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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Utah FORGE 6-3629: Application of Machine Learning, Geomechanics, and Seismology for Real-Time Decision Making Tools During Stimulation - 2024 Annual Workshop Presentation

This is a presentation on the Cutting Edge Application of Machine Learning, Geomechanics, and Seismology for Real-Time Decision Making Tools During Stimulation by the University of Utah, presented by No'am Zach Dvory. This video slide presentation, by the University of Utah, discussed the technical objectives of developing a real-time decision-making platform to enhance seismic monitoring and risk management during stimulation activities. This presentation was featured in the Utah FORGE R&D Annual Workshop on August 15, 2024.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Relating Measured Component Damage to Assessed Component Reliability in Reliability Integrity Management (RIM)

There is currently no widely agreed detailed general method for licensing a novel plant incorporating novel materials (or materials being deployed in novel environments); in many such situations, there are no directly applicable engineering code cases for decision-makers (including regulators) to rely on. It may be possible to develop an approach to licensing such a plant that is based on the Reliability and Integrity Management (RIM) approach delineated in ASME BPVC Section XI Division 2. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.246, Rev.0, endorses, with conditions, the subject portion of the ASME Code. But that portion of the ASME code is written at a very high level, and there are fundamental technical challenges associated with applying it literally to licensing a real plant. In the RIM approach, applicants need to do the following (among other things): • Allocate target reliabilities to structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that collectively support the top-level plant safety and availability objectives; • Understand failure modes of those SSCs, and the degradation mechanisms that could lead to those failure modes; • Develop and propose a program of surveillances that will identify degradation prior to failure of SSCs; • Provide a means of reporting results, taking actions for anomalous or undesirable conditions, and give the regulator assurance of continued safe operations. Applying RIM in a specific case will call for advances in the state of practice of relating physical observables to functional reliability of certain component types. Except where a given level of damage corresponds to a failed (or nearly failed) state, it is not practical to establish a precise quantitative relationship between physical observables and reliability. This paper focuses on managing risk of passive component failures based on observable damage parameters. A simple approach to cumulative damage modeling will be illustrated with a view to possible use in RIM applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

SMART Deliverable 6.1.2a: Application of the ORION tool to the IBDP Carbon Storage Site

Forecasting and managing potential induced seismic activity is one of the challenges facing commercialscale geologic carbon sequestration (GCS), as well as other geologic energy extraction and byproduct disposal technologies. Historically, the process to develop robust, science-based forecasts of induced seismicity has required an integrated effort from experts in seismology, geomechanics, and reservoir engineering to manage data, develop and evaluate models of subsurface processes, and to calibrate and interpret the results from a range of models to understand site behavior relative to prescribed standards and in the context of uncertainty in geologic characterization data, forecasting models, and operational scenario uncertainty. The Operational Forecasting of Induced Seismicity (ORION) toolkit is an open-source, observation-based forecasting toolkit that is being co-developed by two U.S. DOE-funded initiatives: the National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP) and the Scienceinformed Machine Learning for Accelerating Real Time Decisions in Subsurface Applications (SMART) Initiative. ORION is designed to provide functionality to support decision making about seismic hazard analysis and risk management for GCS stakeholders ranging from the public to site operators to expert seismologists. The tool, which is written as open-source code in the Python programming language, is composed of a desktop graphical user interface (GUI) and an underlying forecasting engine. The forecasting engine uses available reservoir properties, well and fluid injection scenario details, and observed seismic catalog data as inputs to produce a set of temporal and spatio-temporal seismic forecasts.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS2000

Design of a 2-Hour Prebreathe Protocol for Space Walks (EVAs) from the International Space Station (ISS)

The majority of extravehicular activities (EVAs) performed from the shuttle use a 10.2 psi staged decompression. The International Space Station (ISS) will operate at 14.7 psi, requiring crews to "campout" in the airlock at 10.2 psi. The constraints associated with campout (crew isolation, oxygen usage, and waste management), provided the rationale to develop a 2-hour prebreathe protocol from 14.7 psi. Previous studies on the affect of microgravity and exercise during prebreathe suggested the feasibility of this approach. Various combinations of adynamia (nonwalking subjects), prebreathe exercise doses, and space suit donning options (10.2 vs. 14.7 psi) were analyzed against timeline and consumable constraints. Prospective decompression sickness (DCS) and venous gas emboli (VGE) accept/reject criteria were defined from statistical analysis of historical DCS data, combined with risk management of DCS under ISS mission circumstances. Maximum operational DCS levels were defined based on protecting for EVA capability with two crew members at 95% confidence, throughout ISS lifetime (within the constraints of NASA DCS disposition policy JPG 1800.3). The accept / reject limits were adjusted for greater safety (including Grade IV VGE criteria) based on analysis of related medical factors. Monte-Carlo simulation was performed to design a closed sequential, multi-center laboratory trial, including the capability of rejecting the primary protocol and testing at least one alternate exercise dose, within the 2-hour prebreathe. The 2-hour protocol incorporates 0, breathing for 5 0 min at 14.7 psi, including 10 min dual cycle ergometry at 75%VO(2max). It requires an additional 30 minO2breathing during depress from 14.7 to 10.2 psi, followed by a 30-60 min suit donning break at 10.2 psi/26.5% O2. It concludes with a 40 min in-suit O2 prebreathe. The protocol would be accepted for operations, if the incidence of DCS was less than 15% and Grade IV VGE less than 20%, both at 95% confidence. The above protocol and accept/reject limits were implemented in a multi-center study.

Gernhardt, M. L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Integrated Logistics and Supportability Challenges of Sustained Human Lunar Exploration

NASA’s Artemis program plans to establish a sustained human presence on the lunar surface. The International Space Station and other space station programs have demonstrated long-duration human spaceflight operations that reuse infrastructure in Low Earth Orbit, sometimes including long uncrewed “dormant” periods. In contrast, all human exploration beyond Low Earth Orbit to date has consisted solely of relatively short sortie missions, rather than a sustained presence. A sustained human outpost on the Moon that can support month-long crewed exploration missions and be reused by multiple crews will be more challenging than past operations, particularly from the perspective of logistics, supportability, and risk. This paper examines the integrated logistics and supportability challenges of sustained human lunar exploration and provides a review of historical spaceflight experience in terms of crewed mission endurance, uncrewed duration, transportation overhead, and access to abort. Planned Artemis Base Camp crewed mission endurance is approximately 2.5 times longer than past lunar surface crewed mission endurance, but similar to the average time between resupply for the International Space Station. Sustained human spacecraft have only twice experienced uncrewed durations longer than the planned interval between Artemis Base Camp missions, and Artemis surface assets will face long uncrewed periods more regularly than any past sustained human spacecraft. Transportation of crew and cargo to and from the Moon will be more difficult and time-consuming than transportation to and from Low Earth Orbit, and crew access to abort will be more limited. The implications of Artemis lunar operations for crewed Mars mission planning are also discussed. Historical approaches to risk management—including logistics, supportability, and abort strategies—should be reexamined and re-optimized for this new mission context. Sustained lunar operations will provide a valuable proving ground for testing new approaches to crewed space exploration.

logistics↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Integrated Logistics and Supportability Challenges of Sustained Human Lunar Exploration

NASA’s Artemis program plans to establish a sustained human presence on the lunar surface. The International Space Station other space station programs have demonstrated long-duration human spaceflight operations that reuse infrastructure in Low Earth Orbit, sometimes including long uncrewed “dormant” periods. In contrast, human lunar exploration to date has consisted solely of relatively short sortie missions, rather than a sustained presence. A sustained human outpost on the Moon that can support month-long crewed exploration missions and be reused by multiple crews will be more challenging than past operations, particularly from the perspective of logistics, supportability, and risk. This paper examines the integrated logistics and supportability challenges of sustained human lunar exploration and provides a review of historical spaceflight experience in terms of crewed mission endurance, uncrewed duration, transportation overhead, and access to abort. Planned Artemis Base Camp crewed mission endurance is approximately 2.5 times longer than past lunar surface crewed mission endurance, but similar to average time between resupply for the International Space Station. Sustained human spacecraft have only twice experienced uncrewed durations longer than the planned interval between Artemis Base Camp missions, and Artemis surface assets will face long uncrewed periods more regularly than any past sustained human spacecraft. Transportation of crew and cargo to and from the Moon will be more difficult and time-consuming than transportation to and from Low Earth Orbit, and crew access to abort will be more limited. The implications of Artemis lunar operations for crewed Mars mission planning are also discussed. Historical approaches to risk management—including logistics, supportability, and abort strategies—should be reexamined and re-optimized for this new mission context. Sustained lunar operations will provide a valuable proving ground for testing new approaches to crewed space exploration.

logistics↗
NASA NTRS1999

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for calendar year 1998-a year of sharp contrasts and significant successes at NASA. The year opened with the announcement of large workforce cutbacks. The slip in the schedule for launching the International Space Station (ISS) created a 5-month hiatus in Space Shuttle launches. This slack period ended with the successful and highly publicized launch of the STS-95 mission. As the year closed, ISS assembly began with the successful orbiting and joining of the Functional Cargo Block (FGB), Zarya, from Russia and the Unity Node from the United States. Throughout the year, the Panel maintained its scrutiny of NASAs safety processes. Of particular interest were the potential effects on safety of workforce reductions and the continued transition of functions to the Space Flight Operations Contractor. Attention was also given to the risk management plans of the Aero-Space Technology programs, including the X-33, X-34, and X-38. Overall, the Panel concluded that safety is well served for the present. The picture is not as clear for the future. Cutbacks have limited the depth of talent available. In many cases, technical specialties are "one deep." The extended hiring freeze has resulted in an older workforce that will inevitably suffer significant departures from retirements in the near future. The resulting "brain drain" could represent a future safety risk unless appropriate succession planning is started expeditiously. This and other topics are covered in the section addressing workforce. In the case of the Space Shuttle, beneficial and mandatory safety and operational upgrades are being delayed because of a lack of sufficient present funding. Likewise, the ISS has little flexibility to begin long lead-time items for upgrades or contingency planning.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1992

Findings of a review of spacecraft fire safety needs

Discussions from a workshop to guide UCLA and NASA investigators on the state of knowledge and perceived needs in spacecraft fire safety and its risk management are reviewed, for an introduction to an analytical and experimental project in this field. The report summarizes the workshop discussions and includes the visual aids used in the presentations. Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) methods, which are currently not used, would be of great value to the designs and operation of future human-crew spacecraft. Key points in the discussions were the importance of understanding and testing smoldering as a likely fire scenario in space and the need for smoke damage modeling, since many fire-risk models ignore this mechanism and consider only heat damage.

Apostolakis, G. E.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Information technology security system engineering methodology

A methodology is described for system engineering security into large information technology systems under development. The methodology is an integration of a risk management process and a generic system development life cycle process. The methodology is to be used by Security System Engineers to effectively engineer and integrate information technology security into a target system as it progresses through the development life cycle. The methodology can also be used to re-engineer security into a legacy system.

Security risk analysis system engineering↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber Risk Considerations for Nuclear Digital I&C Systems

Many engineers and scientists researching modeling and analysis methods for nuclear energy advancement are focused on proof-of-concept and early-stage development for new reactor designs. Since instrumentation and control (I&C) systems are traditionally developed later in the systems engineering lifecycle, researchers may be unfamiliar with modern digital technology used in these I&C systems. It is even more likely that they are unfamiliar with the cyber risks associated with them. This paper provides a brief overview of nuclear digital I&C systems before examining the importance of cyber risk management at nuclear reactors and the benefits of including Cyber-Informed Engineering throughout the systems engineering lifecycle. The primary goal is for engineers and scientists to develop a mindset that incorporates cybersecurity as another discipline alongside safety when designing and developing new technologies, regardless of technology readiness level.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Autonomous System Subversion Tactics: Prototypes and Recommended Countermeasures

One of the fielding requirements for Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (AR/SMR) is the ability to support remote and autonomous operations. Autonomous Control Systems (ACS) are found on platforms such as Autonomous Space Vehicles, Cruise Missiles, and advanced driver-assistance systems. Each of these ACS implementations depends upon a set of decision support subsystems responsible for supporting Autonomous Mission Managers (names vary based upon field and author preferences). These Autonomous Mission Managers receive inputs from system sensors (e.g., LIDAR collection from an automobile travelling down a street; transients from a nuclear reactor), and perform a set of classifications (e.g., Red Traffic Light; Small Pedestrian at 10m; Load Rejection; Single Coolant Pump Trip), and then use these classifications in combination with recommendation algorithms to achieve platform goals (e.g., Stop the Vehicle at the Traffic Light, Avoid the Small Pedestrian; Trip the Reactor to prevent a Safety Event). The design, implementation, and fielding of an ACS capability will alter the cyber-attack surface such that existing risk management plans will need to be updated to include how to protect and defend against data-science and decision-support-system attack classes. These attack classes would include protection of the design and training environments where algorithm selection and testing and training data would be obvious attack vectors. These attack classes would also require an informed set of detection and response procedures to identify anomalous behaviors and document best practices for anomaly assessment and vulnerability mitigation and remediation. Last year we published a Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for AR/SMRs along with a companion publication on Cyber Attack and Defense Use Cases. The focus of the methodology was on describing and enumerating ACS processes, components, and functions such that security engineers could: evaluate subversion options against the target; identify threat actor attributes and capabilities derived from each subversion option; and identify security controls and response countermeasures. The Use Cases document offered detailed methodology examples including an assessment of a Military Base SMR, an Autonomous System Decision Loop, and implementation of AR/SMR Machine Learning algorithms. Our proposal at the end of last year was to focus on implementation of subversion prototypes related to the last Use Case area: AR/SMR Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms. We included six attack scenarios in our Use Cases paper: a Poisoning Attack against ML functions implemented using an FPGA; a Trojaning Attack against ML classifiers exploiting the excitability of Nuclear Engineers; a Backdooring Attack against ML Training environments to ensure persistence of an attack vector; a False Positive Evasion Attack against multi-factor Access Control Systems using clever inputs; an Inference Attack against ML models by an Insider with access to the Operational environment; and an Adversarial Reprogramming Attack against a Material Access Control Video Surveillance System. At the beginning of this year these six attack scenarios were provided to our research teams at Georgia Tech and Idaho State University and each team successfully implemented a subversion attack against a ML implementation to include transient misclassifications. While this is a notable outcome from this type of research, this paper offers the reader insight into not only how to structure and execute these types of attacks, but into the thought process behind how the researcher investigated the problem space, performed initial algorithm implementation, and the trial-and-error behind arriving at the successful subversion prototypes. We include in this paper a set of associated Scenarios on how these subversion prototypes could be implemented and an initial set of guidance for AR/SMR architects, Nuclear Regulators, and Cyber Defenders to implement awareness and defense capabilities into their current operational portfolios.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Software Bill of Materials in the Nuclear Industry

Nuclear power plants (NPP) have thousands of digital assets throughout their facility. Typically, NPPs have asset and configuration management programs that capture the make, model, and version of a component. This information, however, usually only includes first- or second-tier components and does not capture the complete enumeration of software components and their dependencies within operational technology (OT) equipment. As seen with recent cyberattacks, this level of detail is insufficient for identifying if and where an exploitable vulnerability exists within a facility. A software bill of materials (SBOM) provides this detailed enumeration. Further, integrating SBOMs with vulnerability data sources and vulnerability attestation reports can provide improved awareness leading to better cyber risk management and incident response. Preferably, SBOMs are provided by the supplier; however, when an NPP already owns a device, it is less likely they will have a supplier provided-SBOM. Fortunately, SBOMs can be generated on installed digital assets. This paper provides an introduction to the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy paper titled “Towards Software Bill of Materials in the Nuclear Industry,” which describes the SBOM ecosystem and provides a suggested approach to methodically and seamlessly integrate an SBOM program in an NPP.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Method for Validating Causal Diagrams of Human Health Risk in Space Flight

The complexity of cause-and-effect relationships between spaceflight hazards and resulting health conditions clouds understanding of the totality of human system risk in space. In response, NASA has introduced Directed Acyclic Graphs (causal diagrams) into the human systems risk management process. These diagrams allow for a common understanding of the mechanisms that lead from unique hazards of spaceflight to the health outcomes important to agencies and astronauts. However, the paucity of available biomedical data from spaceflight creates a need for methods of validating causal models that can accommodate data from spaceflight model analogs. Here we outline one approach utilizing open-access rodent bone datasets from the Ames Life Sciences Data Archive. The properties of directed acyclic graphs themselves can provide an epistemological and statistical framework for validation of a priori causal representations of human system risk in space flight. The assumed causal connections on the graph creates sets of logical implications: variables that – if the causal diagram is correct – should be correlated, as well as sets that should be conditionally independent. By testing these implied correlations and conditional independencies both statistically and heuristically, we can provide evidence for or against specific causal pathways on the causal diagram. In addition to validation of expert-generated causal diagrams, machine learning techniques can learn the most likely structure of a causal diagram from a given dataset. Comparison with and reconciliation between machine-learned causal diagrams and expert-generated diagrams is another technique for challenging assumptions and improving our understanding of causal mechanisms. Accurately representing complex causation is essential to systemic understanding of human health risks in space travel. Having a robust system of validating causal diagrams helps us arrive at more accurate representations of causal systems. This process will be integral to developing the countermeasures necessary for extended exploration of the moon and Mars.

Robert Reynolds↗
NASA NTRS1999

Mars 2001 Cruise Phase Radiation Measurments

Mars 2001 presents an exciting opportunity for advances in radiation risk management of a future human mission to Mars. The mission timing is particularly fortuitous, coming just after solar maxinuun, when there will be a high probability to observe significant solar particle events (SPEs). A major objective of this mission is to characterize the Martian radiation environment to support future human missions to Mars. In addition, the MARIE instruments on the Lander and Orbiter, designed to measure the energetic particle flux at Mars, can be used during the cruise phase to provide multipoint observations of SPEs in the critical region of the heliosphere (1 to 1.5 AU) needed to reduce the in-flight radiation risk to a future Mars-bound crew.

Turner, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Ares Launch Vehicles Lean Practices Case Study

The Ares launch vehicles team, managed by the Ares Projects Office (APO) at NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, has completed the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle System Requirements Review and System Definition Review and early design work for the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle. This paper provides examples of how Lean Manufacturing, Kaizen events, and Six Sigma practices are helping APO deliver a new space transportation capability on time and within budget, while still meeting stringent technical requirements. For example, Lean philosophies have been applied to numerous process definition efforts and existing process improvement activities, including the Ares I-X test flight Certificate of Flight Readiness (CoFR) process, risk management process, and review board organization and processes. Ares executives learned Lean practices firsthand, making the team "smart buyers" during proposal reviews and instilling the team with a sense of what is meant by "value-added" activities. Since the goal of the APO is to field launch vehicles at a reasonable cost and on an ambitious schedule, adopting Lean philosophies and practices will be crucial to the Ares Project's long-term SUCCESS.

Doreswamy, Rajiv↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA's Space Health Impacts for the NASA Experience (SHINE) Training Program – Space Radiation Curriculum

In February 2023, the Space Radiation Element of the NASA Human Research Program initiated a virtual, annual space radiation curriculum. The Space Health Impacts for the NASA Experience (SHINE) Space Radiation Didactic Curriculum aims to educate participants not only in the scientific aspects of space radiation but also in the agency’s risk management strategies. SHINE Space Radiation Didactic Curriculum combined weekly seminars by speakers from NASA, other government agencies, academia, and industry, with networking sessions designed to foster collaboration between the competitively selected participants as well as interactions with NASA scientists and HRP funded investigators. The inaugural course ran weekly from February 2023 to August 2023 and was comprised of lectures, less formal coffee hours, and office hours. Each two-hour seminar sessions hosted 1-3 presentations on topics which ranged from the space radiation environment to health effects and countermeasure to granting opportunities. All lectures were recorded and will be published on the THREE (The Health Risks of Extraterrestrial Environments) website for public access (https://three.jsc.nasa.gov/). As a course requirement, participants developed individual or collaborative beam time proposals for real, proposed, or potential experiments at the NASA Space Radiation Laboratory (NSRL) at the Brookhaven National Laboratory. For the 2023 course, 25 participants were selected from a total of 59 applicants. Selected participants were citizens from 8 countries and comprised 5 graduate students, 4 postdocs, 11 scientists and 5 professors/medical doctors. Participants had a wide range of expertise including molecular and cellular biology, microbiology, botany, physiology, engineering, physics, aerospace medicine, planetary science, biostatistics, and modeling. The second annual SHINE training program is scheduled from February to August 2024. In addition, a separate SHINE Space Radiation Practicum session will be held in Fall 2024 at the NSRL. The SHINE Space Radiation Practicum is a unique opportunity that has not been available to the public since the closure of the NASA Space Radiation Summer School in 2017 and will allow a small cohort of participants competitively selected in Fall 2023 to gain hands-on radiation experience.

SHINE↗
DOE OSTI2025

A pronounced decline in northern vegetation resistance to flash droughts from 2001 to 2022

Climate change has led to the transition of droughts into rapid and intensified phenomena known as flash droughts, presenting considerable challenges for risk management, particularly concerning their impact on ecosystem productivity. Quantifying the ecosystem’s capacity to maintain productivity during flash droughts, referred to as ecosystem resistance, is crucial to assess drought impacts. However, it remains uncertain how the resistance of ecosystem productivity to flash drought changes over time. Here we show that vegetation resistance to flash droughts declines by up to 27% (±5%) over the Northern Hemisphere hotspots during 2001-2022, including eastern Asia, western North America, and northern Europe. The notable decline in vegetation resistance is mainly attributed to increased vapour pressure deficit and temperature, and enhanced vegetation structural sensitivity to water availability. Flash droughts pose higher ecological risks than slowly-developing droughts during the growing seasons, where ecosystem productivity experiences faster decline rates with a shorter response time. Our results underscore the limited ecosystem capacity to resist flash droughts under climate change.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA Applications and Lessons Learned in Reliability Engineering

Since the Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986, communities across NASA have been developing and extensively using quantitative reliability and risk assessment methods in their decision making process. This paper discusses several reliability engineering applications that NASA has used over the year to support the design, development, and operation of critical space flight hardware. Specifically, the paper discusses several reliability engineering applications used by NASA in areas such as risk management, inspection policies, components upgrades, reliability growth, integrated failure analysis, and physics based probabilistic engineering analysis. In each of these areas, the paper provides a brief discussion of a case study to demonstrate the value added and the criticality of reliability engineering in supporting NASA project and program decisions to fly safely. Examples of these case studies discussed are reliability based life limit extension of Shuttle Space Main Engine (SSME) hardware, Reliability based inspection policies for Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) turbine disc, probabilistic structural engineering analysis for reliability prediction of the SSME alternate turbo-pump development, impact of ET foam reliability on the Space Shuttle System risk, and reliability based Space Shuttle upgrade for safety. Special attention is given in this paper to the physics based probabilistic engineering analysis applications and their critical role in evaluating the reliability of NASA development hardware including their potential use in a research and technology development environment.

Safie, Fayssal M.↗