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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 577 records · Page 32
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Optimal and Nominal Nuclear Testing Programs

The intent of this paper is to encourage thought on what the Test Site Verification Team (TSVT) might encounter primarily in terms of observable infrastructure when deployed to assess and verify an explosion, and/or a nuclear-testing program, site, or facility. A primary objective is to present the concept of a continuum of nuclear-testing programs between optimal and nominal end members as defined primarily by their observable infrastructure. Key objectives are: 1. Define optimal and nominal nuclear testing programs; 2. Discuss underground development for nuclear operations; 3. Discuss underground nuclear operations, safety, and health; 4. Compare drift complexes of optimal and nominal testing programs; 5. Compare drift complexes for nuclear testing and commercial production; 6. Discuss a potential future look of underground development and operations. A secondary objective is to interpret the intent of the three TSVT verification scenarios, primarily by defining “consistent with” nuclear or non-nuclear or listing criteria that “verify” nuclear or non-nuclear. Before discussing optimal and nominal nuclear testing programs, an understanding of the three verification scenarios is deemed beneficial.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NA-213) [Slides]

The risk of a terrorist group acquiring radioactive/nuclear materials requires NSDD's continuous efforts to build capacity of partner countries to deter, detect, and investigate acts of nuclear smuggling. Over the past 25 years, NSDD has and continues to deploy radiation detection equipment tailored to operational requirements with the goal of developing a layered, flexible, varied, and unpredictable nuclear detection architecture. An effective counter nuclear smuggling strategy considers both technical and operational challenges to develop the tools necessary to achieve the mission. LANL provides expert support to the NSDD mission to constantly improve and adapt to any future challenges.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Analysis methods for quantifying Xe-127 samples from the UNESE project

In the Underground Nuclear Explosions Signatures Experiment (UNESE) radioactive 37 Ar and 127 Xe were used as tracers in subsurface migration experiments. As part of the experiment, methods were developed to quantify 127 Xe via β-γ coincidence spectroscopy. Later examination of the results highlighted a weakness of this analysis method in samples with no 127 Xe present, so a reanalysis of samples was performed to identify those which were falsely identified as having 127 Xe present. Ongoing work to develop a new analysis method with targeted regions of interest is also described. Measurements were also performed to quantify the concentration of 127 Xe and 37 Ar which were injected as part of UNESE Phase 2. A best value for the concentration of 37 Ar and 127 Xe was determined and reported here for use in future analyses of the UNESE Phase 2 results.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Trinity 78th Anniversary: re-discovered and newly edited unclassified footage shows use of tanks to collect radioactive samples immediately after Trinity test (Rev. 1)

On July 16, 1945, at 5:29 a.m., a team of Los Alamos scientists successfully detonated the world’s first atomic bomb at a remote section of south-central New Mexico desert, then known as the Alamogordo Bombing Range. This full-scale test, dubbed “Trinity” by the Lab’s first Director J. Robert Oppenheimer, proved the viability of the implosion-type bomb known as The Gadget and ushered in the Atomic Age. Three weeks after Trinity, two Los-Alamos created atomic weapons – Little Boy and Fat Man – were released above Japan, helping to end World War II and changing the course of history forever.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Trade Study of Nondestructive Assay Technologies

The purpose of this report is to summarize the capabilities of currently existing NDA technologies that can be applied to holdup measurements. Cataloguing the strengths and weaknesses of the existing state of the art is a necessary step towards setting goals for new technology development. The NDA technologies evaluated in this report include gamma imaging, non-imaging gamma detectors, and neutron coincidence counting. These technologies were chosen based on their potential for technological improvement or to be applied in different settings. Each technology will be analyzed on a set of evaluation criteria chosen to represent the most salient features of a detector system for holdup measurements. These criteria include sensitivity, energy resolution, angular resolution (for imaging technologies only), ease of use, and cost.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

The Effects of the War in Ukraine on National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Missions

While the challenge from a risen and revisionist China may prove greater and more enduring, Russia’s war on Ukraine profoundly changes the strategic context, importance, and requirements of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) missions. The world changed as much in February of 2022 as it did in November of 1989 or December of 1991 , when the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union fell apart. These changes will not likely be ephemeral. Russia is preparing for a long war and a prolonged period of isolation from and hostility toward the West. Although Russia has many political, economic, and military weaknesses, it retains the world’s largest arsenal of nuclear weapons. Russia is therefore central to deterrence, arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear security issues. Furthermore, Moscow’s permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council affords it a veto potentially affecting all these issues.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Packaging Plan for Mark-18A Plutonium Oxide

Mark-18A (Mk-18A) targets were irradiated at the Savannah River Site and have been in wet storage at the site since the 1970s. The Mk-18A Target Material Recovery Program has been established to recover the 244 Pu and heavy curium (≥50% 246 Cm and 248 Cm) in the targets at the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and ship the materials to Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s (ORNL’s) Radiochemical Engineering Development Center for programmatic use. Two products will be recovered from the Mk- 18A targets for shipment from SRNL to ORNL: a plutonium oxide stream and an oxide material that will contain the americium, curium, and lanthanides. This document presents the plan for packaging of the plutonium oxide material for shipment and storage at ORNL.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

TEX 2.0: DOE-EM NCS Experimental Needs [Slides]

This presentation touches on the needs presented from recent work with Hanford Tank Farms (HTF) and Savannah River Site (SRS) Liquid Waste Process (LWP). The Meetings were held with other sites by presenting information about TEX 2.0 and having discussions on what the current challenges were for criticality safety validation.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Nuclear Criticality Safety Training: Needs and Efforts [Slides]

This presentation on Nuclear Criticality Safety Training: Needs and Efforts covers several points. This presentation starts with a quick overview of Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Training. Then it lists current and ongoing training with a focus on the training in progress. This presentation then concludes with a look at supporting efforts.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Phase Field Sintering Simulations of Tagged UO 2

Isotopic taggants are being considered as an additive for UO 2 manufacturing to improve nuclear security. Before taggants can be adopted, it must be determined whether taggants have any effect on the fuel microstructure or performance. As part of this effort, a grand potential formulation of the phase field method was used to model untagged, Cr-tagged, and Fe-tagged UO 2 . The simulations were compared to determine whether the taggants had any effect on fuel density or grain size. The results suggest that the taggants will not affect the density or grain size, but these findings may not be reliable because of high uncertainty. Causes of the uncertainty were discussed, and future work is proposed to reduce the model uncertainty.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Harnessing Uncertainty through Functional Data Analysis in Gas Breakthrough Data

Detecting subsurface explosions from radionuclide gas migration through rock fractures is an effective way to identify nuclear activity. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has developed simulation methods, based on data from the 1962 Hardhat underground nuclear test, to predict gas breakthrough times at the surface. However, these methods rely on an imperfect understanding of the relationship between rock damage and fracture permeability. Our clinic project studies methods for predicting breakthrough curves that characterize total mass produced as a function of time, as well as quantifying the uncertainty associated with these predictions. The model that is currently employed to relate damage to permeability uses an empirically motivated power-law expression, with a range of parameter values that are compatible with the experimental Hardhat data. We develop emulators, built from functional data analysis techniques and trained on simulation data, that rapidly predict the gas breakthrough curve given a damage field and given the parameter values of the power-law equation. Using Bayesian regression, we address the problem of uncertainty quantification in our emulators. Finally, in order to test the robustness of the model, we further validate it on a damage field representing different physical conditions.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Demonstrating and Expanding DRiFT’s Helium-3 Detector Response Capabilities [Slides]

Helium-3 tubes are an efficient way to detect neutrons after they have thermalized by polyethylene. They are often arranged in rings to perform coincidence counting. Applications include nuclear safeguards, treaty verification, and emergency response. DRiFT has the ability to simulate pile-up, room return, and end effects. A new feature determines real and accidental correlated counts. The next steps include DRiFT 2.0 released as executable, continued demonstration of gas module capabilities, and semiconductor module under a development.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

Report on Next-Gen AI for Proliferation Detection Workshop: Domain-Aware Methods

The emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) in the modern world has impacted nearly every application imaginable. This includes nuclear proliferation detection, which offers the potential to improve existing capabilities as well as create new ones. Proliferation detection seeks to detect and characterize attempts by state and non-state actors to acquire nuclear weapons or associated technology, materials, or knowledge. Such a mission is vitally important for global stability and security but is notoriously difficult. By leveraging advances in AI, exciting opportunities exist to enhance the proliferation detection regime. The Data Science and AI portfolio within the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D) seeks to leverage the capabilities of the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) national laboratories and other partners to develop AI systems that can accomplish otherwise impossible tasks in support of proliferation detection. As part of its efforts, the portfolio has created a series of workshops on Next-Gen AI for Proliferation Detection to help define the requirements for suitable AI systems, share successful research and best practices, and foster connection and understanding between the relevant parties including researchers and end-users. Each workshop in the series focuses on a specific and critical aspect of AI to enable it to accomplish proliferation detection objectives. The first workshop focused on explainability techniques; the second workshop and the topic of this report, covers methods for incorporating domain awareness into AI. The Next-Gen AI for Proliferation Detection Workshop: Domain-Aware Methods took place virtually over two days in February 2021 and included four keynote presentations, 22 technical presentations, and a concluding panel. The presentations, discussions, and workshop findings are summarized in this report.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗