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DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-Physical Tabletop Exercise for Small Modular Reactor Facilities

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. This evolving threat landscape includes adversaries having offensive cyber capabilities to attack information technology (IT) systems and operation technology (OT) systems. These adversaries may have the ability to attack the physical protection system (PPS) networks with potential consequential impacts that could degrade the effectiveness of the PPS. These cyber attacks may also be used to attack the safety and operational systems used to operate and ensure the safety of the reactor. Additionally, adversaries may gain access to unmanned aerial systems (UAS) that may be used to provide reconnaissance and surveillance of the facility, provide information to the adversaries, and be equipped with kinetic capabilities such as explosives or weapons that can be used to directly attack the facility. The Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy’s Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program funded Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop a cyber-physical tabletop exercise (TTX). This exercise was conducted on a hypothetical small modular reactor (SMR) facility, and only considered a potential adversary cyber attack on the PPS to a physical attack on the hypothetical facility to achieve a radiological release. This cyber-physical TTX is meant to provide lessons learned to integrate the cyber security system design and the physical protection system (PPS) design to decrease design, operation, and maintenance costs as well as increase effectiveness for defending against design basis threat attacks at the facility. This TTX will also provide a framework and method for SMR and microreactor vendors to conduct their own cyber-physical TTX and gain impactful insights to improving the cyber and physical protection system design for their SMR or microreactor facility design.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Development of A Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) Testbed for Cyber-Physical Security in Smart Buildings

As smart buildings move towards open communication technologies, providing access to the Building Automation System (BAS) through the building's intranet, or even remotely through the Internet, has become a common practice. However, BAS was historically developed as a closed environment and designed with limited cyber-security considerations. Thus, smart buildings are vulnerable to cyber-attacks with the increased accessibility. This study introduces the development and capability of a Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIT) testbed for testing and evaluating the cyber-physical security of typical BASs in smart buildings. The testbed consists of three subsystems: (1) a real-time HIL emulator simulating the behavior of a virtual building as well as the Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) equipment via a dynamic simulation in Modelica; (2) a set of real HVAC controllers monitoring the virtual building operation and providing local control signals to control HVAC equipment in the HIL emulator; and (3) a BAS server along with a web-based service for users to fully access the schedule, setpoints, trends, alarms, and other control functions of the HVAC controllers remotely through the BACnet network. The server generates rule-based setpoints to local HVAC controllers. Based on these three subsystems, the HIL testbed supports attack/fault-free and attack/fault-injection experiments at various levels of the building system. The resulting test data can be used to inform the building community and support the cyber-physical security technology transfer to the building industry.

Li, Guowen↗

DOE OSTI2020

Cyber Threat Dictionary Using MITRE ATT&CK Matrix and NIST Cybersecurity Framework Mapping

Cyber-attack and defense frameworks offer numerous ways to protect systems and networks from threats. However, only a few of these numerous attack and defense frameworks provide countermeasures by linking multiple frameworks. Due to the lack of attack-defense mapped frameworks, a number of cyber security practitioners are often puzzled how to cope with cyber-attacks when it occurs. The objective of this paper is to present a tool called the “Cyber Threat Dictionary” to solve the problem . Cyber Threat Dictionary offers approaches and practical solutions to the threats by mapping MITRE ATT&CK Matrix to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. By providing immediate solutions to cyber security practitioners, Cyber Threat Dictionary enables effective responses against cyber-attacks.

MITRE ATT&CK MATRIX, NIST Cybersecurity Framework,↗

DOE OSTI2023

Language-Theoretic Data Analysis to Support ICS Protocol Baselining

Critical infrastructure stakeholders need to baseline their systems to understand expected protocol communications. Baseline behaviors may vary based on operational context. Expected operations during a maintenance window, for example, may be different from normal operations. Furthermore, constructing system baselines for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is difficult and time-consuming. ICS processes generate artifacts expressed across heterogeneous data sources such as network traffic and device logs. This paper explores the hypothesis that such ICS artifacts form a language in the language-theoretic sense. From a theoretical perspective, the variety of implementations of ICS protocols and constrained environment of OT networks provide a rich application domain for language-theoretic approaches. We present several use cases related to the practical construction of system baselines: grammars for data fusion, language dialects for device fingerprinting, and security automata for system baselining

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

Grid Communications: Digital Assurance and Supply Chain Challenges and Emerging Regulation Session Two

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem. This is Session 2 of 3 (Full Version).

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2025

Grid Communications: Cybersecurity and Supply Chain Challenges and Emerging Regulation Session Three

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2022

A Cybersecurity Threat Profile for a Connected Lighting System

In anticipation of improved energy performance and cost savings, cities and building owners are increasingly considering “smart lighting initiatives” that aim to convert their collection of simple luminaires (i.e., lighting fixtures) into an intelligent connected lighting system (CLS) capable of remotely monitoring energy consumption and fault conditions, and possibly implementing adaptive lighting schemes. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has set an national goal of tripling the energy efficiency and demand flexibility of the buildings sector by 2030, relative to 2020 levels 1. It is forecast that connected lighting systems can contribute to that goal by delivering 125 TWh of annual energy savings by 2035 2, equivalent to the annual output of 50 typical (500 MW) power plants. However, these energy savings and the DOE goal are put at significant risk if connected technologies are not adopted due to real or perceived cybersecurity concerns. Connected IoT devices such as these have historically been rife with vulnerabilities which sometimes put security considerations secondary to functionality and operability. What are the cybersecurity threats that will impact these systems, as formerly banal luminaires transition into intelligent connected devices that collect information about themselves, their surrounding environment, and possibly us? In this paper we analyze a threat profile performed on a fault-detection use case for streetlights. A threat profile establishes security requirements, justifies security measures, yields actionable controls, and effectively communicates risk to stakeholders. This effort provides critical information for making threat-based decisions to increase security at a reasonable cost, and can effectively be used by development teams, software architects, and managers to make cybersecurity a part of their ongoing culture of awareness, training, and prevention. This leads to more secure systems and better-understood security. On-premise, cloud, and hybrid architectures with different authentication mechanisms were modeled and later categorized using the Microsoft STRIDE framework. An analysis of the recommended controls for each threat was performed to determine which controls could and should be put in place by manufacturers or third-party suppliers, and which controls need to be left up the end-user to implement. Fifty-seven threats were identified. Among our key findings: (1) 65% (37/57) of the threats did not involve the luminaires, but rather the other components needed to communicate with and manage them; (2) 63% (36/57) of the threats could have been mitigated through manufacturer-implemented defensive techniques or “controls”; and (3) 23% (13/57) of the threats were dependent on the network configuration. Recommendations based on the results of this work are made to key stakeholder groups. Notably, lighting technology developers are advised to address all threats that can be reasonably controlled with baked-in technology solutions (e.g., encryption or authentication controls), and employ some form of secure supply chain management and tracking where other parts (e.g., sensors, microprocessors) of a luminaire must also be built and manufactured with the proper security controls in place. Developers should also review threats involving assets not developed in-house to understand how connectivity with other devices will affect their product during system operation and determine if a compensating control for a defense-in-depth strategy will be needed. Finally, those interested in deploying CLS should compare the differences between cloud and on-premise models to determine which is more suitable for their needs and the abilities of their security team.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

DOE OSTI2024

5G Securely Energized and Resilient: (5G-SER) (Final Report)

NREL's work on 5G integration with physical power systems (versus simulated systems demonstrated in task 3) under 5G-Securely Energized and Resilient (5G-SER) achieved a major milestone in with the completion of Task 4 activities. After many months (6+) of planning and development along with scaling challenges along the way, a full 5G end-to-end network with physical hardware components (physical inverter, physical power panel, physical battery, etc.) was deployed in a containerized environment. In parallel, a distributed controls architecture for a microgrid powering 5G resources was also successfully modified from its previous instantiation for a simulated environment to work with these physical components. These accomplishments set the stage to use newly setup 5G technology with physical microgrid components to test the feasibility of 5G wireless with physical systems to enable resilient communications between controls and distributed solar and storage resources while exploring ways to configure 5G components to survive power disturbances. The results detailed in the report below show that even utilizing physical components, 5G wireless systems were able to provide resilient results that were similar to the results from the simulated environment Task 3).

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2023

Intensification differentially affects the delivery of multiple ecosystem services in subtropical and temperate grasslands

Intensification, the process of intensifying land management to enhance agricultural goods, results in “intensive” pastures that are planted with productive grasses and fertilized. These intensive pastures provide essential ecosystem services, including forage production for livestock. Understanding the synergies and tradeoffs of pasture intensification on the delivery of services across climatic regions is crucial to shape policies and incentives for better management of natural resources. Here, we investigated how grassland intensification affects key components of provisioning (forage productivity and quality), supporting (plant diversity) and regulating services (CO 2 and CH 4 fluxes) by comparing these services between intensive versus extensive pastures in subtropical and temperate pastures in the USDA Long-term Agroecosystem Research (LTAR) Network sites in Florida and Oklahoma, USA over multiple years. Our results suggest that grassland intensification led to a decrease in measured supporting and regulating services, but increased forage productivity in temperate pastures and forage digestibility in subtropical pastures. Intensification decreased the net CO 2 sink of subtropical pastures while it did not affect the sink capacity of temperate pastures; and it also increased environmental CH 4 emissions from subtropical pastures and reduced CH 4 uptake in temperate pastures. Intensification enhanced the global warming potential associated with C fluxes of pastures in both ecoregions. Our study demonstrates that comparisons of agroecosystems in contrasting ecoregions can reveal important drivers of ecosystem services and general or region-specific opportunities and solutions to maintaining agricultural production and reducing environmental footprints. Further LTAR network-scale comparisons of multiple ecosystem services across croplands and grazinglands intensively vs extensively managed are warranted to inform the sustainable intensification of agriculture within US and beyond. Our results highlight that achieving both food security and environmental stewardship will involve the conservation of less intensively managed pastures while adopting sustainable strategies in intensively managed pastures.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2026

Characterization of volcanic tuff pores pre- and post-underground nuclear detonation using ultra-small and small angle neutron scattering

The ability to accurately model the subsurface transport of radionuclides is fundamental to the remote detection and characterization of underground nuclear explosion (UNE) events. Developing more sophisticated transport models presents a significant opportunity to enhance monitoring capabilities, particularly in the reliable prediction of signature migration. Experimentally determined characterization of geologic materials associated with transport properties is the pertinent base information for such robust model development and calibration. Here, we report results from an unprecedented study demonstrating changes to the pore and fracture network structures in geological materials in response to UNEs over nanometer to micrometer length scales. Volcanic tuffs of five different lithological formations from pre- and post-UNE environments were collected from the Nevada National Security Site. Combined ultra-small and small-angle neutron scattering techniques were used to characterize the tuff pore structure. The results demonstrate measurable differences in the specific surface area and porosity of samples pre- and post-shot from texturally similar lithological formations, indicating that pore properties can serve as a direct physical signature of a UNE. The results also provide experimentally determined transport parameters in support of advanced model development through the integration of gas migration, hydrodynamic simulations, and geologic framework models.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2024

Massively scalable workflows for quantum chemistry: BigChem and ChemCloud

Electronic structure theory, i.e., quantum chemistry, is the fundamental building block for many problems in computational chemistry. Here we present a new distributed computing framework (BigChem), which allows for an efficient solution of many quantum chemistry problems in parallel. BigChem is designed to be easily composable and leverages industry-standard middleware (e.g., Celery, RabbitMQ, and Redis) for distributed approaches to large scale problems. BigChem can harness any collection of worker nodes, including ones on cloud providers (such as AWS or Azure), local clusters, or supercomputer centers (and any mixture of these). BigChem builds upon MolSSI packages, such as QCEngine to standardize the operation of numerous computational chemistry programs, demonstrated here with Psi4, xtb, geomeTRIC, and TeraChem. BigChem delivers full utilization of compute resources at scale, offers a programable canvas for designing sophisticated quantum chemistry workflows, and is fault tolerant to node failures and network disruptions. We demonstrate linear scalability of BigChem running computational chemistry workloads on up to 125 GPUs. Finally, we present ChemCloud, a web API to BigChem and successor to TeraChem Cloud. ChemCloud delivers scalable and secure access to BigChem over the Internet.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

DOE OSTI2022

Uncertainty-Proof Hosting Capacity with Surrogate Affine Policy

Physical constraints must be enforced when dis-tributed energy resources, such as PV, are integrated into distribution network. Hosting capacity (HC) is thus introduced to define the maximum renewable that distribution system can accommodate. When the grid is further pushed towards low-carbon, many research efforts are devoted to increasing HC. Security and cost-efficiency become even more important in determining HC. This work proposes an uncertainty-proof HC with surrogate affine policy. Flexible resources are leveraged to increase HC. We propose a novel hybrid two-stage AC model with variable uncertainty set. An iterative algorithm is designed to solve the problem. The proposed model and solution approach are validated in modified 141-node feeders, and HC performance is also analyzed.

hosting capacity↗

DOE OSTI2023

Guest Editorial: Special Section on Sustainable Energy for Enhancing Grid Resiliency

Extreme weather threatens lives, disables communities, and devastates energy generation, transmission, and distribution systems. These extreme events are likely to become more frequent or more intense due to climate change. Energy networks have shown significant vulnerability during record hurricanes, deadly heat waves, destructive wildfires, and winter storms in the past few years. Because of the energy transition process, modern power grids will feature a high penetration level of the use of renewable resources. The adoption of renewable energy and the rise of omnidirectional power delivery mean that our energy network is more decentralized than ever. In this new environment, grid operation becomes more complex, and achieving resiliency is more difficult than in the past. Many utilities are seeking the latest technologies to improve energy security and responsiveness to severe events. On the one hand, sustainable energy resources can provide emergency power and assist grid restoration in disastrous events. On the other hand, their volatility, susceptibility, interdependency, and other unique features must be carefully considered when being used for grid resilience enhancement. This special section brings together 22 papers that range from innovative research advances tackling fundamental challenges of achieving more resilient grids to real-world demonstrations of leveraging sustainable energy resources to enhance grid resiliency. These papers can be categorized into three groups.

climate change↗

DOE OSTI2022

Actor API

This package provides a secure transport layer connecting mini-applications run as components of a server infrastructure. The guiding principle is that mini-apps should be "actors" -- able to expose a set of API calls to the network and to have a shared trust model for knowing who is calling which API function and who takes responsibility for the result.

Rogers, DavidM. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), O↗

DOE OSTI2024

Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator: Cohort 2 - runZero Public Report

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) sponsors the Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator™ (CECA) to expedite the deployment of emerging security technologies that address the most urgent security concerns facing modern and future electric grids. CECA Cohort 2 assessed solutions focused on hidden risks due to incomplete system visibility and device security and configuration. Improving visibility can be achieved through operational technology (OT) asset identification solutions, including capabilities like automatic discovery, vulnerability reporting, and configuration monitoring. Solutions that monitor and identify assets in information technology (IT) networks in other domains are widely used; however, there is far less adoption of monitoring solutions for operational technology environments. Wider adoption may increase with increased confidence in the ability for these solutions to understand and respond to the specific requirements of OT environments. CECA Cohort 2 evaluated the active and passive asset discovery capabilities of market-ready solutions, documented and analyzed results, and identified gaps in functionality or capabilities. This report and describes how these results can help advance the adoption of these and similar solutions in the electric sector.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2024

Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator: Cohort 2 - Asimily Public Report

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) sponsors the Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator (TM) (CECA) to expedite the deployment of emerging security technologies that address the most urgent security concerns facing modern and future electric grids. CECA Cohort 2 assessed solutions focused on hidden risks due to incomplete system visibility and device security and configuration. Improving visibility can be achieved through operational technology (OT) asset identification solutions, including capabilities like automatic discovery, vulnerability reporting, and configuration monitoring. Solutions that monitor and identify assets in information technology (IT) networks in other domains are widely used; however, there is far less adoption of monitoring solutions for operational technology environments. Wider adoption may increase with increased confidence in the ability for these solutions to understand and respond to the specific requirements of OT environments. CECA Cohort 2 evaluated the active and passive asset discovery capabilities of market-ready solutions, documented and analyzed results, and identified gaps in functionality or capabilities. This report and describes how these results can help advance the adoption of these and similar solutions in the electric sector.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

Security of DERs and Grid Edge Technologies [Slides]

Distributed energy resources (DERs) offer significant value for incorporating diverse generation technologies and improving reliability. They also present a new set of cybersecurity challenges. The move of generation to the grid edge can also mean more distributed control systems and expanded communication networks, resulting in an increase in attack surface. This presentation will discuss definitions and essential terms related to DERs; developments and deployment trends for DERs; recent cyber attacks on operational technology and industrial systems; cyber risk arising from distributed grid resources; and ways in which standards may help mitigate some of these risks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2023

Reinforcement Learning Approach to Cybersecurity in Space (RELACSS)

Securing satellite groundstations against cyber-attacks is vital to national security missions. However, these cyber threats are constantly evolving. As vulnerabilities are discovered and patched, new vulnerabilities are discovered and exploited. In order to automate the process of discovering existing vulnerabilities and the means to exploit them, a reinforcement learning framework is presented in this report. We demonstrate that this framework can learn to successfully navigate an unknown network and detect nodes of interest despite the presence of a moving target defense. The agent then exfiltrates a file of interest from the node as quickly as possible. This framework also incorporates a defensive software agent that learns to impede the attacking agents progress. This setup allows for the agents to work against each other and improve their abilities. We anticipate that this capability will help uncover unforeseen vulnerabilities and the means to mitigate them. The modular nature of the framework enables users to swap out learning algorithms and modify the reward functions in order to adapt the learning tasks to various use cases and environments. Several algorithms, viz., tabular Q learning, deep Q networks, proximal policy optimization, advantage actor-critic, generative adversarial imitation learning, are explored for the agents and the results highlighted. The agent learns to solve the tasks in a light-weight abstract environment. Once the agent learns to perform sufficiently well, it can be deployed in a minimega virtual machine environment (or a real network) with wrappers that map abstract actions to software commands. The agent also uses a local representation of the actions called a ‘slot-mechanism’. This allows the agent to learn in a certain network and generalize it to different networks. The defensive agent learns to predict the actions taken by an offensive agent and uses that information to anticipate the threat. This information can then either be used to raise an alarm or to take actions to thwart the attack. We believe that with the appropriate reward design, a representative environment, and action set, this framework can be generalized to tackle other cybersecurity tasks. By sufficiently training these agents, we can anticipate vulnerabilities leading to robust future designs. We can also deploy automated defensive agents that can help secure satellite groundstation and their vital national security missions.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗