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At least 577 records · Page 32
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2010

Shuttle Lesson Learned - Toxicology

This is a script for a video about toxicology and the space shuttle. The first segment is deals with dust in the space vehicle. The next segment will be about archival samples. Then we'll look at real time on-board analyzers that give us a lot of capability in terms of monitoring for combustion products and the ability to monitor volatile organics on the station. Finally we will look at other issues that are about setting limits and dealing with ground based lessons that pertain to toxicology.

James, John T.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Design Lessons Learned from Temperature Management of Galileo's Retro-Propulsion Module

Launched in 1989, the Galileo mission added dramatically to our understanding of the Jovian system and our entire solar system1. To make best use of limited resources, the Galileo Orbiter used excess power from its Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) for temperature management of its Retro-Propulsion Module (RPM). This paper describes operational challenges introduced by this design and how, despite major mission changes through development and flight, they were overcome through a challenging six-year interplanetary cruise to Jupiter. This case study offers lessons for missions planning to couple critical spacecraft subsystems in unconventional ways.

Gounley, Robert↗
NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned for Planning and Estimating Operations Support Requirements

Operations (phase E) costs are typically small compared to the spacecraft development and test costs. This, combined with the long lead time for realizing operations costs, can lead projects to focus on hardware development schedules and costs, de-emphasizing estimation of operations support requirements during proposal, early design, and replan cost exercises. The Discovery and New Frontiers (D&NF) programs comprise small, cost-capped missions supporting scientific exploration of the solar system. Even moderate yearly underestimates of the operations costs can present significant LCC impacts for deep space missions with long operational durations, and any LCC growth can directly impact the programs ability to fund new missions. The D&NF Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center recently studied cost overruns for 7 D&NF missions related to phase C/D development of operational capabilities and phase E mission operations. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential operations risks and controlling the associated impacts to operations development and execution costs. The study found that the drivers behind these overruns include overly optimistic assumptions regarding the savings resulting from the use of heritage technology, late development of operations requirements, inadequate planning for sustaining engineering and the special requirements of long duration missions (e.g., knowledge retention and hardware/software refresh), and delayed completion of ground system development work. This presentation summarizes the study and the results, providing a set of lessons NASA can use to improve early estimation and validation of operations costs.

Newhouse, Marilyn↗
NASA NTRS1971

Lessons learned from a decade of international space cooperation.

A case history of the Alouette/ISIS series is presented, giving attention to aspects of U.S.-Canadian cooperation in this program. The project is only one example of a broad network of international cooperative relationships established by NASA over the past decade. Participation by other countries in important space science and applications projects is not limited to those providing flight hardware or conducting flight observations. Much valuable work is done on the ground, ranging from analysis in the laboratories of samples returned from the moon to correlated ground-based reception and analysis of radio beacon signals from satellites. It was found that cooperation is more likely to proceed smoothly and produce beneficial results if it is focused on projects that are clearly defined and agreed on in advance.

Barnes, R. J. H.↗
NASA NTRS1980

Mission management - Lessons learned from early Spacelab missions

The concept and the responsibilities of a mission manager approach are reviewed, and some of the associated problems in implementing Spacelab mission are discussed. Consideration is given to program control, science management, integrated payload mission planning, and integration requirements. Payload specialist training, payload and launch site integration, payload flight/mission operations, and postmission activities are outlined.

Craft, H. G., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1981

The OSS-1 mission - Lessons learned in developing and integrating experiments

Experience gained in the development and integration of experiments for the OSS-1 payload to be carried on board the Space Shuttle for the characterization of the effects of the STS environment on future scientific missions is related. Following a review of mission objectives, including the demonstration of Shuttle research capabilities and the evaluation of new technology, the experiments and mission operations to be performed are outlined, and mission support requirements are indicated. The conduct of mission management by the Goddard Space Flight Center, which required interfacing with a large number of other agencies, centers, and investigators and contractors and an enormous amount of formal documentation, is then examined, with consideration given to the management of mechanical, electrical, and thermal systems development mock-up construction, EMI/EMC and acoustic testing, the formation of an integration and test team, and trade-offs between cost, schedule and performance. It is concluded that although work still remains to be done, significant progress has been made in ensuring that the STS is a viable system for space exploration.

Kissin, K.↗
NASA NTRS1983

Lessons learned from the CSIS

A discussion is presented of the Centralized Storm Information System (CSIS), a joint effort by several organizations including NASA and the National Weather Service, which has been developed to aid the forecaster in evaluating weather data. The CSIS was developed to provide a handling, analyzing, intercomparison, and display system for real-time data from all available sources. The CSIS hardware and software, the impact of the CSIS, and the initial experience gained following the implementation of the CSIS are examined. Several general insights learned from this interactive processing system are examined in detail, including the benefits of an evolutionary bottom up rather than top down design approach, the crucial nature of scheduler function to any real time system, the recognition that meteorological interactive terminals requirements are different from image processing terminals requirements, and the knowledge that forecasters generate a large peak load on computer resources.

Mosher, F. R.↗
NASA NTRS1983

Shuttle Performance: Lessons Learned, part 1

Beginning with the first orbital flight of the Space Shuttle, a great wealth of flight data became available to the aerospace community. These data were immediately subjected to analyses by several different groups with different viewpoints and motivations. The results were collected and presented in several papers in the subject areas of ascent and entry aerodynaics; guidance, navigation, and control; aerothermal environment prediction; thermal protection systems; and measurement techniques.

James P Arrington↗
NASA NTRS1983

Space Shuttle Orbiter Venting: Lessons Learned

The orbiter vent system provides dedicated vent areas to permit the gases trapped inside the vehicle to escape during accent. The same vent system also repressurizes the vehicle during entry. The vent system is one of six systems that constitutes the purge, vent and drain subsystem. The orbiter active vent system has been very adaptable to the changing requirements that have occurred during the development of the Space Shuttle orbiter. Good correlation has been obtained between predicted and measured compartment pressures during the orbital flight test (OFT) program. An investigation of the flight data showed that the difference between preflight prediction and the measured values were primarily due to the difference between the baseline external pressures, which was based on subscale wind tunnel test data, and the actual vehicle local external pressures measured during the flight. The current predictions are based on flight derived vent port pressure coefficients since the wind tunnel data does not adequately define the orbiter ascent pressure environment.

H S Lutfi↗
NASA NTRS1983

Explanation of the hypersonic longitudinal stability problem: Lessons learned

Inviscid and viscous CFD codes have been applied to a modified Space Shuttle orbiter geometry to investigate differences between preflight aerodynamic predictions and aerodynamic data from hypersonic reentry flight. Flow field solutions were obtained for wind tunnel conditions and flight conditions to assess Mach number, real-gas, and viscous effects on the reentry aerodynamics of the orbiter. Based on the CFD studies, a methodology model has been developed to (1) extrapolate wind tunnel data to flight conditions and (2) calculate a DCM for use with the Aerodynamic Design Data Book. Comparisons are made with selected flight data. Results of the study indicate that the differences between flight and pre-STS-1 predictions of hypersonic pitching moment are primarily due the to Mach number and real-gas effects.

Griffith, B. J.↗
NASA NTRS1983

Aerodynamic coefficient identification package dynamic data accuracy determinations: Lessons learned

The errors in the dynamic data output from the Aerodynamic Coefficient Identification Packages (ACIP) flown on Shuttle flights 1, 3, 4, and 5 were determined using the output from the Inertial Measurement Units (IMU). A weighted least-squares batch algorithm was empolyed. Using an averaging technique, signal detection was enhanced; this allowed improved calibration solutions. Global errors as large as 0.04 deg/sec for the ACIP gyros, 30 mg for linear accelerometers, and 0.5 deg/sec squared in the angular accelerometer channels were detected and removed with a combination is bias, scale factor, misalignment, and g-sensitive calibration constants. No attempt was made to minimize local ACIP dynamic data deviations representing sensed high-frequency vibration or instrument noise. Resulting 1sigma calibrated ACIP global accuracies were within 0.003 eg/sec, 1.0 mg, and 0.05 deg/sec squared for the gyros, linear accelerometers, and angular accelerometers, respectively.

Heck, M. L.↗
NASA NTRS1983

Shuttle Performance: Lessons Learned, Part 2

Several areas of Space Shuttle technology were addressed including aerothermal environment, thermal protection, measurement and analysis, Shuttle carrier aerodynamics, entry analysis of the STS-3, and an overview of each section.

Arrington, J. P.↗
NASA NTRS1983

Orbiter Entry Heating Lessons Learned from Development Flight Test Program

The Space Shuttle orbiter's thermal protection system (TPS), designed mainly on the basis of wind tunnel test data, has successfully completed its design, development, and flight test program. The flight test data provide an exceptional opportunity to evaluate the use of wind tunnel test data for the design of TPS for reentry vehicles. Comparisons of flight test data against wind tunnel data used to design the orbiter's TPS were developed. These flight data, though still in the preliminary analysis phases, generally support the use of wind tunnel test data in the design of TPS for hypersonic reentry vehicles.

Haney, J. W., Jr.↗