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At least 559 records · Page 31

UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Sandia National Laboratories Sealed Sources at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Sealed Sources >100 microcuries (μCi) (ASLA000000030, Revision 1 [SNL 2018]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the SNL Sealed Sources waste stream meets all performance objectives of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The SNL Sealed Sources waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Transuranic Waste Processing Center Low-Level Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Transuranic Waste Processing Center (TWPC) Low-Level Waste (LLW), FWORCHLLW0102, Revision 12 (TWPC 2021), is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the TWPC LLW meets all performance objectives of DOE Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The TWPC LLW waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory General Radioactive Sources Low-Level Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) General Radioactive Sources (ORNLSOURCES01, Revision 5 [ORNL 2017]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the ORNL General Radioactive Sources meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999).The ORNL General Radioactive Sources waste stream is recommended for acceptance with the following conditions: The total waste stream tritium (3H) inventory shall not exceed 5E10 Bq. The total waste stream strontium-90 (90Sr) inventory shall not exceed 5E9 Bq. The total waste stream cesium-137 (137Cs) inventory shall not exceed 2E11 Bq. The total waste stream radium-226 (226Ra) inventory shall not exceed 2E10 Bq. The total waste stream protactinium-231 (231Pa) inventory shall not exceed 2E9 Bq. The total waste stream uranium-234 (234U) inventory shall not exceed 5E9 Bq.

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Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the West Valley Demonstration Project Contaminated Concrete and General Debris at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Contaminated Concrete and General Debris (WVDP000000013, Revision 12 [WVDP 2017]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the WVDP Contaminated Concrete and General Debris waste stream meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The WVDP Contaminated Concrete and General Debris is recommended for acceptance with the condition that the total radium-226 (226Ra) activity not exceed 8.1E9 becquerels (Bq).

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UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Idaho National Laboratory Classified Mockup Low-Level Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Classified Mockup Low-Level Waste (LLW) (INEL208599QR0, Revision 0 [INL 2020]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the INL Classified Mockup LLW meets all performance objectives of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The INL Classified Mockup LLW stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Idaho National Laboratory Classified Mockup Low-Level Waste, Revision 1, at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Classified Mockup Low-Level Waste (LLW) (INEL208599QR0, Revision 1 [INL 2021]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the INL Classified Mockup LLW meets all performance objectives of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The INL Classified Mockup LLW stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the West Valley Demonstration Project Drum Cell Cement Solidified Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Drum Cell Cement-Solidified Waste (WVDP000000018, Revision 4 [WVDP 2017]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the WVDP Drum Cell Cement-Solidified Waste meets all performance objectives in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual , Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The WVDP Drum Cell Cement-Solidified Waste is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Vault Clean-Out Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Vault Clean-Out waste stream (LANL000000030, Revision 4 [LANL 2018]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the LANL Vault Clean-Out waste stream meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 2011). The LANL Vault Clean-Out waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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Use of Multi-attribute Utility Functions in Evaluating Security Systems

In analyzing security systems, we are concerned with protecting a building or facility from an attack by an adversary. Typically, we address the possibility that an adversary could enter a building and cause damage resulting in an immediate loss of life, or at least substantial disruption in the operations of the facility. In response to this setting, we implement security systems including devices, procedures, and facility upgrades designed to (a) prevent the adversary from entering, (b) detect and neutralize him if he does enter, and (c) harden the facility to minimize damage if an attack is carried out successfully. Although we have cast this in terms of physical protection of a building, the same general approach can be applied to non-physical attacks such as cyber attacks on a computer system. A rigorous analytic process is valuable for quantitatively evaluating an existing system, identifying its weaknesses, and proposing useful upgrades. As such, in this paper we describe an approach to assess the degree of overall protection provided by security measures. Our approach evaluates the effectiveness of the individual components of the system, describes how the components work together, and finally assesses the degree of overall protection achieved. This model can then be used to quantify the amount of protection provided by existing security measures, as well as to address proposed upgrades to the system and help identify a robust and cost effective set of improvements. Within the model, we use multiattribute utility functions to perform the overall evaluations of the system.

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An Assessment of Geological Carbon Storage Options in the Illinois Basin: Validation Phase

The Midwest Geological Sequestration Consortium (MGSC) assessed the options for geological carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) storage in the 155,400 km 2 (60,000 mi 2 ) Illinois Basin, which underlies most of Illinois, western Indiana, and western Kentucky. The region has annual CO 2 emissions of about 265 million metric tonnes (292 million tons), primarily from 122 coal-fired electric generation facilities, some of which burn almost 4.5 million tonnes (5 million tons) of coal per year (U.S. Department of Energy, 2010). Validation Phase (Phase II) field tests gathered pilot data to update the Characterization Phase (Phase I) assessment of options for capture, transportation, and storage of CO 2 emissions in three geological sink types: coal seams, oil fields, and saline reservoirs. Four small-scale field tests were conducted to determine the properties of rock units that control injectivity of CO 2 , assess the total storage resources, examine the security of the overlying rock units that act as seals for the reservoirs, and develop ways to control and measure the safety of injection and storage processes. The MGSC designed field test operational plans for pilot sites based on the site screening process, MVA program needs, the selection of equipment related to CO 2 injection, and design of a data acquisition system. Reservoir modeling, computational simulations, and statistical methods assessed and interpreted data gathered from the field tests. Monitoring, Verification, and Accounting (MVA) programs were established to detect leakage of injected CO 2 and ensure public safety. Public outreach and education remained an important part of the project; meetings and presentations informed public and private regional stakeholders of the results and findings. A miscible (liquid) CO 2 flood pilot project was conducted in the Clore Formation sandstone (Mississippian System, Chesterian Series) at Mumford Hills Field in Posey County, southwestern Indiana, and an immiscible CO 2 flood pilot was conducted in the Jackson sandstone (Mississippian System Big Clifty Sandstone Member) at the Sugar Creek Field in Hopkins County, western Kentucky. Up to 12% incremental oil recovery was estimated based on these pilots. A CO 2 huff puff (HNP) pilot project was conducted in the Cypress Sandstone in the Loudon Field. This pilot was designed to measure and record data that could be used to calibrate a reservoir simulation model. A pilot project at the Tanquary Farms site in Wabash County, southeastern Illinois, tested the potential storage of CO 2 in the Springfield Coal Member of the Carbondale Formation (Pennsylvanian System), in order to gauge the potential for large-scale CO 2 storage and/or enhanced coal bed methane recovery from Illinois Basin coal beds. The pilot results from all four sites showed that CO 2 could be injected into the subsurface without adversely affecting groundwater. Additionally, hydrocarbon production was enhanced, giving further evidence that CO 2 storage in oil reservoirs and coal beds offers an economic advantage. Results from the MVA program at each site indicated that injected CO 2 did not leave the injection zone. Topical reports were completed on the Middle and Late Devonian New Albany Shale and Basin CO 2 emissions. The efficacy of the New Albany Shale as a storage sink could be substantial if low injectivity concerns can be alleviated. CO 2 emissions in the Illinois Basin were projected to be dominated by coal-fired power plants.

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Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory EnergyX Macroencapsulation Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) EnergyX Macroencapsulation mixed low-level waste (MLLW) (BCLAMACRONCAP, Revision 2 [LLNL 2017]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the LLNL EnergyX Macroencapsulation MLLW meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The LLNL EnergyX Macroencapsulation waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the West Valley Demonstration Project Asbestos Contaminated Low-Level Waste Debris at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Asbestos Contaminated Low-Level Waste Debris (WVDP000000023, Revision 3 [WVDP 2018a]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the WVDP Asbestos Contaminated Low-Level Waste Debris meets all performance objectives of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The WVDP Asbestos Contaminated Low-Level Waste Debris is recommended for acceptance with the condition that the total radium-226 (226Ra) waste stream activity shall not exceed 1.4E8 Bq.

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Geologic Assessment and Recommended New Well Locations to Improve the Area 25 Potable Water System, Nevada National Security Site

The Mission Support and Test Services, LLC (MSTS) Geoscience Operations Group performed a hydrogeologic study of an area of interest in Area 25 at the request of the MSTS Enterprise Infrastructure Program to identify potential locations for a new water well to replace J-14 Water Well (J-14 WW). Based on limited subsurface hydrogeologic data for the area, geologists developed two options for construction of a new well. Option 1 is to construct the well within approximately 250 feet (ft) of J-14 WW, and Option 2 is to construct the well approximately 1,550 ft north of J-11 Water Well (J-11 WW). Option 1 may be preferred, as the hydrogeology is better understood adjacent to an existing well. A well drilled at the Option 2 location would not have to be as deep as that at the Option 1 location, but the hydrogeologic setting is more uncertain at this greater distance from a verified subsurface geologic data point.

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UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory Torus Cleanup System Molecular Sieve Dryer Bed at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (PPPL) Torus Cleanup System Molecular Sieve Dryer Bed (MSDB), PERM000000043, Revision 0 (Perma-Fix [PERM] 2021), is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the PPPL Torus Cleanup System MSDB meets all performance objectives of DOE Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The PPPL Torus Cleanup System MSDB waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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Worker Safety and Health and Nuclear Safety Quarterly Performance Analysis (January - March 2008)

The DOE Office of Enforcement expects LLNL to 'implement comprehensive management and independent assessments that are effective in identifying deficiencies and broader problems in safety and security programs, as well as opportunities for continuous improvement within the organization' and to 'regularly perform assessments to evaluate implementation of the contractor's processes for screening and internal reporting.' LLNL has a self-assessment program, described in ES&H Manual Document 4.1, that includes line, management and independent assessments. LLNL also has in place a process to identify and report deficiencies of nuclear, worker safety and health and security requirements. In addition, the DOE Office of Enforcement expects LLNL to evaluate 'issues management databases to identify adverse trends, dominant problem areas, and potential repetitive events or conditions' (page 14, DOE Enforcement Process Overview, December 2007). LLNL requires that all worker safety and health and nuclear safety noncompliances be tracked as 'deficiencies' in the LLNL Issues Tracking System (ITS). Data from the ITS are analyzed for worker safety and health (WSH) and nuclear safety noncompliances that may meet the threshold for reporting to the DOE Noncompliance Tracking System (NTS). This report meets the expectations defined by the DOE Office of Enforcement to review the assessments conducted by LLNL, analyze the issues and noncompliances found in these assessments, and evaluate the data in the ITS database to identify adverse trends, dominant problem areas, and potential repetitive events or conditions. The report attempts to answer three questions: (1) Is LLNL evaluating its programs and state of compliance? (2) What is LLNL finding? (3) Is LLNL appropriately managing what it finds? The analysis in this report focuses on data from the first quarter of 2008 (January through March). This quarter is analyzed within the context of information identified in previous quarters to include April 2007 through March 2008. The results from analyzing the deficiencies are presented in accordance with the two primary NTS reporting thresholds for WSH and nuclear safety noncompliances: (1) those related to certain events or conditions and (2) those that are management issues. In addition, WSH noncompliances were also analyzed to determine if any fell under the 'other significant condition' threshold. This report also identifies noncompliance topical areas that may have issues that do not meet the NTS reporting threshold but should remain under observation. These are placed on the 'watch list' for continued analysis.

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Performance Analysis: ITS Data through September 30, 2009

Data from ITS was analyzed to understand the issues at LLNL and to identify issues that may require additional management attention and these that meet the threshold for reporting to the DOE Noncompliance Tracking System (NTS). In this report we discuss assessments and issues entered in ITS and compare the number and type presently entered in ITS to previous time periods. Issues reported in ITS were evaluated and discussed. The analysis identified two noncompliances that meet the threshold for reporting to the DOE NTS. All of the data in ITS is analyzed; however, the primary focus of this report is to meet requirements for performance analysis of specific functional areas. The DOE Office of Enforcement expects LLNL to 'implement comprehensive management and independent assessments that are effective in identifying deficiencies and broader problems in safety and security programs, as well as opportunities for continuous improvement within the organization' and to 'regularly perform assessments to evaluate implementation of the contractor's's processes for screening and internal reporting.' LLNL has a self-assessment program, described in the document applicable during this time period, ES&H Manual Document 4.1, that includes line, management and independent assessments. LLNL also has in place a process to identify and report deficiencies of nuclear, worker safety and health and security requirements. In addition, the DOE Office of Enforcement expects that 'issues management databases are used to identify adverse trends, dominant problem areas, and potential repetitive events or conditions' (page 15, DOE Enforcement Process Overview, June 2009). LLNL requires that all worker safety and health and nuclear safety noncompliances be tracked as 'deficiencies' in the LLNL Issues Tracking System (ITS). Data from the ITS are analyzed for worker safety and health (WSH) and nuclear safety noncompliances that may meet the threshold for reporting to the DOE Noncompliance Tracking System (NTS). This report meets the expectations defined by the DOE Office of Enforcement to evaluate implementation of internal processes for screening and reporting, review the assessments conducted by LLNL, analyze the noncompliances found in these assessments, and evaluate the data in the ITS database to identify adverse trends, dominant problem areas, and potential repetitive events or conditions. The report attempts to answer three questions: (1) Is LLNL evaluating its programs and state of compliance; (2) What is LLNL finding; and (3) Is LLNL appropriately managing what it finds? The results from analyzing the deficiencies are presented in accordance with the two primary NTS reporting thresholds for WSH and nuclear safety noncompliances: (1) those related to certain events or conditions and (2) those that are management issues. In addition, WSH noncompliances were also analyzed to determine if any fell under the 'other significant condition' threshold. This report identifies deficiencies that meet the criteria for reporting to the DOE NTS; topics and subtopics that should remain under observation because the number of entries meets the test criteria or because of management concern; and topics and subtopics that are determined to no longer require observation. Topics and subtopics that are identified for continued observation are placed on a 'watch list.' The purpose of the watch list is for the Performance Analysis and Reporting Section (PARS) of the Contactor Assurance Office to analyze these topics and subtopics in future performance analysis reports.

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UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Idaho National Laboratory Radioactive Waste Management Complex Low-Level Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) Low-Level Waste (INEL11006367N, Revision 4 [INL 2017]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the INL RWMC Low-Level Waste meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The INL RWMC Low-Level Waste is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Regulated Asbestos-Contaminated Low-Level Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sited, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Regulated Asbestos-Contaminated Low-Level Waste (LANL000000029, Revision 5 [LANL 2017]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the LANL Regulated Asbestos-Contaminated Low-Level Waste meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The LANL Regulated Asbestos Contaminated Low-Level Waste is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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