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At least 559 records · Page 31

PU/SS EUTECTIC ASSESSMENT IN 9975 PACKAGINGS IN A STORAGE FACILITY DURING EXTENDED FIRE

In a radioactive material (RAM) packaging, the formation of eutectic at the Pu/SS (plutonium/stainless steel) interface is a serious concern and must be avoided to prevent of leakage of fissile material to the environment. The eutectic temperature for the Pu/SS is rather low (410 C) and could seriously impact the structural integrity of the containment vessel under accident conditions involving fire. The 9975 packaging is used for long term storage of Pu bearing materials in the DOE complex where the Pu comes in contact with the stainless steel containment vessel. Due to the serious consequences of the containment breach at the eutectic site, the Pu/SS interface temperature is kept well below the eutectic formation temperature of 410 C. This paper discusses the thermal models and the results for the extended fire conditions (1500 F for 86 minutes) that exist in a long term storage facility and concludes that the 9975 packaging Pu/SS interface temperature is well below the eutectic temperature.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

NEUTRONICS STUDIES OF URANIUM-BASED FULLY CERAMIC MICRO-ENCAPSULATED FUEL FOR PWRs

This study evaluates the core neutronics and fuel cycle characteristics that result from employing uranium-based fully ceramic micro-encapsulated (FCM) fuel in a pressurized water reactor (PWR). Specific PWR bundle designs with FCM fuel have been developed, which by virtue of their TRISO particle based elements, are expected to safely reach higher fuel burnups while also increasing the tolerance to fuel failures. The SCALE 6.1 code package, developed and maintained at ORNL, was the primary software employed to model these designs. Analysis was performed using the SCALE double-heterogeneous (DH) fuel modeling capabilities. For cases evaluated with the NESTLE full-core three-dimensional nodal simulator, because the feature to perform DH lattice physics branches with the SCALE/TRITON sequence is not yet available, the Reactivity-Equivalent Physical Transformation (RPT) method was used as workaround to support the full core analyses. As part of the fuel assembly design evaluations, fresh feed lattices were modeled to analyze the within-assembly pin power peaking. Also, a color-set array of assemblies was constructed to evaluate power peaking and power sharing between a once-burned and a fresh feed assembly. In addition, a parametric study was performed by varying the various TRISO particle design features; such as kernel diameter, coating layer thicknesses, and packing fractions. Also, other features such as the selection of matrix material (SiC, Zirconium) and fuel rod dimensions were perturbed. After evaluating different uranium-based fuels, the higher physical density of uranium mononitride (UN) proved to be favorable, as the parametric studies showed that the FCM particle fuel design will need roughly 12% additional fissile material in comparison to that of a standard UO2 rod in order to match the lifetime of an 18-month PWR cycle. Neutronically, the FCM fuel designs evaluated maintain acceptable design features in the areas of fuel lifetime, temperature coefficients of reactivity, as well as pin cell and assembly peaking factors. Key Words: FCM, TRISO, Uranium Mononitride, PWR

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Application of Fully Ceramic Microencapsulated Fuels in Light Water Reactors

This study aims to perform a preliminary evaluation of the feasibility of incorporation of Fully Ceramic Microencapsulated (FCM) fuels in Light Water Reactors (LWRs). In particular pin cell, lattice, and full core analyses are carried out on FCM fuel in a pressurized water reactor. Using uranium-based fuel and transuranic (TRU) based fuel in TRistructural ISOtropic (TRISO) particle form, each fuel design was examined using the SCALE 6.1 analytical suite. In regards to the uranium-based fuel, pin cell calculations were used to determine which fuel material performed best when implemented in the fuel kernel as well as the size of the kernel and surrounding particle layers. The higher physical density of uranium mononitride (UN) proved to be favorable, while the parametric studies showed that the FCM particle fuel design would need roughly 12% additional fissile material in comparison to that of a standard UO2 rod in order to match the lifetime of an 18-month PWR cycle. As part of the fuel assembly design evaluations, fresh feed lattices were modeled to analyze the within-assembly pin power peaking. Also, a color-set array of assemblies was constructed to evaluate power peaking and power sharing between a once-burned and a fresh feed assembly. In regards to the TRU based fuel, lattice calculations were performed to determine an optimal lattice design based on reactivity behavior, pin power peaking, and isotopic content. After obtaining a satisfactory lattice design, feasibility of core designs fully loaded with TRU FCM lattices was demonstrated using the NESTLE three-dimensional core simulator.

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A METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING THE DOSE RATE FOR BOUNDING MASS LIMITS IN A 9977 PACKAGING

The Small Gram Quantity (SGQ) concept is based on the understanding that the hazards associated with the shipment of a radioactive material are directly proportional to its mass. This study describes a methodology that estimates the acceptable masses for several neutron and gamma emitting isotopes that can be shipped in a 9977 Package compliant with the Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71 (10CFR71) external radiation level limits. 10CFR71.33 states that a shipping application identifies the radioactive and fissile materials at their maximum quantity and provides an evaluation demonstrating compliance with the external radiation standards. Since rather small amounts of some isotopes emit sufficiently strong radiation to produce a large external dose rate, quantifying of the dose rate for a proposed content is a challenging issue for the SGQ approach. It is essential to quantify external radiation levels from several common gamma and neutron sources that can be safely placed in a specific packaging, to ensure compliance with federal regulations. A methodology was established for determining the dose rate for bounding mass limits for a set of isotopes in the Model 9977 Shipping Package. Calculations were performed to estimate external radiation levels using the MCNP radiation transport code to develop a set of response multipliers (Green's functions) for 'dose per source particle' for each neutron and photon spectral group. The source spectrum from one gram of each isotope was folded with the response multipliers to generate the dose rate per gram of each isotope in the 9977 shipping package and its associated shielded containers. The maximum amount of a single isotope that could be shipped within the regulatory limits for dose rate at the surface was determined. For a package containing a mixture of isotopes, the acceptability for shipment can be determined by a sum of fractions approach. Furthermore, the results of this analysis can be easily extended to additional radioisotopes by simply evaluating the neutron and/or photon spectra of those isotopes and folding the spectral data with the Green's functions provided.

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International Nuclear Security

This presentation discusses: (1) Definitions of international nuclear security; (2) What degree of security do we have now; (3) Limitations of a nuclear security strategy focused on national lock-downs of fissile materials and weapons; (4) What do current trends say about the future; and (5) How can nuclear security be strengthened? Nuclear security can be strengthened by: (1) More accurate baseline inventories; (2) Better physical protection, control and accounting; (3) Effective personnel reliability programs; (4) Minimize weapons-usable materials and consolidate to fewer locations; (5) Consider local threat environment when siting facilities; (6) Implement pledges made in the NSS process; and (7) More robust interdiction, emergency response and special operations capabilities. International cooperation is desirable, but not always possible.

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THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF MATERIALS IN ADVANCED NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES FOR VARIOUS PROLIFERATION AND THEFT SCENARIOS

We must anticipate that the day is approaching when details of nuclear weapons design and fabrication will become common knowledge. On that day we must be particularly certain that all special nuclear materials (SNM) are adequately accounted for and protected and that we have a clear understanding of the utility of nuclear materials to potential adversaries. To this end, this paper examines the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing SNM and alternate nuclear materials associated with the plutonium-uranium reduction extraction (Purex), uranium extraction (UREX), coextraction (COEX), thorium extraction (THOREX), and PYROX (an electrochemical refining method) reprocessing schemes. This paper provides a set of figures of merit for evaluating material attractiveness that covers a broad range of proliferant state and subnational group capabilities. The primary conclusion of this paper is that all fissile material must be rigorously safeguarded to detect diversion by a state and must be provided the highest levels of physical protection to prevent theft by subnational groups; no 'silver bullet' fuel cycle has been found that will permit the relaxation of current international safeguards or national physical security protection levels. The work reported herein has been performed at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and is based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that are expressed in terms consistent with, but normally reserved for, the nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The methodology and findings are presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance and physical security is discussed.

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Used Fuel Cask Identification through Neutron Profile

Currently, most spent fuel is stored near reactors. An interim consolidated fuel storage facility would receive fuel from multiple sites and store it in casks on site for decades. For successful operation of such a facility there is need for a way to restore continuity of knowledge if lost as well as a method that will indicate state of fuel inside the cask. Used nuclear fuel is identifiable by its radiation emission, both gamma and neutron. Neutron emission from fission products, multiplication from remaining fissile material, and the unique distribution of both in each cask produce a unique neutron signature. If two signatures taken at different times do not match, either changes within the fuel content or misidentification of a cask occurred. It was found that identification of cask loadings works well through the profile of emitted neutrons in simulated real casks. Even casks with similar overall neutron emission or average counts around the circumference can be distinguished from each other by analyzing the profile. In conclusion, (1) identification of unaltered casks through neutron signature profile is viable; (2) collecting the profile provides insight to the condition and intactness of the fuel stored inside the cask; and (3) the signature profile is stable over time.

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235 U Determination using In-Beam Delayed Neutron Counting Technique at the NRU Reactor

This paper describes a collaborative effort that saw the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC)’s delayed neutron and gamma counting apparatus transported to Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) for use in the neutron beamline at the National Research Universal (NRU) reactor. Samples containing mg quantities of fissile material were re-interrogated, and their delayed neutron emissions measured. This collaboration offers significant advantages to previous delayed neutron research at both CNL and RMC. This paper details the determination of 235 U content in enriched uranium via the assay of in-beam delayed neutron magnitudes and temporal behavior. 235 U mass was determined with an average absolute error of ± 2.7 %. This error is lower than that obtained at RMCC for the assay of 235 U content in aqueous solutions (3.6 %) using delayed neutron counting. Delayed neutron counting has been demonstrated to be a rapid, accurate, and precise method for special nuclear material detection and identification.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Considerations for Using FGE Conversion Factors in Type A Shipping Packages at the Savannah River Site

Contact Handled-Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC) conversion factors are typically used as fissile gram equivalent (FGE) values in systems such as transuranic waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Publicly available technical justifications for CH-TRAMPAC conversion factors are lacking. Special considerations are needed to justify the use of the CH-TRAMPAC conversion factor for 235 U to 239 Pu, over the full range of Pu and U densities for Type A shipping packages in the K-Area Complex (KAC) at SRS. It is important to understand the limitations and the area of applicability for using these conversion factors.

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Preliminary design of ultra-long cycle fast reactor employing breed-and-burn strategy

A new design of ultra-long cycle fast reactor with power rate of 1000 MWe (UCFR) has been developed based on the strategy of breed-and burn. The bottom region of the core with low enriched uranium (LEU) plays a role of igniter of the core burning and the upper natural uranium (NU) region acts as blanket for breeding. Fissile materials are bred in the blanket and the active core moves upward at a speed of 5.4 cm/year. Through the core depletion calculation using Monte Carlo code, McCARD, it is confirmed that a full power operation of 60 years without refueling is feasible. Core performance characteristics have been evaluated in terms of axial/radial power shapes, reactivity feedback coefficients, etc. This design will serve as a base model for further design study of UCFRs using LWR spent fuels in the blanket region. (authors)

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Improvement of the thermal margins in the Swedish Ringhals-3 PWR by introducing new fuel assemblies with thorium

Thorium is a fertile material and most of the past research has focused on breeding thorium to fissile material. In this paper, the focus is on using thorium to improve the thermal margins by homogeneously distributing thorium in the fuel pellets. A proposed uranium-thorium-based fuel assembly is simulated for the Swedish Ringhals-3 PWR core in a realistic demonstration. All the key safety parameters, such as isothermal temperature coefficient of reactivity, Doppler temperature of reactivity, boron worth, shutdown margins and fraction of delayed neutrons are studied in this paper, and are within safety limits for the new core design using the uranium-thorium-based fuel assemblies. The calculations were performed by the two-dimensional transport code CASMO-4E and the two group steady-state three dimensional nodal code SIMULATE-3 from Studsvik Scandpower. The results showed that the uranium-thorium-based fuel assembly improves the thermal margins, both in the pin peak power and the local power (Fq). The improved thermal margins would allow more flexible core designs with less neutron leakage or could be used in power uprates to offer efficient safety margins. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Improvement of the thermal margins in the Swedish Ringhals-3 PWR by introducing new fuel assemblies with thorium

Thorium is a fertile material and most of the past research has focused on breeding thorium to fissile material. In this paper, the focus is on using thorium to improve the thermal margins by homogeneously distributing thorium in the fuel pellets. A proposed uranium-thorium-based fuel assembly is simulated for the Swedish Ringhals-3 PWR core in a realistic demonstration. All the key safety parameters, such as isothermal temperature coefficient of reactivity, Doppler temperature of reactivity, boron worth, shutdown margins and fraction of delayed neutrons are studied in this paper, and are within safety limits for the new core design using the uranium-thorium-based fuel assemblies. The calculations were performed by the two-dimensional transport code CASMO-4E and the two group steady-state three dimensional nodal code SIMULATE-3 from Studsvik Scandpower. The results showed that the uranium-thorium-based fuel assembly improves the thermal margins, both in the pin peak power and the local power (Fq). The improved thermal margins would allow more flexible core designs with less neutron leakage or could be used in power uprates to offer efficient safety margins. (authors)

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Neutronics studies of uranium-based fully ceramic micro-encapsulated fuel for PWRs

This study evaluates the core neutronics and fuel cycle characteristics using uranium-based fully ceramic micro-encapsulated (FCM) fuel in a pressurized water reactor (PWR). Specific PWR assembly designs with FCM fuel have been developed, which by virtue of their TRISO particle-based elements are expected to achieve higher fuel burnups while also increasing the tolerance to fuel failures. The SCALE 6.1 code package, developed and maintained at ORNL, was the primary software used to model the assembly designs. Analysis was performed using the SCALE double-heterogeneous (DH) fuel modeling capabilities; however, the Reactivity-Equivalent Physical Transformation (RPT) method was used for lattice calculations due to the long run times associated with the SCALE DH capability. In order to understand the impact on reactivity and reactor operating cycle length, a parametric study was performed by varying TRISO particle design features, such as kernel diameter, coating layer thicknesses, and packing fraction. Also, other features such as the selection of matrix material (SiC, zirconium) and fuel rod dimensions were studied. After evaluating different uranium-based fuels, the higher compound density of uranium mononitride (UN) proved to be favorable, as the parametric studies showed that the FCM particle fuel design will need roughly 12% additional fissile material in comparison to that of a standard UO{sub 2} rod in order to match the lifetime of an 18-month PWR cycle. Neutronically, the FCM fuel designs evaluated maintain acceptable design features in the areas of fuel lifetime and temperature coefficients of reactivity, as well as pin cell and assembly peaking factors. (authors)

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Regulatory Perspective on Potential Fuel Reconfiguration and Its Implication to High Burnup Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation - 13042

The recent experiments conducted by Argonne National Laboratory on high burnup fuel cladding material property show that the ductile to brittle transition temperature of high burnup fuel cladding is dependent on: (1) cladding material, (2) irradiation conditions, and (3) drying-storage histories (stress at maximum temperature) [1]. The experiment results also show that the ductile to brittle temperature increases as the fuel burnup increases. These results indicate that the current knowledge in cladding material property is insufficient to determine the structural performance of the cladding of high burnup fuel after it has been stored in a dry cask storage system for some time. The uncertainties in material property and the elevated ductile to brittle transition temperature impose a challenge to the storage cask and transportation packaging designs because the cask designs may not be able to rely on the structural integrity of the fuel assembly for control of fissile material, radiation source, and decay heat source distributions. The fuel may reconfigure during further storage and/or the subsequent transportation conditions. In addition, the fraction of radioactive materials available for release from spent fuel under normal condition of storage and transport may also change. The spent fuel storage and/or transportation packaging vendors, spent fuel shippers, and the regulator may need to consider this possible fuel reconfiguration and its impact on the packages' ability to meet the safety requirements of Part 72 and Part 71 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is working with the scientists at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to assess the impact of fuel reconfiguration on the safety of the dry storage systems and transportation packages. The NRC Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation has formed a task force to work on the safety and regulatory concerns in relevance to high burnup fuel storage and transportation. This paper discusses the staff's preliminary considerations on the safety implication of fuel reconfiguration with respect to nuclear safety (subcriticality control), radiation shielding, containment, the performance of the thermal functions of the packages, and the retrievability of the contents from regulatory perspective. (authors)

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Characterizing Surplus US Plutonium for Disposition - 13199

The United States (US) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM). SRNL manages a broad program of item tracking through process history, laboratory analysis, and non-destructive assay. A combination of analytical techniques allows SRNL to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that qualify materials for disposition through the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). The research also defines properties that are important for other disposition paths, including disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as transuranic waste (TRUW) or to high-level waste (HLW) systems. (authors)

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Utilization of Used Nuclear Fuel in a Potential Future US Fuel Cycle Scenario - 13499

To date, the US reactor fleet has generated approximately 68,000 MTHM of used nuclear fuel (UNF) and even with no new nuclear build in the US, this stockpile will continue to grow at approximately 2,000 MTHM per year for several more decades. In the absence of reprocessing and recycle, this UNF is a liability and needs to be dealt with accordingly. However, with the development of future fuel cycle and reactor technologies in the decades ahead, there is potential for UNF to be used effectively and efficiently within a future US nuclear reactor fleet. Based on the detailed expected operating lifetimes, the future UNF discharges from the existing reactor fleet have been calculated on a yearly basis. Assuming a given electricity demand growth in the US and a corresponding growth demand for nuclear energy via new nuclear build, the future discharges of UNF have also been calculated on a yearly basis. Using realistic assumptions about reprocessing technologies and timescales and which future fuels are likely to be reprocessed, the amount of plutonium that could be separated and stored for future reactor technologies has been determined. With fast reactors (FRs) unlikely to be commercially available until 2050, any new nuclear build prior to then is assumed to be a light water reactor (LWR). If the decision is made for the US to proceed with reprocessing by 2030, the analysis shows that the UNF from future fuels discharged from 2025 onwards from the new and existing fleet of LWRs is sufficient to fuel a realistic future demand from FRs. The UNF arising from the existing LWR fleet prior to 2025 can be disposed of directly with no adverse effect on the potential to deploy a FR fleet from 2050 onwards. Furthermore, only a proportion of the UNF is required to be reprocessed from the existing fleet after 2025. All of the analyses and conclusions are based on realistic deployment timescales for reprocessing and reactor deployment. The impact of the delay in recycling the UNF from the FRs due to time in the core, cooling time, reprocessing, and re-fabrication time is built into the analysis, along with impacts in delays and other key assumptions and sensitivities have been investigated. The results of this assessment highlight how the UNF from future reactors (LWRs and FRs) and the resulting fissile materials (U and Pu) from reprocessing can be effectively utilized, and show that the timings of future nuclear programs are key considerations (both for reactors and fuel cycle facilities). The analysis also highlights how the timings are relevant to managing the UNF and how such an analysis can therefore assist in informing the potential future R and D strategy and needs of the US fuel cycle programs and reactor technology. (authors)

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Safety Aspects of Dry Spent Fuel Storage and Spent Fuel Management - 13559

Dry storage systems are characterized by passive and inherent safety systems ensuring safety even in case of severe incidents or accidents. After the events of Fukushima, the advantages of such passively and inherently safe dry storage systems have become more and more obvious. As with the storage of all radioactive materials, the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) must conform to safety requirements. Following safety aspects must be achieved throughout the storage period: - safe enclosure of radioactive materials, - safe removal of decay heat, - securing nuclear criticality safety, - avoidance of unnecessary radiation exposure. The implementation of these safety requirements can be achieved by dry storage of SF and HLW in casks as well as in other systems such as dry vault storage systems or spent fuel pools, where the latter is neither a dry nor a passive system. Furthermore, transport capability must be guaranteed during and after storage as well as limitation and control of radiation exposure. The safe enclosure of radioactive materials in dry storage casks can be achieved by a double-lid sealing system with surveillance of the sealing system. The safe removal of decay heat must be ensured by the design of the storage containers and the storage facility. The safe confinement of radioactive inventory has to be ensured by mechanical integrity of fuel assembly structures. This is guaranteed, e.g. by maintaining the mechanical integrity of the fuel rods or by additional safety measures for defective fuel rods. In order to ensure nuclear critically safety, possible effects of accidents have also to be taken into consideration. In case of dry storage it might be necessary to exclude the re-positioning of fissile material inside the container and/or neutron moderator exclusion might be taken into account. Unnecessary radiation exposure can be avoided by the cask or canister vault system itself. In Germany dry storage of SF in casks fulfills both transport and storage requirements. Mostly, storage facilities are designed as concrete buildings above the ground, but due to regional constraints, one storage facility has also been built as a rock tunnel. The decay heat is always removed by natural air flow; further technical equipment is not needed. The removal of decay heat and shielding had been modeled and calculated by state-of-the-art computer codes before such a facility has been built. TueV and BAM present their long experience in the licensing process for sites and casks and inform about spent nuclear fuel management and issues concerning dry storage of spent nuclear fuel. Different storage systems and facilities in Germany, Europe and world-wide are compared with respect to the safety aspects mentioned above. Initial points are the safety issues of wet storage of SF, and it is shown how dry storage systems can ensure the compliance with the mentioned safety criteria over a long storage period. The German storage concept for dry storage of SF and HLW is presented and discussed. Exemplarily, the process of licensing, erection and operation of selected German dry storage facilities is presented. (authors)

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Evaluation of fuel cycle scenarios on MOX fuel recycling in PWRs and SFRs

Prospects on advanced fuel cycle scenario are considered for achieving a progressive integration of Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) technology within the current French Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) nuclear fleet, in a view to benefit from fissile material multi-recycling capability. A step by step process is envisioned, and emphasis is put on its potential implementation through the nuclear mass inventory calculations with the COSAC code. The overall time scale is not optimized. The first step, already implemented in several countries, the plutonium coming from the reprocessing of used Light Water Reactor (LWR) fuels is recycled into a small number of LWRs. The second step is the progressive introduction of the first SFRs, in parallel with the continuation of step 1. This second step lets to prepare the optimized multi recycling of MOX fuel which is considered in step 3. Step 3 is characterized by the introduction of a greater number of SFR and MOX management between EPR reactors and SFRs. In the final step 4, all the fleet is formed with SFRs. This study assesses the viability of each step of the overall scenario. The switch from one step to the other one could result from different constrains related to issues such as resources, waste, experience feedback, public acceptance, country policy, etc.

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