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This talk provides a conceptual overview of nuclear-hydrogen hybridization, including results from a recent study evaluating the potential profit impacts of hybridizing a nuclear power plant to product hydrogen during low electricity price periods.
Development of non-power molten salt reactors (MSRs) are under consideration to further establish an MSR experience base, support the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.43(e), and provide any additional analyses needed for development of a full-scale MSR. Guidance provided in this report is based on MSRs operating with liquid fuel (i.e., fuel dissolved within a molten salt). These reactors, unless owned by the DOE or DOD, will require licensing by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff. Standard review plan (SRP) guidance for large light water reactors (LWRs) is available in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants; Light Water Reactor (LWR) Edition. However, NRC staff observed that NUREG-0800 is very cumbersome to apply to non-power reactors “because of the great differences in complexity and hazards between non-power reactors and nuclear power plants.” Therefore, a program to develop performance-based guidance applicable to non-power reactors was initiated. In 1996, NUREG-1537, Parts 1 and 2, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, was published. Part 1, the format and content guide, suggests a uniform format for presenting information in non-power reactor applications that is acceptable to the NRC staff, but conformance with the format and content is not required. Part 2, the SRP, ensures the quality and uniformity of the staff review of an application. Unfortunately, the application guidelines and SRP do not provide adequate guidance for all advanced non-LWR technologies and applications. This discrepancy eventually led to the 2012 development of interim staff guidance (ISG) for NUREG-1537, which includes criteria for describing and reviewing aqueous homogeneous reactors (AHRs). Specifically, NUREG-1537 ISG, 2012 expanded the original document to address three areas: 1. updated criteria for heterogeneous non-power reactors, 2. criteria for licensing AHRs, and 3. criteria for licensing a Part 50-licensed isotope production facility. In 2015, the US Department of Energy (DOE) opted to build on the AHR NUREG-1537 ISG experience by performing a gap analysis of the guidance that would be used to license a non-power MSR. MSRs represent one of the advanced non-LWR technologies selected by DOE for development through a multiyear cost share award with Southern Company Services. Under this Advanced Reactor Concepts 2015 (DOE Advanced Reactor Concepts [ARC] 15) award program, the DOE tasked Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to evaluate the guidance changes that the NRC may need to consider when licensing an MSR non-power reactor. ORNL staff, with support from Boston Government Services, LLC, focused on five system-related chapters in NUREG-1537 that were considered most relevant to inform the effort that would be required for a non-power MSR applicant. ORNL documented this review in a technical report, ORNL/TM-2018/834, Proposed Guidance for Preparing and Reviewing Molten Salt Non-Power Reactor License Applications (NUREG-1537). The report was subsequently shared with industry and the NRC. The 2018 review was limited in scope, focusing on key system chapters based on the expected significance of each chapter relative to expected differences in addressing advanced non-LWR technologies, specifically non-power MSRs, compared with heterogeneously fueled non-power reactors. In the ORNL report, proposed generic adaptations were suggested for the following NUREG-1537 chapters: Chapter 4, “Reactor Description”; Chapter 5, “Reactor Coolant Systems”; Chapter 6, “Engineered Safety Features”; Chapter 9, “Auxiliary Systems”; Chapter 11, “Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management” The inclusion of Chapter 11 in the previous review effort was intended to provide guidance for categorizing the waste-handling process for an MSR operating with homogenous fuel. The introductions from Parts 1 and 2 of the 2012 NUREG-1537 ISG provide guidance for the application and review of production facilities. After a period of operation, non-power MSRs with homogenous fuel will include gaseous and soluble fission products. The gaseous fission products will be collected and held for decay in an off-gas system. There might also be an initiative to polish or filter the soluble fission products in the fuel salt by some mechanical or chemical means. The treatment and handling of fission products in the non-power MSR fuel salt and the description of this process in the safety analysis report (SAR) must be very precise to avoid the waste treatment facility being construed as a co-located special nuclear material (SNM) fuel cycle facility (see Section 2.3 of this report). Subsequent to the release of ORNL/TM-2018/834, NRC staff expressed a desire to continue the regulatory gap analysis that was begun in that report. This would provide additional clarity and information addressed in certain sections of the original report, while also providing new guidance on certain topics not addressed in the original report. This revision would benefit the NRC staff reviewing applications involving non-power MSR designs and would help developers understand how the NRC staff might approach the review of such applications. The focus of this report is to provide infrastructure support to the NRC staff for the regulatory review of non-power MSRs.
Abstract The paper describes an ongoing effort in developing a declarative system for supporting operators in the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) control room. The focus is on two modules: diagnosis and explanation of events that happened in NPPs. We describe an Answer Set Programming (ASP) representation of an NPP, which consists of declarations of state variables, components, their connections, and rules encoding the plant behavior. We then show how the ASP program can be used to explain the series of events that occurred in the Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2) NPP accident, the most severe accident in the USA nuclear power plant operating history. We also describe an explanation module aimed at addressing answers to questions such as “why an event occurs?” or “what should be done?” given the collected data.
This report documents the initial findings from the Nuclear Regulatory commission (NRC)-sponsored research project Methods for Estimating Joint Probabilities of Coincident and Correlated Flooding Mechanisms for Nuclear Power Plant Flood Hazard Assessments.¹ This research project is a part of NRC’s Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment (PFHA) Research Program and will aid the development of guidance on the use of PFHA methods to evaluate infrastructure safety for existing and proposed US nuclear power plants (NPPs). More specifically, this project intends to provide technical background for the development of flood hazard curves for multi-mechanism floods (MMFs). MMFs are flood events caused by more than one flooding mechanism (e.g., flood events due to the simultaneous occurrence of precipitation-induced river flooding and storm surge).
Components in operating commercial nuclear power plants must withstand very harsh environments that include extended time at neutron and gamma irradiation, stress, and temperature, as well as possible exposure to corrosive media. The many modes of materials degradation are complex and often include synergies between multiple environmental variables and conditions that vary depending on locations and materials. Understanding and managing materials degradation is a requirement for the continued safe and reliable operation of nuclear power plants.
The benefits of using voluntary consensus standards and industry guidance documents and reports are evident in the design and licensing of the current generation of nuclear power plants. The use of voluntary consensus standards and industry guidance and reports facilitates the design and licensing of advanced reactors to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the licensing and regulation of non-light-water reactor (non-LWR) technologies. Most of the regulations, guidance, and standards applicable to nuclear power plants were developed for water-cooled plants, so they may not adequately address factors such as the coolants, materials, temperatures, operations, testing, and maintenance proposed for advanced reactors.
This report describes the development, modeling, and results of a reduced-order thermal power dispatch pressurized water reactor (RO-TPD-PWR) power plant simulator that incorporates coupled electrical and thermal power dispatch to an industrial process. The simulator is built on models that have been developed in previous work, including a Rancor Microworld model previously developed by INL and the University of Idaho [Ref] and reactor core and secondary system models that have been published previously [Ref]. The simulator also includes a scalable model of a high temperature electrolysis (HTE) system that has been developed at INL. A particular benefit of the Rancor Microworld model is that it is compatible with a human-system interface (HMI) that has already been developed by the Human System Simulation Laboratory (HSSL) at INL that can emulate the control room of a PWR for realistic human-in-the-loop studies with mock nuclear power plant operating procedures. The results of these human-in-the-loop tests will be compared with similar tests using a commercial full-scope generic PWR (GPWR) simulator that has been modified to include thermal power dispatch, referred to as the TPD-GPWR [ , ]. The simplicity of the RO-TPD-PWR helps to better understand and verify the results of the TPD-GPWR, which employs >1,000 variables and has much greater complexity. A second key purpose of the RO-TPD-PWR simulator is that its relative simplicity allows it scale between lab-size equipment (~100 kW) and full-scale nuclear power plants (~1 GW) by adjusting only a few parameters in the models, such as fluid masses and heat exchanger areas. The RO-TPD-PWR simulator will be used to guide the controls of lab tests, so that equipment in those tests, such as the Thermal Energy Distribution System (TEDS) and pilot-scale high temperature electrolysis (HTE) units at scales of 50-250 kW, may operate in a manner that is relevant to full-scale PWR operations.
This report documents the initial findings from the Nuclear Regulatory commission (NRC)-sponsored research project Methods for Estimating Joint Probabilities of Coincident and Correlated Flooding Mechanisms for Nuclear Power Plant Flood Hazard Assessments.1 This research project is a part of NRC’s Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment (PFHA) Research Program and will aid the development of guidance on the use of PFHA methods to evaluate infrastructure safety for existing and proposed US nuclear power plants (NPPs). More specifically, this project intends to provide technical background for the development of flood hazard curves for multi-mechanism floods (MMFs). MMFs are flood events caused by more than one flooding mechanism (e.g., flood events due to the simultaneous occurrence of precipitation-induced river flooding and storm surge). Project activities include three main tasks: Task 1—Survey of current concepts and methods in assessing MMF hazards; Task 2—Critical assessment of selected methods and approaches for quantifying probabilistic MMF hazard risk; Task 3—Development of example case studies to illustrate best practices for quantifying probabilistic MMF hazard risk The initial findings from Tasks 1 and 2 are documented in this report. Task 1 comprised a survey of approaches and methods that have been applied to understand and assess flood hazards due to MMFs. Task 2 involved a critical review of the selected approaches and methods. To that end, the scope of this report includes documentation of (1) a reconnaissance-level survey of the current state of concepts and practice for MMF hazard assessment; (2) a generalized MMF assessment framework to address the distinctions among various types of flood-forcing phenomena, flood mechanisms (grouped into three mechanism types), and flood severity metrics; (3) a wide-ranging survey of approaches and methods that have been applied to various flooding phenomena and settings; and (4) a critical assessment of MMF hazard assessment methods. Studies were identified involving MMFs related to coastal flooding mechanisms, fluvial (rivers/streams) flooding mechanisms, and associated combinations of coastal and fluvial flooding mechanisms. Studies were also identified that address MMFs involving coastal and fluvial flooding mechanisms as well as coastal flooding mechanisms along with extreme precipitation (without specific attribution to fluvial or pluvial mechanisms). The studies identified for review in this report included assessments at varying spatial scales (from local to global) with differing geographic regions of focus using both observed and synthetic data. The majority of studies identified and reviewed were site-specific assessments focusing on relatively short return periods. Studies considered a range of flood severity metrics, made differing assumptions regarding the occurrence of extrema, and used multiple statistical techniques; the use of copulas for the development of joint distributions was a particularly popular analysis technique. The literature review highlighted the differences among existing studies relative to terminology used, means of presenting results, framework and techniques employed, and level of sophistication regarding the number and types of variables considered. Despite the significant diversity in existing studies, the review identified several promising techniques that will be considered in future work under this project, including the development of joint distributions for MMFs using copula and Bayesian-motivated approaches.
Modeling and implementing fire safety for nuclear power plants is a costly activity. Because of the complexity of fire phenomena and multiple operational procedures, it is difficult to computationally provide assurance that mitigation methods are adequate for critical areas using current analysis methods in a cost-effective manner. The nuclear industry needs efficient methods to provide more accurate modeling and optimize mitigation methods to improve nuclear power plant understanding for fire scenarios. This report describes the work done over the last two year on the Fire Risk Investigation in 3D (FRI3D) software. This software simplifies the modeling process by importing existing plant models and data, incorporating a 3D modeling environment and coupling with the fire simulation software CFAST. This eliminates the manual labor and errors associated with much of the fire modeling process. The report lays out the status and path of FRID software for the Risk Informed Safety Analysis pathway of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability project at Idaho National Laboratory and industry collaborators to best help reduce costs and improve realism in fire probabilistic risk analysis.
In 2022, researchers at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) used the Accelerated and Real-Time Environmental Nodal Assessment (ARENA) cable and motor test bed to characterize spread spectrum time domain reflectometry (SSTDR) and compare the responses of an SSTDR instrument to those of a frequency domain reflectometry (FDR) instrument. Results showed both techniques could detect and locate cable anomalies such as phase-to-phase low resistance and shorts, thermal insulation damage, mechanical insulation damage, and the presence or absence of water in some conditions. The SSTDR tests used a commercial instrument provided by LiveWire Innovations Inc. This commercial instrument performed tests at 6, 12, 24, and 48 MHz bandwidth. The results of these tests were compared to FDR tests where bandwidths could be extended up to 1.3 GHz, although the best responses for cable tests were from 100 to 500 MHz. Lower bandwidth signals can propagate better along the cable while higher bandwidths have higher resolution for impedance change reflections allowing more precise indication of location and separation of anomalies. The 2022 research found that FDR responses were clearer than SSTDR and speculated that a higher bandwidth SSTDR could more successfully detect and locate cable anomalies. One advantage of the SSTDR system investigated was that it was designed for energized online use up to 1,000 volts, which may be a significant advantage for nuclear power plant use. The LiveWire SSTDR instrument is an established product in the rail and aircraft industry and updating the SSTDR hardware parameters is difficult to justify without more conclusive testing. Therefore, a software adjustable laboratory SSTDR instrument was developed by PNNL and was used to test extended bandwidth SSTDR cable tests. Within the ARENA test bed, 42 cable conditions were tested with the PNNL SSTDR, FDR, and the LiveWire SSTDR—each operating at four different bandwidths. Observations and conclusions regarding the relative performance of the three instruments over different bandwidths are note below. Responses of the PNNL SSTDR (at 50 MHz) and the LiveWire SSTDR (at 48 MHz) were similar. The PNNL SSTDR higher frequency bandwidths behaved as expected showing sharper peaks and higher noise. This validated the PNNL SSTDR as a reasonable implementation of the SSTDR technology. Lower bandwidth SSTDR responses (particularly 6 and 12 MHz) may have increased value for use within longer cables but were not particularly effective at identifying anomalous cable behavior in the 100 ft cables tested here. The higher bandwidths of the PNNL SSTDR (50, 100, 200, and 400 MHz) did not provide substantially clearer cable reflectometry responses, but having the higher frequency responses available did add to the cable test evaluation. Strong responses to shorts and low impedance faults between phases were particularly evident in the higher bandwidth PNNL SSTDR and the FDR data. Measurements were repeatable, with similar responses obtained from a thermally aged cable for tests taken a month apart. Signal noise was affected in the unshielded cable by the local in-tray cable arrangement including proximity to metal edges and rungs of the cable tray. Foam isolation of the cable from the tray metal reduced in both FDR and SSTDR responses. Cable condition monitoring in nuclear power plants will likely benefit from both more informative off-line testing methods and from the development of on-line methods for continuous monitoring of cables in use. The LWRS-funded ARENA test bed was a valuable resource for this development and direct comparison of nuclear electrical cable condition monitoring technologies. Test results are targeted to guide industry advancement of testing and monitoring tools for cable aging management.
Nuclear power plants require human actions throughout their lifecycle from design, construction, operation, and decommissioning. However, for advanced reactors (e.g., Generation IV), the reliance on human intervention in safety-related actions is expected to be reduced or completely replaced by automated actions. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Standard for Advanced Non-LWR Nuclear Power Plants requires that the impacts of all operator actions are captured and incorporated in the risk of the modeled plant. Moreover, the Modernization of Technical Requirements for Licensing Advanced Reactors requires human reliability analysis (HRA) to be included throughout all design and PRA development stages. However, due to the lack of details during the early design stages, HRA is often postponed until the design is mature enough. Conducting HRA in later design stages, though it may be adequate in capturing pre-, at-, and post-initiators comes short of informing the design itself in the iterative design lifecycle. Hence, this paper presents a framework to include HRA during the design's early stages, pre-conceptual or conceptual. The proposed framework provides a process for the removal of operator actions that do not contribute to the risk and the identification of all key operator actions that are critical to the safety of the design. The results of this framework are then used to inform the design of those safety-related operator actions to update the design further. Then, using information from the updated design, this framework can be reapplied to investigate the impact of the design update on human reliability. The PRA model of the X-energy's pre-conceptual Xe-100 high-temperature gas-cooled pebble-bed reactor (HTGR-PB) design is used to demonstrate the approach. In the pre-conceptual Xe-100 PRA model, also called Phase 0 PRA model, human actions were considered an integral part of analyzing the plant response to different initiating events. Hence, in this paper, all possible human actions in the Xe-100 PRA model are identified, analyzed, and removed to emulate a design relying only on the available automated control systems. The preliminary results of this assessment show how safe the Xe-100 design is even without crediting any human actions. The results also list necessary sequences in which operator actions are critical to the risk profile of the design.
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management of U.S. Department of Energy under Funding Opportunity Announcement Number DE-FOA-0002332 “Energy Storage for Fossil Power Generation”. The work aimed to explore and advance an innovative hydrogen energy storage system – the synergistically integrated hydrogen energy storage system (SIHES) – that has the following characteristics: • Compatible with existing or new coal and gas fuel electricity generation units, • best suited for intermediate to long duration energy storage, from 12 hours to weeks even months, and • capable of storing energy at the utility scale – hundreds of MWh to GWh energy storage with power output level in tens to hundreds of MW. Preliminary front-end engineering design (Pre-FEED) studies was carried out to develop and refine a site-specific SIHES as peaking power generation units (so named as HyPeaker) as the first market entry point, to demonstrate both the technical feasibility and the economic viability to integrate the HyPeaker “within the fence” of a fossil power plant. This specific site was TVA’s Johnsonville Combustion Turbine Plant. The HyPeaker was designed and engineered to integrate with a 60MW aeroderivative gas turbine unit already available at TVA’s Johnsonville site. This site-specific HyPeaker consists of an alkaline electrolyzer to produce hydrogen from CO 2 free electricity sources, an innovative low-cost high-pressure hydrogen storage system (Big-Ton) and the aero gas turbine to generate electricity using blend of hydrogen and natural gas. A holistic system level technoeconomic analysis tool specific to HyPeaker was developed to optimize the engineering design of the Johnsonville site-specific HyPeaker for cost and performance. The optimal design and specification of the Johnsonville site-specific HyPeaker are the following: • Alkaline electrolyzer: 3MW • Big-Ton storage vessel: 11,000kg H 2 at 3000psi. • 4-stage diaphragm hydrogen compressor: 55kg-H 2 /hr from 150psi to 3000psi. The HyPeaker is designed to provide sufficient hydrogen for 90% continuous operation of the HyPeaker. All major components have design life of 30 years. The capex of HyPeaker is estimated at $\$$7.1M. This included $\$$1.5M for the electrolyzer, $\$$5.6M for the storage vessel and compressor. The cost of aero gas turbine was included as it is already available at the site. Key findings are: • HyPeaker can be designed, manufactured, installed and integrated with the fossil power plants, with sub-systems and components commercially available on the market today, even when it is scaled up to an order of magnitude larger than the one at the Johnsonville site. HyPeaker is a technologically viable solution to cover a wide range of energy storage duration needs, from daily peaking operation to seasonal shifting for fossil fueled assets. • The cost advantage of SCCV based Big-Ton H 2 storage vessel made it possible to “oversize” the H 2 storage subsystem to achieve overall system level cost optimization. The benefits are two-fold. First, it allows to significantly reduce the capacity and cost of electrolyzer by spreading H 2 production over a much longer period of time when the fuel cost for electricity production is low. Second, it allows to balance the hydrogen production and usage shift over weeks to months to meet the peak demands. As such, the capital cost of HyPeaker system using the Big-Ton was less than half of the cost of a system with today’s steel tube based H 2 storage system. The HyPeaker has even better cost advantage Li-ion battery based energy storage system. The estimated capital cost of Li-Ion battery system would be at $\$$38M, under the same projected 20-year electricity generation profile of the Johnsonville site. This is over 5 times more expensive than the HyPeaker system. • Since industry scale energy storage systems do not have 100% energy conversion and storage efficiency, energy storage systems using fossil fuel generated electricity would increase the CO 2 emission. This is particularly the case for HyPeaker due to its low round trip efficiency. Therefore, a more sensible solution would be to the excessive or curtailed electricity from CO 2 emission free sources such as solar farms, wind farms or nuclear power plants, to produce hydrogen, and integrate them with the HyPeaker. Electricity from TVA’s nuclear power plants was used for the Johnsonville HyPeaker. • The economic viability of HyPeaker is expected to be further improved when global supply chains are taken into consideration. For the same Johnsonville site specific HyPeaker, the capex would be reduced to ~$\$$3.6M from ~$\$$7.1M, and the added LCOE is reduced to ~$\$$85/MWh. With the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, the cost of domestically produced HyPeaker sub-systems would be at the level of today’s global suppliers. Since the peaking units generally operate at peak usage period, thereby demanding higher price, the projected $\$$85/MWh LCOE would be within the realm of financial viability for utility operators.
The domestic nuclear power plant fleet has relied on labor-intensive and time-consuming preventive maintenance programs, thus driving up operation and maintenance costs to achieve high-capacity factors. Artificial intelligence and machine learning can help simplify complex problems, such as diagnosing equipment degradation, to enable more effective decision-making. Benefits will be felt not only within existing analog and digital instrumentation and control, but also work processes, the integration of people with technology, and most importantly, the business case. Together, these hold promise to make nuclear power more efficient and reduce costs associated with operation and maintenance. While the artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies hold significant promise in the nuclear industry, there are challenges or barriers to their adoption. This report outlines the those different machine learning adoption barriers (categorized as historical, technical, economic, regulatory, and user) that the industry must overcome to realize the full benefits of artificial intelligence and machine learning capabilities for long-term economic sustainability. This report also provides solutions for some of these barriers by focusing on improving the explainability of machine learning to encourage trust from the end-user. Trust and explainability are essential to machine learning adoption. This report focuses on research-developed solutions to some of these barriers while analyzing a non-safety-related system, namely the circulating water system. This system frequently experiences waterbox fouling which our models preemptively diagnoses then explains to the operator how those conclusions were reached. This report presents and discusses the inherent trade-off between machine learning performance (in terms of accuracy) and explainability, where highly accurate machine learning methods (such as deep-learning) are the least explainable, and the most explainable methods (such as decision trees) are the least accurate. In addition, explainability of artificial intelligence techniques in terms of transparency and post-hoc metrics are discussed. This report outlines the importance of data novelty and value of new information in evaluating both the explainability and trustworthiness. Novelty detection helps to establish consistency or inconsistency of the new data with respect to the training data. On the other hand, value of information could be a part of the user-centric visualization recommendation system that request additional information to be collected, thereby strengthening the machine learning outcomes. During this project, a copyrighted user-centric visualization that aligns with a human-in-the-loop approach was developed. The user-centric visualization presents different levels of information and can be tailored as per user credentials to gain user confidence. One of the salient features of the user-centric visualization is it presents machine learning methods with explainability metrics. A simplified version of the user-centric visualization was presented to 32 users with varying levels of machine learning expertise. Feedback was solicited to test the hypothesis that the app contained sufficient explainability and that the users would trust the algorithm. Overall, the app was positively received, and the hypothesis was supported. This report discusses the trust-but-verify framework – a potential approach to build user trust artificial intelligence. The framework discusses trust from the human level to artificial intelligence level. The fundamental premise of the trust but verify framework is derived from an observation of nuclear safety culture (i.e., nuclear power plant personnel do not rely on a singular source of data to make a decision). This also ties back to the user-centric visualization that presents different levels of information to achieve both explainability and trustworthiness of artificial intelligence. Even so, the adoption of artificial intelligence and machine learning in the nuclear industry faces additional barriers, namely regulatory and stakeholder readiness. To overcome these challenges, new solutions must gain regulatory approval and cater to stakeholder needs. The Nuclear Regulatory Committee has a 5-year strategic plan which prepares them for reviewing artificial intelligence technologies in licensee submissions. Early and frequent engagement with the regulator is encouraged. Additionally, artificial intelligence solutions should incorporate human-in-the-loop considerations and offer explainability. Stakeholders must prepare by hiring or training staff to adapt to advancing technology in everyday plant tasks.
Interest in embedded digital devices (EDDs) for monitoring and providing control of components is increasing and the added functionality digital brings such as diagnostics, displays, control functions is welcomed in both the nuclear and other industries. As a result, pure analog-based components continue to disappear from the industrial I&C marketplace. Equipment with EDDs, also known by related terms such as smart devices, intelligent devices, and digital devices of limited functionality, can include sensors, breakers, priority logic modules, time delay relays, pumps, valve actuators, motor control centers, and uninterruptible power supplies. Not only is equipment consisting of analog and older digital technology being replaced with commercial grade products containing EDDs, but EDDs can also be retrofitted to work with existing components. EDDs may be installed physically within a component, such as in a relay. There are also external devices that some would not consider an EDD, but that operate in almost all technical ways identically to one internal to a component such as in a valve controller. In fact, the digital portions may be located hundreds of feet from the actual component.Due to the potential of being used in an identical manner and without alteration from their application in other industries, operating experience (OpE) for EDDs may be much more applicable than in the case of other more system level devices. Clear separation and independence of functionality provided with EDDs may also allow greater applicability of existing OpE from industry for changes that can be shown not to affect its safety function. However, OpE also demonstrates issues with different conditions between other industries and nuclear power plants, such as issues with undeclared changes or undeclared digital devices and the new failure modes they may introduce, issues with the reporting of OpE in industry, and a lack of transparency into OpE for EDDs.Understanding and addressing these issues will be key in the future use of EDDs in nuclear power plants, but failure rate data is difficult to obtain for EDDs, and lessons learned from the use of EDDs are difficult to collect and identify.Key words: embedded digital device, smart device, operating experience, failure modes
Industry equipment reliability and asset management programs are essential elements that help ensure the safe and economical operation of nuclear power plants. The effectiveness of these programs is addressed in several industry developed and regulatory programs. However, these programs have proven to be labor intensive and expensive. There is an opportunity to significantly enhance the collection, analysis, and use of this information to provide more cost-effective plant operation. Additionally, there is an acute industry need to leverage advanced technology to reduce costs and improve operational effectiveness. The goal of this paper is to provide effective and efficient analytical methods and tools to support risk-informed decisions for the equipment reliability and asset management programs at nuclear power plants. This is accomplished by creating a direct bridge between component health/lifecycle data and decision making (e.g., maintenance scheduling and project prioritization). Here we are supporting typical system engineer decisions regarding maintenance activity scheduling and component ageing management. This is performed in a risk-informed context where herein the term “risk” is broadly constructed to include both plant reliability and economics. This framework combines data analytics tools to analyze equipment reliability data with risk-informed methods designed to support system engineer decisions (e.g., maintenance and replacement schedules, optimal maintenance posture) in a customizable workflow. A challenge is that the structure of this workflow strongly depends on the decision that needs to be made, the type of data available, and the constraints that need to be considered. Current methods are designed to provide specific answers to specific problems; however, these methods might prove to be inadequate even when problem settings slightly change (e.g., different types of requirements, additional dependencies between system reliability and economics). We tackled this challenge by designing framework in a flexible and modular fashion such that the user can assemble and customize his/her own workflow that integrates SSC economic lifecycle models (e.g., maintenance and replacement costs), system reliability models, and optimization methods.
Sustainability in the context of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program is the ability to maintain the safe and economic operation of the existing fleet of nuclear power plants now and in the future. It has two objectives with respect to long-term operations: (1) to provide science and technology-based solutions to industry to safely enhance the economical operation of power reactors; and (2) to manage the aging of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) so that nuclear power plants can continue to operate safely and cost-effectively.
Electrical cables are integral to power, control, and instrumentation systems within nuclear power plants (NPPs). Exposure of cable systems within nuclear containment to elevated temperatures and gamma radiation during decades-long operation of NPPs can lead to degradation of cable polymeric insulation. Prediction of nuclear cable insulation degradation is complicated as thermal and radiation stress are not additive. In this work, we explore the relative effects of simultaneous and sequential thermal and gamma irradiation on the aging of ethylene-propylene-diene (EPDM) elastomer insulation to better understand realistic scenarios of cable insulation degradation. Cable insulation samples of EPDM were subjected to up to 320 kGy of gamma radiation at a dose rate of 300 Gy/hr in two heating scenarios: (1) simultaneously aged samples were heated at 150°C during irradiation and (2) sequentially aged samples were heated at 150°C for designated durations followed by corresponding periods of irradiation at ambient temperature. The mass, tensile elongation at break, and carbonyl index were assessed to quantify aging of the polymers. The simultaneous aging scenario was found to the more severe of the two for EPDM insulation degradation.
The panel discussion titled "Innovations in Advanced Cybersecurity Technologies for Safety Systems Within Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs)" took place at the American Nuclear Society (ANS) Annual Meeting in Las Vegas on Tuesday, June 18, 2024. The session was moderated by Lee Maccarone of Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and featured four experts: Benjamin Karch from Sandia National Laboratories, Ismael Garcia from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Trevor Taylor from Paragon Energy Solutions (ES), and Forrest Shriver from Sentinel Devices.