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At least 577 records · Page 32

Software-Defined Networking Traffic Engineering Process for Operational Technology Networks

Network design goals are often functional with little consideration for security. Growth and maintenance of critical infrastructure mission-focused networks can be ad hoc and preclude large-scale technology replacements, reconfigurations, or even patching. These restrictions are contributing factors to increased vulnerabilities. Over 90% of all attacks begin with phishing and include lateral movement (Frinke 2019). Adopting a software-defined networking (SDN) approach is an effective mitigation strategy for many existing vulnerabilities. SDNs deny-by-default approach to networking restricts an adversary’s freedom of movement without impacting an organization’s mission. SDN implementations require a process that identifies an organization’s mission-specific network communications. A well-defined traffic engineering process ensures that only known devices communicate with each other on specific ports.

Software Defined Networking, Situational Awareness↗

Design of Defensive Cybersecurity Architectures for Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors

This report presents the design of defensive cybersecurity architectures (DCSAs) for Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors (SFRs). A DCSA is a cybersecurity design feature that places systems into security zones in a graded approach according to the importance of the functions performed by the systems. DCSA design efforts for advanced reactors may commence as early as the system-level design phase. This design approach is consistent with the draft regulatory guide for advanced reactor cybersecurity programs (DG-5075) and enables advanced reactor designers to consider the effects of security-by design (SeBD) features on their DCSAs. Integration of DCSA design and other cybersecurity activities with the traditional design process as part of a SeBD framework may enable advanced reactor designers to improve the security posture of their plants while reducing implementation and operating costs. This report provides a DCSA template for an exemplar SFR and how the template may be optimized for a given SFR design.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cybersecurity Challenges in Low-Inertia Power-Electronics-Dominated Grids

Here, the low inertia characteristics of the power electronics dominated grid (PEDG) introduces challenges while restoring voltage and frequency to their nominal values. These stability challenges create new cybersecurity vulnerabilities that are not thoroughly discussed in the literature. Cyber events such as false data injection (FDI), denial of service (DoS), man-in-the-middle attacks, stealthy attacks, and advanced persistent threats target PEDG to disrupt grid stability or gain financial benefits. The low inertia of PEDG (< 2s) compared to traditional grids (~10s) exacerbates these vulnerabilities. In response to stealthy attacks on state variables that supervisory layers cannot detect until significant harm occurs, the low inertia characteristics of PEDG offer substantial stealthy attack surfaces. To counteract such threats, PEDG must be equipped with ultra-fast real-time anomaly detection system and trajectory prediction mechanism to achieve effective cyberattack resiliency.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Emerging Threats and Technology Investigation: Industrial Internet of Things - Risk and Mitigation for Nuclear Infrastructure

Industries supporting the global nuclear infrastructure striving for cost savings, expansions in efficiency, and convenience are likely to adopt components (e.g., hardware, software) that comprise the Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). These devices offer potential improvements along with security challenges. Modern conveniences achieved through application of technology have propagated through society in the form of interconnected devices, from doorbells to microwave ovens, commonly referred to as IoT. IoT devices are often Internet-connected devices that are designed to send data back to a cloud-based server, where a smart phone application then presents device status and control options. Home-based IoT applications carry a different set of risks when compared to a business or security environment, where there is also a history of convenience and interconnection. Industrial settings have long relied on specifically designed Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for process control where IIoT devices are intended to inform business decisions and augment traditional processes. A recent National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) report provides a distinction between process control and IIoT in that traditional process control is not replaced by IIoT, but rather IIoT devices are intended to enhance industrial processes through additional monitoring of various sensors and application of data analytics models using artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) (Fagan, Marron, et al. 2021) (Ross, et al. 2021).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies for Nuclear Power Plants

As any mechanical system ages, broken or outdated parts must be replaced; nuclear power plants (NPPs) are no different. The average age of a NPP in the United States' aging fleet of commercial reactors is 35 years, with many of these plants operating under extensions of their original licenses. These plants, originally designed in the 1960's and 1970's, are controlled by analog instrumentation and control (I and C) systems, and have since been upgraded (to varying degrees) to hybrid analog-digital systems. As these NPPs are upgraded to continue operating and to meet more stringent safety requirements imposed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the implementation of digital systems to monitor and run the power plant introduces new vulnerabilities that must be addressed. The main objectives of a vulnerability assessment (VA) are to identify, quantify, and prioritize all of the susceptibilities inherent in a system. This allows for all weaknesses to be analyzed, and for the most serious concerns to be addressed first. Traditional VA methodologies deal with the analysis of physical systems associated with the NPP; with the introduction of digital control systems and computer networks, these methodologies must be expanded to include these fundamentally different systems and vulnerability concerns. Digital systems have been used in NPPs since the 1980's, but only for non-safety control systems; attacks on these systems were not deemed consequential, and no dedicated VA methodology was required. However, 'all new NPPs are being designed with integrated digital instrumentation and control systems as the backbone of protection, controls, alarms, and display and monitoring'. This gives rise to new vulnerabilities such as disrupted data displays, the suppression of critical alarms, or unauthorized access to secure systems from connected networks. The NRC released formal cybersecurity regulations in March 2009 (10 CFR 73.54), as well as a guide for the program in January 2010 (RG 5.71). However, the regulations and guide provide limited insight on how to identify these vulnerabilities; the focus is on remediating them once found. Hence, there is a need for a comprehensive, systematic methodology to conduct a VA on digital computer and communications and network systems. In this paper, we review traditional VA methodologies and discuss relevant cases. Then we discuss challenges to vulnerabilities within the context of modernization of the fleet and what needs to be done to address this issue.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Defensive Cybersecurity Architecture Design Using Force-on-Force Cyber-Physical Modeling

Currently, nuclear power plant physical security systems are highly dependent on air-gaps as a protective measure against cyber-threats. Cyber-physical threats become more likely as advanced cyber-threat capabilities to jump air-gaps transition into common use. Defending against the emerging threat of cyber-enabled physical intrusions is poorly understood. The consequence of these cyber-physical attacks has no quantitative analysis method to inform risk-informed, performance-based cybersecurity approaches. By modifying the physical security simulation tool Dante, cyber-physical threat consequence was able to be analyzed on a notional facility. The results of this analysis are used to design a Defensive Cybersecurity Architecture (DCSA) for the physical security system to produce example resilience measures for this notional facility. A DCSA defines security levels to provide a graded approach for defending plant functions, and security zones for trusted communication between systems. This approach can be applied to real world systems to produce physical protection systems and response measures that are resilient to cyber-physical threats.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Enhancing Automotive Intrusion Detection Through Multi-Modal Fusion: A CAN FD-LiDAR Approach

As vehicles become smarter and more autonomous, they increasingly depend on advanced sensors and communication technologies to operate securely. However, such growing dependence on technology—whether it’s CAN (Controller Area Network) for internal communication or LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) for sensing the world around them—also expands the attack surface for the types of cyber attacks. Traditional intrusion detection systems (IDS) typically monitor these systems in isolation, limiting their ability to detect sophisticated, crosssystem attacks. To address this, we propose a multi-modal fusion approach that combines real-world CAN FD signals (from the HCRL dataset) with LiDAR features (from the nuScenes dataset) to enhance attack detection. Our method employs a twostage ensemble approach. Calibrated XGBoost and LightGBM models initially process CAN FD (Fuzzing Data) and LiDAR data independently, detecting timing anomalies and space abnormalities. They are subsequently logarithmically combined with a logistic regression meta-model along with 17 engineered features capturing cross-modal behavior, prediction conflicts, and nonlinear interactions. This approach achieves an AUC of 0.87 and an F1-score of 0.82, surpassing single-modality baselines and early fusion methods, at merely 2 ms inference latency. Compared with deep learning competitors, it is 3 times more efficient, providing a lightweight, interpretable, and real time solution to automotive cybersecurity.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Bayesian GAN-Based False Data Injection Attack Detection in Active Distribution Grids With DERs

Advancements in information and communication technologies have revolutionized monitoring and control capabilities within smart grids. However, it also brings new vulnerabilities to data acquisition systems and state estimation functions, which attackers can subtly tamper with the measurement data through compromising the communication network. Moreover, the high penetration of renewable energy sources with the inherited characteristics of uncertainty and variability further complicates the design of effective intrusion detection systems. In this paper, a Bayesian deep learning-based approach is developed to detect cyber attacks and maintain the security of smart grids. Our method specifically addresses the prevalent issue of imbalanced data in real power systems, which arises from the predominance of normal system operations over compromised or attacked states. Employing a novel Bayesian GAN-based technique, our approach successfully discriminates between secure and compromised measurement data, even in scenarios with significant data imbalance. Furthermore, the proposed method accommodates various practical application factors, ensuring accurate intrusion detection despite the presence of measurement noise. The feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed detection mechanism are validated by testing on IEEE 13-node and 123-node test systems. Simulation results and comparisons with literature methods demonstrate the superiority of proposed cybersecurity solutions.

Bayesian GAN↗

Standardization and Recommendations for EVSE Cybersecurity Standards

Currently, there is an absence of cybersecurity certification programs specifically for EVSE. Many existing standards focus primarily on safety, such as battery safety, while others provide cybersecu rity guidelines for different types of equipment, which could be adapted for EVSE. Among these, ISA/IEC 62443 has been identified as highly aligned with EVSE security needs. This report is a follow on to the previous research published (“Assessment and Coordination of EVSE Cybersecurity Standards,”). This report aims to find appropriate strategies for closing the gaps found in the aforementioned report and continue to work towards a comprehensive cybersecurity certification program for EVSE. Future testing will leverage this standard to assess EVSE security gaps and strengths, providing valuable insights to support certification development and harmonization of cybersecurity standards.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Charting the unknown: A dive into the world of standards mapping

When you hear standards mapping what do you think about? For the Secure Software Central (SSC) project this means comparing our process to the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) security control catalog. So how is it done? The project completed this summer can be broken down into three simple phases. Phase one consists of mapping the SSC process to the NIST’s security control catalog. While phase two entails mapping mitigations from a threat profile to NIST. Lastly phase three requires the creation of a knowledge base allowing for the reuse of controls across numerous projects This project presented a few different challenges: locating the correct control within the NIST catalog while correctly matching the proposed mitigations from the SSC team, accurately leveling the mitigation to the security level of the system, creating a toolbox to showcase a dataset of mitigations and standards to be used in current and future projects. each challenge allowed for opportunities in growth and understanding of how security controls can map to a governing set of standards. These standards maps are a crucial element to support the insights provided by the SSC team and allow the client to have confidence in the work being completed. My internship has allowed me to set and achieve many goals such as coming to understand that the field of cybersecurity truly is the right place for me. I have also learned that it’s ok to be wrong if you learn something from it. For significant accomplishments I have helped integrate standards mapping into the fabric of SSC. The field experience that I have gained such as interacting with the SSC team along with other senior staff and building a good rapport are crucial skills to. This time at PNNL has been an irreplaceable experience.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Cyber Resiliency and the Implementation of a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System in an Urban Air Mobility Environment

With the growth in Urban Air Mobility systems and the increasing reliance on interconnected technologies, ensuring the security of these complex components has become critical. As cities evolve into smart urban centers, the vulnerability to cyber threats escalates, possibly endangering citizens safety and the efficiency of transportation networks.In response to these challenges, this paper presents a study on the need for cyber resilient techniques within future air traffic environments. It will pay specific attention to the implementation of a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) utilizing Atomic OSSEC software, tailored specifically to a NASA simulation of an UrbanAirMobility environments’ unique demands. Further, this study seeks to outline the rational for NASA’s recommendation for a HIDS in such environments. It explores the design, development, and deployment of the proposed HIDS, focusing on its adaptability to monitor the hybrid nature of the Urban Air Mobility environment. Leveraging machine learning algorithms and anomaly detection techniques, the HIDS is equipped to continuously monitor and analyze the behavior of individual host systems, vehicles, and devices, thereby providing a proactive approach to threat detection. Implementing a HIDS is a pivotal strategy for enhancing cyber resiliency, as it gives an organization granular visibility into internal system activities, enables rapid detection and response to anomalous behavior and cyber threats, and fortifies the organizations overall cybersecurity posture. Finally, this study aims to provide recommendations and include learned takeaways that the Urban Air Mobility industry should consider. In brief, this paper highlights the significance of host-based intrusion detection in UrbanAirMobility environments and underscores the necessity of tailored security solutions to safeguard against emerging cyber threats.

UAM↗

Cryptographic Key Management and Critical Risk Assessment

The Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE-OE) CyberSecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (CSEDS) industry led program (DE-FOA-0000359) entitled "Innovation for Increasing CyberSecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (12CSEDS)," awarded a contract to Sypris Electronics LLC to develop a Cryptographic Key Management System for the smart grid (Scalable Key Management Solutions for Critical Infrastructure Protection). Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Sypris Electronics, LLC as a result of that award entered into a CRADA (NFE-11-03562) between ORNL and Sypris Electronics, LLC. ORNL provided its Cyber Security Econometrics System (CSES) as a tool to be modified and used as a metric to address risks and vulnerabilities in the management of cryptographic keys within the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) domain of the electric sector. ORNL concentrated our analysis on the AMI domain of which the National Electric Sector Cyber security Organization Resource (NESCOR) Working Group 1 (WG1) has documented 29 failure scenarios. The computational infrastructure of this metric involves system stakeholders, security requirements, system components and security threats. To compute this metric, we estimated the stakes that each stakeholder associates with each security requirement, as well as stochastic matrices that represent the probability of a threat to cause a component failure and the probability of a component failure to cause a security requirement violation. We applied this model to estimate the security of the AMI, by leveraging the recently established National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency Report (NISTIR) 7628 guidelines for smart grid security and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 63351, Part 9 to identify the life cycle for cryptographic key management, resulting in a vector that assigned to each stakeholder an estimate of their average loss in terms of dollars per day of system operation. To further address probabilities of threats, information security analysis can be performed using game theory implemented in dynamic Agent Based Game Theoretic (ABGT) simulations. Such simulations can be verified with the results from game theory analysis and further used to explore larger scale, real world scenarios involving multiple attackers, defenders, and information assets. The strategy for the game was developed by analyzing five electric sector representative failure scenarios contained in the AMI functional domain from NESCOR WG1. From these five selected scenarios, we characterized them into three specific threat categories affecting confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA). The analysis using our ABGT simulation demonstrated how to model the AMI functional domain using a set of rationalized game theoretic rules decomposed from the failure scenarios in terms of how those scenarios might impact the AMI network with respect to CIA.

Advanced Metering Infrastructure↗

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Infrastructure Security Division (ISD) Assessment Prioritization Project

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s Infrastructure Security Division (CISA ISD) manages a diverse portfolio of assessments across the nation’s critical infrastructure sectors. These assessments—ranging in type, scope, and complexity—are essential for identifying vulnerabilities and strengthening national security. However, the wide variation in assessment offerings and the increasing demand for limited resources have highlighted the need for a transparent, structured approach to prioritizing assessment activities. To address this challenge, CISA ISD partnered with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to review current assessment methodologies, analyze existing prioritization practices, and develop a comprehensive, national-security-focused prioritization framework. This report summarizes the project’s approach, key findings, and actionable recommendations for enhancing ISD’s assessment program.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

A Risk Assessment Framework for Cyber-Physical Security in Distribution Grids with Grid-Edge DERs

Integration of inverter-based distributed energy resources (DERs) is reshaping the landscape of distribution grids to fulfill the socioeconomic, environmental, and sustainability goals. Addressing the technological challenges of DER grid integration requires an adaptive communication layer for efficient DER management and control. This transition has given rise to a cyberphysical system (CPS) architecture within the distribution system, causing new vulnerabilities for cyberphysical attacks. To better address potential threats, this paper presents a comprehensive risk assessment framework for cyberphysical security in distribution grids with grid-edge DERs. The framework incorporates a detailed CPS model accounting for dynamic DER characteristics within the distribution grid. It identifies vulnerabilities in DER communication systems, models attack scenarios, and addresses communication latency crucial for inverter control timescales. Subsequently, the quantification of attack impacts employs an attack probability model including both the vulnerability and criticality of cyber components. The proposed risk assessment framework was validated through testing on the modified IEEE 13-node and 123-node test feeders.

cyberattack↗

What Role Do Aggregators Play in Power System Security and Resilience? Preprint

Barriers to the participation of distributed energy resources (DERs) in wholesale electricity markets have limited the use of DERs for power system security and resilience. In September 2020, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved an order to reduce these barriers. FERC Order No. 2222 enables the participation of DER aggregators in wholesale electricity markets. DERs include renewable generation and technologies that support the integration of renewable generation by increasing grid flexibility and resilience. Requiring wholesale energy markets to allow DER aggregator participation provides a path for DERs to become competitive in these markets. As the contribution from aggregated DERs continues to increase, the aggregator's role in supporting grid security and resilience will become more critical. This paper reviews work that demonstrates how DER aggregators can provide resilience support through technical capabilities, operational strategies, and secure communication architectures. Socioeconomic influences and impacts of aggregators, including implications for social resilience, are presented. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to enhancing resilience in a power grid that includes a growing cohort of DER aggregators, but there are many options for aggregators to contribute to a more resilient and secure power grid.

aggregator↗

Recommendations for Distributed Energy Resource Access Control

Cybersecurity for internet - connected Distributed Energy Resources (DER) is essential for the safe and reliable operation of the US power system. Many facets of DER cybersecurity are currently being investigated within different standards development organizations, research communities, and industry committees to address this critical need. This report covers DER access control guidance compiled by the Access Controls Subgroup of the SunSpec/Sandia DER Cybersecurity Workgroup. The goal of the group was to create a consensus - based technical framework to minimize the risk of unauthorized access to DER systems. The subgroup set out to define a strict control environment where users are authorized to access DER monitoring and control features through three steps: (a) user is identified using a proof-of-identity, (b) the user is authenticated by a managed database, (c) and the user is authorized for a specific level of access. DER access control also provides accountability and nonrepudiation within the power system control environment that can be used for forensic analysis and attribution in the event of a cyber-attack. This paper covers foundational requirements for a DER access control environment as well as offering a collection of possible policy, model, and mechanism implementation approaches for IEEE 1547-mandated communication protocols.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Testbed-based Evaluation of SIEM Tool for Cyber Kill Chain Model in Power Grid SCADA System

Development of a smarter electric grid necessitates addressing the associated cyber security challenges. Since the interdependence between the legacy grid infrastructure and advanced information technology is growing rapidly, there are numerous ways advanced, motivated, and persistent attackers can affect the SCADA based critical infrastructure. Hence, developing a security information and event management (SIEM) is crucial for securing the SCADA power system. This paper presents the application of Security Onion (SecOn) to develop the network security monitoring (NSM) and intrusion detection system (IDS) in the context of SCADA cyber physical security. Initially, we have applied a cyber kill-chain model to demonstrate the different stages of attacks and associated mechanisms. Later, the rule- based IDS (RIDS) is developed using Snort IDS, and tested in the cyber-physical SCADA environment. Furthermore, we have evaluated its performance in terms of accuracy and detection latency. Our experimental results reveal that the SecOn tool is efficient in monitoring and detecting attacks within an acceptable time frame with a high accuracy rate.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Trade-off Analysis of Operational Technologies to Advance Cyber Resilience through Automated and Autonomous Response to Threats

The advancement of cyber resilience requires a preliminary stage of characterizing the trade-off space of mitigation options and how these might affect the stability and determinism of an operational technology (OT). This first step will set the stage for the proper cyber-secure and cyber-resilient design and confirm the affects that can be considered and approved by the OT and the security groups. To provide a baseline for this discussion, this paper provides a consideration of the cyberphysical interactions, possible mitigation steps against certain attacks and their corresponding affects that lend to the security design planning and evaluation process. As an integral part of the proposed scheme this work introduces the concept of systemwide fuzzer, i.e., a tool that manipulates the system state in an effort to determine mitigation response sequences that minimize detriments and maximize benefit in accordance with specified operational requirements.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗