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At least 559 records · Page 31

Hydropower Black Start: A Guidebook for Retrofitting Grid Dependent Hydropower

Not all United States (US) hydropower plants were designed to provide black start, but they are increasingly needed to uphold resilience in the evolving electric grid. This guidance is designed to help understand the minimal retrofits required for grid dependent hydropower (GDH) plants behind the point of interconnection (POI). For distribution connected hydropower plants or those with dedicated cranking paths, such upgrades can be sufficient for the plant to provide black start. For others, more coordination with the transmission system operator will be needed. This guidebook answers a number of questions relevant to retrofitting hydropower plants with black start capabilities. For example, the guidebook answers: • How flexible do the wicket gate controls need to be? • Who needs to do hydro governor model validation, why, and how? • How robust and flexible do the excitation and AVR controls need to be? • What protection settings need to be adjusted? • What relay(s) will need to be bypassed or overridden and at what risk? • What is the electrical energy demand of the station load or auxiliary power systems? • What should the strategy to energize transformer(s) along cranking path to address inrush currents be? • How should the critical load restoration be sequenced? In addition to outlining the specifications that hydropower plants need to meet for each component to be able to perform black start, this guidebook provides a set of case studies for specific upgrades needed at actual plants. Between the case studies of plants that have already performed black start retrofits and the examples of how this guidebook can be applied to scope future retrofits, five key themes have been identified for retrofit needs. 1. Protection needs “black start” mode: hydropower plants that are not designed with black start capabilities will have protections that prevent them from interconnecting to a “dead bus.” These protections will need to be overridden in every retrofit case and a separate black start mode should be established so that operators can safely switch between black start and grid connected modes, minimizing the risk to the plant. 2. Wicket gates need modern controls: digital governors accelerate the parameter tuning process and gate position sensors improve controllability, so plants with mechanical governors should be upgraded. Furthermore, a black start and islanding mode should be established for controls to maximize plant performance. 3. Robust excitation support: the DC system or excitation generator needs to be reliable enough to form and sustain the rotor electromagnetic field. These systems are typically undersized in plants that were not designed for black start, so they will need to be upgraded. 4. Turbine-governor model validation and operator training: validation of a standard hydro governor model is needed to characterize the dynamic response (i.e., inertial and primary frequency response) of the GDH. This is required for control development and old hydropower plants often have outdated or incorrect models. Operator training is also typically required to ensure the hardware retrofits are utilized correctly during the black start process. 5. Transformer and cranking path energization: any upgradation and control adjustment in front of the POI will depend upon the existing interconnection. Coordination with the transmission or distribution operator may be required.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

Persistence of bacterial-mediated anti-rotifer protection in preliminary outdoor cultivation trial for Microchloropsis salina

Outdoor algal cultivation systems are susceptible to a wide variety of deleterious species. In previously published studies, we observed protection using microbial consortia at laboratory scale cultures; Microchloropsis salina in the presence of microbial consortia were protected from grazing from the marine rotifer, Brachionus plicatilis. Our objective for the present work was to determine if this protection conferred by microbial consortia in controlled laboratory experiments would persist in an open, outdoor multi-liter cultivation system. We found that algal protection did persist as evidenced by the presence of fewer motile rotifers and decreased rotifer-associated egg counts for the consortia-treated outdoor cultures. Due to the low temperature and light conditions that reduced growth of the algae outdoors, we performed an indoor laboratory assay which also confirmed the persistence of algal protection. Lastly, the lower numbers of motile rotifers and fewer rotifer-associated eggs in the consortia-treated algal cultures suggests a possible protective mechanism by the consortia through interfering with the rotifer lifecycle or reproduction. Finally, these initial results support the possibility that low cost, prophylactic treatments with microbial consortia can protect algae from deleterious species in outdoor cultivation systems.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

MARVEL Instrumentation, Control, and Software Considerations

This paper details the various I&C considerations and design decisions made throughout the MARVEL (Micro-reactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation) project, including sensor and actuator selection, safety-related functionality, digital control hardware and software, and testing methodologies. Key challenges such as managing radiation, temperature, and space constraints are discussed, along with the trade-offs between using standard equipment and custom solutions. The successful integration of off-the-shelf components, the emphasis on minimizing safety-related instrumentation, and the lessons learned from prototyping and testing are highlighted. The authors aim to provide insights that can benefit future micro-reactor designs and emphasize the importance of real-world testing in advancing reactor technology.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

Systems and methods for controlling electrical grid resources

The present invention relates to PMU-based control systems for dampening inter-area oscillations in large-scale interconnected power systems or grids to protect against a catastrophic blackout. The control systems receive phasor measurements from two or more locations on an AC transmission line and generates a power control command to a power resource on the grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Mineral protection of soil carbon counteracted by root exudates [Root exudates counteract mineral control on soil carbon turnover]

Multiple lines of existing evidence suggest that climate change enhances root exudation of organic compounds into soils. Recent experimental studies show that increased exudate inputs may cause a net loss of soil carbon. This stimulation of microbial carbon mineralization (‘priming’) is commonly rationalized by the assumption that exudates provide a readily bioavailable supply of energy for the decomposition of native soil carbon (co-metabolism). Here we show that an alternate mechanism can cause carbon loss of equal or greater magnitude. We find that a common root exudate, oxalic acid, promotes carbon loss by liberating organic compounds from protective associations with minerals. By enhancing microbial access to previously mineral-protected compounds, this indirect mechanism accelerated carbon loss more than simply increasing the supply of energetically more favourable substrates. Lastly, our results provide insights into the coupled biotic–abiotic mechanisms underlying the ‘priming’ phenomenon and challenge the assumption that mineral-associated carbon is protected from microbial cycling over millennial timescales.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Developing and Implementing New Waste Chemistry Controls for Hanford's Double-Shell Tanks - 20041

Waste chemistry controls for the Hanford double-shell tanks (DSTs) were established in the 1980's in response to tank failures caused by stress corrosion cracking (SCC) at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The controls were established based on a combination of SRS chemistry limits and corrosion testing results. Conditions in the Hanford DSTs have changed over time, with the temperature in the majority of the DSTs dropping below 50 deg. C. Testing indicated that the original chemistry control specification and SCC testing performed in 2010 did not protect against pitting corrosion mechanisms - what is believed to have caused the failure of tank 241-AY-102. New waste chemistry controls are necessary to protect the DSTs from both SCC and pitting corrosion. Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), with input from the Tank Integrity Expert Panel (TIEP) Corrosion Subgroup (CSG), performed a statistically based investigation of nitrate and halide ion induced pitting corrosion. The investigation was intended to develop a comprehensive waste chemistry envelope that minimizes the risk of both SCC and pitting caused by halide and nitrate ions. The waste chemistry envelope needed to be robust enough to address future waste retrieval and process changes which could significantly change the waste composition of the DSTs. The experimental design allowed the statistically significant ions and their effect on pitting corrosion to be determined. SRNL developed the 'pitting factor' which is an empirical relationship between the statistically significant inhibitive species (hydroxide, and nitrite), and pitting inducing species (nitrate, chloride, and fluoride). The coefficients are weighted factors that show the degree of influence the species have on the propensity for pitting. New waste chemistry control limits were recommended by SRNL, and concurred with by the TIEP CSG, that incorporated the pitting factor along with other limits. The controls developed to reduce the risk of pitting corrosion were evaluated to determine if they also protected against SCC. Hundreds of test results were reviewed and compared against the proposed limits. With the exception of one test result, instances where cracking was observed corresponded to chemistry that was outside of the proposed limits - indicating that the chemistry controls developed for pitting also adequately addressed SCC concerns. Existing tank composition estimates were evaluated against the new chemistry controls - three current tank chemistries are suspect, and may not meet the new chemistry control requirements. These included the interstitial liquid (liquid associated with solids) of DSTs 241-AN-102, 241-AN-106, 241-AN-107, and 241-AY-101. Measures are ongoing to evaluate the tanks with the suspect chemistry. These include varying combinations of: performing additional evaluations (history of use, modeling); DST specific laboratory testing; and, pursuing core samples of the DSTs. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Tier 2 Safety Basis Document: Weapons and Complex Integration - Building 225

This Safety Basis Document (SBD) covers operations in the Weapons and Complex Integration (WCI) Building 225 (B225) facility. B225 is located in the southwestern quadrant of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and is operated and owned by WCI. This SBD satisfies the requirements of LLNL ES&H Manual Document 3.1, Nonnuclear Safety Basis Program (Ref. 2). B225 is classified as a Low Hazard Facility based on the inventory of radiological materials. Other hazards in B225: chemicals, radiation generating devices, and industrial hazards are managed at the Light Science and Industry (LSI) level. Biological and explosive hazards are not authorized in B225. There are four general Administrative Controls (ACs) identified as the B225 Operational Safety Requirements (OSRs). These administrative controls are deemed sufficient to ensure safe operations with respect to co-located workers and the public. Other safety features and administrative requirements are required by the LLNL ES&H Manual, including those to protect the facility workers and the environment, but these have not been selected as credited controls to protect the co-located workers or the public, which are the target populations of concern for the SBD.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Optimized Highly Efficient SSCB Using Organic Substrate Packaging for Electric Vehicle Applications

Solid State Circuit Breakers (SSCBs) are an attractive protection solution for their arcless current interruption and fast actuation speeds over mechanical breakers. This paper proposes a Bidirectional SSCB (BSSCB) with a thermally defined and digitally controlled current time profile for fault protection in EV and other low-voltage DC systems. The paper proposes an organic packaging approach utilizing flex circuitry to develop a reliable, cost-effective power module for BSSCBs. The paper studies transient heat transfer in the power modules using finite element analysis (FEA). An RC themal ladder network is extracted to define a fusing curve. To demonstrate and verify the design, a 1kV/50 A SiC MOSFET BSSCB prototype is fabricated and tested, having a power density of 60 W/cm3 and 4x reduction in form factor over presently researched breakers. Also, given are results for 750 V/150 A operation showing interruption in 2.4 μs.

organic power packaging↗

Corrosion Protection of Phenolic-Epoxy/Tetraglycidyl Metaxylediamine Composite Coatings in a Temperature-Controlled Borax Environment

The failure behavior for two kinds of phenolic-epoxy/tetraglycidyl metaxylediamine composite coatings in 60 °C borax aqueous solution was evaluated using electrochemical methods (EIS) combined with scanning electron microscopy, confocal laser scanning microscope, water immersion test, and Raman spectrum. The main focus was on the effect of curing agent on the corrosion protection of coatings. Results revealed that the coating cured by phenolic modified aromatic amine possessed more compact cross-linked structure, better wet adhesion, lower water absorption (0.064 mg h{sup −1} cm{sup −2}) and its impedance values was closed to 10{sup 8} Ω cm{sup 2} after immersion for 576 h, while the coating cured by modified aromatic ring aliphatic amine was lower than 10{sup 5} Ω cm{sup 2}. The corrosion mechanism of the two coatings is discussed.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Sintering Mechanism of Pt/Al 2 O 3 in Complex Emission Gases Elucidated via In Situ Environmental STEM

Emission control catalysts are crucial for protecting human health by preventing the release of harmful gases and unburnt fuel into the atmosphere. These catalysts often face deactivation through sintering processes in high-temperature, chemically reactive environments containing multiple gas species. Here, we use in situ environmental scanning transmission electron microscopy to monitor the sintering behavior and transient morphologies of Pt/Al 2 O 3 in various relevant gas environments through controlled experiments. Our results reveal the particle migration and atomic ripening behavior of Pt/Al 2 O 3 at the atomic scale in the presence of water vapor and oxygen, which differs from behaviors observed in single gas environments. We identify an atomic ripening mechanism involving the dissociation and migration of Pt adatom chains from Pt nanoparticles, observed only in combinational gases. Finally, these findings provide valuable insights into catalyst degradation behavior in complex gas environments.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

First-of-a-Kind Risk-Informed Digital Twin for Operational Decision Making

A digital twin (DT) is a digital model or a collection of models of a physical entity. DTs in the nuclear arena can be used from plant design through decommissioning. Decisions are typically a priori or made offline. Risk-informed decision making is identifying what can go wrong, its frequency, and the consequences of its failure. Ideally risk-informed decision making reflects the current state of the plant and provides a decision in real time. Traditionally, probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) evaluate the failures of safety systems, the risk of core damage, and the offsite dose as the consequence. However, this DT evaluates the decisions on the control side rather than the protection side. It uses the same risk methods to probabilistically inform the decision-making process but in a different way. Rather than evaluating the risk of core damage, this DT evaluates the likelihood of avoiding a trip set point while maintaining plant safety. Performance-based assessments are identified via its probabilistic evaluation of operational alternatives based on system status. Because the purpose of the control system is to maintain system variables within prescribed operating ranges, upsets or challenges that can exceed a trip set point resulting in a plant transient and a challenge to plant mitigating systems based on actual plant conditions, are evaluated to safely maintain the plant within the operating ranges. The probabilistic portion of the model is autonomously and automatically adjusted, and the metric of interest (i.e. likelihood of avoiding a trip set point) is recalculated. The digital representation of the physical system (i.e. the DT) performs a deterministic performance–based assessment of the probabilistically identified alternatives identified to validate the probabilistic assessment. A decision-making algorithm selects the appropriate option based on the probabilistic and deterministic assessments and transmits a control signal to a component(s) to initiate a corrective action or informs an operator of its decision.

digital twin↗

HC-NIDS: signatures and simulations for detecting cyber-attacks aiming to cause damage against cyber-physical energy systems

Physical device safety is typically implemented locally using embedded controllers, while operations safety is primarily performed in control centers. Safe operations can be enhanced by correct design of device-level control algorithms, and protocols, procedures and operator training at the control-room level, but all can fail. Moreover, these elements exchange data and issue commands via vulnerable communication layers. In order to secure these gaps and enhance operational safety, we believe monitoring of command sequences must be combined with an awareness of physical device limitations and automata models that capture safety mechanisms. One way of doing this is by leveraging specification-based intrusion detection to monitor for physical constraint violations. The method can also verify that physical infrastructure state is consistent with monitoring information and control commands exchanged between field devices and control centers. This additional security layer enhances protection from both outsider attacks and insider mistakes. We implemented specification-based SCADA command analyzers using physical constraint algorithms directly in the Bro framework and Broccoli APIs for three separate scenarios: a water heater, an automated distribution system, and an over-current protection scheme. To accomplish this, we added low-level analyzers capable of examining control system-specific protocol packets for both Modbus TCP and DNP3, and also higher-level analyzers able to interpret device command and data streams within the context of each device's physical capabilities and present operational state. Thus the software that we are making available includes the Bro/Broccoli scripts for these three scenarios, as well as simulators, written in C, of those scenarios that generate sample traffic that is monitored by the Bro/Broccoli scripts. In addition, we have also implemented systems to directly pull cyber-physical information from the OSIsoft PI historian system. We have included the Python scripts used to perform that monitoring.

Source record↗

HC-NIDS: signatures and simulations for detecting cyber-attacks aiming to cause damage against cyber-physical energy systems

Physical device safety is typically implemented locally using embedded controllers, while operations safety is primarily performed in control centers. Safe operations can be enhanced by correct design of device-level control algorithms, and protocols, procedures and operator training at the control-room level, but all can fail. Moreover, these elements exchange data and issue commands via vulnerable communication layers. In order to secure these gaps and enhance operational safety, we believe monitoring of command sequences must be combined with an awareness of physical device limitations and automata models that capture safety mechanisms. One way of doing this is by leveraging specification-based intrusion detection to monitor for physical constraint violations. The method can also verify that physical infrastructure state is consistent with monitoring information and control commands exchanged between field devices and control centers. This additional security layer enhances protection from both outsider attacks and insider mistakes. We implemented specification-based SCADA command analyzers using physical constraint algorithms directly in the Bro framework and Broccoli APIs for three separate scenarios: a water heater, an automated distribution system, and an over-current protection scheme. To accomplish this, we added low-level analyzers capable of examining control system-specific protocol packets for both Modbus TCP and DNP3, and also higher-level analyzers able to interpret device command and data streams within the context of each device's physical capabilities and present operational state. Thus the software that we are making available includes the Bro/Broccoli scripts for these three scenarios, as well as simulators, written in C, of those scenarios that generate sample traffic that is monitored by the Bro/Broccoli scripts. In addition, we have also implemented systems to directly pull cyber-physical information from the OSIsoft PI historian system. We have included the Python scripts used to perform that monitoring.

Source record↗

Modeling Framework for Data Center

This chapter highlights the critical need for advanced modeling of data centers due to their rapidly increasing energy consumption and impact on grid reliability. Driven by the demand for AI applications, data centers are projected to consume a significant portion of US energy by 2028, putting stress on an already challenged power grid. The chapter emphasizes the importance of "fast" time-scale models to understand the dynamic interactions between data centers and the grid, especially given the rapid power fluctuations of AI workloads. It outlines a modeling framework that includes both offline and real-time EMT domain simulations, detailing the necessary representations for various components like utility interfaces, transformers, IT loads, UPS, cooling loads, Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS), generators, protection systems, and higher-level control systems. While standard simulation tools like PSCAD offer basic models, custom development is often required to accurately capture the unique and fast-changing behaviors of modern data centers. The chapter also discusses key metrics and test cases for validating these models, focusing on transient load responses, protection relay coordination, and demand flexibility. Finally, it addresses the challenges of modeling large-scale data centers, such as computational complexity and the trade-off between model fidelity and practicality, suggesting hybrid modeling approaches as a solution. The overarching goal is to create a robust framework that helps assess data center impacts on grid stability, identify vulnerabilities, and inform the development of standards for reliable integration of these large loads into the bulk power system.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Quantum parity Hall effect in Bernal-stacked trilayer graphene

The quantum Hall effect has recently been generalized from transport of conserved charges to include transport of other approximately conserved-state variables, including spin and valley, via spin- or valley-polarized boundary states with different chiralities. In this paper, we report a class of quantum Hall effect in Bernal- or ABA-stacked trilayer graphene (TLG), the quantum parity Hall (QPH) effect, in which boundary channels are distinguished by even or odd parity under the system’s mirror reflection symmetry. At the charge neutrality point, the longitudinal conductance σ x x is first quantized to 4 e 2 / h at a small perpendicular magnetic field B ⊥ , establishing the presence of four edge channels. As B ⊥ increases, σ x x first decreases to 2 e 2 / h , indicating spin-polarized counterpropagating edge states, and then, to approximately zero. These behaviors arise from level crossings between even- and odd-parity bulk Landau levels driven by exchange interactions with the underlying Fermi sea, which favor an ordinary insulator ground state in the strong B ⊥ limit and a spin-polarized state at intermediate fields. The transitions between spin-polarized and -unpolarized states can be tuned by varying Zeeman energy. Our findings demonstrate a topological phase that is protected by a gate-controllable symmetry and sensitive to Coulomb interactions.

2D materials↗

Success of the Melton Valley Watershed Remediation at the ORNL - 12351

The source remediation of the Melton Valley (MV) Watershed at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Oak Ridge National Laboratory was completed 5 years ago (September 2006). Historic operations at the laboratory had resulted in chemical and radionuclide contaminant releases and potential risks or hazards within 175 contaminated units scattered across an area of 430 hectares (1062 acres) within the watershed. Contaminated areas included burial grounds, landfills, underground tanks, surface impoundments, liquid disposal pit/trenches, hydrofracture wells, leak and spill spites, inactive surface structures, and contaminated soil and sediments. The remediation of the watershed was detailed in the MV Interim Action Record of Decision (ROD) and included a combination of actions encompassing containment, isolation, stabilization, removal, and treatment of sources within the watershed and established the monitoring and land use controls that would result in protection of human health. The actions would take place over 5 years with an expenditure of over $340 M. The MV remedial actions left hazardous wastes in-place (e.g., buried wastes beneath hydraulic isolation caps) and cleanup at levels that do not allow for unrestricted access and unlimited exposure. The cleanup with the resultant land use would result in a comprehensive monitoring plan for groundwater, surface water, and biological media, as well as the tracking of the land use controls to assure their completion. This paper includes an overview of select performance measures and monitoring results, as detailed in the annual Remediation Effectiveness Report and the Five-Year Report. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Audit Report on "Protection of the Department of Energy's Unclassified Sensitive Electronic Information"

The Department of Energy and its contractors store and process massive quantities of sensitive information to accomplish national security, energy, science, and environmental missions. Sensitive unclassified data, such as personally identifiable information (PII), official use only, and unclassified controlled nuclear information require special handling and protection to prevent misuse of the information for inappropriate purposes. Industry experts have reported that more than 203 million personal privacy records have been lost or stolen over the past three years, including information maintained by corporations, educational institutions, and Federal agencies. The loss of personal and other sensitive information can result in substantial financial harm, embarrassment, and inconvenience to individuals and organizations. Therefore, strong protective measures, including data encryption, help protect against the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information. Prior reports involving the loss of sensitive information have highlighted weaknesses in the Department's ability to protect sensitive data. Our report on Security Over Personally Identifiable Information (DOE/IG-0771, July 2007) disclosed that the Department had not fully implemented all measures recommended by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and required by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to protect PII, including failures to identify and encrypt PII maintained on information systems. Similarly, the Government Accountability Office recently reported that the Department had not yet installed encryption technology to protect sensitive data on the vast majority of laptop computers and handheld devices. Because of the potential for harm, we initiated this audit to determine whether the Department and its contractors adequately safeguarded sensitive electronic information. The Department had taken a number of steps to improve protection of PII. Our review, however, identified opportunities to strengthen the protection of all types of sensitive unclassified electronic information and reduce the risk that such data could fall into the hands of individuals with malicious intent. In particular, for the seven sites we reviewed: (1) Four sites had either not ensured that sensitive information maintained on mobile devices was encrypted. Or, they had improperly permitted sensitive unclassified information to be transmitted unencrypted through email or to offsite backup storage facilities; (2) One site had not ensured that laptops taken on foreign travel, including travel to sensitive countries, were protected against security threats; and, (3) Although required by the OMB since 2003, we learned that programs and sites were still working to complete Privacy Impact Assessments - analyses designed to examine the risks and ramifications of using information systems to collect, maintain, and disseminate personal information. Our testing revealed that the weaknesses identified were attributable, at least in part, to Headquarters programs and field sites that had not implemented existing policies and procedures requiring protection of sensitive electronic information. In addition, a lack of performance monitoring contributed to the inability of the Department and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to ensure that measures were in place to fully protect sensitive information. As demonstrated by previous computer intrusion-related data losses throughout the Department, without improvements, the risk or vulnerability for future losses remains unacceptably high. In conducting this audit, we recognized that data encryption and related techniques do not provide absolute assurance that sensitive data is fully protected. For example, encryption will not necessarily protect data in circumstances where organizational access controls are weak or are circumvented through phishing or other malicious techniques. However, as noted by NIST, when used appropriately, encryption is an effective tool that can, as part of an overall risk-management strategy, enhance security over critical personal and other sensitive information. The audit disclosed that Sandia National Laboratories had instituted a comprehensive program to protect laptops taken on foreign travel. In addition, the Department issued policy after our field work was completed that should standardize the Privacy Impact Assessment process, and, in so doing, provide increased accountability. While these actions are positive steps, additional effort is needed to help ensure that the privacy of individuals is adequately protected and that sensitive operational data is not compromised. To that end, our report contains several recommendations to implement a risk-based protection scheme for the protection of sensitive electronic information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗