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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 577 records · Page 32
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2014

Overview of Observed and Measured Physical and Geophysical Effects of Historic Underground Nuclear Tests at the Nevada National Security Site

As detailed in a variety of sources (e.g., Allen et al. [1997]; Grasso [2001]), underground explosions can leave visible evidence of their occurrence in the geologic medium. The appearance and extent of the effects visible at the surface depend on a variety of factors, including scaled depth of burial (SDOB; actual depth of burial divided by the cube root of the yield of the explosion) and geologic medium characteristics. Surface effects were routinely documented for most of the underground nuclear explosions (UNEs) conducted at the former Nevada Test Site (now Nevada National Nuclear Site) and spatial data for them are available to the public (Grasso, 2001). Other effects, including collapse chimneys, glass-lined surfaces indicative of the initial explosion cavity, and shock damage to the medium, have also been characterized in various ways. These studies were done for a variety of purposes such as determining how closely UNEs could safely be positioned to conserve testing “real estate,” as input for containment design, to obtain survivability data for various types of equipment and instrumentation, and to understand device performance. Here we present examples of various mapped and measured explosion effects for the two main types of historical UNEs conducted at the NNSS, those in vertical shafts and those in horizontal tunnels. We do not include here cratering tests, which were shots conducted at shallow SDOBs for the purpose of creating a surface excavation.

explosion effects, Nevada National Security Site↗
DOE OSTI2017

Remote Monitoring System Design Requirements for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) worked with other sites within the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration weapons complex to develop design requirements for a Remote Monitoring System. System objectives include: • Continuous monitoring of packaging (containers) within a Facility's buildings to meet Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) inventory requirements. • Remotely access and receive monitoring data for tamper detection/alarm, tracking information, environmental conditions, equipment metadata (serial number, date of manufacturer, etc.), and assessment video feeds. • All data processing, storage/retrieval, and communications will be protected in a manner commensurate with its trust level and classification. • Remotely collected and processed data will be securely stored, backed up, and archived. • Current and historical data will accessible within and outside of a Building (location). • Automated creation of reports and data visualization. • Design features to facilitate the potential future integration with the Facility's physical security alarm and display system. The requirements may be used to develop an integrated conceptual design or may be used in a modular fashion to inform separate designs. The guiding principles in developing the system objectives include: • For MC&A needs, remotely perform the physical inventory and evidence collection of tamper for Security Category I and II packaged material within a facility and be capable of satisfying guidelines establish by DOE M 470.4-6, “Nuclear Material Control and Accountability.” • For personnel safety needs: o Meet/satisfy Nuclear Explosive Safety requirements. o Minimize the exposure of personnel to radiation to be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) in accordance with NSTec Radiological Controls Manual (Ref TBD). • For DOE nuclear materials, Building environment shall be controlled to meet requirements for packaged nuclear materials specified in weapons laboratory literature.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Disposition of Chicago Pile 5 (CP-5) Converter Tubes in the 10-160B Cask

This paper will focus on the unique characterization, packaging, and transportation issues associated with the disposition of the two CP-5 Converter Tube assemblies from Argonne National Laboratory. The converter tubes were constructed of combinations of HEU and alloys of zirconium, and were part of the original research facilities attached to the CP-5 reactor during operating evolutions. These assemblies were heavily irradiated during their operational lifetime, and were segregated from the balance of irradiated test specimens when the reactor was deactivated and slated for Decontamination and Demolition (D&D). In addition, the substantial contribution of fissile material to the assemblies’ inventory made the potential disposition pathways extremely challenging. As a result, these items became part of Argonne’s legacy “nuclear footprint”, and were added to the Nuclear Footprint Reduction Project scope for disposition. The Project was responsible for the size reduction and characterization of these items, as well as the ultimate disposition. After negotiating a disposal pathway for these tubes, there were significant transportation issues that required a small team to overcome, in order to successfully ship these items to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The Project team at Argonne, technical support from transportation specialists, licensing support from the 10-160B license owner, the Savanah River National Lab (SRNL) Packaging Certification Team (PCT, and the DOE EM-33 staff contributed to license and safety analysis report amendments that eventually authorized the shipment of the material. The paper will identify the organizations, and the specific actions, required to successfully make three “one of a kind” shipments of irradiated test specimen material. This will include the unique packaging configurations, contents modification for the cask license (via the Amendment process), criticality evaluations, and associated review and approval processes.

CP-5↗
DOE OSTI2018

Dense Plasma Focus Technology and Applications at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) is used by U.S. national laboratories to conduct nuclear security experiments. Among these investigations is the development and deployment of Dense Plasma Focus (DPF) neutron source technology. These sources include a Megajoule-class source and a portable 1-kilojoule class source both of which fuse deuterium to produce neutrons, and a 300 kilojoule-class source that fuses deuterium and tritium. The applications currently under investigation are reactivity measurements and detection of radiological material.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2018

Programmatic Value Determination and Termination of Safeguards Process for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nuclear Material Management & Storage (MNN&S) and the Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) programs at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) have the responsibility to ensure accountable nuclear material (NM) no longer need by programs/projects is managed, coordinated, and dispositioned in accordance with DOE Orders 410.2, “Management of Nuclear Materials, and 474.2, “Nuclear Material Control and Accountability”. CD-NMM.007, “Programmatic Value Determination of Nuclear Material and Termination of Safeguards” is the document which lays out the process to fulfill these requirements. This paper defines the roles and responsibilities for all the organizations involved, the programmatic value determination (PVD), disposition planning, and termination of safeguards (ToS)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Nuclear Material Management Database Development at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nuclear Material Management & Storage (NMM&S) program at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) have the responsibility for the life-cycle management of accountable nuclear materials (NM) in accordance with Department of Energy (DOE) Order 410.2, “Management of Nuclear Materials” and for ensuring workers are protected from exposure to nuclear materials stored outside of an authorized shipping package under DOE Manual 441.1-1. To ensure these responsibilities were addressed in an effective, concise, and secure manner the development of NMM&S databases was undertaken. Using the existing database server structure and data acquired from the official Material Control & Accountability (MC&A) accounting program development of two separate applications, one for O 410.2 inventory requirements (NMIA) and one for M441, were begun in September 2015. The databases were deployed onto the production server in January 2017. The inventory database allows for entering NM characterization data, production of O 410.2 reports, and the ability to retain history files. The M441 database screens NM to determine if it is subject to the manual's requirements, ability to pull in unclassified RadCon materials, and provide reports as required by NMM&S, NM owners, and headquarters programs. These two databases provide NMM&S the ability to better ensure safe and secure packaging, storage, stabilization, consolidation, or disposition of NM and achieve life-cycle management goals.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Remote Monitoring System Design Requirements for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) worked with other sites within the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration weapons complex to develop design requirements for a Remote Monitoring System. System objectives included: Continuous monitoring of packaging (containers) within a Facility's buildings to meet Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) inventory requirements. Remotely access and receive monitoring data for tamper detection/alarm, tracking information, environmental conditions, equipment metadata (serial number, date of manufacture, etc.), and assessment video feeds. All data processing, storage/retrieval, and communications will be protected in a manner commensurate with its trust level and classification. Remotely collected and processed data will be securely stored, backed up, and archived. Current and historical data will accessible within and outside of a Building (location). Automated creation of reports and data visualization. Design features to facilitate the potential future integration with the Facility's physical security alarm and display system. The requirements may be used to develop an integrated conceptual design or may be used in a modular fashion to inform separate designs. The guiding principles in developing the system objectives include: For MC&A needs, remotely perform the physical inventory and evidence collection of tamper for Security Category I and II packaged material within a facility and be capable of satisfying guidelines establish by DOE M 470.4-6, “Nuclear Material Control and Accountability.” For personnel safety needs: Meet/satisfy Nuclear Explosive Safety requirements. Minimize the exposure of personnel to radiation to be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) in accordance with NSTec Radiological Controls Manual. For DOE nuclear materials, Building environment shall be controlled to meet requirements for packaged nuclear materials specified in weapons laboratory literature.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Environmental TLD program of the Nevada National Security Site

This presentation discusses the program of environmental radiation monitoring at the Nevada National Security Site. The program uses thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLD), Gamma spectroscopy, DOE Orders, and UNSCEAR-based calculations at multiple locations throughout the Site. The TLD and Gamma spectrocosopy measurements are consistent, and the TLDs can detect low levels above natural background radiation from NNSS operations.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Treatment of Problematic Reactive Metal Wastes Using GeoMelt ICV - WM2020 Conference Paper

Decommissioning of sodium-cooled reactors and fast reactor technologies has generated a number of reactive metal waste configurations that are problematic to treat and typically lack cost effective treatment methods and disposition options. As a result, Veolia Nuclear Solutions, under contract with Idaho National Laboratory (owned by the U.S. Department of Energy and managed and operated by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC) demonstrated its GeoMelt® In-Container Vitrification (ICV)™ technology to safely convert sodium metal to a non-reactive vitrified oxide form. The demonstration project, supported by glass formulation and crucible testing, consisted of a series of ICV™ melts that processed elemental sodium into stable non-reactive glass. INL is currently implementing GeoMelt® technology as a means to safely and reliably convert radioactive reactive metal residues that contaminate sodium cooled reactor components into waste forms that comply with existing disposition pathways. Reactive metal wastes require treatment in order to remove the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) reactivity and ignitability characteristics to comply with land disposal restrictions. GeoMelt®, which is an alternative to other potential treatment approaches, provides a robust approach that chemically converts the reactive metals to an inert oxide while also immobilizing radionuclides in a vitrified waste form with durability equal to or better than vitrified nuclear fuel reprocessing wastes (very robust and inert waste forms). Most other treatment approaches generate hydrogen gas which is problematic. In 2016, Veolia Nuclear Solutions first demonstrated the effectiveness of the GeoMelt® ICV™ process in deactivating reactive sodium metal. Crucible, bench-scale, and engineering-scale demonstrations were conducted on several surrogate waste configurations with various ratios of sodium metal and glass-formers. Each ratio and configuration demonstrated complete deactivation of the surrogate sodium metal. Follow-on work in 2017 demonstrated the deactivation of reactive sodium by GeoMelt® ICV™ at a higher waste loading relative to previously demonstrated work performed in 2016; the higher waste loading optimized glass chemistry while enhancing the economical full-scale treatment of reactive metals. Additionally, follow-on demonstration testing in 2018 and 2019 focused on more complex shapes and other reactive-metals (mocked up Experimental Breeder Reactor II [EBR-II] subassembly, sodium filled heat exchanger, and a can containing sodium potassium alloy) which were all performed at engineering-scale. Since 2018, a 10-metric ton full-scale GeoMelt unit (GeoMelt® Richland) was designed, installed, and commissioned at Perma-Fix Northwest in Richland, Washington for the treatment of reactive metal wastes. As of September 2019, over 900 55-gallon drums containing a total of around 3,500 lb of sodium with low levels of radioactivity have been treated at GeoMelt ® Richland, with resulting glass monoliths disposed at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). A full-scale radiological demonstration melt on an actual EBR-II subassembly has also been performed using the full-scale melter in 2019. The GeoMelt® technology is a proven radioactive waste treatment technology capable of immobilizing radioactive wastes, including bulk rubble such as drums and other steel vessels usually without pretreatment. Utilizing the GeoMelt® technology to treat reactive metals eliminates pretreatment steps resulting from having to separate the reactive metal from steel containers or jackets as GeoMelt® can easily operate at temperatures sufficient to melt the steel and expose the reactive metal for treatment. Eliminating handling steps of reactive metals is a significant safety advantage since reactive metals are pyrophoric. The results generated as a part of the 2018-2019 demonstration program are presented in the paper.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Western Burrowing Owl Radio-tracking Study

Summary of western burrowing owl satellite-tracking study on the NNSS for the Fall issue of the Nevada Chapter of The Wildlife Society Newsletter.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Centers of Excellence Descriptions, FY 2022

The descriptions of the NNSS Centers of Excellence and the accompanying table and illustration in intended for official communications about this program and will be used as a whole or in part for internal and external communications.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2015

SHOCKED SURFACE STEREO IMAGING WITH FIBER-OPTIC IMAGING PROBES

“A picture tells a thousand words”—this is a concept that captivates everyone, from the casual observer to the experimental physics scientist. To bring this concept to light in support of Stockpile Stewardship subcritical experiments executed at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), we have developed a new diagnostic tool to investigate the behavior of materials under high-explosive dynamic shock conditions. For the Leda subcritical experiment executed in August, 2014, a single line-of-sight imaging system was designed and fielded as a stretch diagnostic goal for National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec). For the Lyra series, beginning with the Orpheus experiment in September 2015, a newly created dynamic stereo surface imaging (DSSI) capability was deployed. The DSSI diagnostic records a high-speed image sequence that allows scientists to peer inside an imploding hydrodynamic test article with stereoscopic imaging.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

Depth-First Search Image Chasing

This presentation contains results from work on an active NNSS Site-directed research and development (SDRD) project: NLV-019-20. It describes a new algorithm for "few-angle tomography", which can be used to reconstruct an approximation to an object from limited quantities or radiographs under specific conditions. This presentation is an initial documentation of research results thus-far, and we would like to share these methods with colleagues at Lawrence Livermore National Lab who have an expertise in the area of few-angle tomography. Sharing this presentation will be done via email and or teleconference amongst DoE personnel. In the future, we would also like to share these results with collaborators from Academia as well.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Kraken Camera System

Specification sheet for Kraken camera system being developed by NNSS Transformational Diagnostics and Imaging in Los Alamos. Will be shared internally and externally.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

Godiva IER268 PDV Measurements

PowerPoint slides providing a quick-look of photon Doppler velocimetry (PDV) data taken during a series bursts using the Godiva machine located at the NNSS Device Assembly Facility. Vibrations, or ringing, of approximately 7.2 to 7.8 kHz were observed.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2021

New Design Yields Robust Large-Area Framing Camera

Manuscript to be submitted to Review of Scientific Instruments to determine interest in possible publication. Website: https://aip.scitation.org/rsi/authors/manuscript High-speed imaging is a core diagnostic capability for the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Data from experiments that measure the behavior of materials under extreme conditions are essential for the stockpile mission. For example, during subcritical experiments, materials that are shocked and compressed under high-explosive drive change behavior rapidly over timescales measured in millionths or even billionths of a second. Characterizing and understanding this behavior requires radiographic and/or optical imaging to track motion on these timescales. Framing cameras provide a discrete series of images over a short period of time in a manner that mimics a high-speed movie camera, but with individual shutter times that must be extremely short in order to capture freeze-frame images of rapidly evolving phenomena such as high-explosive shock-driven ejecta, dynamic compression of metals, and high-velocity fluid flow.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Perma-Fix Environmental Services Macroencapsulated Debris at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Perma-Fix Environmental Services (PERM) Macroencapsulated Debris, Radioactive Lead (Pb) Solids, Cadmium/Mercury/Silver (Cd/Hg/Ag) Containing Batteries from U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Generators (PERM000000027, Revision 28 [PERM 2021]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the PERM Macroencapsulated Debris, Radioactive Pb Solids, Cd/Hg/Ag Containing Batteries from DOE Generators meets all performance objectives of DOE Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The PERM Macroencapsulated Debris, Radioactive Pb Solids, Cd/Hg/Ag Containing Batteries from DOE Generators stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗