Managing Supply Chain Risks to Space Systems
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This paper provides an overview of some of the major steps needed to mature and justify the design of an avionics system for crewed spacecraft. It is organized as a collection of artifacts or pieces of evidence that NASA needs to assess the system at design reviews, including a functional failure modes and effects analysis (FFMEA), fault containment region (FCR) definitions, the failure hypothesis, and reliability analysis. This paper is intended as a reference for designers working on NASA crewed spaceflight projects, reliability engineers responsible for avionics system assessments, and program managers wanting to understand what evidence is required at design reviews to ensure crew safety and mission success.
Understanding and accounting for uncertainty in risk analysis is a critical step in the management and communication of risk in engineered systems. The component and system-level analysis to determine the probability of a negative outcome and its consequence is often quantified by a point estimate. Many Program and Enterprise decisions involving technical concerns and issues rely on reliability engineering activities to produce quantified risk analysis to inform the decision making process. At NASA, it is common to use a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) to inform the overall risk to Loss of Mission or Loss of Crew that involves integration across all spacecraft subsystem fault trees to produce an overall probability of mission failure. The point estimate is an estimate of this overall probability and is an immediate result of a fault tree model. It is the result of a model where the probability of each event is taken to be equal to its mean. The value provides an approximation of the overall mean without running any uncertainty calculations (e.g., no sampling). Using only the point estimate can lead to a false sense of precision and the point estimate may not match the resulting mean when uncertainty is taken into consideration. This paper will explore five conditions that can cause the PRA model mean to diverge from the point estimate and will provide engineers and managers insight into the importance of understanding uncertainty in the elements of PRA models.
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Space transportation systems for manned space flight support
Space fission power systems could enable advanced civilian space missions. Terrestrially, thousands of fission systems have been operated since 1942. In addition, the US flew a space fission system in 1965, and the former Soviet Union flew 33 such systems prior to the end of the Cold War. Modern design and development practices, coupled with 65 years of experience with terrestrial reactors, could enable the affordable development of space fission power systems for near-term planetary surface applications.
Space fission power systems could enable advanced civilian space missions. Terrestrially, thousands of fission systems have been operated since 1942. In addition, the US flew a space fission system in 1965, and the former Soviet Union flew 33 such systems prior to the end of the Cold War. Modern design and development practices, coupled with 65 years of experience with terrestrial reactors, could enable the affordable development of space fission power systems for near-term planetary surface applications.
Space nuclear power systems are considered for use in those particular spacecraft applications for which nuclear power systems offer unique advantages over solar and/or chemical space power systems. Both isotopic and reactor heated space electrical power units are described in an attempt to illustrate their operating characteristics, spacecraft integration aspects, and factory-to-end of mission operational considerations. The status of technology developments in nuclear power systems is presented. Some projections of those technologies are made to form a basis for the applications of space nuclear power systems to be expected over the next 10-15 years.
Technological and planning issues for data management, processing, and communication on Space Station Freedom are discussed in reviews and reports by U.S., European, and Japanese experts. The space-information-system strategies of NASA, ESA, and NASDA are discussed; customer needs are analyzed; and particular attention is given to communication and data systems, standards and protocols, integrated system architectures, software and automation, and plans and approaches being developed on the basis of experience from past programs. Also included are the reports from workshop sessions on design to meet customer needs, the accommodation of growth and new technologies, and system interoperability.
This recommendation contains the detailed specification of the logic required to carry out the Command Operations Procedures of the Transfer Layer. The Recommendation for Telecommand--Part 2, Data Routing Service contains the standard data structures and data communication procedures used by the intermediate telecommand system layers (the Transfer and Segmentation Layers). In particular, it contains a brief description of the Command Operations Procedures (COP) within the Transfer Layer. This recommendation contains the detailed definition of the COP's in the form of state tables, along with definitions of the terms used. It is assumed that the reader of this document is familiar with the data structures and terminology of part 2. In case of conflict between the description of the COP's in part 2 and in this recommendation, the definition in this recommendation will take precedence. In particular, this document supersedes section 4.3.3.1 through 4.3.3.4 of part 2.
Space shuttle systems structural design and thermal protection technology, stressing hardware reliability and reusability
Space age transportation systems such as reusable launch vehicles, orbital passenger and cargo ferry vehicles and lunar, nuclear ferry vehicles
Space nuclear power system design and operation related to safety, discussing SNAP flights