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At least 559 records · Page 31
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

The Bikinians

On March 29, 1944, a small contingent of Marines invaded Bikini Atoll. Their mission was to wrest control of the atoll from Japan and, at the same time, prevent the Bikinians from interfering with the ongoing war effort. The Marines found only five Japanese, all dead by suicide, and about 150 starving islanders who also were suffering from such diseases as the Yaws. The Marines fed the Bikinians and secured medical treatment for them. The Bikinians, like all Marshallese, were extremely grateful to be rescued by Americans. Two years later, the Navy landed on Bikini to send the islanders into exile so that their ancestral homeland could be used for Operation Crossroads. On March 7 th , the Bikinians were relocated to uninhabited Rongerik Atoll, where the Navy had built a village complete with twenty-six homes, canvas water tanks, screened toilets, and nine concrete cisterns. Although the accommodations were adequate, the Navy did not understand that uninhabited Marshallese atolls cannot sustain native life. Within two years, the Bikinians would have to be rescued from starvation again.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Light output quenching in response to deuterium-ions and alpha particles and pulse shape discrimination in deuterated trans-stilbene

We characterized the light output response of a new 140 cm 3 stilbene-d 12 crystal up to 14.1 MeV neutron energies using a coincidence neutron scattering system. We also characterized its light output response to alpha particles in the 5 to 6 MeV energy range. The excellent PSD capability of the stilbene-d 12 detector allowed us to select light pulses produced by particles of increasing ionization density, namely electrons, protons, deuterium-ions, and alpha particles. The measured fast decay component of the light pulses is increasingly quenched as the ionization density of the particle in the crystal increases. Consistently with this finding, the Birks’ quenching parameter of alpha particles is approximately 8.5 times larger compared to the quenching of deuterium ions, produced by neutron scattering interactions. The reported experimental characterization will allow high-fidelity modeling of the detector enabling its application for fast-neutron detection and spectroscopy in nuclear physics, radiation protection, nuclear security, and non-proliferation.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2025

Scintillation properties of diamond powders and feasibility of using them in thermal neutron detectors

Diamond offers unique properties for radiation detection, including high radiation hardness, very low gamma sensitivity, and fast response. Conventional diamond detectors rely on charge collection, but this approach requires ultra-pure single crystals and suffers from radiation-induced degradation. Here, in this work, we demonstrate an alternative approach using diamonds as scintillators for detection of charged particles and thermal neutrons. Prototypes were fabricated from commercially available diamond powders bonded to glass substrates and coupled with 6 LiF converters and silicon photomultipliers (SiPMs) and conventional PMTs. We characterized their scintillation properties under alpha particle excitation, x-ray photoluminescence, and thermal neutrons. The tryout detectors exhibit strong scintillation light signals, nanosecond-scale response times, and neutron detection efficiencies up to approximately 14 %, evaluated by comparison to conventional 3 He detector with known efficiency. These results demonstrate the feasibility of cost-effective, lightweight and robust diamond scintillation detectors for applications in space and planetary science, nuclear security, safeguards and environmental monitoring requiring efficient, robust, gamma-blind neutron detectors.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Detection and Diagnosis of Data Integrity Attacks in Solar Farms Based on Multilayer Long Short-Term Memory Network

Photovoltaic (PV) systems are becoming more vulnerable to cyber threats. In response to this emerging concern, developing cyber-secure power electronics converters has received increased attention from the IEEE Power Electronics Society that recently launched a cyber-physical-security initiative. Here this letter proposes a deep sequence learning based diagnosis solution for data integrity attacks on PV systems in smart grids, including dc–dc and dc–ac converters. The multilayer long short-term memory networks are used to leverage time-series electric waveform data from current and voltage sensors in PV systems. The proposed method has been evaluated in a PV smart grid benchmark model with extensive quantitative analysis. As a comparison, we have evaluated classic data-driven methods, including K-nearest neighbor, decision tree, support vector machine, artificial neural network, and convolutional neural network. Comparison results verify performances of the proposed method for detection and diagnosis of various data integrity attacks on PV systems.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Understanding Structures of Cyber Competition in an Era of Major Power Rivalry

Over the past two decades, the cyber domain has emerged and evolved into a key strategic domain for nations across the globe. Security strategies are espoused by heads of state that focus on how to manage the increasingly enormous, crosscutting impact that the cyber domain has on national security across economic, military, intelligence, intellectual property, and countless other facets. These strategies frequently evolve, and even change entirely, as leaders adapt to new technologies and administrations change. Even if these strategies did not change at all, they would take inordinate amounts of time to effectively implement within the organizational structures of government. The time required to go from setting department and agency-level goals, to the time small teams have well-oiled processes and expertise to accomplish tactical objectives that meet the strategic vision is lengthy. With near certainty, by the time objectives and vision are implemented, the landscape, strategy, or both has changed entirely. While this churn will likely never cease due to the rapidly changing nature of the cyber domain, this problem raises an important question: can governmental structures be organized to rapidly adapt to changing cyber strategies? As offices responsible for particular missions in cyberspace shuffle about within the bureaucracy, are technical capabilities enabled or enhanced? No matter how advanced a particular technical capability is or how adept the staff is at solving problems, they will be ineffective if placed haphazardly within the organization: the right authorities may not exist for their office, the correct lines of interpersonal communication may not be established properly, or insufficient resources have not been allocated to effectively deploy a brilliant technical solution. This concept of organizational agility in the context of national cyber capabilities is important when taking into account the National Defense Strategy’s emphasis on cyber capability and the ability of the United States to compete and rapidly adapt to new challenges posed by rivals. As a nation, we are at a point where technology evolves rapidly enough to warrant thoughtful and nimble changes to the bureaucratic structures that support how cyber operations are carried out. Taking these questions and cross-comparing them to the organizational structures across China, Russia, and the United States provides for an interesting thought experiment. As non-democratic regimes, China and Russia have differing priorities and internal power dynamics than the United States and thus organize their governments differently. By combining known and broadcasted strategies of these nations with the observed technical capabilities demonstrated in the public domain, we can begin to see how organizational structures map to strategic goals and directly enable technical capabilities. Insight can be gained by introducing organizational structures into traditional analysis focusing solely around strategies and capabilities; additionally, otherwise unknown capabilities or intents might be discovered or inferred by analyzing organizational structures alone. Analyzing cyber operations from this oft-overlooked perspective could potentially provide useful insight and more concrete actions that can be undertaken to realize the National Defense Strategy’s goals.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

1MV Febetron Pulse Generator Operator's Manual

The Febetron Pulse Generator (FPG) is an experimental assembly used to store electrical energy for a period of time and then release that energy over a short duration pulse to achieve high instantaneous power outputs. The FPG is an ideal device to be used for a variety high energy physics experiments. For mobility and ease of repeatable operation, the FPG is secured on a rolling test fixture and paired with a diagnostic and controls rack. The combination of the FPG, test fixture cart, SF6 gas cart, and controls rack is identified as the Pulse Generator Testing Assembly (PGTA). This document outlines all necessary information regarding the working principles, assembly/disassembly, maintenance, operation, uses, hazards, and experimental procedures of the 1 Mega Volt (MV) PGTA. This document, in addition to the manufacturer’s manuals, should be utilized as a reference whenever working with the PGTA and any of its components.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Tommy Morris’ Comments on Nuclear Explosive Safety

Nuclear explosives and weapon systems require special consideration because of their political and military importance, their destructive power, and the potential consequences of an accident. The special consideration translates into specific requirements promulgated by Department of Energy (DOE) O 452.1E “Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety,” and Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3150.02 “DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) W-Division Nuclear Explosive Safety Office mission is to coordinate LANL participation in Nuclear Explosive Safety Studies (NESS) and Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies (NWSS); to provide qualified members and advisors to the studies; to liaise with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the DoD, other national laboratories, the Nevada Test Site, and Pantex Plant with regards to nuclear explosive and weapon system safety. These orders and directives define nuclear detonation as an energy release through a nuclear process, during a period of time on the order of 1 microsecond, in an amount equivalent to the energy released by detonating 4 or more pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

National Ignition Facility Opacity Time Resolved Spectrometer Systems Engineering Final Project

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is the world’s largest and most energetic laser facility. The NIF system is designed to produce high energy density (temperature and pressure) conditions through the application of its 192 laser beams. One of the users of NIF is the opacity platform developed to study the opacities at temperatures and densities relevant to the solar interior and stellar evolution. The platform was developed to study iron (Fe) opacity at temperatures relevant to the solar interior. The opacity campaign uses spectrometers to gather data. Spectrometers utilize crystals to produce x-ray spectra that are recorded on time-integrated and time-resolved detectors. The opacity spectrometer (OpSpec) currently fielded and in use at NIF uses a time integrated film channel to collect data. The opacity spectrometer time resolved (OpSpecTR) will utilize novel hCMOS detectors to capture time resolved images of spectra of interest. The key stakeholders identified for OpSpecTR included the physicists responsible for OpSpec and OpSpecTR, the Target Area Science and Engineering (TASE) department at NIF, the NIF and Photon Science (NIF & PS) Opacity program, the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Physics and Engineering program, the Sandia hCMOS manufacturing and testing program, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) program sponsor. The Target and Experimental Operations (TEXOPS) was identified as a key stakeholder because the group includes the individuals that will physically interact with the OpSpecTR system as it participates in NIF experiments. The opacity platform collects data in a unique orientation relative to the existing diagnostics fielded at NIF. The existing infrastructure at NIF uses a diagnostic manipulator (DIM) to insert the diagnostic near the target chamber center to collect data during a NIF shot. Existing diagnostics collect data through the center line of the DIM axis and collect relevant data perpendicular to this axis. The opacity platform requires crystals mounted in a specific orientation which requires data collection parallel to the DIM axis. This deviation from standard NIF practices was a key factor in developing requirements.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Secure System Composition and Type Checking using Cryptographic Proofs [Slides]

We can use formal methods to verify that systems compose correctly without the possibility of incorrect behavior. This means exhaustively checking that System A’s postconditions agree with System B’s preconditions. If so, it is safe to compose. Normal Setting: Every computational path must be accounted for and checked. Verification cost (time) is multiplicative across systems.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Portal Monitoring Considerations for Treaty Verification Applications

Portal monitoring is one method in a suite of options for treaty verification and can assist in verification of treaty accountable items (TAIs). Portal monitor technology spans a wide range of sensors, including radiation detectors, break-beams, or weight sensors. For radiation-detecting portal monitors, they are able to confirm absence / presence of a radiological signature and to track TAI direction of motion. Portal monitoring uses measurements from strategically placed sensors (e.g., radiation detectors) to record the entry or egress of TAIs. The implementation of portal monitoring relies on three key elements: perimeter definition, portal locations, and sensor technology, and can be implemented in either time-bound or continuous operations depending on what is permitted by the Treaty.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

GRUMDN: A Multi-Task Model for Predicting Human Patterns-of-Life from Stay Transition Data

Understanding human patterns-of-life (PoL) is essential towards ensuring safe and secure indoor facility environment as well as outdoor urban environment. Prediction of human movement in between places of interest is vital in understanding human PoL. Movement between spaces maybe represented and detected in one of the two forms: 1) trajectories: locations measured at regular time intervals by mobile sensors, bluetooth or GPS sensors; or 2) stay transitions: semantic PoI (points of interest) and stay duration data measurable by eventbased sensors that collect data when a check-in or check-out event is detected. Stay transition data provides a more compressed data format compared to trajectories data, especially in situations with longer stay durations, while preserving the information necessary for PoL analysis. Now as introduced briefly in the paper, our deployed end application (Digital Twin of a facility with non-player characters, besides the interactive user in virtual reality) needed a well-performing and validated AI/ML model for simulating high quality stay transitions behavior. In this study we thus primarily present our findings with developing and validating that model, which is a multi-task neural network for stay transition prediction. The neural network consists of two heads, for corresponding two tasks of stay category prediction and stay duration prediction. We evaluated gated recurrent units and multi-layer perceptrons of varying network sizes for stay category prediction; while mixture density networks, noisy generator-only networks, and generative adversarial networks of varying network sizes for stay duration prediction. We have then evaluated four multi-task models, constructed by combining these specialized models, on their ability to predict stay transition data. We tested our models on datasets from two different cases: 1) a simulation-generated dataset of indoor movement within the HFIR (high flux isotope reactor) nuclear reactor facility at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL); and 2) the GeoLife human mobility dataset of outdoor urban movement available in literature. Our results indicate that GRUMDN, which combines gated recurrent units (GRU) for stay category prediction task, and mixture density networks (MDN) for stay duration prediction task, did overall outperform other multitask models and the current state-of-the-art.

Gunaratne, Chathika [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000225088745↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Rise in the Utilization of IoT Devices in Nuclear Facilities

The term Internet of Things (loT) encompasses everything connected to the internet, but it is increasingly being used to define objects that "talk" to each other. A broader term is that loT are the devices that connect to each other and to the internet. It has been mentioned that loT offers the potential for a "Forth industrial revolution" (1). This is primally because of the ease of use and quick link-up of devices within an area. This poses options for great interactivity but also create security concerns as many of these devices may not have been vetted for industrial use. By allowing for the intercommunication of these devices and combining with automated systems, we can now gather information, provide analysis and create automotive actions. This allows for faster response times as well as lowering the overall cost for operations in nuclear power facilities. (2)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Userspace Squash Filesystem for Launching Linux Containers on HPC Systems [Thesis]

The demand for user defined software stacks (UDSS) has been increasing in the high-performance computing (HPC) community. Container technology has become popular due to the flexibility and isolation it provides to HPC users. Container images must be available to all nodes involved for use in HPC and can be distributed to compute nodes in a variety of ways. A common method for container image distribution is to simply copy the container image to memory on each compute node, which can be time consuming at scale, and uses valuable memory on each node. The kernel mounted squash filesystem (squashfs) has proven fast and efficient for this task but requires root-level access. This paper will show a user space mounted squashfs is an efficient and secure solution for container image distribution.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Nuclear Criticality Experiments Research Center Futures: A Report of a Workshop held September 6-9, 2022, Los Alamos, NM, November, 2022

Experiments and training with critical assemblies and fissionable material (at or near the critical state) that explore reactivity phenomena are central to a number of national security challenges. From fission energy to nuclear weapons to a broad suite of scientific challenges, it is clear that additional capacity and capability are needed. The National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) marked 10 years of operations in 2021. This anniversary was an opportune time to celebrate our successes and progress, and to evaluate the remaining and emergent challenges. Against this backdrop, a workshop of approximately 140 national and international leaders in nuclear research was convened in Los Alamos, New Mexico to explore “NCERC Futures.” Therefore, the present workshop focused specifically on needed capabilities and tools to meet the research challenges in eight topical mission areas served by NCERC. As each Topical Group summarized their discussions in the out brief, it was recognized that key challenges could be met through enabling infrastructure investments and new critical assemblies. Enabling infrastructure includes staffing, additional space/buildings, developing an agile bounding safety basis, the ability to keep pace with technological advances in detectors and data acquisition systems (allowing use of those with Bluetooth™ and similar technologies), an expanded set of materials options (especially plutonium), a “Plug and Play” design and implementation mindset, and a facility that enabled free-field measurements. The new critical assemblies that were identified as having the most impact were a bare plutonium (Pu) Critical Assembly, a Horizontal Split Table (HST), a Super Comet, and a Uranium Solution Burst Assembly. NECRC is a unique, one-of-a-kind facility in the United States. If all the improvements were to be made, NCERC would enable the United States and its partners to address many important research questions related to criticality. These include but are not limited to: (1) Covering the entire neutron energy spectrum for both highly enriched uranium (HEU) and Pu in configurations for virtually all conceivable applications; (2) Performing multi-physics solution experiments and irradiations with a Uranium Solution Burst Assembly, which more closely resembles actual criticality accidents; (3) Conducting free-field experiments to make basic fission physics measurements and much cleaner benchmarks with various experimental observables; and (4) Providing more training classes and more experiments annually at greater cost efficiency enabled by additional buildings and machines and an agile, bounding, risk-balanced Safety Basis. In the end, workshop attendees enthusiastically concluded that NCERC Futures are bright and the workshop helped to identify a roadmap of capability gaps that need to be addressed. This report documents the results of those efforts.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Second Life Battery Analysis

SAND2021-15908 O Second Life Battery Analysis estimates capacity loss on a lithium-ion battery based on time spent in service and the number of cycles. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Wesolowski, Daniel↗
DOE OSTI2022

Modeling Needs to Support the Reconstruction Strategy of Ukraine

Ukraine has been facing difficult times. Russia started a full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, and has caused huge human and infrastructure losses. As a result of the invasion, more than 8 million people left their homes. The Russian army has targeted Ukrainian energy sources, destroying or damaging over 50% of thermal power generation capacity (coal and gas), 30% of solar generation, and 90% of wind generation. The Russians are also threatening Ukrainian energy security, as they currently control the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant – Europe’s largest. In addition, Russia has destroyed 121,000 buildings, including 5,300 multistory buildings - more buildings than Ukraine built during the past five years. The occupiers destroyed or damaged 343 district heat boiler stations (destroyed 12 / damaged 331) and 8 CHPs (destroyed 4/ damaged 4). There is no doubt that Ukraine will be able to protect its sovereignty and restore its territorial integrity; however, this will be a long process. The Government of Ukraine needs to simultaneously focus on many issues, from waging war to the restoration of electricity, water, and heat supply in the territories close to the front line. In addition to these time-sensitive issues, the government also needs to plan a long term multi-sector strategy for the reconstruction of Ukraine’s economy. Ukraine initiated a broad-based political process for recovery at the International Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC 2022) in Lugano, Switzerland. Prior to URC 2022, Ukraine applied for EU membership on February 28 and was granted the status of candidate country by the European Council on June 23, 2022. More than 40 nations are fully committed to supporting Ukraine throughout its path from early to long-term recovery. In addition, these countries link a successful recovery to Ukraine’s European future (URC, 2022a). The reconstruction process will be long. The government also recognizes that it is not enough to build energy infrastructure back – it should be built back better. The government is committed to building a more sustainable and cleaner energy sector. Energy modeling can provide important insights into paths to decarbonize Ukraine’s economy while rebuilding it after the war. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and the Institute for Economics and Forecasting of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (IEF) work on modeling decarbonization scenarios in the energy sector of Ukraine. The teams focus on the heat sector, which includes district heat, autonomous and individual heating, and energy consumption by final energy consumption sectors, including buildings. Since the teams use world-class integrated assessment models, other sectors will be analyzed as well. The purpose of the document is to describe the needs of key Ukrainian ministries in modeling the reconstruction process. The scope of this document is limited to modeling energy consumption by the power and heat sectors, final energy consumption by buildings, and GHG emissions from these two sectors. The rest of this policy memo is organized as follows. After this introduction, Chapter 2 discusses key provisions of the reconstruction strategy with a focus on energy, buildings, heat supply, environment, and European integration aspirations. Section 3 provides an overview of recent developments and key decisions of the Government of Ukraine in the area of energy efficiency and decarbonization. Finally, Section 4 provides key suggestions on how PNNL and IEF can help the Government of Ukraine in developing strategic documents.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Evaluating and Countering the Insider Threat to the Radioactive Source Supply Chain

The modern supply chain is a global enterprise and little drove this home more than the global COVID-19 pandemic which sent economic shockwaves throughout the world. Many goods became scarce, as products were delayed, in limited supply, or simply not available. The suddenly diminished supply collided with still high demand and led to greatly increased costs. This was particularly true for the radioactive source supply chain. The pandemic introduced extensive delays for construction projects, slowed the transport of radiological materials to facilities, interrupted treatment deliveries, and impaired the mobility of contractors across the industry. All of these concerns not only adversely affected the economy, but also impacted the safety and security of radiological material, potentially raising national security concerns. The vulnerability of the supply chain, a critical element in an increasingly interconnected world, was exposed. One example that challenged the adaptive capacity of the overall supply chain is the Ever Given container ship, which became stuck in the Suez Canal in 2020. This accident immediately shut down shipments that accounted for 12% of global trade, with long-term impacts estimated to be much larger. Developing the ability to anticipate and react in real-time to sudden changes has quickly become a necessity, particularly in industries that deal with the transport of hazardous material. The reaction to these dramatic incidents was to largely focus attention and resources on protecting the supply chain from external threats. However, the threat to the radioactive material supply chain from insiders intimately involved in the process may be even greater and remains a blind spot that requires increased attention. Recent events revealed the blueprint for targeting and disrupting that supply chain, so the potential for a malicious insider—or a manipulated, unwitting insider—to take advantage of this vulnerability is elevated, creating security concerns for radiological industries. This paper examines and analyzes the potential insider threat to the radioactive source supply chain and recommends steps to take to counter this possibility.

Kinney, Justin↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cyber Secure Sensor Network for Fossil Fuel Power Generation Assets Monitoring

The energy sector is undergoing digital transformation which is to say more and more power generation assets have become automated and connected to the internet. The connected sensors can tap into plants to monitor the health of assets and manage fleets remotely. These are just some of the benefits digitalization is bringing to the power industry. Within a power plant, control systems are no longer concerned with one system or one piece of equipment, but rather whole fleet of assets inter-connected with smart sensors which have the function of continuously monitoring and transmitting real-time operational data to operators. These connected systems will form a part of the industrial internet of things (IIoT). The big data scenarios provide benefits of performing system prognostics and optimization which is a key selling point of power plant digitalization.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗