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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2014

Adaptive Augmenting Control Flight Characterization Experiment on an F/A-18

This paper summarizes the Adaptive Augmenting Control (AAC) flight characterization experiments performed using an F/A-18 (TN 853). AAC was designed and developed specifically for launch vehicles, and is currently part of the baseline autopilot design for NASA's Space Launch System (SLS). The scope covered here includes a brief overview of the algorithm (covered in more detail elsewhere), motivation and benefits of flight testing, top-level SLS flight test objectives, applicability of the F/A-18 as a platform for testing a launch vehicle control design, test cases designed to fully vet the AAC algorithm, flight test results, and conclusions regarding the functionality of AAC. The AAC algorithm developed at Marshall Space Flight Center is a forward loop gain multiplicative adaptive algorithm that modifies the total attitude control system gain in response to sensed model errors or undesirable parasitic mode resonances. The AAC algorithm provides the capability to improve or decrease performance by balancing attitude tracking with the mitigation of parasitic dynamics, such as control-structure interaction or servo-actuator limit cycles. In the case of the latter, if unmodeled or mismodeled parasitic dynamics are present that would otherwise result in a closed-loop instability or near instability, the adaptive controller decreases the total loop gain to reduce the interaction between these dynamics and the controller. This is in contrast to traditional adaptive control logic, which focuses on improving performance by increasing gain. The computationally simple AAC attitude control algorithm has stability properties that are reconcilable in the context of classical frequency-domain criteria (i.e., gain and phase margin). The algorithm assumes that the baseline attitude control design is well-tuned for a nominal trajectory and is designed to adapt only when necessary. Furthermore, the adaptation is attracted to the nominal design and adapts only on an as-needed basis (see Figure 1). The MSFC algorithm design was formulated during the Constellation Program and reached a high maturity level during SLS through simulation-based development and internal and external analytical review. The AAC algorithm design has three summary-level objectives: (1) "Do no harm;" return to baseline control design when not needed, (2) Increase performance; respond to error in ability of vehicle to track command, and (3) Regain stability; respond to undesirable control-structure interaction or other parasitic dynamics. AAC has been successfully implemented as part of the Space Launch System baseline design, including extensive testing in high-fidelity 6-DOF simulations the details of which are described in [1]. The Dryden Flight Research Center's F/A-18 Full-Scale Advanced Systems Testbed (FAST) platform is used to conduct an algorithm flight characterization experiment intended to fully vet the aforementioned design objectives. FAST was specifically designed with this type of test program in mind. The onboard flight control system has full-authority experiment control of ten aerodynamic effectors and two throttles. It has production and research sensor inputs and pilot engage/disengage and real-time configuration of up to eight different experiments on a single flight. It has failure detection and automatic reversion to fail-safe mode. The F/A-18 aircraft has an experiment envelope cleared for full-authority control and maneuvering and exhibits characteristics for robust recovery from unusual attitudes and configurations aided by the presence of a qualified test pilot. The F/A-18 aircraft has relatively high mass and inertia with exceptional performance; the F/A-18 also has a large thrust-to-weight ratio, owing to its military heritage. This enables the simulation of a portion of the ascent trajectory with a high degree of dynamic similarity to a launch vehicle, and the research flight control system can simulate unstable longitudinal dynamics. Parasitic dynamics such as slosh and bending modes, as well as atmospheric disturbances, are being produced by the airframe via modification of bending filters and the use of secondary control surfaces, including leading and trailing edge flaps, symmetric ailerons, and symmetric rudders. The platform also has the ability to inject signals in flight to simulate structural mode resonances or other challenging dynamics. This platform also offers more test maneuvers and longer maneuver times than a single rocket or missile test, which provides ample opportunity to fully and repeatedly exercise all aspects of the algorithm. Prior to testing on an F/A-18, AAC was the only component of the SLS autopilot design that had not been flight tested. The testing described in this paper raises the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) early in the SLS Program and is able to demonstrate its capabilities and robustness in a flight environment.

VanZwieten, Tannen S.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Simulating the Trajectory and Biomass Growth of Free-Floating Macroalgal Cultivation Platforms along the U.S. West Coast

Trajectory tracking and macroalgal growth models were coupled to support a novel macroalgae-harvesting concept known as the Nautical Off-shore Macroalgal Autonomous Device (NOMAD). The NOMAD consists of 5 km long carbon-fiber longlines that are seeded and free float southward along the U.S. West Coast for approximately 3 months before harvesting off the California coast, taking advantage of favorable environmental conditions. The trajectory and macroalgal growth models were applied to answer planning questions pertinent to the techno-economic analysis such as identifying the preferred release location, approximate pathway, timing until harvest, and estimated growth. Trajectories were determined with the General NOAA Operational Modeling Environment (GNOME) model, using 11 years of current and wind data, determining probabilities by running nearly 40,000 Monte Carlo simulations varying the start time and location. An accompanying macroalgal growth model was used to estimate the growth of macroalgae based on the trajectory tracks and environmental forcing products, including light, temperature and nutrients. Model results show that NOMAD lines transit south in the months of April to September due to seasonal currents, taking approximately 3 months to reach Southern California. During transit, NOMAD lines are dispersed but typically avoid beaching or passing through marine sanctuaries. NOMAD lines can yield up to 30 kg wet weight per meter of cultivation line.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Development of the IES Plug-and-Play Framework

This report discusses the status of the flexible plug-and-play framework development currently ongoing that aims to integrate Modelica/Dymola with the Risk Analysis and Virtual ENvironment (RAVEN) software in terms of both Functional Mock-Up Interface (FMI)/Functional Mock-Up Unit (FMU) construction and repository structures that aim to ease the sharing and simulation of complex dynamic models. This report aims to provide an overview of all the performed activities resolving around the deployment of methods, software infrastructures, guidelines and workflow for the construction and usage of models, encapsulated using the FMI/FMU protocols and standards. In particular, the report is organized in three main macro-subjects, which are connected to each other: - FMI/FMU adaptors for modelica models - HYBRID repository new structure and open-source deployment - RAVEN FMI/FMU exporting capabilities and Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based analysis acceleration. The first part of the report discusses the FMI/FMU adaptors that have been created within the HYBRID repository to allow users to quickly export models, such as FMUs. Several examples are shown that highlight the step-by-step process of converting an existing Modelica model into an FMU for use within the Dymola platform. Simulation results demonstrate that, while minor differences may occur, the overall control, trends, and solution integrity are maintained between standard Modelica simulation and FMU simulation results. However, it is worth noting that, for small systems, the FMU results have a slower simulation time than the Modelica only simulation. Using this process, a company can provide models that contain proprietary information to entities without disclosing any of the information about the model that could be considered business sensitive. Such an ability would allow institutions to bypass the necessity of “whitewashing” data. In the second part of the report, the new structure of the HYBRID repository is discussed with a major focus on the series of updates that has been completed. These updates include the addition of Modelica system-level regression tests and software quality assurance documentation that ensure that modifications to the Modelica models do not alter system-level model results. The third and final part of the report aims to report the work that has been performed for the deployment of methods and workflows for the construction of RAVEN AI-based models compliant with the FMI/FMU standard. Such development represents the key for the deployment of the concept of “Flexible ecosystem” since it allows for the replacement of high-fidelity modelica models (or any other FMI/FMU compliant model) with RAVEN generated AI surrogate models. Overall, extensive work has been completed on developing FMUs and FMIs from existing models, understanding the requirements and limitations of FMUs, and open-sourcing the HYBRID repository with an integrated regression system.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2015

High Performance EVA Glove Collaboration: Glove Injury Data Mining Effort

Human hands play a significant role during Extravehicular Activity (EVA) missions and Neutral Buoyancy Lab (NBL) training events, as they are needed for translating and performing tasks in the weightless environment. Because of this high frequency usage, hand and arm related injuries are known to occur during EVA and EVA training in the NBL. The primary objectives of this investigation were to: 1) document all known EVA glove related injuries and circumstances of these incidents, 2) determine likely risk factors, and 3) recommend interventions where possible that could be implemented in the current and future glove designs. METHODS: The investigation focused on the discomforts and injuries of U.S. crewmembers who had worn the pressurized Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuit and experienced 4000 Series or Phase VI glove related incidents during 1981 to 2010 for either EVA ground training or in-orbit flight. We conducted an observational retrospective case-control investigation using 1) a literature review of known injuries, 2) data mining of crew injury, glove sizing, and hand anthropometry databases, 3) descriptive statistical analyses, and finally 4) statistical risk correlation and predictor analyses to better understand injury prevalence and potential causation. Specific predictor statistical analyses included use of principal component analyses (PCA), multiple logistic regression, and survival analyses (Cox proportional hazards regression). Results of these analyses were computed risk variables in the forms of odds ratios (likelihood of an injury occurring given the magnitude of a risk variable) and hazard ratios (likelihood of time to injury occurrence). Due to the exploratory nature of this investigation, we selected predictor variables significant at p≤0.15. RESULTS: Through 2010, there have been a total of 330 NASA crewmembers, from which 96 crewmembers performed 322 EVAs during 1981-2010, resulting in 50 crewmembers being injured inflight and 44 injured during 11,704 ground EVA training events. Of the 196 glove related injury incidents, 106 related to EVA and 90 to EVA training. Over these 196 incidents, 277 total injuries (126 flight; 151 training) were reported and were then grouped into 23 types of injuries. Of EVA flight injuries, 65% were commonly reported to the hand (in general), metacarpophalangeal (MCP) joint, and finger (not including thumb) with fatigue, abrasion, and paresthesia being the most common injury types (44% of total flight injuries). Training injuries totaled to more than 70% being distributed to the fingernail, MCP joint, and finger crotch with 88% of the specific injuries listed as pain, erythema, and onycholysis. Of these training injuries, when reporting pain or erythema, the most common location was the index finger, but when reporting onycholysis, it was the middle finger. Predictor variables specific to increased risk of onycholysis included: female sex (OR=2.622), older age (OR=1.065), increased duration in hours of the flight or training event (OR=1.570), middle finger length differences in inches between the finger and the EVA glove (OR=7.709), and use of the Phase VI glove (OR=8.535). Differentiation between training and flight and injury reporting during 2002-2004 were significant control variables. For likelihood of time to first onycholysis injury, there was a 24% reduction in rate of reporting for each year increase in age. Also, more experienced crewmembers, based on number of EVA flight or training events completed, were less likely to report an onycholysis injury (3% less for every event). Longer duration events also found reporting rates to occur 2.37 times faster for every hour of length. Crewmembers with larger hand size reported onycholysis 23% faster than those with smaller hand size. Finally, for every 1/10th of an inch increase in difference between the middle finger length and the glove, the rate of reporting increased by 60%. DISCUSSION: One key finding was that the Series 4000 glove had a lower injury risk than the Phase VI, which provides a platform for further evaluation. General interventions that reduce hand overexertion and repetitive use exposure through tool development, procedural changes and shorter exposures may be one mitigation path, but due to the way the training event times were reported, we cannot provide a guideline for a specific event duration change. When the finger length was different from the glove length, the risk of injury increased indicating that the use of larger finger take-ups could be contributing to injury and therefore may not be recommended. Prior to this investigation, there was one previous investigation indicating hand anthropometry may be related to onycholysis. We found different hand anthropometry variables indicated by this investigation as compared to the prior, specifically differences in middle finger length compared to glove finger length, which point more towards a sizing issue than a specific anthropometry issue. Additionally, although this investigation has identified sizing as an issue, the force and environmental-related variables of the EVA glove that could also cause injury were not accounted for.

Reid, C. R.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Development of the IES Plug-and-Play Framework

This report discusses the status of the flexible plug-and-play framework development currently ongoing that aims to integrate Modelica/Dymola with the Risk Analysis and Virtual ENvironment (RAVEN) software in terms of both Functional Mock-Up Interface (FMI)/Functional Mock-Up Unit (FMU) construction and repository structures that aim to ease the sharing and simulation of complex dynamic models. This report aims to provide an overview of all the performed activities resolving around the deployment of methods, software infrastructures, guidelines and workflow for the construction and usage of models, encapsulated using the FMI/FMU protocols and standards. In particular, the report is organized in three main macro-subjects, which are connected to each other: - FMI/FMU adaptors for modelica models - HYBRID repository new structure and open-source deployment - RAVEN FMI/FMU exporting capabilities and Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based analysis acceleration. The first part of the report discusses the FMI/FMU adaptors that have been created within the HYBRID repository to allow users to quickly export models, such as FMUs. Several examples are shown that highlight the step-by-step process of converting an existing Modelica model into an FMU for use within the Dymola platform. Simulation results demonstrate that, while minor differences may occur, the overall control, trends, and solution integrity are maintained between standard Modelica simulation and FMU simulation results. However, it is worth noting that, for small systems, the FMU results have a slower simulation time than the Modelica only simulation. Using this process, a company can provide models that contain proprietary information to entities without disclosing any of the information about the model that could be considered business sensitive. Such an ability would allow institutions to bypass the necessity of “whitewashing” data. In the second part of the report, the new structure of the HYBRID repository is discussed with a major focus on the series of updates that has been completed. These updates include the addition of Modelica system-level regression tests and software quality assurance documentation that ensure that modifications to the Modelica models do not alter system-level model results. The third and final part of the report aims to report the work that has been performed for the deployment of methods and workflows for the construction of RAVEN AI-based models compliant with the FMI/FMU standard. Such development represents the key for the deployment of the concept of “Flexible ecosystem” since it allows for the replacement of high-fidelity modelica models (or any other FMI/FMU compliant model) with RAVEN generated AI surrogate models. Overall, extensive work has been completed on developing FMUs and FMIs from existing models, understanding the requirements and limitations of FMUs, and open-sourcing the HYBRID repository with an integrated regression system.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Autonomous System Subversion Tactics: Prototypes and Recommended Countermeasures

One of the fielding requirements for Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (AR/SMR) is the ability to support remote and autonomous operations. Autonomous Control Systems (ACS) are found on platforms such as Autonomous Space Vehicles, Cruise Missiles, and advanced driver-assistance systems. Each of these ACS implementations depends upon a set of decision support subsystems responsible for supporting Autonomous Mission Managers (names vary based upon field and author preferences). These Autonomous Mission Managers receive inputs from system sensors (e.g., LIDAR collection from an automobile travelling down a street; transients from a nuclear reactor), and perform a set of classifications (e.g., Red Traffic Light; Small Pedestrian at 10m; Load Rejection; Single Coolant Pump Trip), and then use these classifications in combination with recommendation algorithms to achieve platform goals (e.g., Stop the Vehicle at the Traffic Light, Avoid the Small Pedestrian; Trip the Reactor to prevent a Safety Event). The design, implementation, and fielding of an ACS capability will alter the cyber-attack surface such that existing risk management plans will need to be updated to include how to protect and defend against data-science and decision-support-system attack classes. These attack classes would include protection of the design and training environments where algorithm selection and testing and training data would be obvious attack vectors. These attack classes would also require an informed set of detection and response procedures to identify anomalous behaviors and document best practices for anomaly assessment and vulnerability mitigation and remediation. Last year we published a Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for AR/SMRs along with a companion publication on Cyber Attack and Defense Use Cases. The focus of the methodology was on describing and enumerating ACS processes, components, and functions such that security engineers could: evaluate subversion options against the target; identify threat actor attributes and capabilities derived from each subversion option; and identify security controls and response countermeasures. The Use Cases document offered detailed methodology examples including an assessment of a Military Base SMR, an Autonomous System Decision Loop, and implementation of AR/SMR Machine Learning algorithms. Our proposal at the end of last year was to focus on implementation of subversion prototypes related to the last Use Case area: AR/SMR Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms. We included six attack scenarios in our Use Cases paper: a Poisoning Attack against ML functions implemented using an FPGA; a Trojaning Attack against ML classifiers exploiting the excitability of Nuclear Engineers; a Backdooring Attack against ML Training environments to ensure persistence of an attack vector; a False Positive Evasion Attack against multi-factor Access Control Systems using clever inputs; an Inference Attack against ML models by an Insider with access to the Operational environment; and an Adversarial Reprogramming Attack against a Material Access Control Video Surveillance System. At the beginning of this year these six attack scenarios were provided to our research teams at Georgia Tech and Idaho State University and each team successfully implemented a subversion attack against a ML implementation to include transient misclassifications. While this is a notable outcome from this type of research, this paper offers the reader insight into not only how to structure and execute these types of attacks, but into the thought process behind how the researcher investigated the problem space, performed initial algorithm implementation, and the trial-and-error behind arriving at the successful subversion prototypes. We include in this paper a set of associated Scenarios on how these subversion prototypes could be implemented and an initial set of guidance for AR/SMR architects, Nuclear Regulators, and Cyber Defenders to implement awareness and defense capabilities into their current operational portfolios.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Analysis of Launch Vehicle Liftoff Debris: Historical Perspective from Space Shuttle and Application to Artemis I

Human exploration-class launch vehicles are inherently prone to debris due to the extreme environments generated during pre-launch operations, liftoff, and flight. The use of cryogenic propellants often requires thermal protection system (TPS) coatings, typically foam, to maintain the propellant conditions in the tank and prevent an accumulation ice on the external surface of the vehicle. Some ice growth is to be expected at umbilical interfaces, vents, flanges, or brackets where it is difficult to apply TPS. This ice may come loose at any time due to wind on the launch pad, structural vibration and acoustics after rocket ignition, or aerodynamic forces during flight. This phenomena is especially apparent on vehicles with no TPS, such as the Saturn V rockets used in the Apollo Program, see Figure 1. During propellant tanking, the thermal contraction of the underlying substrate may generate cracks in the TPS (Figure 1). Chunks of TPS can release due to the expansion of ingested gas from cryopumping or from aerodynamic forces if the crack creates an offset surface. Most foams will also have a certain amount of “popcorning” where small pieces of foam will pop off during flight because of the differential between the static surface pressure and the pressure of the gas trapped in the foam cell structure. There are a number of other coating or closeout materials that may be shed from the vehicle and become debris. During pre-launch operations and liftoff, the vehicle may also be exposed to debris originating from the launch pad or ground support equipment. This debris is separate from foreign object debris, or FOD, which is not intended to be present and is strictly controlled through operations and maintenance procedures. In this case, debris is generated from hardware and materials that are necessary for launch and are subject to the intense vibration, acoustics, and direct plume impingement of the launch environment. Examples include ice from umbilicals, tape and tie wraps that protect cables, and rust or corrosion from the launch platform. While NASA has historically been aware of debris as a potential issue that could cause a failure resulting in loss of mission, loss of vehicle, or loss of crew, the likelihood and severity of that risk was not always well understood or given sufficient weight in program and flight decisions. After the Space Shuttle Columbia accident (STS-107), the investigation found that foam TPS debris shed from the external tank was the proximate cause of the damage to the orbiter wing. Six previous observations of debris released from the foam ramp that covered the bipod connecting the forward end of the orbiter to the external tank resulted in minor changes or were determined to be accepted flight risks. Two occurrences of bipod ramp foam loss were not identified until the STS-107 investigation. Despite the damage inflicted by these debris strikes, the Shuttle Program Requirements Control Board deemed the vehicle safe to fly. During the Return to Flight effort following the Columbia disaster, NASA Engineering developed a process for the assessment of debris transport, impact, and damage tolerance to support independent assessments of risk by NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA). Under this system, each element (vehicle or ground system) defines a catalog of all expected debris based on launch history, component testing, or analysis. Debris transport analysis (DTA) is conducted using the debris catalog characteristics and potential flow transport mechanisms (e.g., vehicle aerodynamics, gravity, wind, plume-driven). The predicted debris impact locations and velocities are provided to the hardware owners, who use available test data and analysis to determine whether each component can withstand the impacts. In cases where the element hardware may be severely damaged or fail, the options are to mitigate the debris source through some change in design or operation, or to work with S&MA to try to characterize the probability of the impact and damage for program risk acceptance. Because of the differences in debris characteristics and transport, the DTA has been divided between the Liftoff and Ascent regimes. The development and application of Liftoff DTA methodology from the Shuttle Program to the current Artemis Program is the subject of this paper. Liftoff DTA covers the time from the start of pre-launch operations at the launch pad, up until the vehicle clears the launch tower and there is no longer any interaction with ground systems. Debris transport during this period is broadly classified as either gravity, wind, and plume-entrained (GWPE) or plume driven (PD). GWPE debris is generally lower speed, travelling in a forward-to-aft direction. PD transport includes flow features from the rocket ignition transient, as well as plume impingement and recirculation that occur as the vehicle lifts off the launch platform. In these cases, the debris typically moves in an aft-to-forward direction at higher speeds. The applicable transport mechanisms must be considered for each piece of debris depending on the material, and release location and time. For example, rust or metallic debris from the tower could fall (GWPE) and impact the vehicle before landing on the launch platform deck where it could be also be transported by plume impingement (PD). However, falling ice (GWPE) from an umbilical is unlikely to survive impact with the vehicle or launch platform and be available for PD transport. Modeling of debris transport is accomplished using a set of DTA tools which simulate debris trajectories subject to a reference frame acceleration (i.e., gravity) and aerodynamic drag. Where the trajectory encounters a solid surface, the debris is allowed to rebound with a specified coefficient of restitution. The drag is calculated by interpolating the fluid state at each point in the debris trajectory from high-fidelity computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations of the launch vehicle and pad. The CFD data may either be static (steady state or time averaged), typically for GWPE transport, or dynamic (time-accurate) for PD flow features like the ignition transient. Examples of the CFD flow field solutions for the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket and launch pad are shown in Figure 2. Typical SLS debris trajectory predictions from DTA are illustrated in Figure 3. The final version of this paper will include a more detailed examination of the Liftoff DTA process developed during the Shuttle Program, and how it has been augmented and applied to the SLS rocket under the Artemis Program. Comparisons with debris observations from the Artemis I launch will demonstrate validation of the tools and methodology.

Debris↗
DOE OSTI2025

RTN-095: The Vera C. Rubin Observatory Data Preview 1

We present Rubin Data Preview 1 (DP1), the first release of data from the NSF-DOE Vera C. Rubin Observatory, consisting of raw and calibrated single-epoch images, coadds, difference images, detection catalogs, and other derived data products. DP1 is based on 1792 science-grade optical/near-infrared exposures acquired over 48 distinct nights by the Rubin Commissioning Camera, LSSTComCam, on the Simonyi Survey Telescope at the Summit Facility on Cerro Pachón, Chile during the first on-sky commissioning campaign in late 2024. DP1 covers a total of ~15 sq. deg. over seven roughly equally-sized non-contiguous fields, each independently observed in six broad photometric bands, ugrizy, spanning a range of stellar densities and latitudes and overlapping with external reference datasets. The median image quality across all bands, measured by the FWHM of the point-spread function, is approximately 1.13 arcseconds, with the sharpest images reaching about 0.65 arcseconds. DP1 contains approximately 2.3 million distinct astrophysical objects, of which 1.6 million are extended in at least one band, and 431 solar system objects, of which 93 are new discoveries. DP1 is approximately 3.5 TB in size and available to Rubin data rights holders via the Rubin Science Platform, a cloud-based environment for the analysis of petascale astronomical data. While small compared to future LSST releases, its high quality and diversity of data support a broad range of early science investigations across all four LSST themes, providing a valuable opportunity to engage with Rubin data ahead of the start of full operations in late 2025.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2026

The Vera C. Rubin Observatory Data Preview 1

We present Rubin Data Preview 1 (DP1), the first data from the National Science Foundation–Department of Energy Vera C. Rubin Observatory, comprising raw and calibrated single-epoch images, coadds, difference images, detection catalogs, and ancillary data products. DP1 is based on 1792 optical–near-infrared exposures acquired over 48 distinct nights by the Rubin Commissioning Camera (LSSTComCam) on the Simonyi Survey Telescope at the Summit Facility on Cerro Pachón, Chile in late 2024. DP1 covers ∼15 deg 2 distributed across seven roughly equal-sized noncontiguous fields, each independently observed in six broad photometric bands, ugrizy. The median FWHM of the point-spread function across all bands is approximately 1"14, with the sharpest images reaching about 0." 58. The 5σ point-source depths for coadded images in the deepest field, the Extended Chandra Deep Field South, are u = 24.55, g = 26.18, r = 25.96, i = 25.71, z = 25.07, and y = 23.1. Other fields are no more than 2.2 mag shallower in any band, where they have nonzero coverage. DP1 contains approximately 2.3 million distinct astrophysical objects, of which 1.6 million are extended in at least one band in coadds, and 431 solar system objects, of which 93 are new discoveries. DP1 is approximately 3.5 TB in size and is available to Vera C. Rubin Observatory data rights holders via the Rubin Science Platform, a cloud-based environment for the analysis of petascale astronomical data. While small compared to future LSST releases, its high quality and diversity of data support a broad range of early science investigations ahead of full operations in 2026.

Ground-based astronomy↗