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Proliferation resistance of small modular reactors fuels

In this paper the proliferation resistance of different types of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) has been examined and classified with criteria available in the literature. In the first part of the study, the level of proliferation attractiveness of traditional low-enriched UO{sub 2} and MOX fuels to be used in SMRs based on pressurized water technology has been analyzed. On the basis of numerical simulations both cores show significant proliferation risks. Although the MOX core is less proliferation prone in comparison to the UO{sub 2} core, it still can be highly attractive for diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material. In the second part of the paper, calculations to assess the proliferation attractiveness of fuel in typical small sodium cooled fast reactor show that proliferation risks from spent fuel cannot be neglected. The core contains a highly attractive plutonium composition during the whole life cycle. Despite some aspects of the design like the sealed core that enables easy detection of unauthorized withdrawal of fissile material and enhances proliferation resistance, in case of open Non-Proliferation Treaty break-out, weapon-grade plutonium in sufficient quantities could be extracted from the reactor core.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Performance evaluation of two-stage fuel cycle from SFR to PWR

One potential fuel cycle option being considered is a two-stage fuel cycle system involving the continuous recycle of transuranics in a fast reactor and the use of bred plutonium in a thermal reactor. The first stage is a Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) fuel cycle with metallic U-TRU-Zr fuel. The SFRs need to have a breeding ratio greater than 1.0 in order to produce fissile material for use in the second stage. The second stage is a PWR fuel cycle with uranium and plutonium mixed oxide fuel based on the design and performance of the current state-of-the-art commercial PWRs with an average discharge burnup of 50 MWd/kgHM. This paper evaluates the possibility of this fuel cycle option and discusses its fuel cycle performance characteristics. The study focuses on an equilibrium stage of the fuel cycle. Results indicate that, in order to avoid a positive coolant void reactivity feedback in the stage-2 PWR, the reactor requires high quality of plutonium from the first stage and minor actinides in the discharge fuel of the PWR needs to be separated and sent back to the stage-1 SFR. The electricity-sharing ratio between the 2 stages is 87.0% (SFR) to 13.0% (PWR) for a TRU inventory ratio (the mass of TRU in the discharge fuel divided by the mass of TRU in the fresh fuel) of 1.06. A sensitivity study indicated that by increasing the TRU inventory ratio to 1.13, The electricity generation fraction of stage-2 PWR is increased to 28.9%. The two-stage fuel cycle system considered in this study was found to provide a high uranium utilization (>80%). (authors)

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Decommissioning, Dismantling and Disarming: a Unique Information Showroom Inside the G2 Reactor at Marcoule Centre (France) - 12068

The paper aims at presenting the new information showroom called 'Escom G2' (for 'Espace Communication') inaugurated by the French Atomic Energy and Alternative Energies Commission (CEA) in spring 2011. This showroom is settled directly inside the main building of the G2 nuclear reactor: a facility formerly dedicated to weapon-grade plutonium production since the late 1950's at the Marcoule nuclear centre, in south of France. After its shutdown, and reprocessing of the last spent fuels, a first dismantling step was successfully completed from 1986 to 1996. Unique in France and in Europe, Escom G2 is focused on France dismantling expertise and its action for disarmament. This showroom comprises of a 300-square meters permanent exhibition, organized around four themes: France strategy for disarmament, decommissioning and dismantling technical aspects, uranium and plutonium production cycles. Each of these topics is illustrated with posters, photos, models and technical pieces from the dismantled plants. It is now used to present France's action in disarmament to highly ranked audiences such as: state representatives, diplomats, journalists... The paper explains the background story of this original project. As a matter of fact, in 1996 France was the first nuclear state to decide to shut down and dismantle its fissile material production facilities for nuclear weapons. First, the paper presents the history of the G2 reactor in the early ages of Marcoule site, its operating highlights as well as its main dismantling operations, are presented. In Marcoule, where the three industrial-scale reactors G1, G2 and G3 used to be operated for plutonium production (to be then reprocessed in the nearby UP1 plant), the initial dismantling phase has now been completed (in 1980's for G1 and in 1996 for G2 and G3). The second phase, aimed at completely dismantling these three reactors, will restart in 2020, and is directly linked to the opening of a future national storage facility for irradiated graphite waste. Then, the paper recalls communication events and official visits hosted in Pierrelatte and Marcoule, following a formal invitation from the French President Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy. These visits, which were organized in order to illustrate the irreversibility of these dismantling operations, allowed visitors to discovers places that used to be former highly classified areas. Three official visits were organized in 2008 and 2009 for representatives of the Conference on Disarmament Member States, non-governmental experts and journalists. All participants visited the dismantled uranium enrichment plant in Pierrelatte, the G2 reactor and the UP1 plant in Marcoule. The visits were successful and visitors were especially impressed by the G2 reactor and its massive industrial architecture, symbolic of the early ages of nuclear history. In late 2010, this feedback convinced CEA Military Application Directorate (CEA DAM) that a permanent showroom could be installed inside the reactor, making it possible to preserve the cultural value of this historical landmark, and to continue its ongoing effort of communication and outreach. The paper explains the design of this concept: the museography project with a professional designer, the communication material conception and the features of such an original place. (authors)

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In-Situ Radiological Surveys to Address Nuclear Criticality Safety Requirements During Remediation Activities at the Shallow Land Disposal Area, Armstrong County, Pennsylvania - 12268

Cabrera Services Inc. (CABRERA) is the remedial contractor for the Shallow Land Disposal Area (SLDA) Site in Armstrong County Pennsylvania, a United States (US) Army Corps of Engineers - Buffalo District (USACE) contract. The remediation is being completed under the USACE's Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) which was established to identify, investigate, and clean up or control sites previously used by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and its predecessor, the Manhattan Engineer District (MED). As part of the management of the FUSRAP, the USACE is overseeing investigation and remediation of radiological contamination at the SLDA Site in accordance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 US Code (USC), Section 9601 et. seq, as amended and, the National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Section 300.430(f) (2). The objective of this project is to clean up radioactive waste at SLDA. The radioactive waste contains special nuclear material (SNM), primarily U-235, in 10 burial trenches, Cabrera duties include processing, packaging and transporting the waste to an offsite disposal facility in accordance with the selected remedial alternative as defined in the Final Record of Decision (USACE, 2007). Of particular importance during the remediation is the need to address nuclear criticality safety (NCS) controls for the safe exhumation and management of waste containing fissile materials. The partnership between Cabrera Services, Inc. and Measutronics Corporation led to the development of a valuable survey tool and operating procedure that are essential components of the SLDA Criticality Safety and Material Control and Accountability programs. Using proven existing technologies in the design and manufacture of the Mobile Survey Cart, the continued deployment of the Cart will allow for an efficient and reliable methodology to allow for the safe exhumation of the Special Nuclear Material in existing SLDA trenches. (authors)

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The Belgian Research and Development Feasibility Programme for the Geological Disposal of High-Level and Long-Lived Radioactive Waste - 12338

ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials, considers geological disposal in the poorly indurated Boom Clay as the reference solution for the long-term management of high-level and/or long-lived radioactive waste. To develop a safety concept and design for geological disposal, ONDRAF/NIRAS follows an iterative process demonstrating that the repository will be both safe and feasible to implement. This process is called the safety strategy. A part of the safety strategy is the feasibility programme which aims at demonstrating, at a conceptual level, that the proposed geological disposal system can be constructed, operated and progressively closed. The followed methodology is based on the substantiation of a hierarchy of feasibility statements. These statements cover all activities from the removal of primary waste packages from interim storage buildings to the closure of the disposal site and a period of institutional control. They focus on engineering practicability, health and safety and environmental considerations, costs and quality assurance issues. A 4 year research project to support the R and D feasibility programme was launched in 2009 with several international partners coordinated by ONDRAF/NIRAS. It aims at confirming that there are no fundamental flaws or show-stoppers in the feasibility of building and operating the facilities for geological disposal in the Boom Clay. (authors)

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Construction and characterization of the detection modules for the Muon Portal Project

The Muon Portal Project is a joint initiative between research and industrial partners, aimed at the construction of a real size detector prototype (6 x 3 x 7 m{sup 3}) for the inspection of containers by the muon scattering technique, devised to search for hidden high-Z fissile materials and provide a full 3D tomography of the interior of the container in a scanning time of the order of minutes. The muon tracking detector is based on a set of 48 detection modules (size 1 m x 3 m), each built with 100 extruded scintillator strips, so as to provide four X-Y detection planes, two placed above and two below the container to be inspected. Two wavelength shifting (WLS) fibres embedded in each strip convey the emitted photons to Silicon Photomultipliers (SiPM) which act as photo-sensors. After a research and development phase, which led to the choice and test of the individual components, the construction of the full size detector has already started. The paper describes the results of the mass characterization of the photo-sensors and the construction and test measurements of the first detection modules of the Project. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Bare Fiber Bragg Gratings embedded into concrete buffer Supercontainer concept for nuclear waste storage [ANIMMA--2015-IO-337]

Nuclear power plants have been generating electricity for more than 50 years. In Belgium, 55% of the current energy supply comes from nuclear power. Providing for the safe storage of nuclear waste, including spent fuel (SF) and vitrified high level radioactive waste (HLW), remains an important challenge in the life cycle of nuclear fuel. In this context, the Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials (ONDRAF/NIRAS) is investigating a reference conceptual design called the Supercontainer (SC) for the packaging of SF and HLW. This conceptual design is based on a multiple-barrier system consisting of a hermetically-sealed carbon steel overpack and a surrounding highly-alkaline concrete buffer. The first one is developed to retain the radionuclides. The two main functions of the buffer are (a) to create a high pH environment around the carbon steel overpack in order to passivate the metal surface and so to slow down the corrosion propagation during the thermal phase and (b) to provide a radiological shielding during the construction and the handling of the Supercontainer. A recent test has been performed to investigate the feasibility to construct the SC. This test incorporated several kinds of sensors including Digital Image Correlation (DIC), Acoustic Emission (AE), corrosion sensing techniques and optical fibers with and without fiber Bragg gratings (FBGs). In particular, several single-mode optical fibers with 4 mm long FBGs with different Bragg wavelengths and distributed along the optical fibers were used. For casting and curing condition monitoring, a number of gratings were incorporated inside the concrete buffer during the first stage of construction. Then other sensors were embedded near a heat source installed in the second stage to simulate the effects of heat generated by radioactive waste. The FBGs were designed to measure both temperature and strain effects in the concrete. To discriminate between these effects special packaging was used for some sensors that were installed very close to the unpackaged ones. Sensors placed in plastic tubes have reduced sensitivity to strain, while the ones inserted in metal tubes are only temperature sensitive and their readings can be directly compared with those obtained from thermocouples located nearby. In addition to monitoring temperature and strain behaviour, embedding also had as objective to determine the impact of the high alkaline environment on the silica fibers over a very long time. This article presents the preliminary results obtained with the different FBGs and provides recommendations for future improvement. (authors)

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An advanced materials irradiation facility for materials and fuels irradiations at the high flux isotope reactor

The High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is a pressurized, light-water-cooled and -moderated, beryllium-reflected, 85 MW research reactor fueled by Highly enriched {sup 235}U. The Materials Irradiation Facility (MIF) at HFIR) is one of the two experimental platforms in the US that can host fully instrumented and monitored experiments in a high-neutron-flux environment. The unique advantage of instrumented capsules is that the researcher can monitor and acquire in situ data and change capsule operating conditions in real time during the irradiation. Recently ORNL funded a Laboratory-Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project to strategically enhance the capabilities of MIF and provide researchers with a more flexible experimental platform. MIF comprises 4 systems: a gas supply system, a supervisory control system, an effluent system, and a standard gas routing system. The first 3 systems have common functionality for all types of experiments. The gas routing system provides the correct gases and gas mixtures for individual experiments and is unique to each experiment. MIF improvements include an updated and more sophisticated experiment monitoring system, a modular design allowing easier addition of simultaneous experiments, and features that allow rapid incorporation of additional instrumentation. The new design is both modular and re-configurable. It calls for a standard gas routing system module that can be configured with software to allow for easy expansion to multiple experiments. The ability to monitor the effluent activity during fissile material irradiation is a much needed enhancement for detecting fuel failures or determining fission product release. A gamma-ray spectrometry will be installed in a bypass gas line off the effluent main stream. The gas will flow through the detector for continuous detection of the particles of interest.

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Using FENOSOL{sup TM} Phenolic Foam as a Shock Absorber for Type B Packaging - 17256

Type B and fissile material transportation packages are designed to withstand deformation from dynamic forces experienced during impacts in hypothetical accident conditions. A critical aspect is to ensure the containment system is not breached. The package design normally includes impact limiters made up of a shell filled with energy-absorbing material. Various types of materials are used as energy absorbers, including wood, foam, and honeycomb structures. Synthetic foam is an ideal material for impact limiters; it has isotropic material properties, it acts as a heat insulator during fire conditions, and it maintains structural integrity at high temperatures. In addition, the density of the foam may be controlled during the manufacturing process, allowing the cask designer flexibility to select the right density for each application. The foam properties can be used as inputs for numerical simulations of dynamic impacts. These simulations are a key component of the safety analysis report for Type B transportation casks. Robatel has recently invested in equipment to produce FENOSOL{sup TM} phenolic foam in our factory for use in our cask designs. This acquisition was made jointly between Robatel and the CEA, with Robatel ensuring the industrialization of the product. In the past decade, this foam was successfully integrated into more than 10 European cask designs, and there has been extensive in-laboratory characterization of its properties. FENOSOL{sup TM} has already been accepted by the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) as a shock absorbing material for use in cask designs. Since the acquisition of the phenolic foam production process by Robatel, a new research and development program has been launched to provide more accurate information to our clients, extend the range of application of this foam, and to improve its properties. Robatel has built an extensive database of material characteristics through the use of a universal mechanical tester, a scanning electron microscope, and a nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometer. In addition, Robatel has successfully implemented FENOSOL{sup TM} in two recent cask designs. This included scale model drop testing of a 9 meter drop in three orientations, and a pin puncture drop test. Robatel is in the process of producing FENOSOL{sup TM} samples for testing according to ASTM standards. Various densities will be included in the study. The testing will include duro-meter hardness, specific heat, thermal conductivity, compressive strength and modulus, and tensile strength. Once the testing is complete, Robatel will compile the data in the form of product specification sheets for each density. These information sheets and test reports will be used to validate FENOSOL{sup TM} for use in future impact limiters for the North American Type B cask market. (authors)

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Development of a New 48 Inch UF6 Cylinder Overpack - 17476

The Kevil Kougar overpack is new generation USA DOT Specification 7A packaging designed to transport ANSI N14.1 and ISO-7195 compliant 48-inch UF6 cylinders. In December 2016, the USA DOT issued USA/0815/H(U)-96 for the transport of 48X and 48Y cylinders and USA/0819/H(M)-96 for the transport of 48G, 48H, 48HX, 48O, 48OM, 48OM(Allied) and 48T cylinders. The H(U) certificate is for transport of thick-walled cylinders and the H(M) certificate is for transport of thin-walled cylinders. The Kevil Kougar design provides thermal and impact protection for the cylinder under conditions required for a Type A package capable of transporting UF{sub 6} via road, rail, and ocean. The packaging design is a smooth octagonal shape designed to carry one 48-inch UF{sub 6} cylinder. It consists of an upper subassembly and lower subassembly, which are fastened together with ten toggle bolts, five per side. Each subassembly consists of an outer and inner steel shell secured to a frame assembly, with wood and polyurethane foam filling the space between. The protruding components are only for ease of operation and consist of four lifting lugs and fork pockets on the upper body, and the base and fork pockets on the lower body. The design incorporates interior rubber pads for cylinder cushioning, support and alignment, steel stabilizing beams fore and aft to prevent cylinder movement, closure mechanisms, a tamper indicating device and tie-down features. The Kevil Kougar is currently designed to transport contents of depleted uranium and natural uranium. Future activities include licensing the package as Type AF to facilitate transport of historic USA Department of Energy fissile material packages. (authors)

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EDF's used fuel management french policy - 15199

Regarding back-end fuel cycle, EDF's strategy, implemented from the very beginning of French nuclear production, consists in reprocessing of used fuel; decision to recycle plutonium in French PWR was taken from 1984. This reprocessing and recycling strategy, relying on existing industrial facilities (AREVA La Hague and Melox plants), has proven to be reliable and efficient. Treatment leads to a stabilization of used fuel total inventory in interim storage. Vitrification process ensures a safe packaging for high level and long-lived waste under a reduced volume. Recycling of fissile materials saves natural uranium requirements. Concentration of Pu in MOX used fuel leaves open the option to reuse it for starting next Generation IV systems beyond 2040. In 2008, EDF and AREVA, supported by French Government, agreed on commercial terms covering long term fuel reprocessing and recycling (up to 2040). Currently, EDF fuel management strategy relies on flow equilibrium in order to respect fuel cycle consistency and sustainability. The underlying principle is to strictly adjust separated plutonium production to recycling possibilities (i.e. licensed reactors and MOX fuel fabrication facilities). Given that fuel cycle policy, any trend in NPP core management that may impact the fuel cycle should be anticipated within times in order to avoid technical or administrative incompatibilities, and guarantee a high level of safety and robustness. In collaboration with industrial operators, EDF have to perform periodic 'Cycle Impact' analyses and report to the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN); next exercise is scheduled by the end of 2016. (authors)

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Life Extension of Nuclear Plant Facilities through Monitoring and Detailed Analysis - 16175

The UK has accumulated a substantial legacy of radioactive waste from various civil nuclear and defence programmes. Presently, however most of the UK radioactive waste is generated from nine power stations which generate approximately one sixth of the of the country's electricity. Irradiated fuel is removed from these reactors and safe management of the radioactive solid and liquid effluents is required. The safe management of these effluents is essential. Sellafield, in West Cumbria UK, contains two reprocessing plants, one designed to process nuclear fuel from Magnox reactors (CO{sub 2} cooled with Uranium bar fuel) and the other to process nuclear fuel from Advanced Gas cooled Reactors and Pressurized Water Reactors. The reprocessing stage enables extraction of fissile material for recycling. This leaves a volume of dilute but high-level waste. The high-level radioactive liquid waste is concentrated to reduce its volume and then incorporated into borosilicate glass, using a process called vitrification. The glass is then poured into stainless steel containers and placed in long term storage. This required concentration of HLW liquor is achieved using a suite of aging evaporators. All evaporators are of similar design constructed from corrosion resistant stainless steel having dimensions height ∼11 m, internal diameter 3.05 m and capable of holding 13.7 m{sup 3} of liquor. The basic principle of operation is to heat the dilute liquor under partial vacuum, at constant volume, until the target concentration is achieved. Heating of the liquor is achieved using steam heated coils within the evaporator, and steam in the jacket which surrounds the lower half of the evaporator vessel. The evaporator is then brought to atmospheric pressure and the concentrated liquor is ejected whilst hot. The evaporator is then cooled with water cooled coils and a water filled jacket. New dilute liquor is then added for a new batch. The process is then repeated. As the evaporators reach the end of their original design life accurate prediction of the current condition of nuclear plant facilities is essential to safely justify continued plant operation by ensuring structural integrity. This poses a significant challenge as many aging UK nuclear facilities were not inherently built with inspection in mind. The potential life limiting components of the HA evaporators at Sellafield are the surfaces that contact the product liquor at elevated temperatures i.e. the steam heated surfaces of the coils within the evaporator vessel and the vessel base and wall surrounded by the steam jacket. Each heating component is critical to the operational life of the evaporator - the removal from service of a coil heating component significantly reduces the operational flexibility and remnant life of this plant. Over the last decade a variety of cutting-edge expertise and methodologies have been utilised to accurately measure and then predict the current condition of the plant and also to predict its remnant life. This paper provides an overview of the development of several techniques deployed, namely non-destructive testing/inspection, in-house software development and finite element modelling. These methods have been validated by lab-scale or full-scale experiments along with historical plant data. These techniques have been evolved and refined for over a decade, providing vital insights into the physical behaviour of this complex reprocessing system. This enables not only accurate assessment of the current condition of the plant equipment but also allows scientifically underpinned predictions to be made of how it will behave into the future. This is critical for Sellafield as this knowledge feeds into their safety case to the Office of Nuclear Regulation to justify continued operation. It is concluded that this integrated approach provides a robust analysis tool which has driven change and optimisation of plant procedures ensuring continued safe operation whilst extending the life of the facility. (authors)

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Disposition of Chicago Pile 5 (CP-5) Converter Tubes in the 10-160B Cask - 16632

This paper will focus on the unique characterization, packaging, and transportation issues associated with the disposition of the two CP-5 Converter Tube assemblies from Argonne National Laboratory. The converter tubes were constructed of combinations of HEU and alloys of zirconium, and were part of the original research facilities attached to the CP-5 reactor during operating evolutions. These assemblies were heavily irradiated during their operational lifetime, and were segregated from the balance of irradiated test specimens when the reactor was deactivated and slated for Decontamination and Demolition (D and D). In addition, the substantial contribution of fissile material to the assemblies' inventory made the potential disposition pathways extremely challenging. As a result, these items became part of Argonne's legacy 'nuclear footprint', and were added to the Nuclear Footprint Reduction Project scope for disposition. The Project was responsible for the size reduction and characterization of these items, as well as the ultimate disposition. After negotiating a disposal pathway for these tubes, there were significant transportation issues that required a small team to overcome, in order to successfully ship these items to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The Project team at Argonne, technical support from transportation specialists, licensing support from the 10-160B license owner, the Savannah River National Lab (SRNL) Packaging Certification Team (PCT, and the DOE EM-33 staff contributed to license and safety analysis report amendments that eventually authorized the shipment of the material. The paper will identify the organizations, and the specific actions, required to successfully make three 'one of a kind' shipments of irradiated test specimen material. This will include the unique packaging configurations, contents modification for the cask license (via the Amendment process), criticality evaluations, and associated review and approval processes. (authors)

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Criticality detection method based on FP gamma radiation measurement

A method is proposed to evaluate the extent of subcriticality of an accident-damaged nuclear reactor. In this method the radiation ratio of two FP rare gas nuclides, {sup 88}Kr and {sup 133}Xe, is measured. From the measured value, the value in the core is estimated by correcting for the time required by the gases to diffuse from the core to the measuring point. A simple expression for neutron multiplication factor has been derived, which uses the corrected {sup 88}Kr-to-{sup 133}Xe radiation ratio and the {sup 88}Kr-to-{sup 133}Xe fission yield ratios from {sup 244}Cm and {sup 235}U but no information on the amount or distribution of fissile materials, making the proposed method very simple. The method has the advantage that FP rare gases can easily leak from the reactor core through many openings and gaps, reaching germanium counters without reacting with other materials. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Validation and bias quantification of criticality safety codes for SRNS operations

The validation and bias quantification methods employed by the Criticality Safety Engineering group at Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS) are discussed. Both SCALE and MCNP are validated against benchmark experiments, where these benchmark models have been divided into subgroups representative of the types of fissile material operations at SRNS. A quantification of the bias is made for each subgroup for each code and the three methods employed for quantification are discussed. The bias information is employed directly in the establishment of the Upper Safety Limit (USL) value of the neutron multiplication factor when using standardized documented SRNS methods. A simple example of validation and bias quantification is given and the procedure for setting the USL using the derived bias information is also presented. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

CRISTAL V2: New package for criticality calculations

A new release of the CRISTAL French criticality calculation package, named CRISTAL V2, has been developed and intensively validated by IRSN and CEA, in collaboration with AREVA. This package was designed to cover the needs of criticality practitioners in the fields of nuclear fuel cycle facilities and transportation of fissile materials. Based on an optimized modular architecture in an updated software development environment, the design of CRISTAL package V2 integrates new generation of cross-section libraries, new calculation schemes consistent with new applications, and up-to-date calculation codes capabilities. Four calculation routes are currently available allowing multi-group and continuous energy calculations. The validation database is composed of more than 3000 critical experiments, in order to cover a wide range of configurations. The CRISTAL V2 package also includes customer services covering a large scope of activities like documentations, hotline, maintenance and training courses. A significant promotion and an increased recognition referred both nationally and internationally are foreseen, including the provision of the CRISTAL V2 package to the OECD / NEA Data Bank. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Development of criticality safety validation guidance for NRC-regulated activities

Some guidance documents support validation of criticality safety evaluations for many system types, and some accommodate different regulators or regulatory requirements. While these reports address specific applications, no single document applies to all systems and incorporates both traditional and sensitivity/uncertainty-based validation techniques. Oak Ridge National Laboratory will develop a single reference report for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that provides modern examples and suggested recommendations for a uniform approach for performing and documenting k{sub eff} calculation validations applicable to any system containing fissile material. The project will include a literature review and development of a new, comprehensive NUREG/CR document on nuclear criticality safety validation. The NUREG will address the following experiences from recent reviews: 1) Inappropriate critical experiment selection; 2) Insufficient trending analysis; 3) Incorrectly calculated 95/95 uncertainties; 4) Failure to address how validation applies to safety analysis; 5) Lack of goodness-of-fit testing in trending analyses; 6) Incorrect use of commercial reactor critical data; 7) Failure to meet bias determination methodology prerequisites; 8) Inappropriate extrapolation of bias and uncertainty; 9) Failure to identify validation analysis gaps and weaknesses; and 10) Inadequate validation analysis documentation. The final report will provide guidance on use of trending analysis results, acceptable confidence levels for normality testing and trending analysis, management of validation analysis gaps and weaknesses, use of sensitivity and uncertainty analysis in validation analysis, and potential impact of correlations among critical experiments used in validation. It will also consolidate existing guidance documents using both traditional and sensitivity/uncertainty-based approaches. This document will support NRC-regulated activities, as well as validation used in criticality safety within other regulatory frameworks. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Thermal/epithermal experiments with hafnium (TEX-Hf)

Critical experiment benchmarks are essential for validating calculational techniques used by criticality safety engineers to guarantee safe fissile material operations, yet there remain significant areas of need where existing benchmarks are insufficient or entirely absent. There is a particularly notable shortage of intermediate benchmarks (where the majority of fissions are caused by neutrons with energy between 0.625 eV and 100 keV). This work describes the design of a set of critical experiments (TEX-Hf) that address this gap by developing a highly enriched uranium (HEU) test bed into which various materials of interest (diluents) can be substituted. The first diluent to be investigated with this test bed is hafnium, a neutron poison used in nuclear applications for which there are no sufficiently sensitive benchmarks. Twenty-one critical configurations made up of stacked disks of HEU, polyethylene, and hafnium were designed and simulated in MCNP6 to calculate their fission energy spectra and the sensitivity of k{sub eff} to changes in various cross sections. It was shown that configurations spanned the energy range from thermal (below 0.625 eV), through the intermediate energy range (0.625 eV to 100 keV), to fast (above 100 keV). Furthermore, it was determined that this set of experiments is sensitive to the hafnium and {sup 235}U cross section data. These test bed experiments were designed to allow substitution of various diluent plates and can therefore be used to quickly and easily produce many more benchmarks. (authors)

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