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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

FY2025 Status Report: Model 9975 O Ring Fixture Long-Term Leak Performance

Leak testing experiments to monitor the aging performance of Viton® GLT and GLT-S O-rings used in the model 9975 shipping package have been ongoing since 2004 at Savannah River National Laboratory. Seventy tests using mock-up 9975 primary containment vessels (PCVs) with GLT O-rings were assembled and heated to temperatures ranging from 200 to 450 °F. Due to material substitution, fourteen tests with GLT-S O-rings were initiated in 2008 and heated to temperatures ranging from 200 to 400 °F. The conditioning temperatures are elevated compared to the calculated maximum O-ring temperature in a 9975 package in storage, 158 °F, to accelerate aging and enable observations of O-ring failures in a reasonable time frame. The mock-up PCV fixtures are leak tested periodically, and all GLT O-ring fixtures aged at 350 °F or above have failed to maintain a leak-tight seal. Eight GLT O-ring fixtures aged at 300 °F have failed after 2.8 to 5.7 years at temperature while the remaining fixtures at 300 °F were retired from testing following more than five years of aging without failure. Two of these retired fixtures were returned to testing and heated to 350 °F to evaluate the impact of additional heating at higher temperature for aged O-rings. Fixture #20 failed after 3 months while fixture #18 failed after 9 months at 350 °F. These O-rings demonstrated that aged and in-service O-rings can continue to be used, even at higher temperatures, after being in storage, and their leak performance are consistent with other samples at 350 °F. There has been one GLT O-ring fixture which failed after 13.4 years of aging at 200 °F. However, 20 other GLT O-rings aging at 200 °F have remained leak-tight for over 16.9 years and remain in test. There are two GLT O-ring fixtures at 270 °F; one fixture has failed after 12.9 years while the other fixture remains in test after 12.5 years. All GLT-S O-ring fixtures aged at 300 °F or above have failed their leak test. No failures have yet been observed in GLT-S O-ring fixtures aging at 250 °F for 14.9 years, while one GLT-S O-ring fixture failed after 12.4 years at 200 °F. The leak testing data to date suggest the GLT and GLT-S O-rings aging in the K-Area Complex (KAC) storage at temperatures of 158 °F might maintain a leak-tight seal for up to 59 years. Data from the O-ring fixtures are generally consistent with results from compression stress-relaxation testing and provide confidence in the predictive models based on those results. However, uncertainty exists in extrapolating these elevated temperature results to the lower temperatures of interest for normal storage in KAC. The collective data from these test efforts suggest the minimum O-ring service life at KAC normal storage conditions should be at least 34 years for GLT and GLT-S O-rings. Measurement of compression set in O-rings removed from failed fixtures, compared to that from KAC surveillance O-rings, indicate significant margin remains for O-rings still in service in 9975 packages in KAC. Aging and periodic leak testing will continue for the remaining 24 mock-up PCV fixtures.

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NASA NTRS2011

A Contemporary Analysis of the O'Neill-Glaser Model for Space-Based Solar Power and Habitat Construction

In 1975 Gerard O Neill published in the journal Science a model for the construction of solar power satellites. He found that the solar power satellites suggested by Peter Glaser would be too massive to launch economically from Earth, but could be financially viable if the workforce was permanently located in free space habitats and if lunar and asteroid materials were used for construction. All new worldwide electrical generating capacity could be then achieved by solar power satellites. The project would financially break even in about 20 years after which it would generate substantial income selling power below fossil fuel prices. Two NASA / Stanford University led studies at Ames Research center during the summers of 1974 and 1976 found the concept technically sound and developed a detailed financial parametric model. Although the project was not undertaken when suggested in the 1970s, several contemporary issues make pursuing the O Neill -- Glaser concept more compelling today. First, our analysis suggests that if in the first ten years of construction that small habitats (compared to the large vista habitats envisioned by O Neill) supporting approximately 300 people were utilized, development costs of the program and the time for financial break even could be substantially improved. Second, the contemporary consensus is developing that carbon free energy is required to mitigate global climate change. It is estimated that 300 GW of new carbon free energy would be necessary per year to stabilize global atmospheric carbon. This is about 4 times greater energy demand than was considered by the O Neill Glaser model. Our analysis suggests that after the initial investments in lunar mining and space manufacturing and transportation, that the profit margin for producing space solar power is very high (even when selling power below fossil fuel prices). We have investigated the financial scaling of ground launched versus space derived space solar power satellites. We find that for the carbon mitigation case even modernized ground launched space solar power satellites are not financially viable. For space derived solar power satellites, however, the increased demand makes them break even substantially sooner and yield much higher profit. Third, current awareness is increasing about the dangers of humanity remaining a single planet species. Our technological power has been increasing relative to the size of the planet Earth. Since the middle of the 20th century our technological power has grown large relative to our planet's size. This presents a very real potential for human self-extinction. We argue that the potential for human self-extinction is increasing with time in proportion to the exponential growth of our technological power making self-extinction likely within this century if humanity remains a single planet species. The O Neill model of multiple independent free space habitats, it is argued, can protect humanity from extinction in the same way that portfolio diversification protects ones assets from total loss. We show that about 1 million people for the electricity only case, and about 1 billion people for the carbon mitigation case, can be provided with permanent space habitats and transportation from Earth in 30 years and can be funded by the space derived solar power satellite program. 1.2 Scope of this Chapter The goal of this chapter is to illustrate the power and importance of the O'Neill-Glaser concept in the context of human survival and maintaining a healthy planet Earth. We argue that at this point in human history our technological power is too dangerous to our selves and our home planet for us not to expand into space. We show by the models presented in the chapter that the imminent dangers of global warming and human self-extinction mandate that humanity move aggressively into the solar system in this generation. We show that the production of solar power satellites using space resources and with a work foe living in space provides a viable financial model to mitigate CO2 preventing the worst global warming scenarios, and safeguards humanity against self-extinction by providing hundreds of habitats and a billion people living in space within about 35 years. To accomplish this goal we need only consider the classic O'Neill-Glaser model which was parameterized for 1970's technological projections. Only habitat size optimization for the first ten years of production is added. This is a conservative approach since the innovations of the last 30 years will make the financial projections more favorable. However, the classic O'Neill-Glaser model represented a broad technological consensus. The model is well documented in the references and our calculations can be easily reproduced In this chapter the economics of the O Neill - Glaser model is compared with models that rely exclusively on Earth launched materials. Although many studies of Earth launched Solar Power Satellites have been made, we found that the NASA "Fresh Look Study" was the most comprehensive and well documented. It also provided one of the most optimistic Earth launch financial projections. We thus chose it for comparison purposes.

Curreri, Peter A.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

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