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At least 577 records · Page 32

Hanford Single-Shell Tank Leak Causes and Locations - 241-U Farm

This document identifies 241-U Tank Farm (U Farm) leak causes and locations for the 100 series leaking tanks (241-U-104, 241-U-110, and 241-U-112) identified in RPP-RPT-50097, Rev. 0, Hanford 241-U Farm Leak Inventory Assessment Report. This document satisfies the U-Farm portion of the target (T04) in the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order milestone M-045-91F.

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Hanford Single-Shell Tank Leak Causes and Locations - 241-T Farm

This document identifies 241-T Tank Farm (T Farm) leak causes and locations for the 100 series leaking tanks (241-T-106 and 241-T-111) identified in RPP-RPT-55084, Rev. 0, Hanford 241-T Farm Leak Inventory Assessment Report. This document satisfies the T Farm portion of the target (T04) in the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order milestone M-045-91F.

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Hanford Single-Shell Tank Leak Causes and Locations - 241-B Farm

This document identifies 241-B Tank Farm (B Farm) leak cause and locations for the 100 series leaking tank (241-B-107) identified in RPP-RPT-49089, Hanford B-Farm Leak Inventory Assessments Report. This document satisfies the B Farm portion of the target (T04) in the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order milestone M-045-91F.

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Hanford Single-Shell Tank Leak Causes and Locations - 241-A Farm

This document identifies 241-A Tank Farm (A Farm) leak causes and locations for the 100 series leaking tanks (241-A-104 and 241-A-105) identified in RPP-ENV-37956, Hanford A and AX Farm Leak Assessment Report. This document satisfies the A Farm portion of the target (T04) in the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order milestone M-045-91F.

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Hanford Single-Shell Tank Leak Causes and Locations - 241-C Farm

This document identifies 241-C Tank Farm (C Farm) leak causes and locations for the 100 series leaking tanks (241-C-101 and 241-C-105) identified in RPP-RPT-33418, Rev. 2, Hanford C-Farm Leak Inventory Assessments Report. This document satisfies the C Farm portion of the target (T04) in the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order milestone M-045-91F.

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Hanford Single-Shell Tank Leak Causes and Locations - 241-SX Farm

This document identifies 241-SX Tank Farm (SX Farm) leak causes and locations for the 100 series leaking tanks (241-SX-107, 241-SX-108, 241-SX-109, 241-SX-111, 241-SX-112, 241-SX-113, 241-SX-114, and 241-SX-115) identified in RPP-ENV-39658, Rev. 0, Hanford SX-Farm Leak Assessments Report. This document satisfies the SX Farm portion of the target (T04) in the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order milestone M-045-91F.

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Hanford Single Shell Tank Leak Causes and Locations - 241-TX Farm

This document identifies 241-TX Tank Farm (TX Farm) leak causes and locations for the 100 series leaking tanks (241-TX-107 and 241-TX-114) identified in RPP-RPT-50870, Rev. 0, Hanford 241-TX Farm Leak Inventory Assessment Report. This document satisfies the TX Farm portion of the target (T04) in the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order milestone M-045-91F.

Girardot, C. L.↗

Accelerating Hanford Site Cleanup through Operations Research Modeling - 20238

The Hanford Site cleanup effort will require the integration of dozens of unique facilities and processes, many of which will be first-of-a-kind in implementation and design. Each facility will be governed by its own set of operating logic, configured with a unique array of unit operations, and subject to a set of constraints that will affect its behavior. The collection of facilities have multiple points of interface, making the operations of any one facility potentially significant to the operations of other up- or downstream processes. It is therefore highly desirable to accurately predict these operations, as it allows for Site officials to identify and preempt bottlenecks and vulnerabilities before they unexpectedly inhibit the cleanup mission. With the quantity and complexity of the processes that will be on Site, building a pen-and-paper or even a spreadsheet-assisted model of the cleanup mission quickly becomes overwhelming in scope and inaccurate in execution. The Engineering organization for the Site's Tank Operations Contract (TOC) has therefore implemented the use of operations research (OR) modeling to simulate and predict future operations of Site facilities. These models are created using a discrete event simulation tool that allows for the development of detailed, versatile, and robust models. Not only can these models account for complex logical behaviors, but they can also simulate process details down to the level of vessel sizing, labor utilization, equipment reliability, and resource availability. To date, the TOC has developed OR models for several facilities on Site, including for single-shell tank (SST) farms, double-shell tank (DST) farms, the Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF), and the waste transfer system. These models have focused on identifying bottlenecks and operational constraints, and have been used to quantify the effects of implementing process changes. This latter point is particularly valuable, as it allows for several alternatives to be studied in a virtual setting before committing resources to making a change in the field. The decision to develop OR models has gained tremendous support from the Site's stakeholders and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) management, and has prompted the use of the tool to support additional internal and external initiatives. Recently, an initiative was proposed to use the models to help identify and provide quantitative backing for risks and opportunities for the TOC. This application of OR could not only help inform how the TOC manages its risks (e.g. quantities and types of spare parts), but could also help drive process improvements whose benefits might otherwise be hard to quantify. The models have also been used to drive the TOC's cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), and machine learning (ML) initiatives. These initiatives will not only improve the ability of the TOC to more rapidly respond to the needs of its customers, but it will also aid in the ability of the TOC to analyze and improve the processes it studies. Partnership with two external software development and consulting companies (Lanner and Ynformed) has furthered not only the application of AI and ML within the TOC, but has also spurred the development of new/improved software tools and platforms used by the companies. These partnerships have proven to be mutually beneficial and productive, and have set a precedent for the types of gains that can be made by exploring such options. (authors)

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Savannah River Site Composite Analysis (FY2019 Annual Review)

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a Department of Energy (DOE) site encompassing approximately 310 square miles in South Carolina. It is bounded on the southwest by the Savannah River (SR) and is situated approximately 12 miles south of Aiken, South Carolina, and 15 miles southeast of Augusta, Georgia. Construction of and subsequent operations at the SRS began in 1951 under the direction of the Atomic Energy Commission. The primary mission of the SRS was to produce tritium and plutonium for the national nuclear weapons complex. Between 1953 and 1955, SRS brought five reactors and various support facilities into operation in support of its primary mission. Support facilities included two chemical separations plants, a heavy water extraction plant, a nuclear fuel and target fabrication facility, a tritium extraction facility and waste management facilities. With the declining need for a large nuclear weapons stockpile since the end of the Cold War, many SRS facilities no longer produce or process nuclear materials. All reactors were shut down by 1993. However, the SRS Tritium Extraction Facility continues to supply DOE with tritium. Additionally, operations at the K-Area Complex currently provide interim safe storage for much of DOE’s excess plutonium (Pu) and high enriched uranium, in a building which formerly housed K Reactor. As the SRS mission has changed, many surplus facilities are being dispositioned safely and economically. SRS has completed extensive decommissioning activities in D-Area, M-Area, P-Area, R-Area, and T-Area, with groundwater (GW) remediation ongoing. High-level waste tanks continue to be emptied and closed.

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SRS Composite Analysis Monitoring Plan (FY2019 Model Validation)

Using a projected end-state date of 2065 (SRNS 2015b), the Savannah River Site (SRS) Composite Analysis (CA) modeling for each facility and waste site began on the inventory year assigned to it so that source depletion and radionuclide transport out of the system could be appropriately captured. Some SRS waste sites that have already achieved their end states (i.e. end-state inventories and end-state configuration) are currently contributing to the potential off-site public dose through source release, groundwater transport, discharge to on-site surface streams, and stream transport to the CA point of assessments (POAs). The inventory year assigned to these waste sites is 2002 or before. This means that SRS CA results from 2002 and beyond are a reasonable representation for these waste sites that have already achieved their end states and are currently contributing to the potential off-site public dose. The SRS Annual Environmental Report (AER) monitoring can differentiate and separate liquid pathway data allowing the data representing only waste sites at their end state to be produced. Because the SRS CA has projected reasonable end-state impacts from 2002 and beyond, and the AER monitoring can differentiate and separate operating and end-state contributions to annual liquid pathway release, an opportunity exists to use the AER monitoring data to validate the SRS CA model. The CA model validation program uses a graded and systematic approach for taking corrective action, starting with an SRS established administrative dose limit of 15 mrem/yr, below which no action is required. Based on the location of the 2010 SRS CA POAs, the only potential exposure pathway for the public is through surface water. The completion of the FY2019 CA model validation indicates that the SRS CA projected dose, while generally conservative, provides a reasonable representation of the maximum annual doses. These doses are well below the administrative limit; therefore, no additional action is required.

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West Valley Demonstration Project Annual Site Environmental Report Calendar Year 2010

The West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2010. The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2010. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE's effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2010 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

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West Valley Demonstration Project Annual Site Environmental Report Calendar Year 2011

The West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2011. The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2011. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2011 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

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West Valley Demonstration Project Annual Site Environmental Report Calendar Year 2009

The West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2009. The report, prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2009. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program by the DOE ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental regulations and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2009 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

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Investigation of Tank 241-AN-101 Floating Solids

Tank 241-AN-101 is the receiver tank for retrieval of several C-Farms waste tanks, including Tanks 241-C-102 and 241-C-111. Tank 241 C 111 received first-cycle decontamination waste from the bismuth phosphate process and Plutonium and Uranium Extraction cladding waste, as well as hydraulic fluid. Three grab samples, 1AN-16-01, 1AN-16-01A, and 1AN-16-01B, were collected at the surface of Tank 241-AN-101 on April 25, 2016, after Tank 241-C-111 retrieval was completed. Floating solids were observed in the three grab samples in the 11A hot cell after the samples were received at the 222-S Laboratory. Routine chemical analyses, solid phase characterization on the floating and settled solids, semivolatile organic analysis mainly on the aqueous phase for identification of degradation products of hydraulic fluids were performed. Investigation of the floating solids is reported.

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241-AY-101 Tank Construction Extent of Condition Review for Tank Integrity

This report provides the results of an extent of condition construction history review for tank 241-AY-101. The construction history of tank 241-AY-101 has been reviewed to identify issues similar to those experienced during tank AY-102 construction. Those issues and others impacting integrity are discussed based on information found in available construction records, using tank AY-102 as the comparison benchmark. In tank 241-AY-101, the second double-shell tank constructed, similar issues as those with tank 241-AY-102 construction reoccurred. The overall extent of similarly and affect on tank 241-AY-101 integrity is described herein.

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Double-Shell Tank Construction: Extent of Condition

This presentation covers: quick recap of Hanford DSTs and the contribution of construction difficulties which led to the leak in tank AY-102; approach to Extent of Condition reviews; typical DST construction sequence; presentation of construction information resulting from extent of condition reviews of other DST farms with comparison to tank AY-102; and overall conclusion and impact of issues on the other DST tank farms.

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Characterization of Uranium-Contaminated Sediments From Beneath A Nuclear Waste Storage Tank From Hanford, Washington: Implications for Contaminant Transport and Fate

The concentration and distribution of uranium (U) in sediment samples from three boreholes recovered near radioactive waste storage tanks at Hanford, Washington State, USA, were determined in detail using bulk and micro-analytical techniques. The source of contamination was a plume that contained an estimated 7000 kg of dissolved U that seeped into the subsurface as a result of an accident that occurred during filling of tank BX-102. The desorption character and kinetics of U were also determined by experiment in order to assess the mobility of U in the vadose zone. Most samples contained too little moisture to obtain quantitative information on pore water compositions. Concentrations of U (and contaminant phosphate—P) in pore waters were therefore estimated by performing 1:1 sediment-to-water extractions and the data indicated concentrations of these elements were above that of uncontaminated “background” sediments. Further extraction of U by 8 N nitric acid indicated that a significant fraction of the total U is relatively immobile and may be sequestered in mobilization-resistant phases. Fine- and coarse-grained samples in sharp contact with one another were sub-sampled for further scrutiny and identification of U reservoirs. Segregation of the samples into their constituent size fractions coupled with microwave-assisted digestion of bulk samples showed that most of the U contamination was sequestered within the fine-grained fraction. Isotope exchange ( 233 U) tests revealed that ~51 to 63% of the U is labile, indicating that the remaining fund of U is locked up in mobilization-resistant phases. Analysis by micro-X-Ray Fluorescence and micro-X-Ray Absorption Near-Edge Spectroscopy (μ-XRF and μ-XANES) showed that U is primarily associated with Ca and is predominately U(VI). The spectra obtained on U-enriched “hot spots” using Time-Resolved Laser-Induced Fluorescence Spectroscopy (TRLIFS) provide strong evidence for uranophane-type [Ca(UO 2 ) 2 (SiO 3 OH) 2 (H 2 O) 5 ] and uranyl phosphate [Ca(UO 2 ) 2 (PO 4 ) 2 (H 2 O) 10-12 ] phases. These data show that disseminated micro-precipitates can form in narrow pore spaces within the finer-grained matrix and that these objects are likely not restricted to lithic fragment environments. Uranium mobility may therefore be curtailed by precipitation of uranyl silicate and phosphate phases, with additional possible influence exerted by capillary barriers. Consequently, equilibrium-based desorption models that predict the concentrations and mobility of U in the subsurface matrix at Hanford are unnecessarily conservative.

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Career Development through Discreet Simulation Modeling - 19009

The cleanup mission of the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of River Protection (ORP) at the Hanford Site is to immobilize 212,000 m3 (56 million gallons) of nuclear waste, currently stored in 177 underground tanks, at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) and associated supplemental treatment facilities. Waste transfers to and from the WTP utilize the intricate Hanford Waste Feed Delivery (WFD) system, a network composed of: double-shell tanks (DSTs), single shell tanks (SSTs), the effluent treatment facility (ETF), a large number of pumps, valves, and leak detectors, and thousands of feet of underground transfer lines. This equipment must be prepared to safely and reliably transfer waste to the WTP. This study used discrete event simulation modeling to explore the behavior of the waste transfer system to identify areas of improvement. Two models and their subsequent results are presented: the Effluent Treatment Facility and the next-to-be-retrieved single-shell tanks (A/AX Farms). This study focused on identifying throughput bottlenecks, operational constraints, choke-point analysis, and redundancy in equipment, process design, and operational strategy. Analysis performed on the ETF OR Model indicated that the existing facility operation strategy will not result in a sufficient throughput to prevent WTP melter idling. Furthermore, in the absence of equipment failures, the facility was still shown to be unable to reach the required throughput to prevent melter idling. It is concluded that ETF system maintenance events are currently the main bottlenecks in the ETF facility. Analysis performed on the SST (A/AX) OR model indicate that the main drivers of the retrieval schedule are the hard retrieval start dates for each SST tank. In addition, it was concluded that operating the ventilation trains in parallel results in 15 times less retrieval interruptions and shortens the retrieval durations. (authors)

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