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Data Summary Report for Soil and Slab Sampling at Former Building 175

Lawrence Livermore National Security (LLNS) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) are in the process of returning the area where Building 175 existed to beneficial use for future site development. The completed assessment will help LLNS and DOE to outline project scope and costs associated with the removal, characterization, and disposal of materials generated when the concrete slab for the former building and any associated remaining subsurface structures are demolished. Slab removal under the Transition & Disposition process requires full screening for potential site contamination to determine appropriate future land use. Borehole locations and depths were designed to correctly assess DOE’s future liability for characterizing residual vadose zone contamination. If a residual source area is identified at depth, DOE will need to evaluate the additional cost of future subsurface cleanup (with limited access) due to planned development. This is necessary to leave the location in a “ready-to-build” status. As a result, Phase II sampling requirements may in some cases extend beyond the construction zone required for slab removal to ensure the necessary due diligence. To avoid the potential spread of contamination and/or the creation of an environmental release by impacting the integrity of known contamination areas (e.g., pit within room 102 and the east to west boundary seam), these locations were not sampled for this project. During demolition of the slab, these locations and their underlying soils should be further evaluated. The assessment was conducted in accord with the May 2022 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Former Building 175 Assessment Soil Sampling and Analysis Plan / Quality Assurance Plan. Thirty-six, direct-push borings were advanced, along with collecting concrete (where present) and soil samples for laboratory analyses. Thirty-two of the borings were advanced to a depth of 25 feet below ground (bgs), and four borings were advanced to a depth of 55 feet bgs. The concrete slab for former Building 175 ranged from approximately 8 inches to over two feet in thickness. Soils encountered during the investigation consisted primarily of clayey silt, with interbeds of sandy gravel and silty sand to the total depth explored of 55 feet bgs. Field photoionization detector readings – checking for volatile organic compound (VOC) vapors in soils, ranged from zero (0) to a peak of 33 parts per million at 25 feet bgs in boring PC-B175- 028. The cause for the peak reading is unknown, however, no visually discolored or odorous soils were encountered during the assessment and all VOC results were below Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s (LLNL’s) Soil Screening and Management Plan (SSMP) soil screening levels (SSL). Groundwater was not encountered during the assessment and is expected to occur at roughly 65 feet bgs in the project area. No metals were detected at concentrations of concern in the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. Low gross alpha and beta activity concentrations were detected in the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. The detected activity concentrations would appear to be from naturally occurring radioactive isotopes, i.e., potassium 40, present in the raw materials used to make concrete and not artificially added. Tritium was not detected above the testing laboratory's Method Detection Limit (MDL) in any of the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. The radioactive isotopes - actinium 228, bismuth 214, lead 212, lead 214, potassium 40, radium 226, radium 228, and thallium 208, were detected at low activity concentrations in the concrete core samples analyzed. Based on the detected activity concentrations, the isotopes would appear to be naturally occurring in the raw materials used to make concrete and not artificially added. Acetone – a common laboratory contaminant, was detected in nine of the soil samples collected and analyzed. Concentrations of two other volatile organic compounds (benzene and tetrachloroethene) were detected in five of the soil samples analyzed. All concentrations were below SSLs. Total petroleum hydrocarbons as diesel range organics were detected at 43.9 milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg) in the 20-foot bgs duplicate sample from boring PC-B175-007. Total petroleum hydrocarbons as motor oil were detected at 7.20 mg/kg in the 15-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-001, and at 20.7 mg/kg in the 20-foot bgs duplicate sample from boring PC-B175-007. The SSL for diesel-range TPHs is 260 mg/kg. LLNL does not have an SSL for motor oil range TPHs. No indications of a release, e.g., visibly stained, or odorous soil, were present at the boring locations. No samples collected contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in concentrations above the laboratory reporting limit. Arsenic was detected above its SSL of 8.51 mg/kg in the 25-foot bgs routine sample collected from boring PC-B175-023. Nickel was detected above its SSL of 86.0 mg/kg in the 10-foot bgs routine sample from boing PC-B175-005, the 20-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-025, and the 25-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-034. The detected concentrations, however, were well below ten times (10x) their respective STLCs. Gross alpha and/or gross beta were detected above their respective SSL activity concentrations in three routine soil samples. Retesting (two per sample) of the samples showed that the initial reported activity concentrations were anomalous. Tritium was not detected in any of the routine or duplicate soil samples collected and analyzed during the investigation. The radioactive isotopes - actinium 228, bismuth 212 and 214, lead 212 and 214, potassium 40, radium 224, 226 and 228, thallium 208, thorium 234 and uranium, were detected at low activity concentrations in the soil samples analyzed for radioactive constituents. The detected isotopes and their associated activity concentrations are typical of those naturally occurring in the marine-type sedimentary deposits underlying the Livermore Valley. No radiological controls are necessary for the soil evaluated.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Biosorption of Uranium by Bone Meal

The treatment of aqueous solution waste containing organic compounds and radionuclides has always been a great concern since the processes available are usually expensive and unfeasible for the low volume of radioactive liquid waste recovered. In view of a more efficient and low cost treatment, biosorption-based technologies for the removal of this hazardous radionuclides, heavy metals, and organic substances from contaminated matrices have been studied as an alternative process. In this context, bone meal is the material of choice, and contains calcium phosphate in the form of hydroxyapatite. Previous studies with hydroxyapatite showed that this material is efficient in removing heavy metals from polluted soils due to its adsorbing ability. In this context, uranium biosorption capacity by using bone meal was evaluated by different experimental conditions. This study aims at analyzing the capacity of bone meal to remove uranium from aqueous solution through biosorption process, considering that this nuclide is radiotoxic and may cause serious environmental problems and risks to human life if not correctly disposed. The biosorption capacity of U by bone meal was evaluated under different experimental conditions. The results suggested that adsorption with this material can be applied in the treatment of aqueous solutions as a low-cost and highly efficient alternative to remove U. Therefore, we believe that our results are useful for other investigators dealing with similar problems. Further work is required to evaluate this material as a potential adsorbent concerning the treatment of liquid organic radioactive waste containing uranium. Next studies are crucial to ascertain the biosorption efficiency, by analyzing other variables, such as adsorbent dosage, pH and temperature.

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Waste management technology development and demonstration programs at Brookhaven National Laboratory

Two thermoplastic processes for improved treatment of radioactive, hazardous, and mixed wastes were developed from bench scale through technology demonstration: polyethylene encapsulation and modified sulfur cement encapsulation. The steps required to bring technologies from the research and development stage through full scale implementation are described. Both systems result in durable waste forms that meet current Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Environmental Protection Agency regulatory criteria and provide significant improvements over conventional solidification systems such as hydraulic cement. For example, the polyethylene process can encapsulate up to 70 wt pct. nitrate salt, compared with a maximum of about 20 wt pct. for the best hydraulic cement formulation. Modified sulfur cement waste forms containing as much as 43 wt pct. incinerator fly ash were formulated, whereas the maximum quantity of this waste in hydraulic cement is 16 wt pct.

Kalb, Paul D.↗

Machine Learning Surrogates of a Fuel Matrix Degradation Process Model for Performance Assessment of a Nuclear Waste Repository

Spent nuclear fuel repository simulations are currently not able to incorporate detailed fuel matrix degradation (FMD) process models due to their computational cost, especially when large numbers of waste packages breach. The current paper uses machine learning to develop artificial neural network and k-nearest neighbor regression surrogate models that approximate the detailed FMD process model while being computationally much faster to evaluate. Further, using fuel cask temperature, dose rate, and the environmental concentrations of CO 3 2- , O 2 , Fe 2+ , and H 2 as inputs, these surrogates show good agreement with the FMD process model predictions of the UO 2 degradation rate for conditions within the range of the training data. A demonstration in a full-scale shale repository reference case simulation shows that the incorporation of the surrogate models captures local and temporal environmental effects on fuel degradation rates while retaining good computational efficiency.

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Acceptable Knowledge Technologist Procedure

Process acceptable knowledge (AK) is a waste stream characterization method that can be used to meet all or part of the waste analysis requirements appropriate for the waste. The method may include documented knowledge of process (KOP), additional characterization data, and/or facility records of analysis. LANL will use process AK to ensure chemical compatibility; assign matrix parameter categories and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) hazardous waste numbers (HWNs) commonly referred to as EPA codes to waste streams; and determine the waste material parameters and radionuclides present in waste streams.

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Hanford Site Composite Analysis: Dose Sensitivity Analyses

This environmental calculation file (ECF) documents the methodologies, assumptions, and results of five analyses that evaluate parameter changes to the revised Hanford Site Composite Analysis (CA) (DOE-RL-2019-52, Composite Analysis for Low-Level Waste Disposal in the Hanford Site Central Plateau). Specifically, this ECF describes the impact on total dose and analyte-specific doses for five sensitivity cases where changes to the following exposure-related parameters were implemented – (1) inventory, (2) recharge rate, (3) external dose conversion factors (DCFs) based on Federal Guidance Report (FGR) No. 15 in (EPA-402-R-19-002, Federal Guidance Report No. 15, External Exposure to Radionuclides in Air, Water, and Soil) instead of FGR No. 12 (EPA 402-R-93-081, Federal Guidance Report No. 12, External Exposure to Radionuclides in Air, Water, and Soil) for groundwater pathway scenario; (4) use of mean instead of 95th percentile intake assumptions for groundwater pathway scenario; and (5) consideration of limited sources based on U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) owned waste sites regulated under DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. It should be noted that dose assessments for both base and sensitivity cases are based on the all-pathways representative person groundwater exposure scenario presented in DOE/RL-2022-52, Composite Analysis for Low-Level Waste Disposal in the Hanford Site Central Plateau.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 29, No. 3, July-September 1988]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 259 Fifteenth Water Reactor Safety Information Meeting by E. G. Silver; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 284 Reliability Technology to Improve and/or Maintain Emergency Diesel Generator Performance by S. Karimian and J. H. Taylor, 293 A Noise Diagnostics System for Operator Advice by G. Hessel, P. Liewers, P. Schumann, W. Schmitt, and F.-P. Weiss; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 307 A Passive Containment System for Advanced Light-Water Reactors by O. B. Falls, Jr., and F. W. Kleimola; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 318 Data Base Construction for a Computerized Radiological Risk Investigation System by L. M. Hively, J. E. Nyquist, J. L. Bledsoe, and A. L. Sjoreen, 326 Erratum to "Radiation Hormesis and Nuclear Safety," Vol. 29, No. 1; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 327 Operational Safety Experience and Passive Safety Testing at the Fast Flux Text Facility by Q. L. Baird, J. L. Rathbun, D. D. Stepnewski, R. L. Stover, and A. E. Waltar, 344 Backfilling of Independent Residual Heat Removal Systems in West Germany and Switzerland by G. Eckert and Y. Salomon, 353 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 356 Selected Safety-Related Events Compiled by G. A. Murphy, 363 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 384 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 390 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 395 Status of Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Licensing Review Compiled by E. G. Silver, 400 Proposed Rule Changes as of Mar. 31,1988; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 283 International ENS/ANS Conference on Thermal Reactor Safety "NUCSAFE 88", 317 Northwestern University Short Course on Radiation Safety, 407 Second International Seminar on Small- and Medium-Sized Nuclear Reactors, 407 International Workshop on New Developments in Occupational Dose Control and ALARA Implementation at Nuclear Power Plants and Similar Facilities, 408 Fourth International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Reactor Thermal Hydraulics (NURETH-4), 404 The Authors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Radiation portal monitor data file format for comprehensive background radiation monitoring

Radiation portal monitors (RPMs) are widely used at border security checkpoints to detect the presence of radioactive materials in people, vehicles, and cargo. Typically, RPM detection systems consist of two pillars equipped with gamma and neutron detectors. To improve detection efficiency, RPMs employ techniques such as a limited energy window, dynamic alarm thresholds, and lead shielding. However, without continuous monitoring of background radiation, signal interpretation can be compromised, because environmental factors and mechanical failures can cause fluctuations. Here, we introduce a daily file format that logs gamma background and neutron background radiation levels continuously over a 24 h period; this format is different from traditional formats that record data only when the RPM is active or occupied. The approach enables RPM operators and analysts to (1) identify and diagnose malfunctioning components, (2) adjust system settings to account for dynamic environmental factors, and (3) use the recorded data to characterize outer space phenomena. Continuous background reporting is essential for identifying issues such as faulty connections, voltage divider failures, and errors in background updates. Continuous background reporting also enables the detection of external influences, including nearby X-ray scanners, temperature fluctuations, rainfall, cosmic radiation, and lunar phase changes. These data files are designed to be easily evaluated and parsed using common tools, and a quick review by an expert is often sufficient for problem diagnosis. We anticipate that continuous background radiation monitoring and these new strategies will significantly improve the accuracy and reliability of RPM systems, reducing the rate of false alarms and enhancing overall system performance.

Background radiation monitoring↗

A teleoperated system for remote site characterization

The detection and characterization of buried objects and materials is an important step in the restoration of burial sites containing chemical and radioactive waste materials at Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) facilities. By performing these tasks with remotely controlled sensors, it is possible to obtain improved data quality and consistency as well as enhanced safety for on-site workers. Therefore, the DOE Office of Technology Development and the US Army Environmental Center have jointly supported the development of the Remote Characterization System (RCS). One of the main components of the RCS is a small remotely driven survey vehicle that can transport various combinations of geophysical and radiological sensors. Currently implemented sensors include ground-penetrating radar, magnetometers, an electromagnetic induction sensor, and a sodium iodide radiation detector. The survey vehicle was constructed predominantly of non-metallic materials to minimize its effect on the operation of its geophysical sensors. The system operator controls the vehicle from a remote, truck-mounted, base station. Video images are transmitted to the base station by a radio link to give the operator necessary visual information. Vehicle control commands, tracking information, and sensor data are transmitted between the survey vehicle and the base station by means of a radio ethernet link. Precise vehicle tracking coordinates are provided by a differential Global Positioning System (GPS).

Sandness, Gerald A.↗

Summary Report for the Analysis of the Sludge Batch 7b (Macrobatch 9) DWPF Pour Stream Glass Sample for Canister S04023

In order to comply with the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) Waste Form Compliance Plan for Sludge Batch 7b, Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) personnel characterized the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) pour stream (PS) glass sample collected while filling canister S04023. This report summarizes the results of the compositional analysis for reportable oxides and radionuclides and the normalized Product Consistency Test (PCT) results. The PCT responses indicate that the DWPF produced glass that is significantly more durable than the Environmental Assessment glass. Results and further details are documented in SRNL-STI-2013-00462, Revision 1 “Analysis of the DWPF Sludge Batch 7b (Macrobatch 9) Pour Stream Glass Sample.”

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Efficient Mesofluidic Separation of Large Particles in nuclear slurries - 20408

Efficient and effective particle separation is essential to cleanup of many nuclear wastes. For example, particle separation may be used to accelerate settle-decant bottlenecks that limit the throughput necessary to achieve the U.S. Department of Energy waste cleanup mission in a timely manner. Particle separation may be used to protect downstream processing equipment from pulses of solids that may be encountered near (within a few feet of) liquid-solid interfaces during waste transfer operations, thereby preventing work stoppages. Effective particle separation may permit efficient sludge washing. These are only a few of the ways in which particle separation is important. Yet, efficient and effective particle separation in nuclear processing environments remains challenging. For example, settle-decant operations permit larger and heavier particles to settle, leaving smaller, lighter particles suspended. However, settle-decant operations are slow, convection currents may resuspend solids, hindered settling of multicomponent slurries remains incompletely understood, and predictive models for settling in graduated cylinders fail to match limited observations of settling in large waste tanks. Additionally, pumping operations can cause turbulent resuspension of particles when the pump intake is close to the settled solids layer. Filtration techniques that use membranes or partially permeable barriers retain larger particles, permitting smaller particles to permeate. However, filters, including dead-end filtration, are prone to clogging and caking, operate at elevated pressures due to minimal void volume, and increase in pressure during operations, which require more control systems. Therefore, the need for high throughput particle separation techniques that operate with modest pressure drops persists. A novel mesofluidic separator presents the opportunity to effectively and efficiently accelerate the waste cleanup mission. The separator separates large particles from process streams across a broad range of particle sizes and has no moving parts or media to replace, regenerate, or clean. This separator design has an unusually large void volume, permitting operation at much higher flow rates (and lower pressures) than traditional filtration (e.g., dead-end filtration). Industrial-scale flow rates have been demonstrated. In performance testing, mesofluidic separators operate at might flow rates (>90 gpm (0.0006 m{sup 3}/s) in piping 3 inches (0.08 m) in diameter; Re>10{sup 5}), with modest pressure drop (∼25 psi (170 KPa) in testing). In complex, aggregating waste simulants, the separator loses <25% of flow projected over months without back pulsing or chemical cleaning. Mesofluidic separation presents infrastructure advantages, reduces risk, and provides mission impact. Infrastructure advantages include implementation within existing transfer systems, plug and play without facility modifications to safety systems, and operation at low pressures. The separator is flexible in location, may be positioned within or outside of waste tanks, and may replace or augment dead-end and cross-flow filters. Mesofluidic separation reduces risk by minimizing waste (no media to replace or regenerate and no cleaning chemicals to handle and dispose) and by minimizing filter change-out consistent with as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) exposure to workers. The potential mission impact of these separators is substantial. The separator has potential to support, simplify, and accelerate in-farm transfers and waste feed delivery. Furthermore, the separator can free up settling and holding tanks in the Direct Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) mission by reducing or eliminating post-transfer settling and wait times with the potential to free up 1 Mgal (4000 m{sup 3}) of double-shell tank space. This paper quantitatively compares mesofluidic separation to dead-end filtration, discusses scale-up results, and considers the separator's potential to efficiently and effectively reduce the long-term environmental ability of particulate-rich nuclear wastes. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 36, No. 2, July-December 1995]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHORNOBYL ACCIDENT: 195 The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, Part III: Chernobyl Source Term Release Dynamics and Reconstruction of Events During the Active Phase, A. R. Sich; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 218 Second ANS Workshop on the Safety of Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants, R. A. Bari; 234 Elements of a Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, C. M. Hopper; 243 Rickover, Excellence, and Criticality Safety Programs, R. E. Wilson; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 249 Transient Analysis of the PIUS Advanced Reactor Design with the TRAC-PF1/MOD2 Code, B. E. Boyack, J. L Steiner, S. C. Harmony, H. J. Stumpf, and J. F. Lime; 278 The Hierarchy-By-Interval Approach to Identifying Important Models that Need Improvement in Severe-Accident Simulation Codes, T. J. Heames, M. Khatib-Rahbar, J. E. Kelly, R. P. Jenks-Johnson, and Y.-S. Chen; 290 RELAP5/MOD3 Code Coupling Model, R. P. Martin; 299 Missiles Caused by Severe Pressurized-Water Reactor Accidents, R. Krieg; DESIGN FEATURES: 310 Validation of COMMIX with Westinghouse AP-600 PCCS Test Data, J. G. Sun, T. H. Chien, J. Ding, and W T. Sha; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 321 Spent Nuclear Fuel Characterization for a Bounding Reference Assembly for the Receiving Basin for Off-Site Fuel, S. D. Kahook, R. L. Garrett, L. R. Canas, and M J. Beckum; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 332 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 335 Reactor Coolant System Blowdown at Wolf Creek on September 17, 1994, J. V. Kauffman and S. L. Israel; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 344 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Oueener; 349 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 320 Symposium on Acceptability of Risk From Radiation—Application to Manned Space Flight; 320 24th DOE/NRC Nuclear Air Cleaning and Treatment Conference; 361 Radiation Biology and Radiation Protection— Modern Developments and Tendencies in Radiation Biology; 362 1997 IEEE Sixth Conference on Human Factors and Power Plants; 354 The Authors; 360 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol. 36.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 29, No. 1, January-March 1988]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT: 1 Core History and Nuclide Inventory of the Chernobyl Core at the Time of Accident by Gerald Kirchner and Cornelius C. Noack; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 6 Nonprescriptive Nuclear Safety Regulation: The Example of Loss of Offsite Power by M. W. Golay, V. P. Manno, and C. Vlahoplus, Jr., 20 Nuclear Power Safety Goals in Light of the Chernobyl Accident by C. Whipple and C. Starr; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 29 Containment Loads from Severe Accidents—U.S. Program by W. Kerr and M. K. Dey; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 36 Safety Characteristics of Modern High-Temperature Reactors: Focus on German Designs by W. Kröger, H. Nickel, and R. Schulten; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 49 Radiation Hormesis and Nuclear Safety by C. C. Congdon; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 58 Evaluation of Nonradiological Water Chemistry at Power Reactors by Harvey Zibulsky, James J. Kottan, Walter J. Pasciak, Mary Ann Castrogivanni, and Sujit Banerjee, 64 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 67 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 85 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 94 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 100 Status of Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Licensing Review Compiled by E. G. Silver, 103 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1987; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 5 Northwestern University Short Course on Radiation Safety, 28 International Approach to Nuclear Safety (After Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl), 57 RPI Short Course on Modern Developments in Boiling Heat Transfer and Two-Phase Flow, 107 20th DOE/NRC Nuclear Air Cleaning Conference, 110 Third International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Power Plant Thermal Hydraulics and Operations, 108 The Authors, 111 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 28.

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Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

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Induced radioactivity of LDEF materials and structural components

We present an overview of the Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF) induced activation measurements. The LDEF, which was gravity-gradient stabilized, was exposed to the low Earth orbit (LEO) radiation environment over a 5.8 year period. Retrieved activation samples and structural components from the spacecraft were analyzed with low and ultra-low background HPGe gamma spectrometry at several national facilities. This allowed a very sensitive measurement of long-lived radionuclides produced by proton- and neutron-induced reactions in the time-dependent, non-isotropic LEO environment. A summary of major findings from this study is given that consists of directionally dependent activation, depth profiles, thermal neutron activation, and surface beryllium-7 deposition from the upper atmosphere. We also describe a database of these measurements that has been prepared for use in testing radiation environmental models and spacecraft design.

NASA Discipline Radiation Health↗

Alpha Spectrometry Results for Groundwater Samples Collected in Northern Iraq and a Summary of the Environmental Setting of the Adaya Burial Site

The Radiation Protection Center (RPC) of the Iraqi Ministry of Environment continues to evaluate the potential health impacts associated with the Adaya Burial Site, which is located 33 kilometers (20.5 miles) southwest of Mosul. This report documents the radiological analyses of 16 groundwater samples collected from wells located in the vicinity of the Adaya Burial Site and at other sites in northern Iraq. The Adaya Burial Site is a high-risk dump site because a large volume of radioactive material and contaminated soil is located on an unsecure hillside above the village of Tall ar Ragrag. The uranium activities for the 16 water samples in northern Iraq are considered to be naturally occurring and do not indicate artificial (man-made) contamination. With one exception, the alpha spectrometry results for the 16 wells that were sampled in 2019 indicate that the water quality concerning the three uranium isotopes (Uranium-233/234, Uranium-235/236, and Uranium-238) was acceptable for potable purposes (drinking and cooking). However, Well 7 in Mosul had a Uranium-233/234 activity concentration that slightly exceeded the World Health Organization guidance level. Eight of the 16 wells are located in the villages of Tall ar Ragrag and Adaya and had naturally occurring uranium concentrations. Wells in the villages of Tall ar Ragrag and Adaya are located near the Adaya Burial Site and should be sampled on an annual schedule. The list of groundwater analytes should include metals, total uranium, isotopic uranium, gross alpha/beta, gamma spectroscopy, organic compounds, and standard water quality parameters. Our current understanding of the hydrogeologic setting in the vicinity of the Adaya Burial Site is solely based on villager's domestic wells, topographic maps, and satellite imagery. To better understand the hydrogeologic setting, a Groundwater Monitoring Program needs to be developed and should include the installation of twelve groundwater monitoring wells in the vicinity of Tall ar Ragrag and the Adaya Burial Site. Characterization of the limestone aquifer and overlying alluvium is needed. RPC should continue to support health assessments for the villagers in Tall ar Ragrag and Adaya. Collecting samples for surface water (storm water), airborne dust, vegetation, and washway sediment should be conducted on a routine basis. Human access to the Adaya Burial Site needs to be strictly limited. Livestock access on or near the burial site needs to be eliminated. The surface-water exposure pathway is likely a greater threat than the groundwater exposure pathway. Installation of a surface-water diversion or collection system is recommended in order to reduce the potential for humans and livestock to come in contact with contaminated water and sediment. To reduce exposure to villagers, groundwater treatment should be considered if elevated uranium or other contaminants are detected in drinking water. Installing water-treatment systems would likely be quicker to accomplish than remediation and excavation of the Adaya Burial Site. The known potential for human exposure to uranium and metals (such as arsenic, chromium, selenium, and strontium) at the Adaya Burial Site is serious. Additional characterization , mitigation, and remediation efforts should be given a high priority.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Effect of Cr(III) Adsorption on the Dissolution of Boehmite Nanoparticles in Caustic Solution

Incorporation of relatively minor impurity metals onto metal (oxy)hydroxides can strongly impact solubility. In complex highly alkaline multicomponent tank waste such as that at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, tests indicate that the surface area-normalized dissolution rate of boehmite ($γ$-AlOOH) nanomaterials is at least an order of magnitude lower than that predicted for the pure phase. In this work we examine the dissolution kinetics of boehmite coated by adsorbed Cr(III), which adheres at saturation coverages as sparse chemisorbed monolayer clusters. Using 40 nm boehmite nanoplates as a model system, temperature-dependent dissolution rates of pure versus Cr(III)-adsorbed boehmite showed that the initial rate for the latter is consistently several times lower, with an apparent activation energy 16 kJ·mol -1 higher. Although the surface coverage is only around 50%, solution analytics coupled to multimethod solids characterization reveals a phyicochemical armoring effect by adsorbed Cr(III) that substantially reduces the number of dissolution-active sites on particle surfaces. Such findings could help improve kinetics models of boehmite and/or metal ion adsorbed boehmite nanomaterials, ultimately providing a stronger foundation for the development of more robust complex radioactive liquid waste processing strategies.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗