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Design and construction of coal/biomass to liquids (CBTL) process development unit (PDU) at the University of Kentucky Center for Applied Energy Research (CAER)

This report describes a first phase of a project to design, construct and commission an integrated coal/biomass-to-liquids facility at a capacity of 1 bbl. /day at the University of Kentucky Center for Applied Energy Research (UK-CAER) – specifically for construction of the building and upstream process units for feed handling, gasification, and gas cleaning, conditioning and compression. The deliverables from the operation of this pilot plant [when fully equipped with the downstream process units] will be firstly the liquid FT products and finished fuels which are of interest to UK-CAER’s academic, government and industrial research partners. The facility will produce research quantities of FT liquids and finished fuels for subsequent Fuel Quality Testing, Performance and Acceptability. Moreover, the facility is expected to be employed for a range of research and investigations related to: Feed Preparation, Characteristics and Quality; Coal and Biomass Gasification; Gas Clean-up/ Conditioning; Gas Conversion by FT Synthesis; Product Work-up and Refining; Systems Analysis and Integration; and Scale-up and Demonstration. Environmental Considerations - particularly how to manage and reduce carbon dioxide emissions from CBTL facilities and from use of the fuels - will be a primary research objectives. Such a facility has required significant lead time for environmental review, architectural/building construction, and EPC services. UK, with DOE support, has advanced the facility in several important ways. These include: a formal EA/FONSI, and permits and approvals; construction of a building; selection of a range of technologies and vendors; and completion of the upstream process units. The results of this project are the FEED and detailed engineering studies, the alternate configurations and the as-built plant - its equipment and capabilities for future research and demonstration and its adaptability for re-purposing to meet other needs. These are described in some detail in this report, along with lessons learned.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Diversity Strategies to Mitigate Postulated Common Cause Failure Vulnerabilities

This paper describes an approach to establish effective mitigating strategies that can resolve potential common-cause failure (CCF) vulnerabilities in instrumentation and control (I&C) systems at nuclear power plants. A particular objective in the development of these strategies, which consist of combinations of diversity attributes and their associated criteria, is to address the unique characteristics of digital technology that can contribute to CCF concerns. The research approach employed to establish diversity strategies involves investigation of available documentation on diversity usage and experience from nuclear power and non-nuclear industries, capture of expert knowledge and lessons learned, determination of common practices, and assessment of the nature of CCFs and compensating diversity attributes. The resulting diversity strategies address considerations such as the effect of technology choices, the nature of CCF vulnerabilities, and the prospective impact of each diversity type. In particular, the impact of each attribute and criterion on the purpose, process, product, and performance aspects of diverse systems are considered.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Stratgies for Diversity Usage to Mitigate Postulated Common Cause Failure Vulnerabilities

This paper describes an approach to establish effective mitigating strategies that can resolve potential common-cause failure (CCF) vulnerabilities in instrumentation and control systems at nuclear power plants. A particular objective in the development of these strategies, which consist of combinations of diversity attributes and their associated criteria, is to address the unique characteristics of digital technology that can contribute to CCF concerns. The research approach employed to establish diversity strategies involves investigation of available documentation on diversity usage and experience from nuclear power and non-nuclear industries, capture of expert knowledge and lessons learned, determination of common practices, and assessment of the nature of CCFs and compensating diversity attributes. The resulting diversity strategies address considerations such as the effect of technology choices, the nature of CCF vulnerabilities, and the prospective impact of each diversity type. In particular, the impact of each attribute and criterion on the purpose, process, product, and performance aspects of diverse systems are considered.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Challenges in the UK Generic Design Assessment Process - 17062

In the UK, Generic Design Assessment (GDA) is a voluntary step-wise joint assessment process undertaken by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) and the Environment Agency (EA) of a generic reactor design. The process focuses purely on the reactor design and does not consider any site specific issues. The key objective of GDA is for the regulators to consider the adequacy of claims, arguments and evidence (CAE) put forward by a requesting party (RP) to demonstrate the safety of its design in the UK context. This includes all CAE relating to management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. The CAE are generally applied to a reference design put forward by the RP that is substantially complete in terms of the overall concepts and functions of the major systems, having already been deployed elsewhere. GDA assessment encompasses a broad range of topic areas which include fuel and core design, management of spent fuel, radioactive waste management and decommissioning. Other technical disciplines also have valid interests in particular aspects of the management of spent fuel. This paper summarises the UK GDA process and the types of issues raised; in particular aspects of the proposed operation of liquid waste management systems and Spent Fuel Interim Storage are presented and the instructive resolution of the RP's original limited design scope to allow the regulators to carry out a meaningful assessment. Some examples are presented and useful lessons learned for future GDAs are discussed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

CEA decommissioning and clean-up activities legacy waste management and lessons learned - 15506

The CEA has generated radioactive waste in both liquid and solid form for more than 50 years within the scope of its R and D, clean-up and dismantling programs. The vast majority of the waste produced is transferred to disposal centers in approved waste packages. Nonetheless, a large quantity of legacy waste still remains in ageing facilities in which the storage conditions are sometimes no longer satisfactory with respect to the safety requirements that are constantly evolving. As part of a broad clean-up and dismantling process focusing on these ageing facilities managed by the CEA, the top priority is to shut down nuclear activities on two symbolic sites: Grenoble and Fontenay-aux-Roses, which are both located in a dense urban environment. After about ten years of dismantling, the nuclear facilities on the Grenoble site are on their way to be completely decommissioned in the regulatory sense of the term. Furthermore, the radwaste issue on this site has raised no specific problems, though it did require developing innovative and sometimes costly waste outlets. The older Fontenay-aux-Roses site is where the first experimental research on minor actinide separation took place. The facilities on this site have reached a stage in dismantling which necessitates the recovery of irradiating legacy waste containing alpha, beta and gamma emitters. The transfer of this waste to interim storage centers more than 600 kilometers away is a decisive factor in reducing the site's nuclear source term and in ensuring the satisfactory progress of the dismantling operations. This paper details the issues raised by the recovery of legacy waste, which requires greater characterization to better understand its radiological and chemical status. This waste also requires better characterization to meet the storage requirements of new sites designed for storage periods exceeding 50 years prior to its final disposal in a deep geological repository. The issue of transporting waste on public roads is specifically covered, along with the strategy defined to securely transfer all legacy waste resulting from the CEA's very diverse R and D programs. Emphasis is placed on finding the right balance between collecting the necessary data on the waste to be transported, ensuring the reconditioning of this waste so it can be transported safely, and maintaining an efficient industrial-scale waste transfer process to limit the lead times and costs related to legacy waste recovery operations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Advanced Analytics Studies Applied to US Department of Veterans Affairs' Corporate Data Warehouse (Initial Draft)

In this report, we describe our experience of applying several advanced analytics algorithms to the US Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA’s) Corporate Data Warehouse (CDW) electronic health records datasets during FY2017-18. While various algorithms were applied to the CDW data, the main goal of this effort was to provide useful insights into the operational aspects (as opposed to the purely clinical aspect) of this specific implementation. Since there are not many reports in the public literature on advanced analytics applied to this data, this report provides unique insight in this regard. We focused on two machine learning (ML) applications: (1) clinical pathway inference (patterns dominating clinical pathways applied to a male dataset of Stable Ischemic Heart Disease patients as use case) and (2) medical-concept representation learning’s capability to inform and refine cohort membership based on probable patient outcomes. During our study on clinical pathway inference, we used two main modeling techniques: (a) topic probabilistic modeling (latent Dirichlet allocation [LDA]) and (b) feature imbedding. We observed that the applicability of LDA to the pathway inference remains in question. LDA provides results that are intuitive and easy for humans to comprehend; however, when applied to the pathway inference, it also generates pathway patterns that consist of a few dominant pathway components. In addition, LDA provides no information regarding the relationships among components in the same pathway. The outputs of LDA are also found to categorize patients based on their trace data of clinical procedures. However, the results suggest that LDA is biased toward statistically dominant components. This makes it particularly hard to discriminate pathway subbranches. To address the issue, we designed a new pathway inference methodology that integrates temporal ordering of pathway components into LDA results, as existing feature embedding tools such as word2vec are not readily applicable to our task. In addition, we developed our own feature embedding tool customized for patient traces. We conclude this study by suggesting two approaches to use embedding representation of a component into LDA and briefly list our lessons learned and recommendations for future work. For our study on medical-concept representation learning ability to inform and refine cohort membership based on probable patient outcomes, during our empirical evaluation we compared methods from medical-concept learning to standard one of a kind (one-of-K) encoding to evaluate the change in effectiveness as done in Choi, Schuetz, Stewart, and Sun (2016). We performed two primary empirical evaluations. The first evaluation was on a curated collection of 60,000 patients with no more than 1 year of medical history included. The second was a collection of patients with no restriction to the amount of medical history included. The hypothesis across both evaluations is that representation learning is broadly useful independent of downstream processing models; thus, for each experiment, we trained three models—a logistic regression model, a two-layer neural network model, and a nearest-neighbor model—and then averaged the results. Each model was trained using fivefold cross validation. We provided evidence that medical-representation learning improves predictions of the primary diagnosis category of a short patient history through 12 experiments. In addition, we provided evidence that medical-representation learning fails to improve prediction of the primary diagnosis category of an arbitrarily long patient history through 12 experiments. We conclude this study with a brief list of our lessons learned and recommendations for future work. We conclude the report with a discussion of recent technology trends as they relate to our artificial intelligence and, more specifically, to our ML research and approaches as described previously.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

An Approach to Evaluate Scientist Support in Abstract Workflows and Provenance Traces

Abstract workflows are useful to bridge the gap between scientists and technologists towards using computer systems to carry out scientific processes. Provenance traces provide evidence required to validate results and support their reuse. Assuming both technologies are based on formal semantics, a knowledge-based system that consistently merges both technologies is useful for scientists that produce data to document their data collecting and transformation processes; it is also useful for scientists that reuse data to assess scientific processes and resulting datasets produced by others. While evaluation of each technology is necessary for a given application, this work discusses their combined evaluation. The claim is that both technologies should complement each other and align consistently to a scientist’s perspective in order to be effective for science. Evaluation criteria are proposed based on lessons learned and exemplified for discussion.

Provenance↗

Towards Acceptance Testing at the Exascale Frontier

At the 2007 Cray User Group meeting, the Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility (OLCF) introduced the OLCF Test Harness (OTH), a framework[1] used for acceptance testing of the Jaguar supercomputer[2]. Since then, the OTH framework has evolved to version 2.0 which adds new features and streamlines usability. The OTH is the key piece of software used to orchestrate acceptance testing for all OLCF computational resources before they are deployed for production use, including our leadership class high performance computing (HPC) systems. The OTH framework is written in Python and is publicly available[3].In this paper, we first describe the requirements, design, and structure of the OTH. Then, we present specific improvements developed to support acceptance testing of the OLCF’s Summit system[4]. We will also showcase new OTH features that have been added to streamline the acceptance test process as well as the motivation behind those changes. As part of this work, we also evaluated different workflow tools in order to determine whether these tools could complement the OTH in two key areas: automation and reporting. The advantages and disadvantages identified with each tool will be discussed. Lastly, we summarize the challenges and lessons learned collected from using the OTH for the acceptance of the last three flagship systems at the OLCF. These may be useful for other HPC centers developing their own testing frameworks or those interested in using the OTH.

Melesse Vergara, Veronica↗

Panel Session 120: Roundtable: Waste Management - Energy Facilities Contractor Operating Group (EFCOG WM)

This Roundtable focused on the WM EFCOG working group as they met to discuss a variety of issues of importance to US DOE waste management operations. The purpose of the WM EFCOG is to seek out and promote the best management and operating practices, cost effective technologies and disposal options for all waste streams generated at US DOE facilities whether destined for US DOE or commercial facilities. Each site representative provided a radioactive waste management lessons learned briefing. Panelists with presentations: Savannah River Site (SRS) Solid Waste Program Update (Kerri Crawford); Idaho Clean-up Project Status (Frederick Hughes); West Valley Demonstration Project Update - EFCOG Waste Management Working Group (John Rendall); Key Project Challenges and Successes (Kalli Shupe); EFCOG WMWG Challenging Waste Subgroup Update (Tammy Monday); CH TRU Difficult Waste Stream Processing Challenges (Daniel Pancake); Argonne Building 350 Clean-up Success Using Effective Work Control (Daniel Dilday); Problematic Waste Streams on the Oak Ridge Reservation (John Wrapp)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Encapsulation of Defective Fuel Rods for Transport and Dry Storage - 18190

Removing of the whole inventory of fissile and non-fissile material out of the spent fuel pool is performed when the power plant is about to start its last operation phases or may occur during the extended operating life cycle due to plant storage space limitation. Removal of defective spent fuel is then definitely required for emptying the pool and may in addition also be performed in the course of plant operation for reducing pool contamination. Depending on the general used fuel management solution chosen for post-storage pool operations, specific management of a defective fuel assembly (DFA) and/or a defective fuel rod (DFR) should be implemented accordingly to the regulation requirements to be followed. For meeting these DFA and/or DFR management needs, Framatome together with New AREVA offer wide portfolio of solutions with flexibility and adaptability advantages: - from simple to advanced technologies; - for several types of fuel assemblies and/or defective rods; - for suitable and compatible cask designs; - for compatible solution with both used fuel final management strategies (closed and open fuel cycles). For instance, a technology is jointly proposed and developed by New AREVA and Framatome for implementing dry storage of DFR. It consists in: - encapsulating each DFR by loading the fuel rod in a respective capsule, drying the fuel rod using a process which allows to physically verify with high accuracy the dryness inside the DFR, and seal welding the capsule - assembling the capsules in a capsule canister (a skeleton with external dimensions similar to a respective fuel assembly) and - transferring the capsule canister along with intact spent fuel assemblies in an associated dry transport and storage (dual purpose) cask. Such a project is currently being implemented in Belgium. After successfully obtaining the cask transport and storage license extensions for including the encapsulated DFR content, the first encapsulation campaign has been started in 2017. The purpose of the paper is to present the industrial solutions proposed by Framatome and New AREVA together, for management of DFR, notably the one related to dry storage of encapsulated DFR implemented in Belgium and the perspectives opened by this successful project. The paper presents: - the available solutions for management of DFA and/or DFR depending on applicable requirements - the drying method, welding of a capsule and associated cask as the state of art technology for dry storage of DFR and/or DFA; - lessons learned from project management and encapsulation campaign performed in Belgium; - perspectives for management of DFR and/or DFA. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Prioritizing Countries by Concern Regarding Access to Weapons of Mass Destruction Materials

This article presents a global prioritization methodology that evaluates the relative risks of non-state actor acquisition of materials that could be used in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high explosive Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) from the country’s relevant infrastructure. Prioritization is based on three domains: 1. Assessing relative scale of materials in each country, 2. The country’s corresponding security posture, and 3. The presence of threat actors. The output is a list of countries prioritized from greatest risk to least. Rather than providing an overall 1 to N ranking, however, the results are placed into tiers based upon their natural groupings within the three domains. The countries in the highest tiers are flagged as potential US national security concern; those scoring in the middle and at the bottom are flagged as posing lower US national security concern. A systematic approach assesses each country by leveraging many disciplines, such as risk and decision analysis, as well as expert judgement. A quantitative value model based on Multi-Attribute Value Theory (MAVT) organizes the objectives scoring criteria into a value tree using lessons learned from previous studies, published literature, and expert judgement. The article presents the prioritization categories and corresponding value model scoring criteria to include measurement type, weight, range, and value preference. Country names and data are notional in order to share the details on the underlying methodology and model without identification of actual security risks. A deliberative process addresses factors external to the model and scrutinizes inputs, methodology, model, and results.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Contaminant Migration Modeling to Support the In Situ Decommissioning of Hardened Nuclear Facilities - 20215

The decommissioning of hardened nuclear facilities provides a unique challenge in balancing current worker dose with exposure to future receptors and media. In situ decommissioning (ISD) is a cost-effective and safe option for the closure of such facilities but requires a detailed understanding of the threat that radioactive and hazardous constituents remaining in the facilities pose to groundwater and surrounding surface water. The Savannah River Site (SRS) extensively employs contaminant migration models within the decommissioning process to develop site-specific removal, grouting, and monitoring strategies in support of safe and effective final end states of nuclear facilities. This work discusses the use of contaminant migration modeling in the ISD process at SRS, including specific examples from the closure of P-Reactor and R-Reactor, Building 235-F, F-Canyon and F/H Laboratory Complex. Migration models developed during the closure of P-Reactor and R-Reactor were divided into four source areas: the reactor vessel, the process area, the disassembly basin, and the purification wing. Each source area was assigned a specific inventory and migration pathway and was then subject to varying hypothetical removal, capping, and grouting schemes. Modeling indicated that groundwater Maximum Concentration Limits (MCLs) might be exceeded if no action was taken for eleven and ten constituents of concern (COCs) at P-Reactor and R-Reactor, respectively. These exceedances could occur in as few as 200 to 500 years. Alternatively, the migration modeling demonstrated that the selected ISD actions reduced contaminant mobility which allowed for significant radioactive decay and resulted in fewer predicted exceedances of groundwater MCLs (five COCs for P-Reactor; eight COCs for R-Reactor). In response to the modeling results for P-Reactor and R-Reactor, effectiveness monitoring programs were developed to target contaminants, specific to each reactor, that may migrate to groundwater. Contaminant migration modeling also revealed that roof collapse was a large factor in the release of COCs to the environment, giving rise to roof improvements, and an inspection and vegetation control program to ensure roof stability over time. Contaminant migration modeling is also aiding in the closure planning for hardened facilities in F Area. Building 235-F housed the Actinide Billet Line, which produced Np-237 billets for irradiation in SRS reactors, and the Plutonium Fuel Form (PuFF) facility that produced Pu-238 heat sources for the space program. As a result of these missions, areas within Building 235-F contain considerable residual amounts of both Pu-238 and Np-237. Contaminant migration modeling of Building 235-F was originally performed in 2012 to identify the feasibility of ISD and the amount of radioactive material removal required to prevent the exceedance of groundwater MCLs. The original model indicated that a 60% reduction in the PuFF facility Pu-238 inventory could keep groundwater concentrations below standards, while Np-237 did not pose a threat to groundwater. However, updates to the model with an emphasis on source impact pathways revealed that, due to the orientation of the source areas relative to groundwater flow, no amount of reasonable removal of Pu-238 would keep groundwater concentrations below MCLs and that Np-237 could be a large contributor to localized MCL exceedances. With this insight, the refined 2019 model is being used to assist in the development of grouting plans specific to each facility source area, where bentonite may be utilized to slow the migration of Pu-238 and its daughter products from the PuFF facility and a reducing grout may decrease Np-237 transport by ensuring the nuclide remains in the less mobile +IV oxidation state. The beginning phases of contaminant migration modeling are underway for F-Canyon and associated facilities using lessons learned from the Reactors and Building 235-F. A contaminant migration pathway, similar to the pathway used for the reactor vessels, is being developed for the hot and warm canyons. The F-Canyon inventories are being spatially refined to identify specific and localized source zones, comparable to Building 235-F, that may impact groundwater. Contaminant migration modeling provides vital input within the ISD process, from facility investigation to post closure effectiveness monitoring, making it a valuable tool in the development of safe and effective end states for hardened nuclear facilities at SRS. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol in the Philippines: USDOE/PNRI Cooperation

The Philippines entered into force the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol (AP) in February 2010. The Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) is the government agency responsible for implementing the AP. In June 2010 the IAEA invited the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to help conduct a joint national training seminar on the AP. DOE presented to PNRI its AP international technical assistance program, administered by the International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP), which helps partner countries implement the AP. In coordination with the IAEA, DOE established this program in 2008 to complement IAEA AP seminars with long-term country-specific cooperation from the perspective of a Member State. The US version of the AP is the same version as that of non-nuclear weapon states except for the addition of a national security exclusion. Due to this, DOE cooperation with other countries enables the sharing of valuable lessons learned in implementing the AP. DOE/INSEP described to PNRI the various areas of cooperation it offers to interested countries, whether they are preparing for entry into force or already implementing the AP. Even countries that have entered the AP into force are sometimes not fully prepared to implement it well, and welcome cooperation to improve their implementation process. PNRI and DOE/INSEP subsequently agreed to cooperate in several areas to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the Philippines AP implementation. These areas include providing working-level training to PNRI staff and preparing an information document that details that training for future reference, assisting with the development of an outreach program and procedures for AP reporting and complementary access, and identifying Annex II equipment and non-nuclear materials whose export must be reported under the AP. DOE laboratory representatives, funded by INSEP, met again with PNRI in February 2011 to provide training for PNRI AP staff and investigate specific ways to improve implementation. Another meeting in July 2011 focused on preparations for outreach to industry and universities. In this paper PNRI describes current implementation of the AP in the Philippines, and both DOE/INSEP and PNRI provide their perspectives on their cooperation to enhance that implementation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

STATUS OF MECHANICAL SLUDGE REMOVAL AND COOLING COILS CLOSURE AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE - F TANK FARM CLOSURE PROJECT - 9225

The Savannah River Site F-Tank Farm Closure project has successfully performed Mechanical Sludge Removal using the Waste on Wheels (WOW) system within two of its storage tanks. The Waste on Wheels (WOW) system is designed to be relatively mobile with the ability for many components to be redeployed to multiple tanks. It is primarily comprised of Submersible Mixer Pumps (SMPs), Submersible Transfer Pumps (STPs), and a mobile control room with a control panel and variable speed drives. These tanks, designated as Tank 6 and Tank 5 respectively, are Type I waste tanks located in F-Tank Farm (FTF) with a capacity of 2839 cubic meters (750,000 gallons) each. In addition, Type I tanks have 34 vertically oriented cooling coils and two horizontal cooling coil circuits along the tank floor. DOE intends to remove from service and operationally close Tank 5 and Tank 6 and other HLW tanks that do not meet current containment standards. After obtaining regulatory approval, the tanks and cooling coils will be isolated and filled with grout for long term stabilization. Mechanical Sludge Removal of the remaining sludge waste within Tank 6 removed {approx} 75% of the original 25,000 gallons in August 2007. Utilizing lessons learned from Tank 6, Tank 5 Mechanical Sludge Removal completed removal of {approx} 90% of the original 125 cubic meters (33,000 gallons) of sludge material in May 2008. The successful removal of sludge material meets the requirement of approximately 19 to 28 cubic meters (5,000 to 7,500 gallons) remaining prior to the Chemical Cleaning process. The Chemical Cleaning Process will utilize 8 wt% oxalic acid to dissolve the remaining sludge heel. The flow sheet for Chemical Cleaning planned a 20:1 volume ratio of acid to sludge for the first strike with mixing provided by the submersible mixer pumps. The subsequent strikes will utilize a 13:1 volume ratio of acid to sludge with no mixing. The results of the Chemical Cleaning Process are detailed in the 'Status of Chemical Cleaning of Waste Tanks at the Savannah River Site--F Tank Farm Closure Project--Abstract 9114'. To support Tank 5 and Tank 6 cooling coil closure, cooling coil isolation and full scale cooling coil grout testing was completed to develop a strategy for grouting the horizontal and vertical cooling coils. This paper describes in detail the performance of the Mechanical Sludge Removal activities and SMP operational strategies within Tank 5. In addition, it will discuss the current status of Tank 5 & 6 cooling coil isolation activities and the results from the cooling coil grout fill tests.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Lessons Learned - Startup and Transition to Operations at the 200 West Pump and Treat Facility

This document lists key Lessons Learned from the Startup Team for the 200 West Pump and Treat Facility Project. The Startup Team on this Project was an integrated, multi-discipline team whose scope was Construction Acceptance Testing (CAT), functional Acceptance Testing Procedures (ATP), and procedure development and implementation. Both maintenance and operations procedures were developed. Included in the operations procedures were the process unit operations. In addition, a training and qualification program was also part of the scope.

42 ENGINEERING↗

IAEA ITC28 Project Report. 28th International Training Course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has hosted the International Training Course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities since 1978. This course is the flagship training course of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On behalf of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), SNL manages, develops, and coordinates all course materials, and works closely with the IAEA to arrange all logistical details for the course. ITC-28 incorporated several new approaches based on feedback and experience with ITC-27 and earlier versions of the course. For ITC-28, an addition to the Integrated Security Facility (ISF) at SNL was a mock reactor hall with a mock reactor pool. Other facilities at the ISF include a mock processing facility, material receiving area, and central alarm station. The physical protection system at the ISF—an area that formerly housed Category I nuclear material—provides many opportunities for hands-on, real world training in the design and evaluation of a physical protection system (PPS). This document provides a brief description of ITC-28, including a summary of lessons learned and key recommendations for future development efforts.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Lab-Scale Demonstration of Plutonium Purification by Anion Exchange, Plutonium(IV) Oxalate Precipitation, and Calcination to Plutonium Oxide to Support the MOX Feed Mission

H-Canyon and HB-Line are tasked with the production of PuO 2 from a feed of plutonium metal. The PuO 2 will provide feed material for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility. After dissolution of the Pu metal in H-Canyon, the solution will be transferred to HB-Line for purification by anion exchange. Subsequent unit operations include Pu(IV) oxalate precipitation, filtration and calcination to form PuO 2 . This report details the results from SRNL anion exchange, precipitation, filtration, calcination, and characterization tests, as requested by HB-Line1 and described in the task plan. This study involved an 80-g batch of Pu and employed test conditions prototypical of HB-Line conditions, wherever feasible. In addition, this study integrated lessons learned from earlier anion exchange and precipitation and calcination studies. H-Area Engineering selected direct strike Pu(IV) oxalate precipitation to produce a more dense PuO 2 product than expected from Pu(III) oxalate precipitation. One benefit of the Pu(IV) approach is that it eliminates the need for reduction by ascorbic acid. The proposed HB-Line precipitation process involves a digestion time of 5 minutes after the time (44 min) required for oxalic acid addition. These were the conditions during HB-line production of neptunium oxide (NpO 2 ). In addition, a series of small Pu(IV) oxalate precipitation tests with different digestion times were conducted to better understand the effect of digestion time on particle size, filtration efficiency and other factors. To test the recommended process conditions, researchers performed two nearly-identical larger-scale precipitation and calcination tests. The calcined batches of PuO 2 were characterized for density, specific surface area (SSA), particle size, moisture content, and impurities. Because the 3013 Standard requires that the calcination (or stabilization) process eliminate organics, characterization of PuO 2 batches monitored the presence of oxalate by thermogravimetric analysis-mass spectrometry (TGA-MS). To use the TGA-MS for carbon or oxalate content, some method development will be required. However, the TGA-MS is already used for moisture measurements. Therefore, SRNL initiated method development for the TGA-MS to allow quantification of oxalate or total carbon. That work continues at this time and is not yet ready for use in this study. However, the collected test data can be reviewed later as those analysis tools are available.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Lessons Learned From Ventilation and Glovebox Flooding Via Overfilling of the Wet Vacuum System in a Plutonium Facility

In the summer of 2021, operations personnel requested maintenance personnel to fill a wet vacuum (Wetvac) seal water tank in a plutonium facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). After the filling was finished, the fill valve of the Wetvac seal water tank was left open and a ‘dead-man’ valve on an isolation line failed to close properly. After a series of other failures, the water exited the glovebox and contaminated three rooms of the first floor of the facility and an underlying area in the basement. A retrospective analysis of this event determined that there was no risk of a criticality due to the inherent design features of the ventilation system. This paper will explain the driving factors behind how this event was able to happen, as well as some of the major lessons learned that can be universally applied to other nuclear facilities. One of the main causes of the event was the delegation of work to maintenance personnel that were not qualified for the work being asked of them. Additionally, there was a lack of coordination between criticality safety engineers and facility operations equipment owners regarding equipment and connections present on the seal water tanks for the Wetvac, specifically the presence of overflow drain lines. The respective criticality safety evaluation credited an overflow drain line being present on the seal water tanks that was later found to have not been present. Lastly, there are lessons to be learned regarding equipment configuration and designing systems with safety in mind.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗