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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2011

Dielectric Covered Planar Antennas at Submillimeter Wavelengths for Terahertz Imaging

Most optical systems require antennas with directive patterns. This means that the physical area of the antenna will be large in terms of the wavelength. When non-cooled systems are used, the losses of microstrip or coplanar waveguide lines impede the use of standard patch or slot antennas for a large number of elements in a phased array format. Traditionally, this problem has been solved by using silicon lenses. However, if an array of such highly directive antennas is to be used for imaging applications, the fabrication of many closely spaced lenses becomes a problem. Moreover, planar antennas are usually fed by microstrip or coplanar waveguides while the mixer or the detector elements (usually Schottky diodes) are coupled in a waveguide environment. The coupling between the antenna and the detector/ mixer can be a fabrication challenge in an imaging array at submillimeter wavelengths. Antennas excited by a waveguide (TE10) mode makes use of dielectric superlayers to increase the directivity. These antennas create a kind of Fabry- Perot cavity between the ground plane and the first layer of dielectric. In reality, the antenna operates as a leaky wave mode where a leaky wave pole propagates along the cavity while it radiates. Thanks to this pole, the directivity of a small antenna is considerably enhanced. The antenna consists of a waveguide feed, which can be coupled to a mixer or detector such as a Schottky diode via a standard probe design. The waveguide is loaded with a double-slot iris to perform an impedance match and to suppress undesired modes that can propagate on the cavity. On top of the slot there is an air cavity and on top, a small portion of a hemispherical lens. The fractional bandwidth of such antennas is around 10 percent, which is good enough for heterodyne imaging applications.The new geometry makes use of a silicon lens instead of dielectric quarter wavelength substrates. This design presents several advantages when used in the submillimeter-wave and terahertz bands: a) Antenna fabrication compatible with lithographic techniques. b) Much simpler fabrication of the lens. c) A simple quarter-wavelength matching layer of the lens will be more efficient if a smaller portion of the lens is used. d) The directivity is given by the lens diameter instead of the leaky pole (the bandwidth will not depend anymore on the directivity but just on the initial cavity). The feed is a standard waveguide, which is compatible with proven Schottky diode mixer/detector technologies. The development of such technology will benefit applications where submillimeter- wave heterodyne array designs are required. The main fields are national security, planetary exploration, and biomedicine. For national security, wideband submillimeter radars could be an effective tool for the standoff detection of hidden weapons or bombs concealed by clothing or packaging. In the field of planetary exploration, wideband submillimeter radars can be used as a spectrometer to detect trace concentrations of chemicals in atmospheres that are too cold to rely on thermal imaging techniques. In biomedicine, an imaging heterodyne system could be helpful in detecting skin diseases.

Chattopadhyay, Goutam↗
NASA NTRS2015

A Framework for the Cross-Sectoral Integration of Multi-Model Impact Projections: Land Use Decisions Under Climate Impacts Uncertainties

Climate change and its impacts already pose considerable challenges for societies that will further increase with global warming (IPCC, 2014a, b). Uncertainties of the climatic response to greenhouse gas emissions include the potential passing of large-scale tipping points (e.g. Lenton et al., 2008; Levermann et al., 2012; Schellnhuber, 2010) and changes in extreme meteorological events (Field et al., 2012) with complex impacts on societies (Hallegatte et al., 2013). Thus climate change mitigation is considered a necessary societal response for avoiding uncontrollable impacts (Conference of the Parties, 2010). On the other hand, large-scale climate change mitigation itself implies fundamental changes in, for example, the global energy system. The associated challenges come on top of others that derive from equally important ethical imperatives like the fulfilment of increasing food demand that may draw on the same resources. For example, ensuring food security for a growing population may require an expansion of cropland, thereby reducing natural carbon sinks or the area available for bio-energy production. So far, available studies addressing this problem have relied on individual impact models, ignoring uncertainty in crop model and biome model projections. Here, we propose a probabilistic decision framework that allows for an evaluation of agricultural management and mitigation options in a multi-impactmodel setting. Based on simulations generated within the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project (ISI-MIP), we outline how cross-sectorally consistent multi-model impact simulations could be used to generate the information required for robust decision making. Using an illustrative future land use pattern, we discuss the trade-off between potential gains in crop production and associated losses in natural carbon sinks in the new multiple crop- and biome-model setting. In addition, crop and water model simulations are combined to explore irrigation increases as one possible measure of agricultural intensification that could limit the expansion of cropland required in response to climate change and growing food demand. This example shows that current impact model uncertainties pose an important challenge to long-term mitigation planning and must not be ignored in long-term strategic decision making

farmlands↗
DOE OSTI2018

Integrated Decision Methodology for Final Disposal of Radioactive Sources

Radioactive sources are used throughout the world, and their beneficial uses are many. Sources are at the core of many applications in different branches of industry, medicine, agriculture and research. Sources are present in a very wide range of equipment that is used for, inter alia, cancer treatment, killing bacteria in food, sterilizing medical supplies, measuring instruments such as gauges used to measure soil moisture and soil density and many other components, irradiating seeds for enhancing food production, protecting buildings from lightning strikes, mapping underground sources of water, prospecting for oil and gas reserves, measuring density of soil for construction projects, or even detecting smoke. At their “cradle” and when in use, radioactive sources are usually properly managed and controlled. It is when a source has reached the end of its useful life when they are at a higher risk of being under inadequate control, poorly managed, or even becoming orphan. Sources that have reached the end of their useful life must be carefully and safely managed. The “grave” of disused sources needs a proper disposal process to prevent them from posing a potential threat to people or the environment. To protect the public and the environment from the potential hazards of ionizing radiation, and to prevent disused sources from becoming orphan, a “cradle-to-grave” control of radioactive sources is essential, as promoted by the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. This approach requires a national policy and strategy, an adequate legal and regulatory framework, and adequate resources and infrastructure. Many IAEAMember States have expressed the need for effective solutions to this challenge. There is also a gap related to the life cycle costs of potential disposal practices. This paper proposes a multi-attribute decision making methodology to compare disposal options using both economic and non-economic criteria leading to a preferred option for disposal and a strategy for final disposal of disused radioactive sources that is specific and optimized for each IAEA Member State.

Beatty, Randy↗
DOE OSTI2020

Optimal Sizing of Resilience Solutions for the U.S. Army Reserve

Power or water outages in buildings threaten the ability of the military to support surrounding communities during natural disasters. Outages can last for days, weeks or months. Typical solutions include very expensive batteries and onsite generation that are sized based on historical power needs. The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) has teamed up with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop a simulation framework that optimizes future power needs to reduce the cost of resilience solutions. The approach starts with the building. Power needs during an emergency event are simulated at the building end-use level, then loads are reduced through the selection of life cycle cost-effective building-level technology improvements. These new optimized loads are then fed into a microgrid sizing tool that dynamically constructs many different combinations of solar photovoltaic, battery storage, and generator resources to meet the load for hundreds of statistically generated outage scenarios. Six site assessments completed by USAR and PNNL in 2019 have resulted in a 1-14% reduction in overall investment when optimizing the buildings first before determining the generation requirements. This approach helps the Army secure critical missions and provide a 14 day-minimum supply of necessary energy and water in the most efficient manner.

buidlings, efficiency, resilience, FEDS, MCOR↗
DOE OSTI2017

IEC 62859: A new international standard on the coordination between safety and cybersecurity for nuclear I and C systems - 160

Cybersecurity requirements and controls for digital I and C systems are increasingly added to well-established safety-oriented provisions. Interactions and potential side-effects are possible and must be mastered, taking into account the nuclear I and C system specificities as well as their normative and regulatory contexts. The new international standard IEC 62859 'Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and control systems - Requirements for coordinating safety and cyber security' aims to optimize the integration of cybersecurity provisions in nuclear I and C architecture and systems, to prevent conflicts between safety and cybersecurity provisions, and to aid the identification and the leveraging of the potential synergies between safety and cybersecurity. The paper presents the structure and the key aspects of this standard. IEC 62859 is structured along three main sections: one dealing with the overall I and C architecture, a second one focusing on the system level, a third one dealing with organizational and procedural issues. The paper also discusses related work in the nuclear industry, and in other sectors. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2013

Integrating Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards (ISOSS) into the design of small modular reactors : a handbook.

The existing regulatory environment for nuclear reactors impacts both the facility design and the cost of operations once the facility is built. Delaying the consideration of regulatory requirements until late in the facility design - or worse, until after construction has begun - can result in costly retrofitting as well as increased operational costs to fulfill safety, security, safeguards, and emergency readiness requirements. Considering the scale and scope, as well as the latest design trends in the next generation of nuclear facilities, there is an opportunity to evaluate the regulatory requirements and optimize the design process for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), as compared to current Light Water Reactors (LWRs). To this end, Sandia has embarked on an initiative to evaluate the interactions of regulations and operations as an approach to optimizing the design of SMR facilities, supporting operational efficiencies, as well as regulatory requirements. The early stages of this initiative consider two focus areas. The first focus area, reported by LaChance, et al. (2007), identifies the regulatory requirements established for the current fleet of LWR facilities regarding Safety, Security, Operations, Safeguards, and Emergency Planning, and evaluates the technical bases for these requirements. The second focus area, developed in this report, documents the foundations for an innovative approach that supports a design framework for SMR facilities that incorporates the regulatory environment, as well as the continued operation of the facility, into the early design stages, eliminating the need for costly retrofitting and additional operating personnel to fulfill regulatory requirements. The work considers a technique known as Integrated Safety, Operations, Security and Safeguards (ISOSS) (Darby, et al., 2007). In coordination with the best practices of industrial operations, the goal of this effort is to develop a design framework that outlines how ISOSS requirements can be incorporated into the pre-conceptual through early facility design stages, seeking a cost-effective design that meets both operational efficiencies and the regulatory environment. The larger scope of the project, i.e., in future stages, includes the identification of potentially conflicting requirements identified by the ISOSS framework, including an analysis of how regulatory requirements may be changed to account for the intrinsic features of SMRs.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

NeuroSymbolic Approaches as a Vector for Assured Artificial Intelligence

The deployment of artificial intelligence systems in critical applications requires higher levels of assurance for safety, security, and interpretability. While neurosymbolic (NESY) approaches combining neural networks with symbolic reasoning offer potential advantages for assured AI, existing differentiable neurosymbolic frameworks face significant limitations including computational overhead and performance constraints. This report investigates the ISED (InferSampleEstimateDescend) framework as an alternative approach that enables neurosymbolic learning without requiring endtoend differentiability. We evaluate ISED’s utility for geointelligence applications by comparing neurosymbolic models against standard neural networks on aircraft classification tasks using the RarePlanes and MTARSI imagery datasets. Our results demonstrate that while ISEDbased models achieve slightly lower accuracy (89.7% vs 92.1% on RarePlanes; 91.1% vs 92.5% on MTARSI), they provide critical explainability capabilities that enable tracing incorrect predictions back to specific attribute misclassifications. We also present an automated pipeline that generates both attributeclass mappings and neurosymbolic model architectures from natural language descriptions, significantly reducing the manual effort required for NESY model deployment. These findings suggest that ISED offers a promising direction for developing assured AI systems where interpretability and reasoning transparency are prioritized alongside performance.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS2023

Technical Basis Related to the Posture of NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance for the Launch of Radioactive Material Other than Space Nuclear Systems: Volume 1–Overview of Analysis and Results

NASA has launched and reentered payloads containing radioactive material for over 50 years. The isotopes, their quantity, and their form have varied significantly. The handling of this material prior to its integration into the spacecraft at the launch Center (and after its return to Earth after flight, if applicable) falls under the purview of the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer, while after the radioactive material is integrated into the spacecraft at the launch Center, it falls under the purview of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance’s (OSMA) Nuclear Flight Safety Program. Historically, OSMA concurrence was required for any launch or reentry involving radioactive material. However, OSMA recently revisited this posture due to changes in the Federal policy in this area, and the significant accrued experience. The current report represents the more quantitative study envisioned in the recent change in posture. More specifically, this document addresses the potential risks and other considerations associated with launching small quantities of radioactive material (below the level requiring the Federally-mandated process in National Security Presidential Memorandum- (NSPM-) 20, “Presidential Memorandum on Launch of Spacecraft Containing Space Nuclear Systems” (USG, 2019) to provide the technical basis for when such activities require OSMA concurrence versus notification, as it relates to nuclear flight safety.

Don Helton↗
DOE OSTI2015

Spectroscopic Needs for Imaging Dark Energy Experiments

Ongoing and near-future imaging-based dark energy experiments are critically dependent upon photometric redshifts (a.k.a. photo-z’s): i.e., estimates of the redshifts of objects based only on flux information obtained through broad filters. Higher-quality, lower-scatter photo-z’s will result in smaller random errors on cosmological parameters; while systematic errors in photometric redshift estimates, if not constrained, may dominate all other uncertainties from these experiments. The desired optimization and calibration is dependent upon spectroscopic measurements for secure redshift information; this is the key application of galaxy spectroscopy for imaging-based dark energy experiments. Hence, to achieve their full potential, imaging-based experiments will require large sets of objects with spectroscopically-determined redshifts, for two purposes: Training: Objects with known redshift are needed to map out the relationship between object color and z (or, equivalently, to determine empirically-calibrated templates describing the rest-frame spectra of the full range of galaxies, which may be used to predict the color-z relation). The ultimate goal of training is to minimize each moment of the distribution of differences between photometric redshift estimates and the true redshifts of objects, making the relationship between them as tight as possible. The larger and more complete our “training set” of spectroscopic redshifts is, the smaller the RMS photo-z errors should be, increasing the constraining power of imaging experiments; Requirements: Spectroscopic redshift measurements for ~30,000 objects over >~15 widely-separated regions, each at least ~20 arcmin in diameter, and reaching the faintest objects used in a given experiment, will likely be necessary if photometric redshifts are to be trained and calibrated with conventional techniques. Larger, more complete samples (i.e., with longer exposure times) can improve photo-z algorithms and reduce scatter further, enhancing the science return from planned experiments greatly (increasing the Dark Energy Task Force figure of merit by up to ~50%); Options: This spectroscopy will most efficiently be done by covering as much of the optical and near-infrared spectrum as possible at modestly high spectral resolution (λ/Δλ > ~3000), while maximizing the telescope collecting area, field of view on the sky, and multiplexing of simultaneous spectra. The most efficient instrument for this would likely be either the proposed GMACS/MANIFEST spectrograph for the Giant Magellan Telescope or the OPTIMOS spectrograph for the European Extremely Large Telescope, depending on actual properties when built. The PFS spectrograph at Subaru would be next best and available considerably earlier, c. 2018; the proposed ngCFHT and SSST telescopes would have similar capabilities but start later. Other key options, in order of increasing total time required, are the WFOS spectrograph at TMT, MOONS at the VLT, and DESI at the Mayall 4 m telescope (or the similar 4MOST and WEAVE projects); of these, only DESI, MOONS, and PFS are expected to be available before 2020. Table 2-3 of this white paper summarizes the observation time required at each facility for strawman training samples. To attain secure redshift measurements for a high fraction of targeted objects and cover the full redshift span of future experiments, additional near-infrared spectroscopy will also be required; this is best done from space, particularly with WFIRST-2.4 and JWST; Calibration: The first several moments of redshift distributions (the mean, RMS redshift dispersion, etc.), must be known to high accuracy for cosmological constraints not to be systematics-dominated (equivalently, the moments of the distribution of differences between photometric and true redshifts could be determined instead). The ultimate goal of calibration is to characterize these moments for every subsample used in analyses - i.e., to minimize the uncertainty in their mean redshift, RMS dispersion, etc. – rather than to make the moments themselves small. Calibration may be done with the same spectroscopic dataset used for training if that dataset is extremely high in redshift completeness (i.e., no populations of galaxies to be used in analyses are systematically missed). Accurate photo-z calibration is necessary for all imaging experiments; Requirements: If extremely low levels of systematic incompleteness (<~0.1%) are attained in training samples, the same datasets described above should be sufficient for calibration. However, existing deep spectroscopic surveys have failed to yield secure redshifts for 30–60% of targets, so that would require very large improvements over past experience. This incompleteness would be a limiting factor for training, but catastrophic for calibration. If <~0.1% incompleteness is not attainable, the best known option for calibration of photometric redshifts is to utilize cross-correlation statistics in some form. The most direct method for this uses cross-correlations between positions on the sky of bright objects of known spectroscopic redshift with the sample of objects that we wish to calibrate the redshift distribution for, measured as a function of spectroscopic z. For such a calibration, redshifts of ~100,000 objects over at least several hundred square degrees, spanning the full redshift range of the samples used for dark energy, would be necessary; and Options: The proposed BAO experiment eBOSS would provide sufficient spectroscopy for basic calibrations, particularly for ongoing and near-future imaging experiments. The planned DESI experiment would provide excellent calibration with redundant cross-checks, but will start after the conclusion of some imaging projects. An extension of DESI to the Southern hemisphere would provide the best possible calibration from cross-correlation methods for DES and LSST. We thus anticipate that our two primary needs for spectroscopy – training and calibration of photometric redshifts – will require two separate solutions. For ongoing and future projects to reach their full potential, new spectroscopic samples of faint objects will be needed for training; those new samples may be suitable for calibration, but the latter possibility is uncertain. In contrast, wide-area samples of bright objects are poorly suited for training, but can provide high-precision calibrations via cross-correlation techniques. Additional training/calibration redshifts and/or host galaxy spectroscopy would enhance the use of supernovae and galaxy clusters for cosmology. We also summarize additional work on photometric redshift techniques that will be needed to prepare for data from ongoing and future dark energy experiments.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗
NASA NTRS2019

Improving Security of Ground System Software

An estimated 84% of all security breaches are application-related, not firewall violations. To what extent is your organization focused on addressing security issues in its software? Software plays a critical role in mission success, and software similarly plays a role in mission security. However, software can introduce vulnerabilities to the system, such as use of a COTS product that has a backdoor, or a hole in the security of the system deliberately left in place by designers or maintainers. The motivations for such holes are not always sinister, but can provide a means for malicious intrusion into the mission. Students will learn an approach to securing ground software within the context of federal information systems. Federal requirements, coding standards, tool usage will be discussed as part of the solution to securing software.

Bailey, Brandon↗
DOE OSTI2013

Life-cycle energy use and greenhouse gas emissions of production of bioethanol from sorghum in the United States

Background: The availability of feedstock options is a key to meeting the volumetric requirement of 136.3 billion liters of renewable fuels per year beginning in 2022, as required in the US 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act. Life-cycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of sorghum-based ethanol need to be assessed for sorghum to play a role in meeting that requirement. Results: Multiple sorghum-based ethanol production pathways show diverse well-to-wheels (WTW) energy use and GHG emissions due to differences in energy use and fertilizer use intensity associated with sorghum growth and differences in the ethanol conversion processes. All sorghum-based ethanol pathways can achieve significant fossil energy savings. Relative to GHG emissions from conventional gasoline, grain sorghum-based ethanol can reduce WTW GHG emissions by 35% or 23%, respectively, when wet or dried distillers grains with solubles (DGS) is the co-product and fossil natural gas (FNG) is consumed as the process fuel. The reduction increased to 56% or 55%, respectively, for wet or dried DGS co-production when renewable natural gas (RNG) from anaerobic digestion of animal waste is used as the process fuel. These results do not include land-use change (LUC) GHG emissions, which we take as negligible. If LUC GHG emissions for grain sorghum ethanol as estimated by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are included (26 g CO2e/MJ), these reductions when wet DGS is co-produced decrease to 7% or 29% when FNG or RNG is used as the process fuel. Sweet sorghum-based ethanol can reduce GHG emissions by 71% or 72% without or with use of co-produced vinasse as farm fertilizer, respectively, in ethanol plants using only sugar juice to produce ethanol. If both sugar and cellulosic bagasse were used in the future for ethanol production, an ethanol plant with a combined heat and power (CHP) system that supplies all process energy can achieve a GHG emission reduction of 70% or 72%, respectively, without or with vinasse fertigation. Forage sorghum-based ethanol can achieve a 49% WTW GHG emission reduction when ethanol plants meet process energy demands with CHP. In the case of forage sorghum and an integrated sweet sorghum pathway, the use of a portion of feedstock to fuel CHP systems significantly reduces fossil fuel consumption and GHG emissions. Conclusions: This study provides new insight into life-cycle energy use and GHG emissions of multiple sorghum-based ethanol production pathways in the US. Our results show that adding sorghum feedstocks to the existing options for ethanol production could help in meeting the requirements for volumes of renewable, advanced and cellulosic bioethanol production in the US required by the EPA’s Renewable Fuel Standard program.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗
DOE OSTI2019

The Need for Nuclear Deterrent Fundamentals Training

NNSA policy requires that personnel working in the Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE) receive comprehensive training to be fully capable before they begin their work and that personnel receive ongoing training to maintain their capability and competence. However, the loss of experienced NSE staff through retirements and the influx of personnel who are inexperienced and untrained in nuclear weapons technology make these training requirements difficult to achieve. This paper presents an approach for developing and delivering a nuclear deterrent (ND) fundamentals curriculum to respond to these challenges. The training approach leverages existing material already used by Sandia National Laboratories in the ND training arena and proposes to deliver the material in an e-learning format as much as possible. The approach also seeks to maximize the amount of material to be delivered in an unclassified setting.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
NASA NTRS1983

Space station needs, attributes, and architectural options study. Volume 1: Missions and requirements

Science and applications, NOAA environmental observation, commercial resource observations, commercial space processing, commercial communications, national security, technology development, and GEO servicing are addressed. Approach to time phasing of mission requirements, system sizing summary, time-phased user mission payload support, space station facility requirements, and integrated time-phased system requirements are also addressed.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2016

Wabash Valley Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle, Coal to Fischer Tropsch Jet Fuel Conversion Study

This reports examines the feasibility of converting the existing Wabash Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) plant into a liquid fuel facility, with the goal of maximizing jet fuel production. The fuels produced are required to be in compliance with Section 526 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA 2007 §526) lifecycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions requirements, so lifecycle GHG emissions from the fuel must be equal to or better than conventional fuels. Retrofitting an existing gasification facility reduces the technical risk and capital costs associated with a coal to liquids project, leading to a higher probability of implementation and more competitive liquid fuel prices. The existing combustion turbine will continue to operate on low cost natural gas and low carbon fuel gas from the gasification facility. The gasification technology utilized at Wabash is the E-Gas™ Technology and has been in commercial operation since 1995. In order to minimize capital costs, the study maximizes reuse of existing equipment with minimal modifications. Plant data and process models were used to develop process data for downstream units. Process modeling was utilized for the syngas conditioning, acid gas removal, CO 2 compression and utility units. Syngas conversion to Fischer Tropsch (FT) liquids and upgrading of the liquids was modeled and designed by Johnson Matthey Davy Technologies (JM Davy). In order to maintain the GHG emission profile below that of conventional fuels, the CO 2 from the process must be captured and exported for sequestration or enhanced oil recovery. In addition the power utilized for the plant’s auxiliary loads had to be supplied by a low carbon fuel source. Since the process produces a fuel gas with sufficient energy content to power the plant’s loads, this fuel gas was converted to hydrogen and exported to the existing gas turbine for low carbon power production. Utilizing low carbon fuel gas and process steam in the existing combined cycle power plant provides sufficient power for all plant loads. The lifecycle GHG profile of the produced jet fuel is 95% of conventional jet fuel. Without converting the fuel gas to a low carbon fuel gas, the emissions would be 108% of conventional jet fuel and without any GHG mitigation, the profile would be 206%. Oil prices greater than $120 per barrel are required to reach a targeted internal rate of return on equity (IRROE) of 12%. Although capital expenditure is much less than if a greenfield facility was built, the relatively small size of the plant, assumed coal price, and the CTL risk profile used in the economic assumptions lead to a high cost of production. Assuming more favorable factors, the economic oil price could be reduced to $78 per barrel with GHG mitigation and $55 per barrel with no GHG mitigation.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗
DOE OSTI2025

Employing a Hardware-in-the-Loop Approach to Realize a Fully Homomorphic Controller for a Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor

This paper addresses the cybersecurity challenges of advanced nuclear reactors by integrating fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) into their control systems, enabling encrypted processing of control signals without compromising functionality. Advanced nuclear reactors, including Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and microreactors, aim to achieve autonomous and remote operations, reducing costs and enhancing competitiveness. However, these advancements expand the attack surface for cyberattacks, particularly in autonomous and remote operation scenarios. Cyberattacks can exploit vulnerabilities to manipulate physical processes, causing shutdowns, asset damage, or public harm. Such attacks begin with passive reconnaissance, where adversaries intercept communications or observe behaviors to gather information, which is then leveraged to execute cyber-physical attacks by injecting malicious commands. Nuclear power must adopt cybersecurity protection measures to secure the integrity and availability of their digital control systems. This paper demonstrates the application of FHE to secure operations by enabling encrypted processing of sensitive signals and parameters -- ensuring privacy without exposing data. FHE supports secure mathematical operations on encrypted data without requiring decryption. Using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) approach, this paper implements an FHE-integrated controller on a BeagleBone Black (BBB) controlling a simulation of the Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor (SmAHTR). By doing so, the encrypted controller protects the integrity of critical set points and control signals during transmission and processing. Thus, FHE-integrated controllers enhance secure operations of advanced nuclear reactors while maintaining functionality.

control systems↗
DOE OSTI2021

Securing Distributed Energy Resource Integration

The penetration of distributed energy resources (DER) is growing at much higher rates than predicted 20 years ago. Far from being used only in residential settings, DER are now installed on distribution and transmission circuits. In this position, they do not have the same properties as traditional generators and are more flexible in many cases. The growing penetration and range of uses for DER motivate the need to reliably and safely integrate them into the grid. Operators must be able to rely on them not only for normal operation, but also during abnormal conditions like black starts or adverse cyber scenarios. To that end, we study the communications, device interfaces, and potential consequences of DER operation under abnormal and adversarial conditions. The weaknesses of communications networks are studied based on the industrial protocols used, and the benefits of security features are examined. The device interfaces are found to be vulnerable to attack based on the requirements in the IEEE-1547 standard for DER interconnection and interoperability, which is expected to be adopted in the next ten years. In addition to exploring the requirements of the standard, we show that these vulnerabilities and others do exist and can be used maliciously in a modern storage system DER. Consequences of these vulnerabilities range from exacerbated grid instability, to simultaneous loss of large portions of DER penetration, to physical damage to inverters or DER themselves and other sensitive equipment. We tie these outcomes to specific attacker actions in an effort to give operators a better threat intelligence view that allows them to prioritize mitigations. Finally, we discuss mitigations that could prevent many of the adversarial scenarios described. Some solutions can be added to existing infrastructure, while others may require longer term planning for grid modernization with consideration for security.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Implementation of Cybersecurity Requirements

Cyber threats are a constant present-day reality for any type of business -- Space exploration is not excluded from these threats either. The Gateway Program is one of NASA’s latest initiatives that extend space exploration beyond low earth orbit. Gateway allows for NASA to prove technologies and mature systems necessary to live and work on another celestial body before embarking on multi-year missions to Mars. The Gateway is a small, human-tended space station in orbit around the Moon. With the increased autonomy, distance and criticality of systems, cybersecurity is one of the critical subsystems that touches and integrates with most if not all subsystems of the Gateway. Building a gateway to the lunar orbit is no simple task. In this presentation, we outline an approach that the Gateway team adopted in creating a cyber safe and robust vehicle to support operations and assure protection of the critical functions. Gateway Program is required to implement National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidelines to adhere to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA). NIST provides a framework for managing and controlling cybersecurity risks by defining cybersecurity controls and methodologies for implementation. The NIST framework is based upon the system, data within the system, integrations with external systems, and risk assessments to determine impacts for each of those systems. The goals and objectives are to identify appropriate security controls that fulfill and map to the NIST 800-53 framework. The implementation process involves developing an organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, people, assets, data, and capabilities. NIST Security controls are interpreted and defined within the Gateway vehicle requirements subsystems specifications. This paper details the approach, implementation, and challenges faced during the development and design phases to address cyber threats during the Gateway vehicle operations.

Svetlana Hanson↗