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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1991

The NASA Radiation Health Program

The Space Radiation Health Program (SRHP) is defined in terms of motivation and methodology with specific reference given to the impacts of HZE particles and solar energetic particles. The biological hazards are mentioned that can be associated with the two particle types and ionizing radiation in general. The lack of data on the impact of such radiation and effective shielding countermeasures is identified as the primary motivation for worst-case assumptions. However, the resulting shielding designs can potentially overestimate the thickness by a factor of 10 and add unnecessarily to vehicle take-off mass. A space-based validation system is proposed to complement ground-based investigations of the effects of ionizing radiation in interplanetary space. The Lifesat satellite is proposed as a part of the SRHP effort to determine the requirements for protection and future shielding specifications.

Schimmerling, Walter↗
DOE OSTI2021

Normal Tissue Complication Probability (NTCP) Prediction Model for Osteoradionecrosis of the Mandible in Patients With Head and Neck Cancer After Radiation Therapy: Large-Scale Observational Cohort

Osteoradionecrosis (ORN) of the mandible represents a severe, debilitating complication of radiation therapy (RT) for head and neck cancer (HNC). At present, no normal tissue complication probability (NTCP) models for risk of ORN exist. The aim of this study was to develop a multivariable clinical/dose-based NTCP model for the prediction of ORN any grade (ORN{sub I-IV}) and grade IV (ORN{sub IV}) after RT (±chemotherapy) in patients with HNC.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
NASA NTRS2016

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) for Small Missions

Varied mission life and complexity is growing for small spacecraft. Small missions benefit from detailed hazard definition and evaluation as done in the past. Requirements need to flow from the system down to the parts level and aid system level radiation tolerance. RHA is highlighted with increasing COTS usage.

small spacecraft↗
NASA NTRS2024

High Ice Water Content in Tropical Mesoscale Convective Systems (A Conceptual Model)

The phenomenon of high ice water content (HIWC) occurs in mesoscale convective systems (MCSs) when a large number of small ice particles with typical sizes of a few hundred micrometers, concentrations of the order of 10 2 –10 3 L −1 , and IWC exceeding 1 g m −3 are present at high altitudes. HIWC regions in MCSs may extend vertically up to 10 km above the melting layer and horizontally up to hundreds of kilometers, filling large volumes of the convective systems. HIWC has great geophysical significance due to its effect on precipitation formation, the hydrological cycle, and the radiative properties of MCSs. It is also recognized as a hazard for commercial aviation operations since it can result in engine power loss and in the malfunctioning of aircraft data probes. This study summarizes observational and numerical simulation efforts leading to the development of a conceptual model for the production of HIWC in tropical MCSs based on the data collected during the HAIC–HIWC campaign. It is hypothesized that secondary ice production (SIP) in the vicinity of the melting layer plays a key role in the formation and sustainability of HIWC. In situ observations suggest that the major SIP mechanism in the vicinity of the melting layer is related to the fragmentation of freezing drops (FFDs). Both in situ data and numerical simulations suggest that the recirculation of drops through the melting layer led to the amplification of SIP. The proposed conceptual model and simulation results motivate further efforts to extend reproducible laboratory measurements.

high ice water content↗
NASA NTRS2015

Human System Risk Management for Space Flight

This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Davis, Jeffrey↗
DOE OSTI1996

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 37, No. 3, July-September 1996]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 181 Attitudes and Practices Regarding Disposal of Liquid Nuclear Waste at Clinton Laboratories in the Very Early Years: A Historical Analysis, S. H. Stow; 202 Off-Site Nuclear Emergency Management in Germany Under the Auspices of the Federal Structure, A. Bayer, S. Bittner, and H. Korn; DESIGN FEATURES: 211 Twenty-Fourth DOE/NRC Nuclear Air-Cleaning and Treatment Conference, R. R. Bellamy, J. J. Hayes, R. D. Porco, and M. W. First; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 222 Explosion in the Tomsk-7 Reprocessing Plant on April 6, 1993, M. L. Hyder, W. G. Lussie, and F. E. Witmer; 234 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 237 Assessment of Spent Fuel Cooling, J. G. Ibarra, W. R. Jones, G. F. Lanik, H. L. Ornstein, and S. V. Pullani; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 256 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 260 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1996; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 210 Tennessee Industries Week; 221 21st International Symposium on The Scientific Basis for Nuclear Waste Management; 259 IAEA Programme of Scientific Meetings for 1997; 270 PSAM 4 (International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management); 265 The Authors; 268 Errata.

05 NUCLEAR FUELS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Evolution of radiation protection for medical workers

Within a few months of discovery, X-rays were being used worldwide for diagnosis and within a year or two for therapy. It quickly became clear that while there were significant benefits, there were significant associated hazards, not only for the patients, but also for the operators of the equipment. Simple radiation protection measures were implemented within a decade or two and radiation protection for physicians and other operators has continued to evolve over the last century driven by cycles of widening uses, new technologies, realization of previously unidentified effects, development of recommendations and regulations, along with the rise of related societies and professional organizations. Today, the continue acceleration of medical radiation uses in diagnostic imaging and in therapeutic modalities not imagined at the turn of this century, such as positron emission tomography, calls for constant vigilance and flexibility to provide adequate protection for the growing numbers of medical radiation workers.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Radiological Dose Consequence Modeling Parameters for Reactor and Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities

To assure consistency between DOE and NRC safety basis requirements this ECAR documents the DOE basis requirements for dose consequence assessments in accordance with Standard DOE-STD-3009-2014. The methodology in this ECAR outlines parameters for evaluating airborne radiological releases and provides a consistent basis for assessing current and future DOE NE facilities.

73 - NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
NASA NTRS1972

Long range planning for the development of space flight emergency systems.

The importance of long-range planning for space flight emergency systems is pointed out. Factors in emergency systems planning are considered, giving attention to some of the mission classes which have to be taken into account. Examples of the hazards in space flight include fire, decompression, mechanical structure failures, radiation, collision, and meteoroid penetration. The criteria for rescue vehicles are examined together with aspects regarding the conduction of rescue missions. Future space flight programs are discussed, taking into consideration low earth orbit space stations, geosynchronous orbit space stations, lunar operations, manned planetary missions, future space flight vehicles, the space shuttle, special purpose space vehicles, and a reusable nuclear shuttle.

Bolger, P. H.↗
NASA NTRS1997

Kennedy Space Center Environmental Health Program

Topic considered include: environmental health services; health physics; ionizing radiation; pollution control; contamination investigations; natural resources; surface water; health hazard evaluations; combustion gas; launch support; asbestos; hazardous noise; and ventilation.

Creech, Joanne W.↗
NASA NTRS1998

NASA's Space Environments and Effects (SEE) Program: The Pursuit of Tomorrow's Space Technology

A hazard to all spacecraft orbiting the earth and exploring the unknown in deep space is the existence of a harsh and ever changing environment with its subsequent effects. Some of these environmental hazards, such as plasma, extreme thermal excursions, meteoroids, and ionizing radiation result from natural sources, whereas others, such as orbital debris and neutral contamination are induced by the presence of spacecraft themselves. The subsequent effects can provide damaging or even disabling effects on spacecraft, its materials, and its instruments. In partnership with industry, academia, and other government agencies, National Aeronautics & Space Administration's (NASA's) Space Environments & Effects (SEE) Program defines the space environments and advocates technology development to accommodate or mitigate these harmful environments on the spacecraft. This program provides a very comprehensive and focused approach to understanding the space environment, to define the best techniques for both flight and ground-based experimentation, to update the models which predict both the environments and the environmental effects on spacecraft, and finally to ensure that this information is properly maintained and inserted into spacecraft design programs. This paper will provide an overview of the Program's purpose, goals, database management and technical activities. In particular, the SEE Program has been very active in developing improved ionizing radiation models and developing related flight experiments which should aid in determining the effect of the radiation environment on modern electronics.

Pearson, Steven D.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Impact of Track Structure Effects on Shielding and Dosimetry

Galactic cosmic rays (GCR) consisting of nuclei of all the known elements with kinetic energies extending from tens to millions of MeV pose a significant health hazard to future deep space operations. Even half of the radiation exposures expected in ISS will result from GCR components. The biological actions of these radiations are known to depend on the details of the energy deposition (not just linear energy transfer, LET, but the lateral dispersion of energy deposition about the particle track). Energy deposits in tissues are dominated by the transfer of tens to hundreds of eV to the tissue's atomic electrons. In the case of low LET radiations, the collisions are separated by large dimensions compared to the size of important biomolecular structures. If such events are also separated in time, then the radiation adds little to the background of radicals occurring from ordinary metabolic processes and causes little or no biological injury. Hence, dose rate is a strong determinant of the action of low LET exposures. The GCR exposures are dominated by ions of high charge and energy (HZE) characterized by many collisions with atomic electrons over biomolecular dimensions, resulting in high radical- density events associated with a few isolated ion paths through the cell and minimal dose rate dependence at ordinary exposure levels. The HZE energy deposit declines quickly laterally and merges with the background radical density in the track periphery for which the exact lateral distribution of the energy deposit is the determinant of the biological injury. Although little data exists on human exposures from HZE radiations, limited studies in mice and mammalian cell cultures allow evaluation of the effects of track structure on shield attenuation properties and evaluation of implications for dosimetry. The most complete mammalian cell HZE exposure data sets have been modeled including the C3H10T1/2 survival and transformation data of Yang et al., the V79 survival and mutation data of various groups, and the Harderian gland tumor data of Alpen et al. Model results for the Harderian gland tumor data in comparison with data from Alpen et al. The Harderian target cell initiation cross section compares closely with the transformation cross section found for the C3H10T1/2 cell transformation data of Yang et al. The most notable feature of the cross sections are the multivalued cross sections for a given LET which implies the corresponding relative biological effectiveness (RBE) is dependent not only on the LET but also the ion type. This fact is at variance with the latest ICRP recommended quality factor which is a defined function of only the LET.

Wilson, J. W.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Vacuum Ultraviolet Radiation Effects on DC93-500 Silicone Film Studied

A space-qualified silicone polymer, DC93-500 (Dow Corning, Midland, MI), has been used as a spacecraft solar cell adhesive and has been proposed for use in a Fresnel lens solar concentrator for space power applications. Applications of DC93-500 for exterior space system surfaces require an understanding of its overall space environmental durability. Vacuum ultraviolet (VUV) radiation is among the space environment elements that can be hazardous to the properties of DC93-500, causing degradation in optical and mechanical properties. For materials or components that have not been tested previously for long-duration performance in space, such as DC93-500 in freestanding film form, ground laboratory testing is an important tool for assuring durability. However, differences between the space environment and ground laboratory testing environments lead to complexities in interpreting the ground test results. Two important differences between space and laboratory vacuum ultraviolet exposure conditions are irradiance spectra and light intensity. These important differences were the basis for laboratory experiments conducted to examine VUV wavelength dependence and VUV intensity dependence of DC93-500 degradation. Testing conducted at the NASA Glenn Research Center along with additional data provided through a grant with the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, has advanced the understanding of VUV effects on DC93-500 and has provided important conclusions regarding the use of ground laboratory VUV testing to predict the space environment performance of DC93-500.

Dever, Joyce A.↗
NASA NTRS2008

A New Handbook for the Development of Space Vehicle Terrestrial Environment Design Requirements.

A new NASA document entitled "Terrestrial Environment (Climatic) Criteria Handbook for Use in Aerospace Vehicle Development (NASA-HDBK-1001A) has been developed. The Handbook provides terrestrial environment information, data bases, models, recommendations, etc. for use in the design, development, trade studies, testing, and mission analyses for space (or launch) .vehicles. This document is organized into fourteen specific natural environment disciplines of which some are winds, atmospheric models, thermal radiation, precipitation-for-icing, cloud cover, atmospheric electricity, geologic hazards, toxic chemical release by propulsion systems, and sea state. Atmospheric phenomena play a significant role in the design and flight of aerospace vehicles and in the integrity of the associated aerospace systems and structures. Environmental design criteria guidelines in this document are based on measurements and observations of atmospheric and climatic phenomena relative to various aerospace development, operational, and vehicle launch locations. The natural environment criteria guidelines data presented in this Handbook were formulated based on discussions with and requests from engineers involved in aerospace vehicle development and operations. Therefore, they represent responses to actual engineering problems and are not just a general compilation of environmental data. The Handbook addresses the basis for the information presented, the interpretations of the terrestrial environment guideline given in the Handbook, and its application to the development of aerospace vehicle design requirements. Specific examples of the Handbook content and associated "lessons lenmed" are given in this paper.

Johnson, Dale L.↗
NASA NTRS2008

A New Handbook for the Development of Space Vehicle Terrestrial Environment Design Requirements

A new NASA document entitled "Terrestrial Environment (Climatic) Criteria Handbook for Use in Aerospace Vehicle Development (NASA-HDBK-IOO1A) has been developed. The Handbook provides terrestrial environment information, data bases, models, recommendations, etc. for use in the design, development, trade studies, testing, and mission analyses for space (or launch) vehicles. This document is organized into fourteen specific natural environment disciplines of which some are winds, atmospheric models, thermal radiation, precipitation-for-icing, cloud cover, atmospheric electricity, geologic hazards, toxic chemical release by propulsion systems, and sea state. Atmospheric phenomena play a significant role in the design and flight of aerospace vehicles and in the integrity of the associated aerospace systems and structures. Environmental design criteria guidelines in this document are based on measurements and observations of atmospheric and climatic phenomena relative to various aerospace development, operational, and vehicle launch locations. The natural environment criteria guidelines data presented in this Handbook were formulated based on discussions with and requests from engineers involved in aerospace vehicle development and operations. Therefore, they represent responses to actual engineering problems and are not just a general compilation of environmental data. The Handbook addresses the basis for the information presented, the interpretations of the terrestrial environment guideline given in the Handbook, and its application to the development of aerospace vehicle design requirements. Specific examples of the Handbook content and associated "lessons lenmed" are given in this paper.

Johnson, Dale L.↗
NASA NTRS2016

NASA Human System Risk Assessment Process

NASA utilizes an evidence based system to perform risk assessments for the human system for spaceflight missions. The center of this process is the multi-disciplinary Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The HSRB is chartered from the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) at NASA Headquarters. The HSRB reviews all human system risks via an established comprehensive risk and configuration management plan based on a project management approach. The HSRB facilitates the integration of human research (terrestrial and spaceflight), medical operations, occupational surveillance, systems engineering and many other disciplines in a comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB considers all factors that influence human risk. These factors include pre-mission considerations such as screening criteria, training, age, sex, and physiological condition. In mission factors such as available countermeasures, mission duration and location and post mission factors such as time to return to baseline (reconditioning), post mission health screening, and available treatments. All of the factors influence the total risk assessment for each human risk. The HSRB performed a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30, where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research and, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit for 6 and 12 months, deep space for 30 days and 1 year, a lunar mission for 1 year, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary two-page assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence of that risk, available risk mitigations, traceability to the Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS) and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the Human Research Program, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets to provide the most economical and timely mitigations. The risk assessments were completed for the 6 DRMs and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB reviews each risk at least annually or when new evidence/information is available that adds to the body of evidence. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Francisco, D.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Cassini’s Grand Finale – Attitude Control Subsystem Performance During Proximal Ring Plane Crossings

On April 22nd, 2017, the Cassini spacecraft made its final close targeted flyby of Titan, placing Cassini in the gap between Saturn and its innermost D-ring for the first time ever of its mission at Saturn. Cassini proceeded to fly through this region 22 times, and on September 15th, 2017, Cassini plunged into Saturn’s atmosphere, concluding a remarkable, nearly 20-year mission. The attitude control subsystem performance during these 22 “proximal” orbits exceeded expectations. Prior to the proximal orbits mission, the effects of dust hazards, Saturn atmospheric drag torque on Cassini’s control authority, radiation on the sensitive instruments, bright body interferences to the star tracker, pointing discrepancies caused by trajectory deviations, and possible fault protection scenarios were assessed. This paper discusses the results of these risks experienced by the attitude control subsystem over the proximal orbits mission, any interesting telemetry observed, as well as any last minute procedural changes implemented along the way.

Sung, Tina S.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Accelerating Nuclear Facility Mission Completion Through an Improved Chemical Hazard Control Strategy - 20460

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗