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DOE OSTI2016

A Historical Review of the Safe Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel, Rev. 1

This report is a revision to M3 milestone M3FT-16OR090402028 for the former Nuclear Fuels Storage and Transportation Planning Project (NFST), “Safety Record of SNF Shipments.” The US Department of Energy (DOE) has since established the Office of Integrated Waste Management (IWM), which builds on the work begun by NFST, to develop an integrated waste management system for spent nuclear fuel (SNF), including the developm

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Establishment of Master Plans on Spent Nuclear Fuel in Korea - 17097

This study pertains to the Master Plans for High-Level Radioactive Waste Management prepared by the Korean Government on the basis of the predicted amount of spent nuclear fuel in Korea and the results of public discussion of the issue. The Korean Government has established the Master Plans for High-Level Radioactive Waste Management on the basis of the results of public discussion of the issue to secure the safety of the nationals and resolve the policy uncertainty that has been accumulated for more than 30 years. To provide a legal basis for the implementation of the Master Plans, legislation of the Act on High-Level Radioactive Waste Management Procedures (tentative) will be promoted, and an independent implementation institute, (tentatively named as) the Management Facility Strategy Committee, and an administrative supporting organization, the Planning and Promotion Group, will be organized and operated. This study is expected to transfer experience of and lessons from determining national policy to countries that have not established their final management policy for spent fuel, based on the formation of national consensus. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Waste Management Approach for a Potential Future U.S. Closed Fuel Cycle - 16233

The U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy has chartered an effort to develop technologies to enable safe and cost effective recycle of commercial used nuclear fuel (UNF) in the U.S. Part of this effort includes the evaluation of exiting waste management technologies for effective treatment of wastes in the context of current U.S. regulations and development of waste forms and processes with significant cost and/or performance benefits over those existing. This study summarizes the results of these ongoing efforts with a focus on the highly radioactive primary waste streams. The primary streams considered and the recommended waste forms include: - Tritium separated from either a low volume gas stream or a high volume water stream. The recommended waste form is low-water cement in high integrity containers. - Iodine-129 separated from off-gas streams in aqueous processing. There are a range of potentially suitable waste forms. As a reference case, a glass composite material (GCM) formed by the encapsulation of the silver Mordenite (AgZ) getter material in a low-temperature glass is assumed. A number of alternatives with distinct advantages are also considered including a fused silica waste form with encapsulated nano-sized AgI crystals. - Carbon-14 separated from LWR fuel treatment off-gases and immobilized as a CaCO{sub 3} in a cement waste form. - Krypton-85 separated from LWR and SFR fuel treatment off-gases and stored as a compressed gas. - An aqueous reprocessing high-level waste (HLW) raffinate waste which is immobilized by the vitrification process in one of three forms: a single phase borosilicate glass, a borosilicate based glass ceramic, or a multi-phased titanate ceramic [e.g., synthetic rock (Synroc)]. - An undissolved solids (UDS) fraction from aqueous reprocessing of LWR fuel that is either included in the borosilicate HLW glass or is immobilized in the form of a metal alloy in the case of glass ceramics or titanate ceramics. - Zirconium-based LWR fuel cladding hulls and stainless steel (SS) fuel assembly hardware that are washed and super-compacted for disposal or as an alternative Zr purification and reuse (or disposal as low-level waste, LLW) by reactive gas separations. - Electrochemical process salt HLW which is immobilized in a glass bonded Sodalite waste form known as the ceramic waste form (CWF). - Electrochemical process UDS and SS cladding hulls which are melted into an iron based alloy waste form. Mass and volume estimates for each of the recommended waste forms based on the source terms from a representative flowsheet are reported. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2017

Compact System for Operating and Decommissioned Reactor Used Fuel Management - 17243

Most nuclear power plants in operation today were designed with limited wet storage for their discharged used nuclear fuel (UNF), predicated on the assumption that either recycling or geologic storage would be available within the reactor's lifetime. While that has proven to be the case in some countries such as France with its recycling, it has not for most. In the USA, dry storage of UNF at the plant site at an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) has since the mid-1980s been the primary mode of interim storage so that the plant can off-load its UNF from the pools at the power plants. Initially the space reserved for the ISFSI at a reactor site was based on the assumption that the Department of Energy (DOE) would be transporting that UNF to a geological repository site, such as Yucca Mountain, by 1998. However, due to the delay in the opening of any geological repository the utilities are running out of space on their existing ISFSIs for additional UNF dry storage systems. Since plants prefer to keep their ISFSIs inside the protected area of the plant, options for expanding the ISFSI are becoming limited. At the same time, increasing the capacity of the dry storage systems is also not an option in most cases as the dry storage systems have almost reached their capacity limits with the 37 PWR or 89 BWR fuel assembly canister designs. For plants that have announced plans to shut down, their main priority is to off-load the UNF from the pool to dry storage at an ISFSI so that they can proceed to 'Safe store' or other storage options, and start their decommissioning process as soon as possible. Thus, keeping the size of the ISFSI compact is very important for safety, security and economics. This paper will describe the details of a reduced footprint version of AREVA TN's NUHOMS{sup R} System that addresses the need for maximizing ISFSI capacity. This system not only offers a compact design that stores nearly double the number of UNF assemblies in the same space, it also offers superior radiation protection to the workers and public. In addition, it offers unmatched protection against beyond design basis (BDB) events like the tsunami at Fukushima in Japan, the earthquake at North Anna site, tornadoes and manmade attacks such as the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York. It also includes significant enhancement for a robust Canister Evolved Safety Program for Aging Management. The utilities in the USA are currently using dry storage systems with canisters of different diameter, different length, and different weights. The fuel assemblies that are stored in these canisters are also different in their fuel types (PWR or BWR),different fuel parameters like burnups, enrichments, and cooling times and different storage orientations in the storage overpacks like horizontal or vertical. The compact version of AREVA TN's NUHOMS{sup R} System offers a 'Universal' Storage Overpack which is designed to accept all these different design dry storage canister available in the industry. As UNF storage continues to drives the industry towards innovations that address the need for consolidated storage, compact ISFSIs and aging management, this new evolution of the AREVA TN NUHOMS{sup R} system offers a significant leap forward in addressing all of these challenges. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Status of DOE-Managed Waste Repository Safety Assessment Information Needs

The U.S. DOE evaluated the need for disposing of only DOE-Managed high-level-waste (HLW, which includes DOE-managed spent nuclear fuel [SNF] in this report) in a geologic repository by using the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 1982 (NWPA, as amended) and stated (DOE, 2015) “A geologic repository for permanent disposal of Defense HLW could be sited, licensed, constructed, and operated more quickly than a Common NWPA Repository and would provide valuable experience to reduce the cost of a future repository and the time needed to develop it.” Based in part on that report, the President of the United States issued a memorandum stating that such a repository was required (see website with content at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/24/presidential-memorandum-disposal-defensehigh-level-radioactive-waste-se). This furthered the recommendation from DOE (2014) to “…begin implementation of a phased, adaptive, and consent-based strategy with development of a separate mined repository for some DOE-managed HLW and cooler DOE-managed SNF, potentially including some portion of the inventory of naval SNF.” The work in this report summarizes the status of activities within the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC) to begin assessing the information needs for evaluating the safety of such a repository, considering both the waste forms being disposed and the repository concepts being considered. This report is milestone M3FT-15SN0824011 performed under the UFDC work package FT-15SN082401 to provide a status of the progress made towards this objective.

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DOE OSTI2014

Full-Scale Accident Testing in Support of Used Nuclear Fuel Transportation.

The safe transport of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste is an important aspect of the waste management system of the United States. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) currently certifies spent nuclear fuel rail cask designs based primarily on numerical modeling of hypothetical accident conditions augmented with some small scale testing. However, NRC initiated a Package Performance Study (PPS) in 2001 to examine the response of full-scale rail casks in extreme transportation accidents. The objectives of PPS were to demonstrate the safety of transportation casks and to provide high-fidelity data for validating the modeling. Although work on the PPS eventually stopped, the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future recommended in 2012 that the test plans be re-examined. This recommendation was in recognition of substantial public feedback calling for a full-scale severe accident test of a rail cask to verify evaluations by NRC, which find that risk from the transport of spent fuel in certified casks is extremely low. This report, which serves as the re-assessment, provides a summary of the history of the PPS planning, identifies the objectives and technical issues that drove the scope of the PPS, and presents a possible path for moving forward in planning to conduct a full-scale cask test. Because full-scale testing is expensive, the value of such testing on public perceptions and public acceptance is important. Consequently, the path forward starts with a public perception component followed by two additional components: accident simulation and first responder training. The proposed path forward presents a series of study options with several points where the package performance study could be redirected if warranted.

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DOE OSTI2015

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2014

This Nevada Nuclear Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NNSA/NFO Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts.This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2014 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) and its two support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory–Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). Through a Memorandum of Agreement, NNSA/NFO is responsible for the oversight of these ER projects, and the Sandia Field Office of NNSA (NNSA/SFO) has oversight of all other TTR and NTTR activities. NNSA/SFO produces the TTR annual environmental report, which is available at http://www.sandia.gov/news/publications/environmental/index.html.Major Site Programs and Facilities NNSA/NFO directs the management and operation of the NNSS and six sites across the nation. The six sites include two in Nevada (NLVF and RSL-Nellis) and four in other states (RSL-Andrews in Maryland, Livermore Operations in California, Los Alamos Operations in New Mexico, and Special Technologies Laboratory in California). Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories are the principal organizations that sponsor and implement the nuclear weapons programs at the NNSS. National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), is the current Management and Operating contractor accountable for the successful execution of work and ensuring that work is performed in compliance with environmental regulations. The six sites all provide support to enhance the NNSS as a location for weapons experimentation and nuclear test readiness. The three major NNSS missions include National Security/Defense, Environmental Management, and Nondefense. The major programs that support these missions are Stockpile Stewardship and Management, Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism, Nuclear Emergency Response, Strategic Partnership Projects, Environmental Restoration, Waste Management, Conservation and Renewable Energy, Other Research and Development, and Infrastructure. The major facilities that support the programs include the U1a Facility, Big Explosives Experimental Facility (BEEF), Device Assembly Facility, Dense Plasma Focus Facility, Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research Facility, Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex, Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex (NPTEC), Radiological/Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Exercise Site (known as the T-1 Site), Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC), and the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2019

The CNSC's Inspector Training and Qualification Program and its Importance to the Nuclear Industry - 19370

Trained, qualified, and designated staff at the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) conduct inspections of licensed nuclear sites as a method of compliance verification. This paper will describe the unique and comprehensive qualification process for CNSC inspectors, known as the Inspector Training and Qualification Program (ITQP). The ITQP includes service-line-specific training that is unique to each inspection group within the CNSC, dependent on the facility/industry type. The training requirements specific to staff in the Wastes and Decommissioning Division and its impact on safety at waste management sites across Canada will be discussed. This paper will specifically identify the importance of CNSC inspector training and detail how the unique training program requirements enable the CNSC to better identify and encourage compliance among nuclear waste and decommissioning sites in Canada. CNSC inspectors are designated under section 29 of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSCA), and the powers of inspectors are outlined in section 32 of the NSCA. Having trained, qualified, and designated inspectors is paramount for both the CNSC and the nuclear industry. For the CNSC, this ensures that staff in the field are aware of potential hazards and how to mitigate such hazards (if applicable), that staff understand the regulatory framework and how to measure compliance against it, and that staff consistently apply CNSC values across the nuclear industry. For the industry, this ensures that staff present at nuclear facilities are knowledgeable and professional, that inspections are conducted in a consistent manner, and that any compliance actions issued are measurable and defendable against the regulatory framework. The CNSC's ITQP incorporates both theoretical (in-class and online) and practical training, and is broken down into six categories: mandatory training for all new employees; core training; service-line-specific training; on-the-job training; CNSC regulations training; and, recommended additional training. This paper will discuss in detail the specific aspects of each of these categories, the importance of each category including the difference between knowledge and skills acquired in theoretical versus hands-on training, and how CNSC staff in designated inspector positions (inspectors-in-training) progress through the program. The complete list of core training and service-line-specific training for inspectors in the Wastes and Decommissioning Division, including re-qualification requirements, will be explored throughout the paper. It is further important that CNSC designated inspectors undergo continuous learning to ensure that their skills remain up to date, as well as to ensure that inspectors requalify at defined intervals to enable the maintenance of the core knowledge and skills with which the determination of the person's qualification was based. The steps involved in this requalification process, as well as the importance of continuous learning and the maintenance of skills and knowledge will be further discussed. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2013

Industrial Program of Waste Management - Cigeo Project - 13033

The French Planning Act of 28 June 2006 prescribed that a reversible repository in a deep geological formation be chosen as the reference solution for the long-term management of high-level and intermediate-level long-lived radioactive waste. It also entrusted the responsibility of further studies and design of the repository (named Cigeo) upon the French Radioactive Waste Management Agency (Andra), in order for the review of the creation-license application to start in 2015 and, subject to its approval, the commissioning of the repository to take place in 2025. Andra is responsible for siting, designing, implementing, operating the future geological repository, including operational and long term safety and waste acceptance. Nuclear operators (Electricite de France (EDF), AREVA NC, and the French Commission in charge of Atomic Energy and Alternative Energies (CEA) are technically and financially responsible for the waste they generate, with no limit in time. They provide Andra, on one hand, with waste packages related input data, and on the other hand with their long term industrial experiences of high and intermediate-level long-lived radwaste management and nuclear operation. Andra, EDF, AREVA and CEA established a cooperation agreement for strengthening their collaborations in these fields. Within this agreement Andra and the nuclear operators have defined an industrial program for waste management. This program includes the waste inventory to be taken into account for the design of the Cigeo project and the structural hypothesis underlying its phased development. It schedules the delivery of the different categories of waste and defines associated flows. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2019

Panel Session 1: WM2019 Plenary Session

The plenary panel focused on government and industry world leaders speaking on the pressing issues facing radioactive waste management in 2019 and beyond. Presentations proposed include: 1 - Waste Management Symposium 2019 - Plenary Session (Rumina Velshi, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (Canada)); 2 - The DOE 2019 Featured Site - Idaho (Congressman Mike Simpson, United States House of Representatives, Idaho's 2. Congressional District)

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DOE OSTI2017

A Classification of Commercial Nuclear Reactor Sites and the Subsequent Impacts on Preparing Spent Nuclear Fuel for Shipment - 17355

The US Department of Energy is conducting analyses to inform future decisions regarding an integrated waste management system for the acceptance of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from commercial nuclear reactor sites. The ability to prepare SNF for shipment from reactor sites is likely to be restricted by ongoing operations at those sites. This report examines the extent to which those operations will restrict the reactor sites' availability to prepare SNF for shipment. Specifically, the analysis focuses on the impact and frequency of refueling operations within the commercial reactor sites in the US. In this report, a characterization of reactor sites into families is described. This characterization is based on the number of operating reactors on site, the length of refueling cycles for those reactors, and the configuration of spent fuel pools on site. Each reactor family is analyzed to estimate the amount of time for which each reactor site in the family would be available to prepare SNF shipments. This analysis is a work in progress, and the results are used to inform the development of new models of an integrated waste management system for commercial SNF. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2019

Environmental Remediation of Waste Management Areas at Chalk River Laboratories - 19130

The Government of Canada's nuclear legacy liabilities have resulted from ∼70 years of nuclear research and development (R and D). The majority of these liabilities are located at the CRL Site and consist of shutdown research buildings (including prototype and research reactors), plus a wide variety of buried and stored wastes, and contaminated lands. The Environmental Remediation Projects (ERP) branch are assessing the waste inventory in the Chalk River Laboratories Waste Management Areas in order to make informed and risk based decisions on remediating affected lands. This paper provides examples of contaminated sites at CRL that require remediation as well as examples of remediation activities already complete. The environmental remediation process followed at CRL and the development of the CRL site cleanup plan are outlined. Until suitable disposal facilities are available ERP will continue to characterize and assess contaminated sites, monitoring and managing the risks in place while preparing for full-scale remediation activities. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 132: Risk-Informed Approach for Decision Making in WM, D and D and SNF Management: Reasonable Assurance for Safety

Mr. Larry Camper organized a panel of experts to discuss approaches to better make risk-informed decisions in waste management, decommissioning, and the management of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). The audience heard the perspectives from four panelists that addressed issues ranging from the technical basis used to make risk-informed decisions to for developing cleanup criteria and promulgating regulations and safety standards both domestically and abroad. A summary of each of the presentations given by the panelists is provided herein. This WMS BOD featured panel focused on the Risk-Informed Approach for Decision Making in WM, D and D and SNF Management and the Reasonable Assurance for Safety. The panelists addressed and discussed with the audience different approaches used for decision-making, summarizing ongoing probabilistic vs. deterministic approaches, including IAEA graded approach, and discussed policies/approaches to achieve reasonable assurance for safety rather than using absolute assurance. Panelists with presentations: Risk-Informed Decision Making - More than a Motto? (Paul Black); NRC Staff Perspective on Risk-Informed Approach and Reasonable Safety Assurance in D and D and LLW (Rateb (Boby) Abu Eid); Risk-Informed Decision-Making and Illustrative National Academies Studies (Charles Ferguson); IAEA's Revised Safety Guidance on Remediation (Michelle Roberts); NDA Radioactive Waste Strategy - A Risk Informed Approach (James McKinney)

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DOE OSTI2016

Waste Shipments To and From the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Radioactive Waste Management Complex (4th Quarter / Annual Transportation Report FY2015)

This report satisfies the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of waste shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex at Area 5. This report summarizes the 4th quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 low-level radioactive waste, mixed low-level radioactive waste shipments and classified non-radioactive shipments. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment and returned to the NNSS this quarter or during FY 2015.

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DOE OSTI2015

Transport of French PWR steam generators to very low level waste disposal - 15203

When considering the complexity of IAEA nuclear transport regulations, the transport of a Steam Generator (SG) in one un-packaged block from a dismantling plant to a nuclear waste disposal is a challenge. The choices made, the difficulties encountered and the feedback that has been learnt from it are described. The disposal of decommissioning waste requires taking into account not only the constraints of acceptance of the repository but also the specific constraints of transportation from the dismantling plant to the final disposal site. In France, these criteria and regulations are respectively under the supervision of the French National Radioactive Waste Management Agency (ANDRA) and the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN). In the course of the dismantling of the EDF PWR plant Chooz A, the four decontaminated SGs were shipped to the ANDRA Very Low Level Waste (VLLW) repository. After removal, the SGs were decontaminated, allowing them to attain the criteria of VLLW and thus be accepted by the ANDRA. However, to transport these decontaminated SGs as single un-packaged blocks, it was necessary to ensure compliance with the Surface Contaminated Object SCO-I regulation criteria. For this, transport safety files were written and surface contamination and radiation criteria checked. One of the four SGs had to be decontaminated again and another one had to be transported under special arrangement. Due to the exceptional nature of the transportation, specialized means of transport and stowage were also studied. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2013

Status Update on the NCRP Scientific Committee SC 5-1 Report: Decision Making for Late-Phase Recovery from Nuclear or Radiological Incidents - 13450

In August 2008, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued its final Protective Action Guide (PAG) for radiological dispersal device (RDD) and improvised nuclear device (IND) incidents. This document specifies protective actions for public health during the early and intermediate phases and cleanup guidance for the late phase of RDD or IND incidents, and it discusses approaches to implementing the necessary actions. However, while the PAG provides specific guidance for the early and intermediate phases, it prescribes no equivalent guidance for the late-phase cleanup actions. Instead, the PAG offers a general description of a complex process using a site-specific optimization approach. This approach does not predetermine cleanup levels but approaches the problem from the factors that would bear on the final agreed-on cleanup levels. Based on this approach, the decision-making process involves multifaceted considerations including public health, the environment, and the economy, as well as socio-political factors. In an effort to fully define the process and approach to be used in optimizing late-phase recovery and site restoration following an RDD or IND incident, DHS has tasked the NCRP with preparing a comprehensive report addressing all aspects of the optimization process. Preparation of the NCRP report is a three-year (2010-2013) project assigned to a scientific committee, the Scientific Committee (SC) 5-1; the report was initially titled, Approach to Optimizing Decision Making for Late- Phase Recovery from Nuclear or Radiological Terrorism Incidents. Members of SC 5-1 represent a broad range of expertise, including homeland security, health physics, risk and decision analysis, economics, environmental remediation and radioactive waste management, and communication. In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident of 2011, and guided by a recent process led by the White House through a Principal Level Exercise (PLE), the optimization approach has since been expanded to include off-site contamination from major nuclear power plant accidents as well as other nuclear or radiological incidents. The expanded application under the current guidance has thus led to a broadened scope of the report, which is reflected in its new title, Decision Making for Late-Phase Recovery from Nuclear or Radiological Incidents. The NCRP report, which is due for publication in 2013, will substantiate the current DHS guidance by clarifying and elaborating on the processes required for the development and implementation of procedures for optimizing decision making for late-phase recovery, enabling the establishment of cleanup goals on a site-specific basis. The report will contain a series of topics addressing important issues related to the long-term recovery from nuclear or radiological incidents. Special topics relevant to supporting the optimization of the decision-making process will include cost-benefit analysis, radioactive waste management, risk communication, stakeholder interaction, risk assessment, and decontamination approaches and techniques. The committee also evaluated past nuclear and radiological incidents for their relevance to the report, including the emerging issues associated with the Fukushima nuclear accident. Thus, due to the commonality of the late-phase issues (such as the potential widespread contamination following an event), the majority of the information pertaining to the response in the late-phase decision-making period, including site-specific optimization framework and approach, could be used or adapted for use in case of similar situations that are not due to terrorism, such as those that would be caused by major nuclear facility accidents or radiological incidents. To ensure that the report and the NCRP recommendations are current and relevant to the effective implementation of federal guidance, SC 5-1 has actively coordinated with the agencies of interest and other relevant stakeholders throughout the duration of the project. The resulting report will be an important resource to guide those involved in late-phase recovery efforts following a nuclear or radiological incident. (authors)

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