Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Environmental Radioactivity”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 559 records · Page 31
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Efficient Mesofluidic Separation of Large Particles in nuclear slurries - 20408

Efficient and effective particle separation is essential to cleanup of many nuclear wastes. For example, particle separation may be used to accelerate settle-decant bottlenecks that limit the throughput necessary to achieve the U.S. Department of Energy waste cleanup mission in a timely manner. Particle separation may be used to protect downstream processing equipment from pulses of solids that may be encountered near (within a few feet of) liquid-solid interfaces during waste transfer operations, thereby preventing work stoppages. Effective particle separation may permit efficient sludge washing. These are only a few of the ways in which particle separation is important. Yet, efficient and effective particle separation in nuclear processing environments remains challenging. For example, settle-decant operations permit larger and heavier particles to settle, leaving smaller, lighter particles suspended. However, settle-decant operations are slow, convection currents may resuspend solids, hindered settling of multicomponent slurries remains incompletely understood, and predictive models for settling in graduated cylinders fail to match limited observations of settling in large waste tanks. Additionally, pumping operations can cause turbulent resuspension of particles when the pump intake is close to the settled solids layer. Filtration techniques that use membranes or partially permeable barriers retain larger particles, permitting smaller particles to permeate. However, filters, including dead-end filtration, are prone to clogging and caking, operate at elevated pressures due to minimal void volume, and increase in pressure during operations, which require more control systems. Therefore, the need for high throughput particle separation techniques that operate with modest pressure drops persists. A novel mesofluidic separator presents the opportunity to effectively and efficiently accelerate the waste cleanup mission. The separator separates large particles from process streams across a broad range of particle sizes and has no moving parts or media to replace, regenerate, or clean. This separator design has an unusually large void volume, permitting operation at much higher flow rates (and lower pressures) than traditional filtration (e.g., dead-end filtration). Industrial-scale flow rates have been demonstrated. In performance testing, mesofluidic separators operate at might flow rates (>90 gpm (0.0006 m{sup 3}/s) in piping 3 inches (0.08 m) in diameter; Re>10{sup 5}), with modest pressure drop (∼25 psi (170 KPa) in testing). In complex, aggregating waste simulants, the separator loses <25% of flow projected over months without back pulsing or chemical cleaning. Mesofluidic separation presents infrastructure advantages, reduces risk, and provides mission impact. Infrastructure advantages include implementation within existing transfer systems, plug and play without facility modifications to safety systems, and operation at low pressures. The separator is flexible in location, may be positioned within or outside of waste tanks, and may replace or augment dead-end and cross-flow filters. Mesofluidic separation reduces risk by minimizing waste (no media to replace or regenerate and no cleaning chemicals to handle and dispose) and by minimizing filter change-out consistent with as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) exposure to workers. The potential mission impact of these separators is substantial. The separator has potential to support, simplify, and accelerate in-farm transfers and waste feed delivery. Furthermore, the separator can free up settling and holding tanks in the Direct Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) mission by reducing or eliminating post-transfer settling and wait times with the potential to free up 1 Mgal (4000 m{sup 3}) of double-shell tank space. This paper quantitatively compares mesofluidic separation to dead-end filtration, discusses scale-up results, and considers the separator's potential to efficiently and effectively reduce the long-term environmental ability of particulate-rich nuclear wastes. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI1995

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 36, No. 2, July-December 1995]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHORNOBYL ACCIDENT: 195 The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, Part III: Chernobyl Source Term Release Dynamics and Reconstruction of Events During the Active Phase, A. R. Sich; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 218 Second ANS Workshop on the Safety of Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants, R. A. Bari; 234 Elements of a Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, C. M. Hopper; 243 Rickover, Excellence, and Criticality Safety Programs, R. E. Wilson; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 249 Transient Analysis of the PIUS Advanced Reactor Design with the TRAC-PF1/MOD2 Code, B. E. Boyack, J. L Steiner, S. C. Harmony, H. J. Stumpf, and J. F. Lime; 278 The Hierarchy-By-Interval Approach to Identifying Important Models that Need Improvement in Severe-Accident Simulation Codes, T. J. Heames, M. Khatib-Rahbar, J. E. Kelly, R. P. Jenks-Johnson, and Y.-S. Chen; 290 RELAP5/MOD3 Code Coupling Model, R. P. Martin; 299 Missiles Caused by Severe Pressurized-Water Reactor Accidents, R. Krieg; DESIGN FEATURES: 310 Validation of COMMIX with Westinghouse AP-600 PCCS Test Data, J. G. Sun, T. H. Chien, J. Ding, and W T. Sha; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 321 Spent Nuclear Fuel Characterization for a Bounding Reference Assembly for the Receiving Basin for Off-Site Fuel, S. D. Kahook, R. L. Garrett, L. R. Canas, and M J. Beckum; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 332 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 335 Reactor Coolant System Blowdown at Wolf Creek on September 17, 1994, J. V. Kauffman and S. L. Israel; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 344 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Oueener; 349 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 320 Symposium on Acceptability of Risk From Radiation—Application to Manned Space Flight; 320 24th DOE/NRC Nuclear Air Cleaning and Treatment Conference; 361 Radiation Biology and Radiation Protection— Modern Developments and Tendencies in Radiation Biology; 362 1997 IEEE Sixth Conference on Human Factors and Power Plants; 354 The Authors; 360 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol. 36.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI1988

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 29, No. 1, January-March 1988]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT: 1 Core History and Nuclide Inventory of the Chernobyl Core at the Time of Accident by Gerald Kirchner and Cornelius C. Noack; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 6 Nonprescriptive Nuclear Safety Regulation: The Example of Loss of Offsite Power by M. W. Golay, V. P. Manno, and C. Vlahoplus, Jr., 20 Nuclear Power Safety Goals in Light of the Chernobyl Accident by C. Whipple and C. Starr; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 29 Containment Loads from Severe Accidents—U.S. Program by W. Kerr and M. K. Dey; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 36 Safety Characteristics of Modern High-Temperature Reactors: Focus on German Designs by W. Kröger, H. Nickel, and R. Schulten; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 49 Radiation Hormesis and Nuclear Safety by C. C. Congdon; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 58 Evaluation of Nonradiological Water Chemistry at Power Reactors by Harvey Zibulsky, James J. Kottan, Walter J. Pasciak, Mary Ann Castrogivanni, and Sujit Banerjee, 64 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 67 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 85 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 94 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 100 Status of Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Licensing Review Compiled by E. G. Silver, 103 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1987; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 5 Northwestern University Short Course on Radiation Safety, 28 International Approach to Nuclear Safety (After Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl), 57 RPI Short Course on Modern Developments in Boiling Heat Transfer and Two-Phase Flow, 107 20th DOE/NRC Nuclear Air Cleaning Conference, 110 Third International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Power Plant Thermal Hydraulics and Operations, 108 The Authors, 111 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 28.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Alpha Spectrometry Results for Groundwater Samples Collected in Northern Iraq and a Summary of the Environmental Setting of the Adaya Burial Site

The Radiation Protection Center (RPC) of the Iraqi Ministry of Environment continues to evaluate the potential health impacts associated with the Adaya Burial Site, which is located 33 kilometers (20.5 miles) southwest of Mosul. This report documents the radiological analyses of 16 groundwater samples collected from wells located in the vicinity of the Adaya Burial Site and at other sites in northern Iraq. The Adaya Burial Site is a high-risk dump site because a large volume of radioactive material and contaminated soil is located on an unsecure hillside above the village of Tall ar Ragrag. The uranium activities for the 16 water samples in northern Iraq are considered to be naturally occurring and do not indicate artificial (man-made) contamination. With one exception, the alpha spectrometry results for the 16 wells that were sampled in 2019 indicate that the water quality concerning the three uranium isotopes (Uranium-233/234, Uranium-235/236, and Uranium-238) was acceptable for potable purposes (drinking and cooking). However, Well 7 in Mosul had a Uranium-233/234 activity concentration that slightly exceeded the World Health Organization guidance level. Eight of the 16 wells are located in the villages of Tall ar Ragrag and Adaya and had naturally occurring uranium concentrations. Wells in the villages of Tall ar Ragrag and Adaya are located near the Adaya Burial Site and should be sampled on an annual schedule. The list of groundwater analytes should include metals, total uranium, isotopic uranium, gross alpha/beta, gamma spectroscopy, organic compounds, and standard water quality parameters. Our current understanding of the hydrogeologic setting in the vicinity of the Adaya Burial Site is solely based on villager's domestic wells, topographic maps, and satellite imagery. To better understand the hydrogeologic setting, a Groundwater Monitoring Program needs to be developed and should include the installation of twelve groundwater monitoring wells in the vicinity of Tall ar Ragrag and the Adaya Burial Site. Characterization of the limestone aquifer and overlying alluvium is needed. RPC should continue to support health assessments for the villagers in Tall ar Ragrag and Adaya. Collecting samples for surface water (storm water), airborne dust, vegetation, and washway sediment should be conducted on a routine basis. Human access to the Adaya Burial Site needs to be strictly limited. Livestock access on or near the burial site needs to be eliminated. The surface-water exposure pathway is likely a greater threat than the groundwater exposure pathway. Installation of a surface-water diversion or collection system is recommended in order to reduce the potential for humans and livestock to come in contact with contaminated water and sediment. To reduce exposure to villagers, groundwater treatment should be considered if elevated uranium or other contaminants are detected in drinking water. Installing water-treatment systems would likely be quicker to accomplish than remediation and excavation of the Adaya Burial Site. The known potential for human exposure to uranium and metals (such as arsenic, chromium, selenium, and strontium) at the Adaya Burial Site is serious. Additional characterization , mitigation, and remediation efforts should be given a high priority.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Effect of Cr(III) Adsorption on the Dissolution of Boehmite Nanoparticles in Caustic Solution

Incorporation of relatively minor impurity metals onto metal (oxy)hydroxides can strongly impact solubility. In complex highly alkaline multicomponent tank waste such as that at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, tests indicate that the surface area-normalized dissolution rate of boehmite ($γ$-AlOOH) nanomaterials is at least an order of magnitude lower than that predicted for the pure phase. In this work we examine the dissolution kinetics of boehmite coated by adsorbed Cr(III), which adheres at saturation coverages as sparse chemisorbed monolayer clusters. Using 40 nm boehmite nanoplates as a model system, temperature-dependent dissolution rates of pure versus Cr(III)-adsorbed boehmite showed that the initial rate for the latter is consistently several times lower, with an apparent activation energy 16 kJ·mol -1 higher. Although the surface coverage is only around 50%, solution analytics coupled to multimethod solids characterization reveals a phyicochemical armoring effect by adsorbed Cr(III) that substantially reduces the number of dissolution-active sites on particle surfaces. Such findings could help improve kinetics models of boehmite and/or metal ion adsorbed boehmite nanomaterials, ultimately providing a stronger foundation for the development of more robust complex radioactive liquid waste processing strategies.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 26: Risk-Based Approaches to Environmental Remediation and Adaptive Site Management

This panel discussed the needs and importance of developing risk-based approaches to environmental remediation that will enable complex sites to be adaptively managed by applying cost-effective remedies that are protective of human health and the environment. The discussion emphasized risk-based approaches within decision processes and subsequent incorporation into regulatory decision documents. Remedy approaches, remediation exit strategies, and long-term monitoring plans that support risk-based end-states for difficult-to-remediate sites were discussed Panelists with presentations: Risk-Informed Approaches to Environmental Remediation and Adaptive Site Management (Vicky Freedman); ITRC Adaptive Site Management Perspective (Michael Truex); Optimization During Operations and Maintenance Phase at the Hanford Site 200-ZP-1 Groundwater Operable Unit (Emerald Laija, Kate Amrhein, Michael Truex); Adaptive Management: EPA Overview (Benjamin Simes); Decommissioning and Environmental Remediation Section Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology (Horst Monken Fernandes)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

System Model Calculations for the Active Trenches of the Low-Level Burial Grounds, Hanford Site, Washington

Two lined trenches (Trench 31 and 34) located within the 200 West Low-Level Burial Ground (LLBG) area of the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Hanford Site are designated for permanent disposal of low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW). In accordance with DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, radioactive waste shall be managed and disposed in a manner that is protective of worker, public health and safety, and the environment. DOE O 435.1 requires a site-specific radiological performance assessment (PA) that includes calculations of potential releases and subsequent doses to members of the public for a period of 1,000 years after closure of a low-level waste (LLW) disposal facility. The purpose of this environmental calculation file (ECF) is to document the various dose calculations performed to support DOE’s LLBG PA. The dose assessments are performed to evaluate the potential exposure of an all-pathway representative person to radionuclide contaminants of potential concern (COPCs) that may be released from the LLBG Trenches 31 and 34 to the point of calculation (POC) located at the outer edge of a 100 m buffer zone surrounding the trench boundary. This ECF uses inputs from other ECFs and their associated model package reports (MPRs) supporting the LLBG PA. The five major objectives of this ECF are to present the results of the following: (1) Deterministic dose assessments for both groundwater and atmospheric exposure scenarios; (2) Radon-222 (Rn-222) flux emanating at the surface from the disposed wastes; (3) Uncertainty analyses of the groundwater pathway annual dose due to uncertainty in input parameters; (4) Sensitivity analyses of the input parameters that could potentially impact the fate and transport of the contaminants and doses; (5) Doses arising from inadvertent intruder exposure scenarios.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

MARSAME Radiological Release Report for Metal Items from Technical Area 53, Set 26

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship Group (EPC-ES) has evaluated the survey results for metal items from the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) at Technical Area 53 (TA-53) and found that the metal items described in Table 1 of this report (identified by Radiation Protection [RP] Tracking Numbers) meet the criteria for unrestricted release under Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1 Chg 4, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment (DOE 2020) and can be recycled. This conclusion is based on the known history of the metal items and radiation survey data. None of the items in this report are located within radiological areas. Therefore, the items are considered unencumbered and are not subject to the moratorium suspension on metal recycling from DOE facilities. Additionally, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has determined that there is no practical opportunity for internal DOE reuse of this metal. Process knowledge indicates that these metal items were unlikely to ever be in direct contact with the beam and thus are unlikely to have become activated. Surface contamination measurements (both total and removable) showed either no detectable radioactivity or activity levels within the range of background. All measurements for volumetric contamination were indistinguishable from background based on calculated decision limits. Additionally, all gamma isotopic surveys conducted for defense-in depth showed no identifiable gamma radiation from beam activation.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI1995

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 36, No. 1, January-June 1995]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHORNOBYL ACCIDENT: 1 The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, Part II: The State of the Nuclear Fuel Located Within the Chornobyl Sarcophagus, A A. Borovoi and A. R. Sich; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 33 Nuclear Power Safety in Central and Eastern Europe, R. Wilson; 46 Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors in the Former Eastern European Countries, S. Chakraborty; 53 Technical Note: On the Definition of Common-Cause Failures, H. Paula; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 58 Modeling and Analysis of Core-Debris Recriticality During Hypothetical Severe Accidents in the Advanced Neutron Source Reactor, S.-H. Kim, V. Georgevich, D. B. Simpson, C. O. Slater, and R. P. Taleyarkhan; 68 Ignitability of Hydrogen/Oxygen/Diluent Mixtures in the Presence of Hot Surfaces, R. K. Kumar and G. W. Koroll; 94 Coupled RELAP5 and CONTAIN Accident Analysis Using PVM, K. A. Smith, A. J. Baratta, and G. E. Robinson; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 109 Application of Fuzzy Logic in Nuclear Reactor Control Part I: An Assessment of State-of-the-Art, A. S. Heger, N. K. Alang-Rashid, and M. Jamshidi; DESIGN FEATURES: 122 Twenty-Third DOE/NRC Nuclear Air-Cleaning and Treatment Conference, R. R. Bellamy, J. J. Hayes, and M. W. First; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 135 Atmospheric Dispersion and the Radiological Consequences of Normal Airborne Effluents from a Nuclear Power Plant, D. Fang, C. Z. Sun, and L. Yang; 142 Calculation of Distribution Coefficients for Radionuclides in Soils and Sediments, I. Puigdomenech and U. Bergstrom: OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 155 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 158 Operating Experience Feedback Report—Reliability of Safety-Related Steam Turbine-Driven Standby Pumps Used in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, J. R. Boardman; 166 Turbine Building Hazards, H. L Ornstein; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 169 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 175 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31,1994; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 32 Harvard School of Public Health In-Place Filter Testing Workshop; 134 International Conference on Advances in the Operational Safety of Nuclear Power Plants; 193 30th Tennessee Industries Week; 193 DOE Technical Standards Program 1995 Workshop; 194 Multiphase Flow Experiments and Instrumentation; 180 The Authors; 185 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volumes 34 and 35.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Annual Status Report (FY 2020): Performance Assessment for the Disposal of Low Level Waste in the 200 East Area Burial Grounds

This annual review provides the projected dose estimates of radionuclide inventories disposed in the 200 East Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds (LLBGs) since September 26, 1988. These estimates are calculated using the original dose methodology developed in the performance assessment (PA) analysis (WHC-SD-WM-TI-730). The estimates are compared with requirements of DOE O 435.1 Chg 1 and performance objectives defined in companion documents DOE M 435.1-1 Chg 1and DOE-STD-5002-2017). All performance objectives are currently satisfied, and operational waste acceptance criteria (HNF-EP-0063) and waste acceptance practices continue to be sufficient to maintain compliance with performance objectives. Inventory estimates and associated dose estimates from future waste disposal actions are unchanged from previous years’ evaluations that indicate potential impacts well below performance objectives; therefore, future compliance with DOE O 435.1 Chg 1 is expected. A new PA study was initiated in fiscal year (FY) 2019 for evaluation of active disposal sites within the 200 East and 200 West Areas (Trench 94 in 200 East; Trenches 31 and 34 in 200 West) due to extended time elapsing between the current annual status report and the original PA for the active disposal sites. The new PA for the active disposal sites is expected to be completed in FY 2021. Within the active burial grounds in the 200 East Area, low-level waste and mixed low-level waste will continue to be disposed of in the dedicated U.S. Navy reactor compartment trench at the 218-E-12B Burial Ground (Trench 94). During this reporting period (FY 2020, from October 1, 2019, through September 30, 2020), two reactor compartments were disposed in Trench 94. Results from sorption experiments are summarized for this reporting period to quantify the efficacy of concrete waste forms in retaining key radionuclides (e.g., technetium-99 and iodine-129). The test durations ranged from 1 to 3 months. Continued groundwater monitoring of the 200 East Area LLBGs indicates no groundwater contamination due to LLBG waste. Current assumptions about future land use at the Hanford Site are consistent with PA analysis1 assumptions of a post-closure facility that will not be degraded by human activity. The LLBGs are located in an area identified for waste management and containment of residual contamination. This area will remain after final environmental remediation and the proposed shrinkage of Hanford Site boundaries to small sections within the 200 East and 200 West Areas in the Central Plateau (DOE/EIS-0391). The current closure plan for the LLBGs (DOE/RL-2000-707) estimates that the 200 East LLBGs will be closed in the 2050 timeframe. The Disposal Authorization Statement, other technical basis documents, and the radioactive waste management basis are of continued adequacy to meet the performance objectives of DOE O 435.1 Chg 1. Overall, there are no substantive changes to primary PA assumptions nor the PA analysis conclusion; therefore, compliance with DOE O 435.1 Chg 1 and the Disposal Authorization Statement is maintained.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Functionalized Mesoporous Carbon and Silica for Effective Recovery of Rare Earth Elements from Magnet Scrap

The dependence on international supplies of rare earth elements (REEs) has prompted the US to explore alternative sources and sustainable technologies for domestic REE production. One potential source is the secondary electronic and industrial wastes across the US. These hazardous wastes require high costs for the maintenance and remediation, while their high-REE contents offer unique opportunities for REE recovery. However, current hydrometallurgical technologies for REE extraction are energy intensive and costly, with low REE recovery efficiency and the generation of hazardous secondary wastes. Thus, it is beneficial to develop environmentally friendly technologies for REE extraction from the secondary wastes. This project aims to develop novel functionalized mesoporous carbon fiber (MCF) and silica materials for effective recovery of REEs from NdFeB magnet scrap.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Plan for Development and Application of Risk Assessment Approach for Transportation Package Approval of an MNPP for Domestic Highway Shipment

For nuclear reactors, Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been conducted since the 1970s [e.g., see WASH-1400 (NRC 1975), NUREG-1150 (NRC 1990), and NUREG-1935 (Chang et al. 2012)]. PRA has also been used to assess a dry cask storage system at a nuclear power plant [see NUREG-1864 (NRC 2007)]. PRA techniques have also been applied to the transportation of spent nuclear fuel, most notably in NUREG/CR-4829 (Fischer et al. 1987), NUREG/CR-6672 (Sprung et al. 2000), and NUREG-2125 (NRC 2014). Additional guidance is provided in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) IAEA-TECDOC-1346 (2003). Transportation PRA was also used in the evaluations of transportation impacts in reports such as the Repository Final Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 2002) and the Repository Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 2008).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI1998

Fusion Safety Program Peer Review (August 31 and September 1, 1999) [Slides]

The Fusion Safety Program Peer Review conference, held on August 31 and September 1, 1999, focuses on advancing the understanding and management of radioactive and hazardous materials within deuterium-tritium (D-T) fusion machines. The conference aims to investigate the behavior of significant sources of radioactive materials, such as activation products, dust, tritium, and beryllium. Additionally, it seeks to comprehend how various energy sources in fusion facilities—such as magnets, plasma, decay heat, and chemical reactions—can mobilize these materials. A key objective of the conference is to develop integrated, state-of-the-art analytic tools to demonstrate the safety and environmental potential of fusion technology. Furthermore, the conference assesses and evaluates safety and environmental issues associated with emerging fusion concepts, including those in the ARIES, ALPS, APEX, and IFE projects. This comprehensive approach aims to ensure the safe and sustainable advancement of fusion energy.

70 - PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Computational Materials Design for Ceramic Nuclear Waste Forms Using Machine Learning, First-Principles Calculations, and Kinetics Rate Theory

Ceramic waste forms are designed to immobilize radionuclides for permanent disposal in geological repositories. One of the principal criteria for the effective incorporation of waste elements is their compatibility with the host material. In terms of performance under environmental conditions, the resistance of the waste forms to degradation over long periods of time is a critical concern when they are exposed to natural environments. Due to their unique crystallographic features and behavior in nature environment as exemplified by their natural analogues, ceramic waste forms are capable of incorporating problematic nuclear waste elements while showing promising chemical durability in aqueous environments. Recent studies of apatite- and hollandite-structured waste forms demonstrated an approach that can predict the compositions of ceramic waste forms and their long-term dissolution rate by a combination of computational techniques including machine learning, first-principles thermodynamics calculations, and modeling using kinetic rate equations based on critical laboratory experiments. By integrating the predictions of elemental incorporation and degradation kinetics in a holistic framework, the approach could be promising for the design of advanced ceramic waste forms with optimized incorporation capacity and environmental degradation performance. Such an approach could provide a path for accelerated ceramic waste form development and performance prediction for problematic nuclear waste elements.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Session 097B - Panel: Pathway to End State at the East Tennessee Technology Park in Oak Ridge, TN (2/4) (R1.16b)

This panel was to focus on the 'Pathway to End State at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP)'. It was to discuss the DoE's long-term vision for the ETTP site and the process for converting the site into a multi-use industrial park, historic preservation and national park, and conservation area. The Panelists were to discuss the challenges in executing a cleanup project of this magnitude, the waste management, and the monitoring efforts that supported the achievement of the Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management (OREM) Vision 2020. This session integrated with panel sessions 97A, 97C, and 97D. Panelists with presentations: Beginning with the End in Mind (Kevin Ironside); Project Execution (Daniel Macias); Waste Management (John Wrapp); Environmental Remediation (Samantha Pack); Waste Management (Josh Pemberton); DOE's Long-Range Vision (Laura Wilkerson)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Mercury Speciation of Hanford 241-AP-107 Tank Waste Samples - 20384

The concentration of key mercury species in the Hanford tank waste has not been previously measured. Based on process knowledge, an estimated inventory of 2,100 kg of mercury is assumed and was distributed in varied amounts across 149 single-shell tanks (SSTs) and 28 double-shell tanks (DSTs). Limited analyses of individual SSTs and DSTs for total mercury were all below detection, yielding upper limits in concentration estimates based solely on instrument detection limits, resulting in an uncertain mercury inventory for Hanford tanks. Accurate and reliable chemical speciation and quantification is desired to anticipate, predict, and abate the mass movements of various mercury species through the Hanford waste processing flowsheet. Highly sensitive separation and quantification methods for total, elemental, and monomethyl mercury species, in tank waste, have been developed at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory's (PNNL) Radiochemical Processing Laboratory (RPL). A non-radiological environmental method to quantify mercury species has been adapted for application to Hanford tank 241-AP-107 raw supernatant feed, filtered feed, and cesium-decontaminated samples. These samples represent feed inventory and pretreatment process effluents prior to immobilization by vitrification. This method separates and preconcentrates total, elemental, and monomethyl mercury onto selective solid substrates with little-to-no radioactive background. The solid samples can then be released from strict radiological control, allowing for analytical work to be conducted in low-level radiological facilities. Separation of mercury species was demonstrated at PNNL's RPL in Richland, Washington before transport and analytical quantification using cold vapor atomic fluorescence spectrometry (CVAFS) at PNNL's Marine Science Laboratory (MSL) in Sequim, Washington. Additional studies were conducted to assess the stability of monomethyl mercury in distilled matrices and preconcentrated onto the Carbotrap{sup R} solid substrate to assess sample degradation over time during transport. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗