is suspected that the method of specifying shock test criteria may be leaving important information out of the test process. The traditional test criteria specification, the shock response spectrum, can be duplicated by any number of waveforms that may not resemble the actual flight test recorded time history. One method of overcoming this limitation is described herein, which may prove useful for qualifying hardware for the upcoming Constellation Program.

Ferebee, R. C.↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA Applications and Lessons Learned in Reliability Engineering

Since the Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986, communities across NASA have been developing and extensively using quantitative reliability and risk assessment methods in their decision making process. This paper discusses several reliability engineering applications that NASA has used over the year to support the design, development, and operation of critical space flight hardware. Specifically, the paper discusses several reliability engineering applications used by NASA in areas such as risk management, inspection policies, components upgrades, reliability growth, integrated failure analysis, and physics based probabilistic engineering analysis. In each of these areas, the paper provides a brief discussion of a case study to demonstrate the value added and the criticality of reliability engineering in supporting NASA project and program decisions to fly safely. Examples of these case studies discussed are reliability based life limit extension of Shuttle Space Main Engine (SSME) hardware, Reliability based inspection policies for Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) turbine disc, probabilistic structural engineering analysis for reliability prediction of the SSME alternate turbo-pump development, impact of ET foam reliability on the Space Shuttle System risk, and reliability based Space Shuttle upgrade for safety. Special attention is given in this paper to the physics based probabilistic engineering analysis applications and their critical role in evaluating the reliability of NASA development hardware including their potential use in a research and technology development environment.

Safie, Fayssal M.↗
NASA NTRS1966

Procedure for Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)

This document provides guidelines for the accomplishment of Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) on the Apollo program. It is a procedure for analysis of hardware items to determine those items contributing most to system unreliability and crew safety problems.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1975

Electronic delay ignition module for single bridgewire Apollo standard initiator

An engineering model and a qualification model of the EDIM were constructed and tested to Scout flight qualification criteria. The qualification model incorporated design improvements resulting from the engineering model tests. Compatibility with single bridgewire Apollo standard initiator (SBASI) was proven by test firing forty-five (45) SBASI's with worst case voltage and temperature conditions. The EDIM was successfully qualified for Scout flight application with no failures during testing of the qualification unit. Included is a method of implementing the EDIM into Scout vehicle hardware and the ground support equipment necessary to check out the system.

Ward, R. D.↗
NASA NTRS1979

A comparison of computer architectures for the NASA demonstration advanced avionics system

The paper compares computer architectures for the NASA demonstration advanced avionics system. Two computer architectures are described with an unusual approach to fault tolerance: a single spare processor can correct for faults in any of the distributed processors by taking on the role of a failed module. It was shown the system must be used from a functional point of view to properly apply redundancy and achieve fault tolerance and ultra reliability. Data are presented on complexity and mission failure probability which show that the revised version offers equivalent mission reliability at lower cost as measured by hardware and software complexity.

Seacord, C. L.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Software fault tolerance in computer operating systems

This chapter provides data and analysis of the dependability and fault tolerance for three operating systems: the Tandem/GUARDIAN fault-tolerant system, the VAX/VMS distributed system, and the IBM/MVS system. Based on measurements from these systems, basic software error characteristics are investigated. Fault tolerance in operating systems resulting from the use of process pairs and recovery routines is evaluated. Two levels of models are developed to analyze error and recovery processes inside an operating system and interactions among multiple instances of an operating system running in a distributed environment. The measurements show that the use of process pairs in Tandem systems, which was originally intended for tolerating hardware faults, allows the system to tolerate about 70% of defects in system software that result in processor failures. The loose coupling between processors which results in the backup execution (the processor state and the sequence of events occurring) being different from the original execution is a major reason for the measured software fault tolerance. The IBM/MVS system fault tolerance almost doubles when recovery routines are provided, in comparison to the case in which no recovery routines are available. However, even when recovery routines are provided, there is almost a 50% chance of system failure when critical system jobs are involved.

Iyer, Ravishankar K.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Apollo Lesson Sampler: Apollo 13 Lessons Learned

This CD-ROM contains a two-part case study of the Apollo 13 accident. The first lesson contains an overview of the electrical system hardware on the Apollo spacecraft, providing a context for the details of the oxygen tank explosion, and the failure chain reconstruction that led to the conditions present at the time of the accident. Given this background, the lesson then covers the tank explosion and immediate damage to the spacecraft, and the immediate response of Mission Control to what they saw. Part 2 of the lesson picks up shortly after the explosion of the oxygen tank on Apollo 13, and discusses how Mission Control gained insight to and understanding of the damage in the aftermath. Impacts to various spacecraft systems are presented, along with Mission Control's reactions and plans for in-flight recovery leading to a successful entry. Finally, post-flight vehicle changes are presented along with the lessons learned.

Interbartolo, Michael A.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Orion GNC Mitigation Efforts for Van Allen Radiation

The Orion Crew Module (CM) is NASA's next generation manned space vehicle, scheduled to return humans to lunar orbit in the coming decade. The Orion avionics and GN&C architectures have progressed through a number of project phases and are nearing completion of a major milestone. The first unmanned test mission, dubbed "Exploration Flight Test One" (EFT-1) is scheduled to launch from NASA Kennedy Space Center late next year and provides the first integrated test of all the vehicle systems, avionics and software. The EFT-1 mission will be an unmanned test flight that includes a high speed re-entry from an elliptical orbit, which will be launched on an expendable launch vehicle (ELV). The ELV will place CM and the ELV upper stage into a low Earth orbit (LEO) for one revolution. After the first LEO, the ELV upper stage will re-ignite and place the combined upper stage/CM into an elliptical orbit whose perigee results in a high energy entry to test CM response in a relatively high velocity, high heating environment. While not producing entry velocities as high as those experienced in returning from a lunar orbit, the trajectory was chosen to provide higher stresses on the thermal protection and guided entry systems, as compared against a lower energy LEO entry. However the required entry geometry with constraints on inclination and landing site result in a trajectory that lingers for many hours in the Van Allen radiation belts. This exposes the vehicle and avionics to much higher levels of high energy proton radiation than a typical LEO or lunar trajectory would encounter. As a result, Van Allen radiation poses a significant risk to the Orion avionics system, and particularly the Flight Control Module (FCM) computers that house the GN&C flight software. The measures taken by the Orion GN&C, Flight Software and Avionics teams to mitigate the risks associated with the Van Allen radiation on EFT-1 are covered in the paper. Background on the Orion avionics subsystem is provided, as well as an overview of the GN&C software architecture. The measures taken to handle radiation induced failure of the one or both of the FCM's are presented, and finally simulation and actual hardware-in-the-loop (HWIL) results are shown confirming the validity of the implementation. The paper presents an overview of the Orion avionics architecture describing the GNC sensors, onboard data network as well as the flight control computers and their planned restart capabilities. GN&C sensors include two Orion Inertial Measurement Units (OIMU's), a Vision Processing Unit (VPU) to process camera images, three barometric altimeters and a single GPS receiver. All of the sensors communicate to one of two Power and Data Units (PDU's). The PDU's multiplex analog and serial data from the sensors and write the data to the Orion Data Network (ODN). The OIMU s write measurement messages directly as onto the ODN, but they are routed through PDU network switches.

King, Ellis T.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Selected Systems Engineering Process Deficiencies and Their Consequences

The systems engineering process is well established and well understood. While this statement could be argued in the light of the many systems engineering guidelines and that have been developed, comparative review of these respective descriptions reveal that they differ primarily in the number of discrete steps or other nuances, and are at their core essentially common. Likewise, the systems engineering textbooks differ primarily in the context for application of systems engineering or in the utilization of evolved tools and techniques, not in the basic method. Thus, failures in systems engineering cannot credibly be attributed to implementation of the wrong systems engineering process among alternatives. However, numerous systems failures can be attributed to deficient implementation of the systems engineering process. What may clearly be perceived as a system engineering deficiency in retrospect can appear to be a well considered system engineering efficiency in real time - an efficiency taken to reduce cost or meet a schedule, or more often both. Typically these efficiencies are grounded on apparently solid rationale, such as reuse of heritage hardware or software. Over time, unintended consequences of a systems engineering process deficiency may begin to be realized, and unfortunately often the consequence is system failure. This paper describes several actual cases of system failures that resulted from deficiencies in their systems engineering process implementation, including the Ariane 5 and the Hubble Space Telescope.

Thomas, Lawrence Dale↗
NASA NTRS2011

Application of Probabilistic Methods to Assess Risk Due to Resonance in the Design of J-2X Rocket Engine Turbine Blades

The LOX-Hydrogen J-2X Rocket Engine, which is proposed for use as an upper-stage engine for numerous earth-to-orbit and heavy lift launch vehicle architectures, is presently in the design phase and will move shortly to the initial development test phase. Analysis of the design has revealed numerous potential resonance issues with hardware in the turbomachinery turbine-side flow-path. The analysis of the fuel pump turbine blades requires particular care because resonant failure of the blades, which are rotating in excess of 30,000 revolutions/minutes (RPM), could be catastrophic for the engine and the entire launch vehicle. This paper describes a series of probabilistic analyses performed to assess the risk of failure of the turbine blades due to resonant vibration during past and present test series. Some significant results are that the probability of failure during a single complete engine hot-fire test is low (~1%) because of the small likelihood of resonance, but that the probability increases to around 30% for a more focused turbomachinery-only test because all speeds will be ramped through and there is a greater likelihood of dwelling at more speeds. These risk calculations have been invaluable for use by program management in deciding if risk-reduction methods such as dampers are necessary immediately or if the test can be performed before the risk-reduction hardware is ready.

Brown, Andrew M.↗
NASA NTRS1985

Failure analysis and performance evaluation of NASA inertial reference unit (DRIRU 2) after 50 months of orbital operation

The first production DRIRU 2 (NASA standard high performance inertial reference unit) system was launched as a subsystem of the Modular Attitude Control System for the Solar Maximum Mission (SMM) spacecraft in February 1980. This hardware was retrieved during the repair of the SMM during Shuttle Flight 41-C in April 1984 and returned to Teledyne Systems Company (manufacturer) for investigation and performance measurements as directed by Goddard Space Flight Center. A failure of one of the three gyro channels occurred approximately 6.5 months after launch. The built in redundancy functioned properly, the DRIRU 2 continued to provide the required attitude control function without performance degradation. Subsequent failure of other attitude control subsystems made the SMM a candidate for the first demonstration of the shuttle in-orbit repair capabilty. The in-orbit DRIRU 2 II failure scenario and the results of the analyses/tests conducted after retrieval are discussed. Comparison of this data with similar data prior to launch demonstates the excellent stability of performance parameters achieveable with DRIRU 2.

Green, K. N.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Advanced information processing system: The Army fault tolerant architecture conceptual study. Volume 2: Army fault tolerant architecture design and analysis

Described here is the Army Fault Tolerant Architecture (AFTA) hardware architecture and components and the operating system. The architectural and operational theory of the AFTA Fault Tolerant Data Bus is discussed. The test and maintenance strategy developed for use in fielded AFTA installations is presented. An approach to be used in reducing the probability of AFTA failure due to common mode faults is described. Analytical models for AFTA performance, reliability, availability, life cycle cost, weight, power, and volume are developed. An approach is presented for using VHSIC Hardware Description Language (VHDL) to describe and design AFTA's developmental hardware. A plan is described for verifying and validating key AFTA concepts during the Dem/Val phase. Analytical models and partial mission requirements are used to generate AFTA configurations for the TF/TA/NOE and Ground Vehicle missions.

Harper, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS2018

A Risk Analysis Tool for Estimating the Risk of Electrical Failures Due to Human Induced Defects

Aerospace electrical systems are required to withstand and adequately operate in extremely harsh environments that include, for example, high radiation exposure, temperature extremes, intense vibrational stress and drastic temperature cycling. The nature of aerospace electronics also demands high reliability since, with very few exceptions, there is no chance for hardware servicing or repairs. Common risk mitigation techniques for this type of situation are to perform a Reliability Analysis of the system throughout the development cycle, and to use electrical components that are regarded as “high reliability” because of additional controls and requirements applied in their design, manufacturing and testing. Unfortunately, studies have shown that even though these techniques are used, many systems fail to meet mission requirements well before the predicted lifetimes. This paper presents the analysis of failures of electrical parts, experienced during various stages of system development, at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt MD, between the years 2001 and 2013. These components were subjected to qualification, screening and testing in which the goal was to ensure that the components would survive the stresses of the mission. The analysis categorizes failures by part type and failure mechanisms. One of the results of the analysis was the realization that a surprising proportion of failures experienced during system integration and testing were caused by human error (i.e. human induced defect). Further analysis included the determination of root failure mechanisms and any influencing factors contributing to these failures. The major causes of these defects were attributed to electrostatic damage (ESD), electrical overstress (EOS), mechanical overstress (MOS), and thermal overstress (TOS). Finally, the study proposes a risk analysis tool which incorporates these major causes for the failures, termed error-producing conditions (EPCs), and a proportionality factor representing the number of each type of failure that has occurred at the facility under study. These factors are quantified and used to communicate the risk of human induced defects for the assembly, integration and testing of space hardware based on the system’s electrical parts list. The new risk identification can trigger risk-mitigating actions more effectively, based on the presence of component categories or other hazardous conditions that have a history of failure due to human error.

Majewicz, Peter J.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Structural Verification of the Redesigned Space Shuttle Bipod Foam Closeout

This document outlines the structural verification approach for the Space Shuttle External Tank Forward Bipod Foam Closeout. Due to the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, debris has become a major concern. The intent of the structural verification is to ensure that any debris shed from the bipod is within acceptable limits. Since cohesive failure due to internal defects was identified as the most likely cause of the STS-107 bipod ramp foam failure, verification for this failure mode receives particular emphasis. However, all failure modes for TPS are considered and appropriate verification rationale is developed for each failure mode. Figure 1 depicts the structural verification of a production design where analysis and test are the primary methods of verification. It can be seen that the successful completion of structural verification is dependent on three main areas: 1. Production process control and quality assurance must ensure that test articles and/or analytical models are representative of (or conservatively envelope) production hardware in terms of geometry, materials and processing. Variability and defects must be considered. 2. Flight environments must be sufficiently characterized to bound driving environments for all failure modes. Applied environments, either test or analytical, must be representative of flight environments and have a load factor that satisfies design requirements. 3. Structural verification must include all failure modes. A comprehensive list of failure modes and the underlying failure mechanisms has been generated based on flight and test experience. Verification tests and / or analyses must address each failure mode. ET TPS Verification is accomplished by a combination of analysis, test, and similarity.

Poole, Eric L.↗
NASA NTRS1971

A three-failure-tolerant computer system.

Two basic factors influence the design of highly reliable computer systems: the amount of failures required to be tol erated and the reliability or MTBF required. A computer system designed to tolerate any three single failures in a fail-operational-fail-operational-fail-safe manner for a real-time control application is presented. The design approach uses adaptive majority voting in both hardware and software with a four-level redundant system. Various methods of performing the adaptive majority voting functions were evaluated with the selected approach using a special module termed a voter-comparator switch (VCS). The VCS module allows the computer system to be operated in a variety of redundant modes, depending on the failure tolerance required at any particular time.

Koczela, L. J.↗
NASA NTRS1972

Installation effects on performance of multiple model V/STOL lift fans

An experimental program was performed in which the individual performance of multiple VTOL model lift fans was measured. The model tested consisted of three 5.5 in. diameter tip-turbine driven model VTOL lift fans mounted chordwise in a two-dimensional wing to simulate a pod-type array. The performance data provided significant insight into possible thrust variations and losses caused by the presence of cover doors, adjacent fuselage panels, and adjacent fans. The effect of a partial loss of drive air supply (simulated gas generator failure) on fan performance was also investigated. The results of the tests demonstrated that lift fan installation variables and hardware can have a significant effect on the thrust of the individual fans.

Diedrich, J. H.↗