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DOE OSTI2024

IBR Digital Supply Chain Gap Analysis and Recommendations

The adoption of clean energy technologies, including solar photovoltaics, continues to introduce non-traditional stakeholders to the operations and planning of the electric system. Stakeholders such as manufacturers, vendors, owners, aggregators, and others are enabling the adoption, integration, and optimum operations of solar technologies at accelerated rates. Inverters form the foundation of many digitally controlled energy sources for clean energy technologies, including Solar, Battery Energy Storage Systems, Hybrid Systems, and Hydrogen Fuel Cells. Their supply chain is complex, a series of microchips, electronic switches and other components making up its primary functions. The complexity of this space and the growing digitization associated with these components can create supply chain cyber risks. One measure to mitigate cybersecurity attacks is proper digital supply chain security. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Solar Energy Technologies Office (SETO), in partnership with the Cybersecurity, Energy, Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) office, is hosting a workshop to bring together solar vendors and services providers to discuss digital supply chain security for solar systems and challenges and opportunities in the transitioning to a fully domestic supply chain for solar energy in the U.S. This workshop will support the Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G) and Energy Cyber Sense program activities. During the workshop, industry experts and researchers from DOE National Laboratories will discuss the current solar supply chain landscape and the transition to domestic manufacturing of solar components in the U.S. Tools and techniques to better manage and secure the digital supply chain of solar devices and systems will be discussed.

cybersecurity↗

DOE OSTI2024

Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment Security Solutions

The EVs@Scale cybersecurity pillar deep dive focuses on the three main tasks that NREL has in the consortium: (1) Analysis of EV charging mobile applications, (2) Cybersecurity risk assessments of EVSE through DER-CF, and (3) PKI for EVSE.

ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS,MATHEMATICS AND COMPUT↗

DOE OSTI2024

Verifying Cyber Implementation Best Practices With Malcolm

Network traffic analysis can reveal a lot about what's right or wrong with a network's cybersecurity footing. Using Malcolm, a powerful open-source network traffic analysis tool suite for network security monitoring, cyber analysts and asset owners can validate cybersecurity best practices and uncover red flags in network configuration, including: proper network segmentation east-west (cross-segment) and north-south traffic unsecure or outdated network protocols authentication using clear text credentials rogue devices and services unexpected protocols (e.g., IPv6, DNS, DHCP, update checks, etc.) suspicious file transfers

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2025

BESS Digital Assurance, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Session Two

The TADA BESS Supply Chain Workshops are designed to equip participants with the knowledge and tools necessary to address the evolving challenges at the intersection of battery energy storage systems (BESS), cybersecurity, and supply chain vulnerabilities. The workshops emphasize the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles using INL’s procurement guide and the CIE-BAT tool. Attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their BESS projects. Additionally, the program fosters a collaborative network of practitioners and provides guidance on navigating emerging regulatory requirements, including FEOC rules under the OBBB framework, to assess and enhance organizational readiness. A comprehensive exploration of BESS cybersecurity supply chain risks, systematic vendor risk assessment through the BESS Procurement Guide, and practical application of the INL SCRM Chatbot for enhanced supply chain resilience. This is Session 2 of 3. (Full Version)

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2026

Automated Generation of Graph-based Cyber Threat Intel

With the advancement of AI technology and tools, specifically in the cybersecurity domain, both cyber defenders and threat actors are continuously adapting the use of these capabilities to expedite their operations. With this phenomenon, threat intelligence that is up to date, refreshable, and has relevant context to a specific threat becomes more and more important as it enables cybersecurity professionals to gain insight into relevant data and relationships to guide their operations. This project enables users to frequently aggregate threat intelligence from various sources, such as vendor vulnerability advisories affecting critical infrastructure, malware reports, and adversary writeups into a centralized, standardized database. The project utilizes the Structured Threat Intelligence eXpression (STIX) for a standardized, shareable threat intelligence data format and Neo4j as a graph database solution to store STIX nodes and relationships. Initial results of the project include datasets of over 8,000 nodes and 20,000 relationships extracted from over 500 data sources that have been released within the past month.

Threat Intelligence↗

DOE OSTI2022

Feasibility of critical infrastructure protection using network functions for programmable and decoupled ICS policy enforcement over WAN

Industrial control systems (ICS) represent a major component of our critical infrastructure. With the increasing need for more control and monitoring of such systems, ICS have seen an increase in connectivity to wide area networks (WAN) exposing aging equipment to rapidly evolving cybersecurity threats. Furthermore, the ICS data requires a reliability measure from the networks for critical functions for infrastructure monitoring and control. Especially when remote plant sites are involved such as pipelines, energy distribution networks, and transportation, WAN transport impairments most often provide a best effort delivery with no strict reliability guarantees. Network functions can provide a vendor agnostic, programmable critical infrastructure protection with a single maintenance, policy determination, and reliability assurance surface. A network function (NF) can be utilized for policy enforcement over the communication between remote entities and the main control office. This paper presents the research on transparent integration with existing ICS without disrupting communications, resulting in minimal downtime while decoupling the fast paced evolution of defensive security measures from the upgrade cycle of expensive long term hardware. We report our measurements on the resource requirements and overhead in the network for successful NF insertion under a wide variety of network impairments (network packet delay, reordering, and loss). Our paired NF implementation provides a policy enforcement platform extensible to cover myriad cybersecurity-related communication goals, including packet signing for verification, encryption for data privacy, packet filtering and data diode operation (i.e. protecting against eavesdropping, packet injection, and denial-of-service). Furthermore, bundling communication specifications into packet flows allows for tunability in applying policies as coarse- or fine-grained as the needs of the operator. We report on network function resource requirements in the form of required queue depth and network utilization overhead to inform the decision making against hardware cost constraints.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2020

Evaluating Resilience of Water Distribution Networks to Operational Failures from Cyber-Physical Attacks

Water cyber-physical systems (CPSs) have gained increasing interest to improve operational efficiency and reliability. However, due to growing exposure to cyber-physical attacks, cybersecurity and resilience against the attacks have become significant concerns. There have been efforts to improve cybersecurity in water CPSs, yet few attempts to investigate resilience against cyber-physical attacks. This study contributes to characterizing resilience of a water CPS and investigating potential resilience strategies. An advanced resilience measure integrating withstanding, absorptive, adaptive, and restorative capability of a system is proposed and applied to the C-town water distribution network (WDN) for 15 failure set scenarios with a pressure-driven hydraulic simulation. The results provide identification of failure sets and unfavorable operational conditions that make the system more vulnerable to the cyber-physical attacks and in turn produce low resilience and capabilities. It is also found that, after recovery of a disrupted component, adjustment of overall operational interactions across system components is needed for complete restoration of disrupted functionality. The findings provide insights on infrastructure investment with resilience strategies in cyber and physical water system domains.

Shin, Sangmin↗

DOE OSTI2023

Smart manufacturing maturity models and their applicability: a review

The purpose of this paper is to review existing smart manufacturing (SM) maturity models' dimensions and maturity levels to assess their applicability and drawbacks. There are many maturity models available but many of them have not been validated or do not provide a useful guide or tool for applications. This gap creates the need for a review of the existing maturity model's applicability. Nineteen peer-reviewed maturity models related to “Digital Transformation,” “Industry 4.0” or “Smart Manufacturing” were selected based on a systematic literature review and five consulting firm models were selected based on the author's industry knowledge. The chosen models were analyzed to determine 10 categories of dimensions. Then they are assessed on a 1–5 scale for how applicable they are in the 10 categories of dimensions. The five “consulting firm” models have a first-mover advantage, are more widely used in industry and are more applicable, but some require payment, and they lack published details and validation. The 19 “peer reviewed” models are not as widely used, lack awareness in the industry and are not as easy to apply because of no web tool for self-assessment, but they are improving. The categories defined to characterize the models and facilitate comparisons for users include “Information Technology (IT) and Cyber-Physical System (CPS) and Data,” “Strategy and Organization,” “Supply Chain and Logistics,” “Products and Services,” “Culture and Employees,” “Technology and Capabilities,” “Customer and Market,” “Cybersecurity and Risk,” “Leadership and Management” and “Governance and Compliance.” The analyzed maturity models were particularly weak in the areas of cybersecurity, leadership and governance. Researchers and practitioners can use this review with consideration of their specific needs to determine if a maturity model is applicable or if a new model needs to be developed. The review can also aid in the development of maturity models through the discussion of each of the dimension categories. Finally, compared to existing reviews of SM maturity models, this research determines comprehensive dimension categories and focuses on applicability and drawbacks.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2025

AI-based Cyber Event OSINT via Twitter Data

Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) is largely regarded as a necessary component for cybersecurity intelligence gathering to secure network systems. With the advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and increasing usage of social media, like Twitter, we have a unique opportunity to obtain and aggregate information from social media. In this study, we propose an AI-based scheme capable of automatically pulling information from Twitter, filtering out security-irrelevant tweets, performing natural language analysis to correlate the tweets about each cybersecurity event (e.g., a malware campaign), and validating the information. This scheme has many applications, such as providing a means for security operators to gain insight into ongoing events and helping them prioritize vulnerabilities to deal with. To give examples of the possible uses, we present three case studies demonstrating the event discovery and investigation processes.

Dale, Dakota↗

DOE OSTI2021

Impact Analysis of Data Integrity Attacks on FACTS-based Wide-Area Voltage Control System

Energy management system (EMS) consists of several wide-area control applications that serve as a backbone for security, stability, and reliability of the power system. Wide-area voltage control system (WAVCS), one of the critical wide-area applications, operates in coordination with local Flexible AC Transmission System (FACTS) devices to provide voltage security and optimal management of active and reactive power resources. Since the WAVCS relies on wide-area communication and data sharing devices, possible cybersecurity vulnerabilities have to be addressed to ensure the closed-loop operation of WAVCS. In this paper, we present a methodology for performing an impact analysis of cyber-attacks in WAVCS cybersecurity. In particular, different types of data integrity attacks, such as malicious tripping, fault replay, and signal altering attacks, are considered, and detailed impact analysis is conducted in a testbed environment using the Kundur's four machine two-area system. For performing an impact analysis, the transient voltage stability of the sensitive bus voltage is studied, followed by the quantitative assessment and severity ranking using the voltage profile index. Our experimental evaluation reveals that the data integrity attacks on control signals exhibit a higher attack severity than on the measurement signals. Further, the severity of these attacks varies with nature (static or dynamic), location, and types of attacks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

Real-World Cyber Security Demonstration for Networked Electric Drives

In this article, we present the design and implementation of a cyber-physical security testbed for networked electric drive systems, aimed at conducting real-world security demonstrations. To our knowledge, this is one of the first security testbeds for networked electric drives, seamlessly integrating the domains of power electronics and computer science, and cybersecurity. By doing so, the testbed offers a comprehensive platform to explore and understand the intricate and often complex interactions between cyber and physical systems. The core of our testbed consists of four electric machine drives, meticulously configured to emulate small-scale but realistic information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) networks. This setup both provides a controlled environment for simulating a wide array of cyber-attacks, and mirrors potential real-world attack scenarios with a high degree of fidelity. The testbed serves as an invaluable resource for the study of cyber-physical security, offering a practical and dynamic platform for testing and validating cybersecurity measures in the context of networked electric drive systems. As a concrete example of the testbed's capabilities, we have developed and implemented a Python-based script designed to execute step-stone attacks over a wireless local area network (WLAN). This script leverages a sequence of target IP addresses, simulating a real-world attack vector that could be exploited by adversaries. To counteract such threats, we demonstrate the efficacy of our developed cyber-attack detection algorithms, which are integral to our testbed's security framework. Furthermore, the testbed incorporates a real-time visualization system using InfluxDB and Grafana, providing a dynamic and interactive representation of networked electric drives and their associated security monitoring mechanisms. This visualization component not only enhances the testbed's usability but also offers insightful, real-time data for researchers and practitioners, thereby facilitating a deeper understanding of cyber-physical security dynamics in networked electric drive systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2026

SDN-Based Smart Cyber Switching (SCS) for Cyber Restoration of a Digital Substation

In recent years, critical infrastructure and power grids have increasingly been targets of cyber-attacks, causing widespread and extended blackouts. Digital substations are particularly vulnerable to such cyber incursions, jeopardizing grid stability. This paper addresses these risks by proposing a cybersecurity framework that leverages software-defined networking (SDN) to bolster the resilience of substations based on the IEC- 61850 standard. The research introduces a strategy involving smart cyber switching (SCS) for mitigation and concurrent intelligent electronic device (CIED) for restoration, ensuring ongoing operational integrity and cybersecurity within a substation. The SCS framework improves the physical network’s behavior (i.e., leveraging commercial SDN capabilities) by incorporating an adaptive port controller (APC) module for dynamic port management and an intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect and counteract malicious IEC-61850-based sampled value (SV) and generic object-oriented system event (GOOSE) messages within the substation’s communication network. The framework’s effectiveness is validated through comprehensive simulations and a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed, demonstrating its ability to sustain substation operations during cyber-attacks and significantly improve the overall resilience of the power grid.

Liu, Chen-Ching (ORCID:0000000289417958)↗

DOE OSTI2024

Cytrics Repository Of Analysis Tools And Engineering Resources

Cybersecurity Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems (CyTRICS) is a DOE-funded project that works with vendors to evaluate the cybersecurity of equipment used in US critical infrastructure. In the process of testing systems, CyTRICS researchers often develop custom tools. The tools in this repository were developed during multiple CyTRICS tests to assist with the testing process. They help solve problems encountered by CyTRICS researchers and address uncommon testing subjects for which limited tooling is available. They are useful to other researchers working on similar systems and architectures.

Laird, SutterE↗

DOE OSTI2023

The Benefits of a Software Bill of Materials Program at Nuclear Facilities

Software supply chain attacks are becoming increasingly more prevalent in both information communications technology and operational technology environments. Often, a supplier or other entity discloses vulnerability information about software components and subcomponents used in a digital asset, but an asset owner is unable to quickly ascertain if the vulnerable component is installed in their facility. The generation and use of a software bill of materials (SBOM) for installed digital assets can enable an asset owner to quickly identify if and where a component is used, allowing them to evaluate the risk and determine necessary risk treatments. The integration of an SBOM program into a nuclear facility not only improves vulnerability management and risk management processes, it also benefits asset and configuration management, cybersecurity, and supply chain programs. This paper reviews the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy Cybersecurity Crosscutting Technology Development program’s work on integrating an SBOM program into a nuclear facility. It also provides a discussion on the benefits of such a program.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Dragonstone Strategy Kickoff Report [Slides]

The oil & natural gas (ONG) system like any other heavy industrial process, relies on a complex system of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) devices. Cyber-preparedness varies across the ONG industry from organization to organization. Common challenges include remote locations, long-lived field assets, and insufficient capabilities to find and track malware. ONG companies tend to be concerned with lack of cyber-awareness from employees, risk stemming from remote access for operations & maintenance, and software vulnerabilities within third-party equipment. For a variety of reasons, the general consensus from stakeholders interviewed by LLNL is that the state of cybersecurity within the electric grid is currently outpacing its ONG cousin. Existing strategies for the resilience and cybersecurity of the electric grid can and should be leveraged to provide immediate benefits to the ONG system. In LLNL’s view, there are two key factors currently limiting the development of necessary cyber-practices within the ONG industry: regulatory overlap and inefficiencies, and lack of industry awareness of potentially useful technologies for solving known issues. In the months following this report, LLNL will develop a cyber-resilience roadmap for the oil & gas pipeline sector, coupling threat intelligence, industry knowledge base, and ongoing outreach

02 PETROLEUM↗

DOE OSTI2020

5G Enabled Energy Innovation: Advanced Wireless Networks for Science (Workshop Report)

Rapidly expanding, new telecommunications infrastructure based on 5G technologies will disrupt and transform how we design, build, operate, and optimize scientific infrastructure and the experiments and services enabled by that infrastructure, from continental-scale sensor networks to centralized scientific user facilities, from intelligent Internet of Things devices to supercomputers. Concurrently, 5G will introduce, or exacerbate, challenges related to protecting infrastructure and associated scientific data as well as to fully leveraging opportunities related to expanded infrastructure scale and complexity. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science operates scientific infrastructure, supporting some of the nation’s most advanced intellectual discoveries, spanning the country and including 30 world-class user facilities from supercomputers to accelerators. Along with field experiments and remote observatories, every aspect of DOE’s scientific enterprise will be affected by 5G, which amounts to a complete renovation of the underpinnings of the nation’s information infrastructure. In this report we explore the scientific opportunities and new research challenges associated with 5G, ranging from scalability to heterogeneity to cybersecurity. The rapid commercial deployment of 5G opens the opportunity to rethink and reinvent DOE’s scientific infrastructure and experimentation, from intelligent sensor networks at unprecedented scales to a digital continuum of cyberinfrastructure spanning low-power sensors, high-performance computing embedded within and at the edge of the network, and DOE’s large-scale user instrument and computing facilities. New programming paradigms, workflow and data frameworks, and AI-based system design, operation, and autonomous adaptation and optimization will be necessary in order to exploit these new opportunities. Field deployments and centralized scientific instruments can also be revolutionized, moving (without traditional performance penalties) from wired to wireless connectivity for data and control systems, improving flexibility, and opening new sensing modalities, including the use of the 5G electromagnetic spectrum itself as an environmental probe. For DOE science, in contrast to commercial 5G applications and settings, devices will be deployed in extreme environments such as cryogenically cooled instrument control systems and in remote settings with harsh conditions, requiring the design of new materials for RF communication and edge processing to operate in these regimes. Concurrently, 5G infrastructure comprises both hardware and sophisticated software systems - currently closed and proprietary. The cybersecurity challenges to 5G-empowered reinvention mirror the complexity and variety of new 5G features, from virtualization to private network slices to ubiquitous access. Research is also needed in order to accelerate the development of secure and open 5G software infrastructure, reducing reliance on hardware and software produced outside the United States and providing the transparency and rigorous evaluation and testing afforded through open software. Twelve broad research thrusts are laid out in four chapters, with a companion fifth chapter (and three additional research thrusts) underscoring the needs and opportunities for an aggressive testbed program co-designed by networking experts and scientists involved in the 15 research thrusts. The urgency of undertaking this research is fueled by a global, accelerating deployment of new telecommunications infrastructure that is designed for entertainment and commercial applications - barely scratching the surface of what 5G can do to extend U.S. leadership in scientific discovery.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2021

Review of Intrusion Detection Methods and Tools for Distributed Energy Resources

Recent trends in the growth of distributed energy resources (DER) in the electric grid and newfound malware frameworks that target internet of things (IoT) devices is driving an urgent need for more reliable and effective methods for intrusion detection and prevention. Cybersecurity intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are responsible for detecting threats by monitoring and analyzing network data, which can originate either from networking equipment or end-devices. Creating intrusion detection systems for PV/DER networks is a challenging undertaking because of the diversity of the attack types and intermittency and variability in the data. Distinguishing malicious events from other sources of anomalies or system faults is particularly difficult. New approaches are needed that not only sense anomalies in the power system but also determine causational factors for the detected events. In this report, a range of IDS approaches were summarized along with their pros and cons. Using the review of IDS approaches and subsequent gap analysis for application to DER systems, a preliminary hybrid IDS approach to protect PV/DER communications is formed in the conclusion of this report to inform ongoing and future research regarding the cybersecurity and resilience enhancement of DER systems.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2021

Development of Integrated Safety and Security Models for Comprehensive Reliability and Resiliency Evaluation

The security of the electric grid and supporting energy systems is crucial to national security. One of the complexities in analyzing the security of energy systems is the safety consequences that may result from accidents. For energy systems, the goal is to ensure that they operate as intended and that any consequences are mitigated or prevented. The integration of safety and security is paramount to protecting these systems from attacks and ensuring that large consequences are prevented. This report describes an integrated safety and security methodology to evaluate cybersecurity events that can lead to large consequences. This novel approach first describes how Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) provides a digital causal analysis for Bayesian Networks (BNs). The use of STPA causal analysis provides a systematic approach to constructing BNs that adequately model cyber scenarios that result in consequences. When combined with the technical principles described in Risk-Informed Management of Enterprise Systems (RIMES), a comprehensive risk-informed cybersecurity analysis results that allows decision-makers to prioritize systems that most impact risk.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗