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DOE OSTI2022

Advances in actinide thin films: synthesis, properties, and future directions

Actinide-based compounds exhibit unique physics due to the presence of 5f electrons, and serve in many cases as important technological materials. Targeted thin film synthesis of actinide materials has been successful in generating high-purity specimens in which to study individual physical phenomena. These films have enabled the study of the unique electron configuration, strong mass renormalization, and nuclear decay in actinide metals and compounds. The growth of these films, as well as their thermophysical, magnetic, and topological properties, have been studied in a range of chemistries, albeit far fewer than most classes of thin film systems. This relative scarcity is the result of limited source material availability and safety constraints associated with the handling of radioactive materials. Here, we review recent work on the synthesis and characterization of actinide-based thin films in detail, describing both synthesis methods and modeling techniques for these materials. Further, we review reports on pyrometallurgical, solution-based, and vapor deposition methods. We highlight the current state-of-the-art in order to construct a path forward to higher quality actinide thin films and heterostructure devices.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗
DOE OSTI2016

International Outdoor Experiments and Models for Outdoor Radiological Dispersal Devices

With the advent of nuclear reactors and the technology to produce radioactive materials in large quantities, concern arose about the use of radioactivity as a poison in warfare, and hence, consideration was given to defensive measures (Smyth 1945). Approximately forty years later, the interest in the environmental- and health effects caused by a deliberate dispersal was renewed, but this time, from the perspective of a malevolent act of radiological terrorism in an urban area. For many years there has been international collaboration in scientific research to understand the range of effects that might result from a device that could be constructed by a sub-national group. In this paper, scientists from government laboratories in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States collectively have conducted a myriad of experiments to understand and detail the phenomenology of an explosive radiological dispersal device.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2015

Pilot Scale Advanced Fogging Demonstration

Radiological contamination control is crucial during decommissioning and demolition (D&D) activities, as well as during modifications to existing radiological systems. It is well known that contamination, in some cases substantial contamination, is present throughout the exhaust ductwork in several older processing facilities within the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, due to years of processing radioactive materials in areas served by closed ventilation systems. Accumulations of radioactive dust and lint – commonly found in laundry facilities, exhaust ventilation ducting, and exhaust stacks – present a specific contamination control issue. Particle suspension is more likely to occur during cleaning, modification, or demolition of these systems and during disposal site exhumation. In a recent demolition of large ventilation ducting (~10’ × 10’ cross section, ~100’ long) at Brookhaven National Laboratory, a spray coating was manually applied to the inside of the duct – requiring painters, dressed in anti-contamination clothing and an airline respirator system, to enter the duct.1 The advanced fogging technique offers an alternative method to mitigate these airborne contamination hazards with minimal personnel entry. Experiments in 2006 developed a useful fog solution using three different chemical constituents. Optimization of the fog recipe and use of commercially available equipment were identified as needs that had not been addressed. During 2012 development work it was noted that low concentrations of the components hampered coverage and drying in the United Kingdom’s National Nuclear Laboratory’s testing much more so than was evident in the 2006 tests. In fiscal year 2014 the Idaho National Laboratory undertook a systematic optimization of the fogging formulation and conducted a non-radioactive, pilot scale demonstration using commercially available fogging equipment. While not as sophisticated as the equipment used in earlier testing, the new approach is much less expensive and readily available for smaller scale operations. Pilot scale testing was important to validate new equipment of an appropriate scale, optimize the chemistry of the fogging solution, and to realize the conceptual approach.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Inertial Fusion Power Plant Concept of Operations and Maintenance

Parsons and LLNL scientists and engineers performed design and engineering work for power plant pre-conceptual designs based on the anticipated laser fusion demonstrations at the National Ignition Facility (NIF). Work included identifying concepts of operations and maintenance (O&M) and associated requirements relevant to fusion power plant systems analysis. A laser fusion power plant would incorporate a large process and power conversion facility with a laser system and fusion engine serving as the heat source, based in part on some of the systems and technologies advanced at NIF. Process operations would be similar in scope to those used in chemical, oil refinery, and nuclear waste processing facilities, while power conversion operations would be similar to those used in commercial thermal power plants. While some aspects of the tritium fuel cycle can be based on existing technologies, many aspects of a laser fusion power plant presents several important and unique O&M requirements that demand new solutions. For example, onsite recovery of tritium; unique remote material handling systems for use in areas with high radiation, radioactive materials, or high temperatures; a five-year fusion engine target chamber replacement cycle with other annual and multi-year cycles anticipated for major maintenance of other systems, structures, and components (SSC); and unique SSC for fusion target waste recycling streams. This paper describes fusion power plant O&M concepts and requirements, how O&M requirements could be met in design, and how basic organizational and planning issues can be addressed for a safe, reliable, economic, and feasible fusion power plant.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2018

UNREVIEWED COMPOSITE ANALYSIS QUESTION EVALUATION: Update of Composite Analysis Sources Potentially Interacting with the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This unreviewed composite analysis question evaluation (UCAQE) assesses the impacts of the FFACO corrective actions on the Area 5 RWMS CA and the need to revise or update the CA Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO, a legal agreement among the NNSA/NFO, the state of Nevada, and the U.S. Department of Defense, establishes a process to identify, characterize, and implement corrective actions for historical sites on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) contaminated with hazardous or radioactive materials. Review of FFACO corrective actions involving sources of residual radioactive contamination potentially interacting with the Area 5 RWMS indicates that no significant changes affecting CA results and conclusions have occurred. Doses from the Area 5 RWMS, Industrial Sites, and Soils sites are a small fraction of the 0.3 mSv CA dose constraint, and significant interactions with releases from the Area 5 RWMS are unlikely. Doses from FFACO CASs, including UGTA sites, can be controlled by FFACO URs and institutional controls that have been implemented since the CA was prepared. As the interactions between the Area 5 RWMS and the FFACO CASs are negligible, the sites can be managed independently. The Area 5 RWMS CA reached the same conclusions about the interaction of the Area 5 RWMS with other sources of residual contamination. Therefore, there is no need to revise or update the Area 5 RWMS CA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Radiation Detection and Dual-Energy X-Ray Imaging for Port Security

Millions of cargo containers are transported across the United States border annually and are inspected for illicit radioactive material and contraband using a combination of passive radiation portal monitors (RPM) and high energy X-ray non-intrusive inspection (NII) systems. As detection performance is expected to vary with the material composition of cargo, characterizing the types of material present in cargo is important to national security. This work analyzes the passive radiation and dual energy radiography signatures from on RPM and two NII system, respectively. First, the cargos were analyzed to determine their ability to attenuate emissions from an embedded radioactive source. Secondly, dual-energy X-ray discrimination was used to determine the material composition and density of the cargos.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2019

Use of Automation in Low Level Waste Storage and Management - 19227

The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) generates Low Level Waste (LLW) and Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) from various site operations such as the operation of a research Reactor and the manufacture of Molybdenum 99. The Low Level Solid Waste (LLSW) generated is stored at ANSTO before and after conditioning. The current process flow involves the storage of LLSW waste before conditioning on racks, handled using forklifts. When the unconditioned waste is ready for conditioning, it is transferred to another facility, where volume reduction and packaging is carried out. Once conditioned, the waste is placed in further storage, pending dispatch to the proposed Australian National Radioactive Waste Management Facility (NRWMF). A new purpose built facility has been constructed, adjacent to the LLSW processing facility, for the storage and management of LLSW in both unconditioned and conditioned forms. This new facility will streamline the waste management process and significantly enhance the safety and efficiency of the process. In line with international best practises, the new facility utilises automation solutions to minimise the build footprint, and minimise the use of forklifts and other mobile plant. Most importantly, it applies the principle of ALARA (As Low as Reasonably Achievable) to minimise operator activities in areas where radioactive material is stored and eliminates double handling of the waste. The automation for unconditioned waste utilises an Automated Storage and Retrieval System (ASRS), a vertical stacker crane within high density racking, to provide easy storage and retrieval for processing and/or routine inspections. This system allows operators to control it from outside of the storage area whilst utilising integrated software that allows for the required tracking of the unconditioned waste. From the ASRS storage area, unconditioned waste will have a smooth transition to the processing facility which is located adjacent to the ASRS system. Once conditioned, the waste is catalogued and returned to a designated storage area within the new facility using an automated building gantry crane with a target delivery system to eliminate the need for operators in the main storage bay. The waste will be held here in preparation for dispatch to the future repository. The utilisation of the ASRS for the purpose of storing LLSW is an innovative use of automation that will eliminate operators from active areas, reduce dose rates received and integrate with the waste tracking software. Furthermore, the system has significant advantages with operational efficiencies increased, reduced double handling of nuclear waste and maximum use of building footprint. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

Enterprise SRS: Leveraging Ongoing Operations to Advance Nuclear Fuel Cycle Programs - 12579

The international leadership in nuclear technology development and deployment long held by the United States has eroded due to the lack of clear national strategies for advanced reactor fuel cycle concepts and for nuclear materials management, as well as to the recent policy decision that halts work on the nuclear fuel repository at Yucca Mountain. Although no national consensus on strategy has yet been reached, a number of recent high-profile reviews and workshops have clearly highlighted a national need for robust research, development and deployment (RD and D) programs in key areas of nuclear technology, especially nuclear separations science and engineering. Collectively, these reviews and workshops provide a picture of the nuclear separations mission needs for three major program offices: Department of Energy Office of-Environmental Management), DOE Office of Nuclear Energy), and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). While the individual program needs differ significantly in detail and timing, they share common needs in two critical areas of RD and D: - The need for access to and use of multi-purpose engineering-scale demonstration test facilities that can support testing with radioactive material, and - The need for collaborative research enterprises that encompass government research organizations (i.e., national laboratories), commercial industry and the academic community. Such collaborative enterprises effectively integrate theory and modeling with the actual experimental work at all scales, as well as strengthen the technical foundation for research in critical areas. The arguments for engineering-scale collaborative research facilities are compelling. Processing history has shown that test programs and demonstrations conducted with actual nuclear materials are essential to program success. It is widely recognized, however, that such facilities are expensive to build and maintain; creating an imposing, if not prohibitive, financial burden on an individual sponsoring office. Given that reality, success for the current and future nuclear separations missions is dependent on a concerted effort to develop new, creative, approaches that leverage existing facilities in a manner that supports both near- and long-term needs of national programs. As a result of this situation, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) organized the 'Nuclear Separations User Facility Strategy Session' in Washington, D.C. on July 29, 2011. This workshop brought together key stakeholders from DOE and the private sector to develop a strategy for using engineering-scale nuclear materials processing facilities to advance our nation's nuclear separations research needs. In particular, the meeting focused on recommending how these engineering-scale demonstration facilities, like the Savannah River Site H-Canyon, can be connected with smaller 'bench-scale' research activities to form a seamless approach that integrates across the continuum of RD and D of advanced separations technologies. Coming out of this workshop, a new vision has been developed for a collaborative research facility model that centers on H-Canyon. Unique to this approach is the fact that H-Canyon will continue to accomplish DOE's critical nuclear material processing missions, while simultaneously serving as an RD and D resource for the scientific and technical portions of the nuclear separations community. This paper describes the planned operations for H-Canyon in FY2012 and beyond and discusses how these operations fit within the context of a collaborative research facility model and support the ongoing fuel cycle research and development programs of the DOE. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Cement Solidification of Residual Metal Oxide from Radioactive Waste

A lot of uranium contaminated soil and concrete waste is generated from the dismantlement of uranium conversion facilities. There are several disposal methods for radioactive materials such as regulation exemption, decontamination and long-term storage. It is necessary for us to achieve the permanent disposal of radioactive waste. The methods for solidifying radioactive waste include cement solidification, asphalt solidification, and polymer solidification. Cement solidification has several advantages such as well-known materials and technologies, various applications, and reasonable cost. On the contrary, it has certain disadvantages such as a large volume expansion of solidification for radioactive waste. Because cement solidification has excellent structural strength and a shielding effect, it is widely used for the permanent disposal of radioactive waste. Cement solidification operates as a barrier against the leaching of nuclides during radioactive waste disposal. To evaluate the criteria of KORAD (Korea Radioactive Waste Agency), integrity tests on the solidification of radioactive waste need to be performed. In this study, to inspect the criteria of KORAD, we carried out the cement solidification of residual metal oxide from radioactive waste. An integrity inspection such as the pressure strength, inundation, and leaching test on cement solidification was performed. We also analyzed the experimental results according to the criteria of KORAD. The calculation of the leachability index on the primary and secondary cement solidification for leaching detection of nuclides is carried out. The integrity of primary and secondary cement solidification is evaluated. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

NORM Concentration Determination in Common Materials in an Urban Environment

The United States government performs searches for illicit radiation sources before and during large special events, such as State of the Union addresses, presidential inaugurations, or the recent papal visit. Clear detection of sources is difficult due to natural background radiation, which can vary greatly throughout a given search area. Background radiation is mostly a function of the materials used in roadways, sidewalks, and building exteriors. A team of scientists from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL), and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) is exploring the nature and variability of background count rates in order to improve the performance of searches in urban areas. A series of background measurements have been and will continue to be taken at a Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) environment at the Fort Indiantown Gap (FTIG) National Guard training facility in Pennsylvania. This site replicates a small town with asphalt roads, concrete intersections, buildings, sidewalks, curbs, and gravel parking areas. Unlike an actual urban area, traffic and pedestrian access can be easily controlled to avoid interference with measurements. This paper documents the efforts focused on characterizing the various concentrations of radioactive material found in these materials at the site. The NORM concentrations determined from this work will be incorporated in to a large-scale simulation (a 'virtual test-bed') that can be used to investigate various search techniques and algorithms, detector suite configurations, and to produce representative synthetic data for future work. A combination of measurement and simulation was used to determine the concentration of {sup 40}K and the radioactive nuclides in the uranium series and the thorium series in several materials at the FTIG MOUT site. The predicted concentrations are consistent with other published results, and they matched favorably with synthetic data generated with MCNP6 models using the determined NORM concentrations and estimates of the FTIG environment as described by available construction plans and using standard material assumptions. Future measurements will incorporate lessons learned from this study. More measurements will be made of the concrete intersections at the site. The methodology explained in this report will also be carried out on building materials in an effort to characterize NORM concentrations in these background sources. Other modeling and simulation work that should be conducted includes a robust sensitivity analysis in which the effects of small changes to the model (and measurement) system can be characterized to help bound the uncertainty on the final NORM concentration predictions. (authors)

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Modification in Applying Appendix D of 40 CFR Part 61 to Heated Solid Radionuclide Materials With High Melting and Boiling Points

Appendix D of Title 40 Part 61 of the US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) provides a procedure that US Department of Energy (US DOE) facility owners and operators can use to estimate radionuclide emissions to the atmosphere for dose calculations instead of measuring emissions for minor sources under the 40 CFR Part 61, Subpart H, National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities, regulation. The procedure assumes that any radioactive material heated above 100 °C is completely vaporized and emitted to the atmosphere. In 1991, the US DOE Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) requested approval to use different release fractions (RFs) for uranium because of its high melting and boiling points. In response to the request, the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) Region IV approved the use of modified RFs for elemental uranium provided no reaction had taken place to alter its chemical form. In 2015, the ORR requested approval to use different RFs for tungsten, again because of its high melting and boiling points. EPA Region IV approved the use of modified RFs for heated radioactive tungsten metal. In accordance with the two precedents set for heating uranium and radioactive tungsten metals, in 2016, the ORR requested approval to use modified RFs in a similar fashion for other radioactive solid metals and compounds with melting and boiling points above 500 °C that might be heated above 100 °C in future research projects and experiments. EPA Region IV again granted approval to use modified RFs for the list of compounds. This note discusses the proposed modified RFs and their development.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2012

RADIOACTIVELY POWERED RISING LIGHT CURVES OF TYPE Ia SUPERNOVAE

The rising luminosity of the recent, nearby supernova 2011fe shows a quadratic dependence with time during the first Almost-Equal-To 0.5-4 days. In addition, studies of the composite light curves formed from stacking together many Type Ia supernovae (SNe Ia) have found similar power-law indices for the rise, but may also show some dispersion that may indicate diversity. I explore what range of power-law rises are possible due to the presence of radioactive material near the surface of the exploding white dwarf (WD). I summarize what constraints such a model places on the structure of the progenitor and the distribution and velocity of ejecta. My main conclusion is that for the inferred explosion time for SN 2011fe, its rise requires an increasing mass fraction X {sub 56} Almost-Equal-To (4-6) Multiplication-Sign 10{sup -2} of {sup 56}Ni distributed between a depth of Almost-Equal-To 10{sup -2} and 0.3 M {sub Sun} below the WD's surface. Radioactive elements this shallow are not found in simulations of a single C/O detonation. Scenarios that may produce this material include helium-shell burning during a double-detonation ignition, a gravitationally confined detonation, and a subset of deflagration to detonation transition models. In general, the power-law rise can differ from quadratic depending on the details of the velocity, density, and radioactive deposition gradients in a given event. Therefore, comparisons of this work with observed bolometric rises of SNe Ia would place strong constraints on the properties of the shallow outer layers, providing important clues for identifying the elusive progenitors of SNe Ia.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Status Update on IAEA MODARIA II Working Group 1 (Assessment and Decision Making) - 19391

During WM2018, the work being done under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s Modelling and Data for Radiological Impact Assessments (MODARIA) II Programme (https://wwwns.iaea.org/projects/modaria/modaria2.asp?s=8 and l=129) was introduced. The Programme comprises seven working groups covering a wide range of topics. Amongst them, Working Group 1 (WG1) is focused on dose assessment and decision aiding tools to address existing exposure situations due to past practices involving naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) and nuclear legacy sites. Specifically, this covers the development of methods and toolsets for risk-informed decision-making for such complex sites, and includes practical demonstration of decision-making processes and tools through case studies. During 2018 WG1 participants met twice to discuss the status and plans of work being conducted by the WG. The group held its Second Interim Meeting from 7 to 11 May 2018 at the Jozef Stefan Institute (JSI) in Ljubljana, Slovenia. The objectives of the meeting were to: (1) Discuss the status of WG1 work; (2) Start preparation of the interim draft version of the MODARIA II WG1 Report (herein referred to as the 'Interim Report'); (3) Review the progress of planned data analyses, model-model comparisons, and model-data comparisons being conducted through case studies for the Tessenderlo Chemie Site in Belgium, the Zapadnoe Uranium Mill Tailings Site in Ukraine, and a Former Tin Processing Facility Site in Brazil; (4) Discuss calculations conducted for a NORM Site in China for potential addition to the WG1 case studies; (5) Report on progress on topical studies and other assignments performed to support the preparation of several sections of the Interim Report; and (6) Discuss plans for incorporating some preliminary case studies considered by MODARIA I WG1 and MODARIA I WG3. During the meeting in Slovenia, WG1 participants also visited the Zirovski vrh (RZV) Uranium Mine and Mill Tailings Site near Ljubljana. From 22 to 25 October 2018, WG1 members also participated in the MODARIA II Third Technical Meeting in Vienna, Austria. The meeting facilitated analysis of the progress made so far by the seven working groups, as well as exploration of the dissemination of the results of the MODARIA II Programme through publication in scientific journals dealing with the various subject areas covered by the Programme. WG1 participants focused on the preparation of its Interim Report, and engaged in technical exchanges with the IAEA Le Trench Project on characterization, assessment, remediation and management of buried waste at legacy trench sites, as well as the To Enhance uncertainties Reduction and stakeholders Involvement Towards integrated and graded Risk management of humans and wildlife In long-lasting radiological Exposure Situations (TERRITORIES) project (https://territories.eu/). Currently, WG1 is in the process of preparing a draft report to document the results of its various case studies and special topics, and is preparing for the final Interim Meeting in May 2019 and the final Technical Meeting in October 2019, before the conclusion of the MODARIA II Program at the end of 2019. This paper will provide a status update of these activities, along with preliminary information on the WG1 report, including potential recommendations for future activities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Distribution of U, Pu and Np in a Mo-99 Recovery Process using Sachtopore NP (titania based) Absorbent Material

A laboratory scale mockup of a prototypical Mo-99 recovery process has been operated in a radioactive materials hood at Savannah River National Laboratory. This equipment has been operated with realistic concentrations of uranium (U-238), plutonium (94% Pu-239), neptunium (Np-237), and non-radioisotopes of common fission products (including Mo). The goal of this work was to determine the amounts of U, Pu, and Np in the liquid waste streams created by the wash streams for the production process. The key question was how the initial acid wash volume will be handled, as this solution contains residual raffinate which amounted to ~ 3% ofthe mass ofthe feed solution in this experiment. If the initial 1.9 bed volumes (BV) of acid wash were recycled as in this experiment then the combined wash solutions can be expected to contain 0.4 g U/L, 2.7 pg Pu/L and < 14 pg Np/L. If, on the other extreme, the entire acid wash solution was discarded as waste, then the combined wash solutions can be expected to contain 11 g U/L, 3.8 pg Pu/L and ~ 80 pg Np/L. The Sachtopore NP absorbent (for Mo-99 recovery) retains a minuscule fraction ofthe U (2.3 mg U per g titania or 0.03% ofthe U in the feed). The uncertainties are too large to determine how close the absorbent is to saturation with U. Less mass but a higher fraction ofthe total Np was retained by the absorbent (0.7 pg Np per g titania or ~2% of the Np in the feed). As has been reported elsewhere, a large fraction ofthe Pu fed to the titania bed was retained by the absorbent (92% of Pu in the feed or 20 pg per g titania).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, UMTRCA Title I Disposal Site 35 Years Postclosure (1985-2020) - 20288

The DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, Disposal Site is a former uranium ore-processing site located in the borough of Canonsburg and an important part of US history. For 46 years (1911-1957), the site processed ore, for vanadium, radium and then uranium. Soils and groundwater beneath the site were contaminated by the milling operations. The 15-hectare (37-acre) site is owned by the US government and managed by LM, which serves as the federal land manager and steward of cultural, historical, and natural resources at Cold War legacy sites that have been successfully cleaned up to remedial standards. In 1978 Congress directed DOE to remediate 22 inactive uranium-ore processing sites under the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA), in accordance with standards promulgated by the US Environmental Protection Agency in Title 40 CFR Part 192 (40 (CFR 192). Subpart B of 40 CFR 192 regulates the cleanup of contaminated groundwater at the processing sites. The radioactive materials were encapsulated in US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved disposal cells, and the NRC general license for UMTRCA Title I sites is established in 10 CFR 40.27. Canonsburg was the first site to be remediated under UMTRCA. From 1983 to 1985, the Canonsburg site underwent cleanup under this US law that provides for the safe and environmentally sound disposal, long-term stabilization, and control of uranium mill tailings in a manner that minimizes or eliminates radiation health hazards to the public. The site is unique in that it is one of only two UMTRCA Title I sites in the eastern half of the United States, the other site being the Burrell, Pennsylvania, Title I Disposal Site, a vicinity property to the Canonsburg site. It has been 35 years since the disposal cell at the Canonsburg site was completed. This paper discusses the many efforts that have been taken to maintain the site and presents some of the lessons learned concerning the long-term care of the site. The discussion includes but is not limited to the following: (1) Preserving site history so the community can better appreciate and understand the site. (2) Community outreach efforts, and the importance of maintaining transparency of environmental monitoring results with the community. (3) Pursuing reuse opportunities that offer the potential for improving the community. (4) Remaining engaged with the local community. (5) Remaining proactive in the long-term care of the site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Calibration facility for environment dosimetry instruments

In the last ten years, the nuclear activities, as well as the major nuclear events (see Fukushima accident) had an increasing impact on the environment, merely by contamination with radioactive materials. The most conferment way to quickly identify the presence of some radioactive elements in the environment, is to measure the dose-equivalent rate H. In this situation, information concerning the values of H due only to the natural radiation background must exist. Usually, the values of H due to the natural radiation background, are very low (∼10{sup −9} - 10{sup −8} Sv/h). A correct measurement of H in this range involve a performing calibration of the measuring instruments in the measuring range corresponding to the natural radiation background lead to important problems due to the presence of the natural background itself the best way to overlap this difficulty is to set up the calibration stand in an area with very low natural radiation background. In Romania, we identified an area with such special conditions at 200 m dept, in a salt mine. This paper deals with the necessary requirements for such a calibration facility, as well as with the calibration stand itself. The paper includes also, a description of the calibration stand (and images) as well as the radiological and metrological parameters. This calibration facilities for environment dosimetry is one of the few laboratories in this field in Europe.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Risk-Informed Approach for Regulatory Approval of Microreactor Transport

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is addressing the challenges associated with safe transport of microreactors including the development and evaluation of regulatory options. PNNL developed a risk-informed regulatory framework for the licensing of the transportation of microreactors in which irradiated nuclear fuel is part microreactor transportation package. The framework lays out a viable regulatory pathway, including decision points for regulatory options and the supporting technical evaluations for those options in phases from near to long term. A microreactor and its contents will likely not be able to meet all the federal regulatory requirements as a Type B or fissile material transportation package under 10 CFR Part 71 (“Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material”). However, the regulatory framework developed by PNNL lays out a viable risk-informed licensing options that are safe and feasible. Risk assessment such as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) can be used to show comparable safety to that provided by a Type B or fissile material package for surface transport. The framework includes guidance on applicable regulations and discusses historical precedence in using risk information for transportation licensing. The framework includes guidance for performing a microreactor transportation PRA, use and development of risk evaluation criteria, and factors such of defense-in-depth and safety margin concepts. Key advantages of using the approach are (1) increasing the likelihood of successfully obtaining regulatory transportation package approval, (2) informing the design on the relative risk significance of microreactor containment and shielding, and (3) informing the need for transportation compensatory measures. This paper focuses on two primary elements of the framework which are development of a transportation PRA for microreactor packages and development of the risk acceptance guidelines to assess the results of the PRA for regulatory decision-making.

microreactor, micro nuclear power plant, MNPP, ris↗