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At least 577 records · Page 32

Los Alamos National Laboratory nuclear criticality safety pipeline for expedited qualification of personnel

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Pipeline is a method of accelerating the training and qualification of its next generation nuclear criticality safety professionals. An upper division university course in NCS will be offered at participating universities; students who perform well can participate in a summer internship in the LANL NCS Division the following summer focusing on NCS practices and facility specific training for qualification. Standout students may proceed with a criticality safety oriented research project worked during the senior academic year. The culmination of the pipeline is the hiring of students as full time personnel. This practice reduces the uncertainty around knowing whether the individual: -1) has the technical skills, knowledge, and abilities to succeed in criticality safety, -2) will be able to effectively integrate within the organization, and -3) is interested enough in the discipline to reduce potential retention issues. This approach will address significant challenges in the NCS industry, including rising attrition rates over the next two decades, significant time and resources typically required to train qualified criticality safety professionals once hired, and the absence of available NCS-related academic course work available at colleges and universities. The university pipeline results in several benefits: -1) reduced training time and costs, -2) interested students will naturally self-sort and pursue the discipline at the university level, and -3) a pipeline of criticality safety candidates is readily available within the DOE Complex so that unexpected organizational or mission changes can be reacted to with increased agility. (authors)

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Regulating Operational Safety at a Future Geological Disposal Facility in the UK - 18038

The United Kingdom (UK) has generated commercial nuclear energy for over 60 years; generating a significant and varied inventory of higher activity radioactive waste (HAW). In accordance with international practice, UK Government policy for long-term management of HAW is disposal in a geological disposal facility (GDF). The nuclear materials comprising HAW include high level waste, intermediate level waste and some low level waste, not suitable for disposal to the Low Level Waste Repository. In addition, other nuclear materials may be reclassified as waste in the future and will require to be managed as HAW for disposal to a GDF; these include spent fuel, uranium and plutonium. The operator of a GDF will be required to obtain a nuclear site licence from the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), as the nuclear safety and security regulator, in order to construct and operate the facility. In the period prior to submission of a licence application, ONR is working to develop its regulatory expectations and provide advice on its regulatory role with regards to a future GDF. ONR has developed regulatory guidance on operational safety, benchmarked against the relevant IAEA Safety Standards and the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) Safety Reference Levels for Disposal. This guidance draws upon ONR's current expectations for nuclear sites; including operational reactors, fuel manufacture and reprocessing facilities, and reactors undergoing decommissioning; and incorporates relevant good practice drawn from international programmes for geological disposal and related industries (eg mining). In addition to the technical assessment guidance, ONR has developed guidance on the licensing process specific to a GDF; providing clarity for example on when a licence will be required. A review of the standard licence conditions applied to all nuclear sites concluded no significant amendment would be required for application to a GDF. Through its voluntary agreement with Radioactive Waste Management Limited (RWM), the developer and future operator of a GDF in the UK, ONR exerts regulatory influence on the design and organisational development of the future licensee. As part of this scrutiny, ONR has assessed RWM's generic Disposal System Safety Case. Subjecting the generic design and safety case to regulatory review provides opportunity for early engagement to ensure the appropriate standards will be achieved. ONR will only grant the necessary regulatory permissions if RWM adequately demonstrates the GDF will be constructed, operated and closed safely. Future challenges faced by ONR with respect to a GDF include building and maintaining regulatory competence and confidence, and engaging effectively with the public as the UK begins its search for a suitable site to provide appropriate assurance that a GDF will be operated safely and securely. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Derivation of Monitoring Parameters based on the Long-term Safety Assessment - 19529

This paper discusses monitoring in the context of the Swiss geological disposal programme and presents a methodology to identify parameters that would be both useful from the point of view of demonstrating long-term safety and technically feasible to monitor. The methodology also serves as a contribution to the EC project on Development and Demonstration of monitoring strategies and technologies for geological disposal - Modern2020. The methodology consists of the following five steps: - STEP 1: Identify key, safety-relevant parameters, - STEP 2: Consider (without consideration of technical feasibility) whether monitoring of these parameters would be of interest, and set priorities, - STEP 3: Consider the technical practicability of monitoring those parameters identified as being of first and secondary priority, - STEP 4: Identify whether models exist for the evolution of those parameters that can be monitored and whether safety-relevant criteria exist that the parameters should meet, - STEP 5: Assess the overall rationale for monitoring those parameters identified in Steps 1 through 4. Key candidate parameters for monitoring, provisionally identified by applying the methodology and that have associated safety-relevant criteria include: - Temperature in the Opalinus Clay host rock and, - Fluid pressure, also in the Opalinus Clay host rock. A number of other high priority parameters not associated with safety-relevant criteria, as well as parameters with lower priority (with and without associated safety relevant criteria), have also been identified. The methodology, as well as its trial application, are to be considered as first iterations, and are likely to be refined over the forthcoming years as experience is gained. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of a systematic approach for safety assessment of PLD based equipment of I and C systems - 354

Nuclear power plants (NPPs) increasingly apply digital equipment for instrumentation and control (I and C) systems. During the life cycle of NPPs the operators, designers and manufactures are facing the need to replace or upgrade obsolete equipment or to implement new digital I and C systems. A relatively new challenge in this area is the deployment of programmable logic devices (PLDs) for the equipment of I and C systems. Regulatory approval for safety and safety related I and C systems demands confirmation of evidence that design as well as verification and validation (V and V) processes have ensured that the application of new equipment will fulfil safety and reliability requirements and its intended design function. The objective of the recent research project of GRS is developing a systematic approach for the assessment of PLD-based equipment in safety and safety-related I and C systems regarding the fulfilment of regulatory requirements and identification of undesired failure effects. A generic approach for the safety-oriented assessment of PLD-based equipment has been developed, based on the principles of a Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle. The approach comprises planning of the assessment, predefined analysis steps and methodologies, as well as required input information, criteria for decision making process, the tasks concerning identification of improvement potential and determining documentation. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Criticality Safety Validation of SCALE 6.1 with ENDF/B-VII.0 Libraries

ANSI/ANS-8.1-1998;2007, Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Material Outside Reactors, and ANSI/ANS-8.24-2007, Validation of Neutron Transport Methods for Nuclear Criticality Safety Calculations, require validation of a computer code and the associated data through benchmark evaluations based on physical experiments. The performance of the code and data are validated by comparing the calculated and the benchmark results. A SCALE procedure has been established to generate a Verified, Archived Library of Inputs and Data (VALID). This procedure provides a framework for preparing, peer reviewing, and controlling models and data sets derived from benchmark definitions so that the models and data can be used with confidence. The procedure ensures that the models and data were correctly generated using appropriate references with documented checks and reviews. Configuration management is implemented to prevent inadvertent modification of the models and data or inclusion of models that have not been subjected to the rigorous review process. VALID entries for criticality safety are based on critical experiments documented in the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments (IHECSBE). The findings of a criticality safety validation of SCALE 6.1 utilizing the benchmark models vetted in the VALID library at Oak Ridge National Laboratory are summarized here.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Fast Reactor Fuel Type and Reactor Safety Performance

Fast Reactor Fuel Type and Reactor Safety Performance R. Wigeland , Idaho National Laboratory J. Cahalan, Argonne National Laboratory The sodium-cooled fast neutron reactor is currently being evaluated for the efficient transmutation of the highly-hazardous, long-lived, transuranic elements that are present in spent nuclear fuel. One of the fundamental choices that will be made is the selection of the fuel type for the fast reactor, whether oxide, metal, carbide, nitride, etc. It is likely that a decision on the fuel type will need to be made before many of the related technologies and facilities can be selected, from fuel fabrication to spent fuel reprocessing. A decision on fuel type should consider all impacts on the fast reactor system, including safety. Past work has demonstrated that the choice of fuel type may have a significant impact on the severity of consequences arising from accidents, especially for severe accidents of low probability. In this paper, the response of sodium-cooled fast reactors is discussed for both oxide and metal fuel types, highlighting the similarities and differences in reactor response and accident consequences. Any fast reactor facility must be designed to be able to successfully prevent, mitigate, or accommodate all consequences of potential events, including accidents. This is typically accomplished by using multiple barriers to the release of radiation, including the cladding on the fuel, the intact primary cooling system, and most visibly the reactor containment building. More recently, this has also included the use of ‘inherent safety’ concepts to reduce or eliminate the potential for serious damage in some cases. Past experience with oxide and metal fuel has demonstrated that both fuel types are suitable for use as fuel in a sodium-cooled fast reactor. However, safety analyses for these two fuel types have also shown that there can be substantial differences in accident consequences due to the neutronic and thermophysical properties of the fuel and their compatibility with the reactor coolant, with corresponding differences in the challenges presented to the reactor developers. Accident phenomena are discussed for the sodium-cooled fast reactor based on the mechanistic progression of conditions from accident initiation to accident termination, whether a benign state is achieved or more severe consequences are expected. General principles connecting accident phenomena and fuel properties are developed from the oxide and metal fuel safety analyses, providing guidelines that can be used as part of the evaluation for selection of fuel type for the sodium-cooled fast reactor.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Bringing Safety to Chemistry for Life

Recently, the chemistry enterprise as a whole has experienced a monumental shift in the way that it understands and approaches safety, both within society and as part of the science of chemistry. The American Chemical Society (ACS) has embraced this change and has committed to modelling it by incorporating “safety” into its core values. In early 2018, a Safety Summit involving stakeholders from across the chemistry enterprise was convened to consider strategies for “accelerating the adoption of an ethos of safety across the chemical enterprise”. The summit concluded in a better understanding of the factors influencing the implementation of safe chemical practices, programs in progress to effect change in this area, and gaps where additional effort is needed. Opportunities were identified where the ACS could make a meaningful impact on chemical safety and which aligned with the goals of the Society. Here, we will describe how the ACS strategic plan addresses the chemical safety challenges in relation to both historical influences and the current environment.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Comparison of fission product release predictions using PARFUME with results from the AGR-1 safety tests

Safety tests were conducted on fuel compacts from AGR-1, the first irradiation experiment of the Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) Fuel Development and Qualification program, at temperatures ranging from 1600 to 1800 °C to determine fission product release at temperatures that bound reactor accident conditions. The PARFUME (PARticle FUel ModEl) code was used to predict the release of fission products silver, cesium, strontium, and krypton from fuel compacts containing tristructural isotropic (TRISO) coated particles during 15 of these safety tests. Comparisons between PARFUME predictions and post-irradiation examination results of the safety tests were conducted on two types of AGR-1 compacts: compacts containing only intact particles and compacts containing one or more particles whose SiC layers failed during safety testing. In both cases, PARFUME globally over-predicted the experimental release fractions by several orders of magnitude: more than three (intact) and two (failed SiC) orders of magnitude for silver, more than three and up to two orders of magnitude for strontium, and up to two and more than one orders of magnitude for krypton. The release of cesium from intact particles was also largely over-predicted (by up to five orders of magnitude) but its release from particles with failed SiC was only over-predicted by a factor of about 3. These over-predictions can be largely attributed to an over-estimation of the diffusivities used in the modeling of fission product transport in TRISO-coated particles. The integral release nature of the data makes it difficult to estimate the individual over-estimations in the kernel or each coating layer. Nevertheless, a tentative assessment of correction factors to these diffusivities was performed to enable a better match between the modeling predictions and the safety testing results. The method could only be successfully applied to silver and cesium. In the case of strontium, correction factors could not be assessed because potential release during the safety tests could not be distinguished from matrix content released during irradiation. Furthermore, in the case of krypton, all the coating layers are partly retentive and the available data did not allow the level of retention in individual layers to be determined, hence preventing derivation of any correction factors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The discovery and development of proteomic safety biomarkers for the detection of drug-induced liver toxicity

Biomarkers are biometric measurements that provide critical quantitative information about the biological condition of the animal or individual being tested. In drug safety studies, established toxicity biomarkers are used along with other conventional study data to determine dose-limiting organ toxicity, and to define species sensitivity for new chemical entities intended for possible use as human medicines. A continuing goal of drug safety scientists in the pharmaceutical industry is to discover and develop better trans-species biomarkers that can be used to determine target organ toxicities for preclinical species in short-term studies at dose levels that are some multiple of the intended human dose and again later in full development for monitoring clinical trials at lower therapeutic doses. Of particular value are early, predictive, noninvasive biomarkers that have in vitro, in vivo, and clinical transferability. Such translational biomarkers bridge animal testing used in preclinical science and human studies that are part of subsequent clinical testing. Although suitable for in vivo preclinical regulatory studies, conventional hepatic safety biomarkers are basically confirmatory markers because they signal organ toxicity after some pathological damage has occurred, and are therefore not well-suited for short-term, predictive screening assays early in the discovery-to-development progression of new chemical entities (NCEs) available in limited quantities. Efforts between regulatory agencies and the pharmaceutical industry are underway for the coordinated discovery, qualification, verification and validation of early predictive toxicity biomarkers. Early predictive safety biomarkers are those that are detectable and quantifiable prior to the onset of irreversible tissue injury and which are associated with a mechanism of action relevant to a specific type of potential hepatic injury. Potential drug toxicity biomarkers are typically endogenous macromolecules in biological fluids with varying immunoreactivity which can present bioanalytical challenges when first discovered. The potential success of these efforts is greatly enhanced by recent advances in two closely linked technologies, toxicoproteomics and targeted, quantitative mass spectrometry. This review focuses on the examination of the current status of these technologies as they relate to the discovery and development of novel preclinical biomarkers of hepatotoxicity. A critical assessment of the current literature reveals two distinct lines of safety biomarker investigation, (1) peripheral fluid biomarkers of organ toxicity and (2) tissue or cell-based toxicity signatures. Improved peripheral fluid biomarkers should allow the sensitive detection of potential organ toxicity prior to the onset of overt organ pathology. Advancements in tissue or cell-based toxicity biomarkers will provide sensitive in vitro or ex vivo screening systems based on toxicity pathway markers. An examination of the current practices in clinical pathology and the critical evaluation of some recently proposed biomarker candidates in comparison to the desired characteristics of an ideal toxicity biomarker lead this author to conclude that a combination of selected biomarkers will be more informative if not predictive of potential animal organ toxicity than any single biomarker, new or old. For the practical assessment of combinations of conventional and/or novel toxicity biomarkers in rodent and large animal preclinical species, mass spectrometry has emerged as the premier analytical tool compared to specific immunoassays or functional assays. Selected and multiple reaction monitoring mass spectrometry applications make it possible for this same basic technology to be used in the progressive stages of biomarker discovery, development, and more importantly, routine study applications without the use of specific antibody reagents. This technology combined with other 'omics' technologies can provide added selectivity and sensitivity in preclinical drug safety testing.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Analysis of the safety and pharmacodynamics of human fibrinogen concentrate in animals

Fibrinogen, a soluble 340 kDa plasma glycoprotein, is critical in achieving and maintaining hemostasis. Reduced fibrinogen levels are associated with an increased risk of bleeding and recent research has investigated the efficacy of fibrinogen concentrate for controlling perioperative bleeding. European guidelines on the management of perioperative bleeding recommend the use of fibrinogen concentrate if significant bleeding is accompanied by plasma fibrinogen levels less than 1.5–2.0 g/l. Plasma-derived human fibrinogen concentrate has been available for therapeutic use since 1956. The overall aim of the comprehensive series of non-clinical investigations presented was to evaluate i) the pharmacodynamic and pharmacokinetic characteristics and ii) the safety and tolerability profile of human fibrinogen concentrate Haemocomplettan P® (RiaSTAP®). Pharmacodynamic characteristics were assessed in rabbits, pharmacokinetic parameters were determined in rabbits and rats and a safety pharmacology study was performed in beagle dogs. Additional toxicology tests included: single-dose toxicity tests in mice and rats; local tolerance tests in rabbits; and neoantigenicity tests in rabbits and guinea pigs following the introduction of pasteurization in the manufacturing process. Human fibrinogen concentrate was shown to be pharmacodynamically active in rabbits and dogs and well tolerated, with no adverse events and no influence on circulation, respiration or hematological parameters in rabbits, mice, rats and dogs. In these non-clinical investigations, human fibrinogen concentrate showed a good safety profile. This data adds to the safety information available to date, strengthening the current body of knowledge regarding this hemostatic agent. - Highlights: • A comprehensive series of pre-clinical investigations of human fibrinogen concentrate. • Human fibrinogen concentrate was shown to be pharmacodynamically active. • Human fibrinogen concentrate was well tolerated, with no adverse events. • Overall, human fibrinogen concentrate demonstrated a good safety profile. • This data adds to the safety information available to date on this hemostatic agent.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

A systematic strategy for estimating hERG block potency and its implications in a new cardiac safety paradigm

Introduction: hERG block potency is widely used to calculate a drug's safety margin against its torsadogenic potential. Previous studies are confounded by use of different patch clamp electrophysiology protocols and a lack of statistical quantification of experimental variability. Since the new cardiac safety paradigm being discussed by the International Council for Harmonisation promotes a tighter integration of nonclinical and clinical data for torsadogenic risk assessment, a more systematic approach to estimate the hERG block potency and safety margin is needed. Methods: A cross-industry study was performed to collect hERG data on 28 drugs with known torsadogenic risk using a standardized experimental protocol. A Bayesian hierarchical modeling (BHM) approach was used to assess the hERG block potency of these drugs by quantifying both the inter-site and intra-site variability. A modeling and simulation study was also done to evaluate protocol-dependent changes in hERG potency estimates. Results: A systematic approach to estimate hERG block potency is established. The impact of choosing a safety margin threshold on torsadogenic risk evaluation is explored based on the posterior distributions of hERG potency estimated by this method. The modeling and simulation results suggest any potency estimate is specific to the protocol used. Discussion: This methodology can estimate hERG block potency specific to a given voltage protocol. The relationship between safety margin thresholds and torsadogenic risk predictivity suggests the threshold should be tailored to each specific context of use, and safety margin evaluation may need to be integrated with other information to form a more comprehensive risk assessment.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

A Blockchain-Enabled Sustainable Safety Management Framework for Connected Vehicles

The notion of an intelligent transportation system (ITS) aims to boost the performance of transportation networks, which has gained more and more traction in both academic and commercial circles. ITS is a constantly evolving vision that combines cutting-edge transportation approaches with new information, communication, computers, and other technology. ITS should discover consequence routes to enhance the sustainability, safety, and trustworthiness of the entire transportation system utilizing emerging technologies. In this paper, a sustainable safety management framework for connected vehicles is proposed by integrating blockchain. It introduces smart transportation equipment called an AI-enabled vehicle smart device (AVSD) for vehicular communications. AVSD can reduce energy consumption by decreasing the computational costs in vehicular communications. Smart contracts are used to identify vehicles automatically and establish secure communication among vehicles and emergency service stations (ESSs) like hospitals, police stations, and fire stations. The experiment results show that the proposed framework provides a communication environment for sustainable safety and security using the introduced smart transportation device. In conclusion, the proposed blockchain-enabled sustainable safety management framework has the potential to improve safety and sustainability in the transportation industry by creating a secure, decentralized, and transparent platform for managing safety data and promoting safe and sustainable driving behaviors.

42 ENGINEERING↗

An Overview of the Safety Case for Small Modular Reactors

Several small modular reactor (SMR) designs emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s in response to lessons learned from the many technical and operational challenges of the large Generation II light-water reactors. After the accident at the Three Mile Island plant in 1979, an ensuing reactor redesign effort spawned the term inherently safe designs, which later evolved into passively safe terminology. Several new designs were engineered to be deliberately small in order to fully exploit the benefits of passive safety. Today, new SMR designs are emerging with a similar philosophy of offering highly robust and resilient designs with increased safety margins. Additionally, because these contemporary designs are being developed subsequent to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack, they incorporate a number of intrinsic design features to further strengthen their safety and security. Several SMR designs are being developed in the United States spanning the full spectrum of reactor technologies, including water-, gas-, and liquid-metal-cooled ones. Despite a number of design differences, most of these designs share a common set of design principles to enhance plant safety and robustness, such as eliminating plant design vulnerabilities where possible, reducing accident probabilities, and mitigating accident consequences. An important consequence of the added resilience provided by these design approaches is that the individual reactor units and the entire plant should be able to survive a broader range of extreme conditions. This will enable them to not only ensure the safety of the general public but also help protect the investment of the owner and continued availability of the power-generating asset. Examples of typical SMR design features and their implications for improved plant safety are given for specific SMR designs being developed in the United States.

Ingersoll, Daniel T↗

Safety Design Strategy for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Project

In accordance with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 413.3A, “Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets,” safety must be integrated into the design process for new or major modifications to DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. The intended purpose of this requirement involves the handling of hazardous materials, both radiological and chemical, in a way that provides adequate protection to the public, workers, and the environment. Requirements provided in DOE Order 413.3A and DOE Order 420.1B, “Facility Safety,” and the expectations of DOE-STD-1189-2008, “Integration of Safety into the Design Process,” provide for identification of hazards early in the project and use of an integrated team approach to design safety into the facility. This safety design strategy provides the basic safety-in-design principles and concepts that will be used for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Project.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Safety Design Strategy for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Project

In accordance with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 413.3A, “Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets,” safety must be integrated into the design process for new or major modifications to DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. The intended purpose of this requirement involves the handling of hazardous materials, both radiological and chemical, in a way that provides adequate protection to the public, workers, and the environment. Requirements provided in DOE Order 413.3A and DOE Order 420.1B, “Facility Safety,” and the expectations of DOE-STD-1189-2008, “Integration of Safety into the Design Process,” provide for identification of hazards early in the project and use of an integrated team approach to design safety into the facility. This safety design strategy provides the basic safety-in-design principles and concepts that will be used for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Project.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program: Risk-Informed Safety Margins Characterization (RISMC) Pathway Technical Program Plan

Safety is central to the design, licensing, operation, and economics of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). As the current Light Water Reactor (LWR) NPPs age beyond 60 years, there are possibilities for increased frequency of Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) degradations or failures that initiate safety-significant events, reduce existing accident mitigation capabilities, or create new failure modes. Plant designers commonly “over-design” portions of NPPs and provide robustness in the form of redundant and diverse engineered safety features to ensure that, even in the case of well-beyond design basis scenarios, public health and safety will be protected with a very high degree of assurance. This form of defense-in-depth is a reasoned response to uncertainties and is often referred to generically as “safety margin.” Historically, specific safety margin provisions have been formulated, primarily based on “engineering judgment.”

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Safety Design Strategy for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Project

In accordance with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 413.3A, “Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets,” safety must be integrated into the design process for new or major modifications to DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. The intended purpose of this requirement involves the handling of hazardous materials, both radiological and chemical, in a way that provides adequate protection to the public, workers, and the environment. Requirements provided in DOE Order 413.3A and DOE Order 420.1C, “Facility Safety,” and the expectations of DOE-STD-1189-2008, “Integration of Safety into the Design Process,” provide for identification of hazards early in the project and use of an integrated team approach to design safety into the facility. This safety design strategy provides the basic safety-in-design principles and concepts that will be used for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Project.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Enhanced Performance Fast Reactors with Engineered Passive Safety Systems

This report summarizes the work and results of NEUP Project #15-8251, "Enhanced Performance Fast Reactors with Engineered Passive Safety System," performed from 2015-2018 at UC Berkeley and Argonne National Laboratory. This project concerns the incorporation of a novel engineered passive safety system, called the Autonomous Reactivity Control (ARC) system, into Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors (SFRs) to improve their transient and economic performance. The first part of this project consisted of fleshing out the basic principles and the manufacturing process for an SFR fuel assembly with the ARC system installed, with the details provided in high-quality, step-by-step CAD drawings. Once the detailed design is laid out, high-fidelity simulations were performed to optimize the dimensions of important ARC system components and to quantify the standalone time-response of ARC systems in a typical SFR environment. These high-fidelity simulations were used to create reduced-order models of ARC system response which could be incorporated into the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 whole-core transient models. In order to accurately account for the time-response of ARC systems in whole-core transient simulations, modifications were made to the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 transient code. These new capabilities were tested and incorporated into the production version of the code, and have been used extensively in this analysis. Before performing whole-core transient calculations, the two reference cores selected for this study to cover a wide design space were simulated and characterized. The two reference cores, (1) a medium-sized oxide-fueled Advanced Burner Reactor and (2) a large metal-fueled Breed-and-Burn core, challenge conventional means of achieving passive safety. Because the two cores vary substantially, simulating the ARC system in both allows for conclusions to be drawn about the applicability of ARC systems in different SFRs. Once both cores were fully characterized, transient calculations were performed to understand the complicated interplay between the ARC system and other inherent reactivity feedback mechanisms. By performing parametric studies of the transient behavior, ARC system designs that best improve transient performance in each core were identified. Once transient improvements were established, the transient calculations were extended to improve reactor economics through design modifications. Upon establishing the potential benefits of ARC system inclusion, the study examines the negative neutronic implications of incorporating ARC systems into the reference cores. The study concludes by discussing a number of knowledge gaps that exist which may have important implications for ARC system implementation. Ultimately, the results of this project indicate that ARC systems may provide an effective means to improve transient performance in certain types of systems. The transient simulations in the oxide Advanced Burner Reactor showed that significant margin to coolant boiling and fuel melting could be gained through the use of a properly designed ARC system, thus improving inherent safety. While oscillatory behavior was induced in the transient response for certain combinations of ARC system parameters, the oscillation-free design space that can be effectively used to improve performance was found to be large, and the additional margin was demonstrated to allow economical improvements to the core design. Conversely, difficulties were encountered in the Breed-and-Burn core due to fundamental aspects of the core design. The combination of a particularly strong positive coolant void feedback and the use of metallic fuel allowed for diverging oscillations to manifest in response to certain transient initiators, and in the end it was found that the current ARC system design could not simultaneously enable passive safety in all transients examined. In order for complete passive safety to be achieved, a mechanism for slowing the reverse actuation of ARC systems is necessary. Regardless, the standard ARC system was able to improve the performance of two out of the three examined transients by increasing the margin to boiling in Loss of Heat Sink transients and avoiding boiling in Transient Overpower accidents. Additionally, no significant barriers to implementation were found, although the issue of tritium production should be closely monitored in any core incorporating ARC systems. Still, a number of technology gaps exist, and these are discussed at the conclusion of the report to recommend directions for future work.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗