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At least 541 records · Page 30

Giving the Public a Perspective into Unmanned Aircraft Systems' Operations

NASA is currently engaged in research to safely enable large-scale commercial applications of small Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) in low altitude airspace. This research effort, referred to as UAS Traffic Management (UTM), encompasses the concepts and technologies needed to accommodate the projected demand of UAS operating in the national airspace. One aspect related to the successful implementation of UTM in the future is public acceptance. Transparency will heavily influence this acceptance, and a public portal will provide much of that transparency through ease of access to information about the operations - mainly who, why, and where such operations are taking place. Related concerns to the public are individual privacy, security, and accountability of the operators. Providing the aforementioned information about operations can mitigate these concerns, but a balance will have to be achieved between the need for transparency from the public and the privacy of the operators. The proper balance and the needs of the various UTM stakeholders with regard to information access will be explored through the development and testing of a public portal as part of NASA's Technical Capability 3 (TCL 3) demonstration. Additionally, various approaches to the display of information and user interfaces will be surveyed through the development of a public portal by multiple UTM industry partners across different test sites.

UAS↗

Nuclear Materials Management Program at the NNSS

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site, was established in 1951 mainly for weapons testing; because special nuclear materials (SNM) were expended during the tests, a nuclear material management program was not required. That changed in December 2004 with the receipt of Category I SNM for purposes other than weapons testing. At that time, Material Control and Accountability and Nuclear Material Management were a joint laboratory (Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore) effort with nuclear material management being performed at the laboratories. That changed in March 2006 when the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office appointed sole responsibility to the Management and Operations (M&O) contractor, National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec). Since 2006 the basic nuclear material management work was completed by a combination of M&O employees and subcontractors, but a true Nuclear Material Management (NMM) Program was not determined to be necessary until recently. With expanding missions and more nuclear material (NM) coming to the NNSS, it became imperative to have an organization to manage these materials; therefore, an NMM Manager was officially appointed by NSTec in 2012. In June 2011 a Gap Analysis and white paper was completed by a subcontractor; this presentation will include highlights from those documents along with our plans to resolve the “gaps” and stand up a functional and compliant NMM Program at the NNSS.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Machine Learning Framework to Deconstruct the Primary Drivers for Electricity Market Price Events

As the electricity grid is moving towards a 100% Renewable Energy Source Bulk Power Grid, the overall operations of the power system operations and electricity markets are changing. The electricity markets are not only dispatching resources economically but also taking into account various controllable actions like renewable curtailment, transmission congestion mitigation, and energy storage optimization to make sure the grid is operating reliably. As a result, price formations in electricity markets have become quite complex. Traditional root cause analysis and statistical approaches are rendered inapplicable to analyze and infer the main drivers behind price formation in the modern grid and markets with variable renewable energy (VRE). In this paper, we propose a machine learning analysis framework to deconstruct some primary drivers for price formation in modern electricity markets with high renewable energy and the outcomes can be utilized for various critical aspects of market design, renewable dispatch and curtailment, operations, and cyber-security applications. The framework can be applied to any ISO or market data and in this paper it is applied to open-source publicly available datasets from California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and ISO New England.

machine learning (ML), electricity markets, Renewa↗

Laboratory-Directed Research and Development 2016 Summary Annual Report

The Laboratory-Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Program at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) reports its status to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) by March of each year. The program operates under the authority of DOE Order 413.2C, “Laboratory Directed Research and Development” (April 19, 2006), which establishes DOE’s requirements for the program while providing the laboratory director broad flexibility for program implementation. LDRD funds are obtained through a charge to all INL programs. This report includes summaries of all INL LDRD research activities supported during Fiscal Year (FY) 2016. INL is the lead laboratory for the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE). The INL mission is to discover, demonstrate, and secure innovative nuclear energy solutions, other clean energy options, and critical infrastructure with a vision to change the world’s energy future and secure our critical infrastructure. Operating since 1949, INL is the nation’s leading research, development, and demonstration center for nuclear energy, including nuclear nonproliferation and physical and cyber-based protection of energy systems and critical infrastructure, as well as integrated energy systems research, development, demonstration, and deployment. INL has been managed and operated by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (a wholly owned company of Battelle) for DOE since 2005. Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC, is a partnership between Battelle, BWX Technologies, Inc., AECOM, the Electric Power Research Institute, the National University Consortium (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ohio State University, North Carolina State University, University of New Mexico, and Oregon State University), and the Idaho university collaborators (i.e., University of Idaho, Idaho State University, and Boise State University). Since its creation, INL’s research and development (R&D) portfolio has broadened with targeted programs supporting national missions to advance nuclear energy, enable clean energy deployment, and secure and modernize critical infrastructure. INL’s research, development, and demonstration capabilities, its resources, and its unique geography enable integration of scientific discovery, innovation, engineering, operations, and controls into complex large-scale testbeds for discovery, innovation, and demonstration of transformational clean energy and security concepts. These attributes strengthen INL’s leadership as a demonstration laboratory. As a national resource, INL also applies its capabilities and skills to the specific needs of other federal agencies and customers through DOE’s Strategic Partnership Program.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE/DHS Industrial Control System Cyber Security Programs: A Model for Use in Nuclear Facility Safeguards and Security

Many critical infrastructure sectors have been investigating cyber security issues for several years especially with the help of two primary government programs. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National SCADA Test Bed and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Control Systems Security Program have both implemented activities aimed at securing the industrial control systems that operate the North American electric grid along with several other critical infrastructure sectors (ICS). These programs have spent the last seven years working with industry including asset owners, educational institutions, standards and regulating bodies, and control system vendors. The programs common mission is to provide outreach, identification of cyber vulnerabilities to ICS and mitigation strategies to enhance security postures. The success of these programs indicates that a similar approach can be successfully translated into other sectors including nuclear operations, safeguards, and security. The industry regulating bodies have included cyber security requirements and, in some cases, have incorporated sets of standards with penalties for non-compliance such as the North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection standards. These DOE and DHS programs that address security improvements by both suppliers and end users provide an excellent model for nuclear facility personnel concerned with safeguards and security cyber vulnerabilities and countermeasures. It is not a stretch to imagine complete surreptitious collapse of protection against the removal of nuclear material or even initiation of a criticality event as witnessed at Three Mile Island or Chernobyl in a nuclear ICS inadequately protected against the cyber threat.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Presentation for LDRD FY19 proposal: An Innovative Secure millimeter wave (mmWave) Machine to Machine (M2M) Communication Network for Operating Drones

We propose to prove the principle that a novel 5G wireless network using newly available millimeter wave (mmWave) frequency bands can operate Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with Machine to Machine (M2M) communication. If successful, this proposed network will provide a superior alternative to existing methods with improved radio frequency (RF) coverage and resiliency against cyberattacks. The use of UAVs or drones for non-military applications has been advancing rapidly for a large number of applications in the United States. They include public safety search and rescue of natural disaster victims, surveillance of remote critical infrastructure, surveys of environmental quality in protected regions, and detection of threats during major public events. The proposed approach involves research with modeling, simulation, and experimentation to validate the hypothesis in the following thrusts: 1) Using mmWave beams with antennas tilted upward for RF coverage in the sky to analyze the security, reliability, and spectral efficiency of this wireless network for UAV/drone operation; 2) Adding non orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) to analyze increase in security and spectral efficiency when compared to existing methods; 3) Adding intra-drone communication among the swarm of drones to analyze further increase in reliability and spectral efficiency; 4) Concluding the proof of principle/concept with modeling and experiment to demonstrate that a swarm of drones controlled with this advanced network can be effectively used during the simulated recovery of a critical infrastructure e.g. a cyber compromised power grid that requires a black restart. The experiments will be executed at the North Carolina State University (NCSU) using NCSU’s 28 GHz mmWave system. A conceptual Invention Record Disclosure (IDR) has been filed and we expect Intellectual Property (IP) from this proposed research to advance the IRD towards patent filing by INL with support from NCSU. Successful outcome from this work will pave the way for significant future research needed to mature the technology for a nationwide secure and reliable network supporting a large number of government and public safety drones.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A Multilevel Approach To Addressing Emerging Technologies In Nuclear Security

Emerging technologies present a unique set of challenges to operators and regulators. Although emerging technologies can be used to strengthen nuclear security systems, they also can increase risks to nuclear facilities. The disruptive nature of emerging technologies could also leave operators unprepared for threats to nuclear materials or facilities. To address the potentially dangerous consequences associated with these innovations, strong adaptive mechanisms and international cooperation on threat mitigation and technological integration are vital. This paper examines the nuclear security implications of emerging technologies from an institutional (as opposed to technology-specific) perspective. Drawing on insights from a recent workshop series hosted by the Stimson Center and the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Global Material Security, as well as research funded by Global Material Security and separate research conducted by Stimson, the paper begins with a definition of emerging technology that bounds the scope of the problem while leaving some margin for expert interpretation. The subsequent sections highlight the challenges as well as potential benefits that these technologies pose at each level of the nuclear security establishment, from the operators of sites hosting radiological or nuclear material, to regulators and national policy makers, to international institutions. Each section also includes specific recommendations for incorporating emerging technologies into radiological and nuclear security planning.

Andrews, Ian↗

Distributed Operations Planning

Maestro software provides a secure and distributed mission planning system for long-term missions in general, and the Mars Exploration Rover Mission (MER) specifically. Maestro, the successor to the Science Activity Planner, has a heavy emphasis on portability and distributed operations, and requires no data replication or expensive hardware, instead relying on a set of services functioning on JPL institutional servers. Maestro works on most current computers with network connections, including laptops. When browsing down-link data from a spacecraft, Maestro functions similarly to being on a Web browser. After authenticating the user, it connects to a database server to query an index of data products. It then contacts a Web server to download and display the actual data products. The software also includes collaboration support based upon a highly reliable messaging system. Modifications made to targets in one instance are quickly and securely transmitted to other instances of Maestro. The back end that has been developed for Maestro could benefit many future missions by reducing the cost of centralized operations system architecture.

Fox, Jason↗

NASA's Earth Observing System (EOS): Delivering on the Dream, Today and Tomorrow

This paper describes the successful operations of NASA's Earth Observing System (EOS) satellites over the past 10 years and the plans for the future. Excellent operations performance has been a key factor in the overall success of EOS. The EOS Program was conceived in the 1980s and began to take shape in the early 1990s. EOS consists of a series of satellites that study the Earth as an interrelated system. It began with the launch of Terra in December 1999, followed by Aqua in May 2002, and Aura in July 2004. A key EOS goal is to provide a long-term continuous data set to enable the science community to develop a better understanding of land, ocean, and atmospheric processes and their interactions. EOS has produced unprecedented amounts of data which are used all over the world free of charge. Mission operations have resulted in data recovery for Terra, Aqua, and Aura that have consistently exceeded mission requirements. The paper describes the ground systems and organizations that control the EOS satellites, capture the raw data, and distribute the processed science data sets. The paper further describes how operations have evolved since 1999. Examples of this evolution include (a) the implementation of new mission safety requirements for orbital debris monitoring; (b) technology upgrades to keep facilities at the state of the art; (c) enhancements to meet changing security requirements; and (d) operations management of the 2 international Earth Observing Constellations of 11 satellites known as the "Morning Constellation" and the "A-Train". The paper concludes with a view into the future based on the latest spacecraft status, lifetime projections, and mission plans.

Kelly, Angelita C.↗

NAVIGATING A QUALITY ROUTE TO A NATIONAL SAFETY AWARD

Deming quality methodologies applied to safety are recognized with the National Safety Council's annual Robert W. Campbell Award. Over the last ten years, the implementation of Statistical Process Control and quality methodologies at the U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Site have contributed to improved safety. Improvements attributed to Statistical Process Control are evidenced in Occupational Safety and Health records and documented through several articles in Quality Progress and the American Society of Safety Engineers publication, Professional Safety. Statistical trending of safety, quality, and occurrence data continues to playa key role in improving safety and quality at what has been called the world's largest environmental cleanup project. DOE's Hanford Site played a pivotal role in the nation's defense beginning in the 1940s, when it was established as part of the Manhattan Project. After more than 50 years of producing material for nuclear weapons, Hanford, which covers 586 square miles in southeastern Washington state, is now focused on three outcomes: (1) Restoring the Columbia River corridor for multiple uses; (2) Transitioning the central plateau to support long-term waste management; and (3) Putting DOE assets to work for the future. The current environmental cleanup mission faces challenges of overlapping technical, political, regulatory, environmental, and cultural interests. From Oct. 1, 1996 through Sept. 30, 2008, Fluor Hanford was a prime contractor to the Department of Energy's Richland Operations Office. In this role, Fluor Hanford managed several major cleanup activities that included dismantling former nuclear-processing facilities, cleaning up the Site's contaminated groundwater, retrieving and processing transuranic waste for shipment and disposal off-site, maintaining the Site's infrastructure, providing security and fire protection, and operating the Volpentest HAMMER Training and Education Center. On October 1,2008, a transition occurred that changed Fluor's role at Hanford. Fluor's work at Hanford was split in two with the technical scope being assumed by the CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) CHPRC is now spearheading much of the cleanup work associated with former nuclear-processing facilities, contaminated groundwater, and transuranic waste. Fluor is an integrated subcontractor to CH PRC in this effort. In addition, at the time of this writing, while the final outcome is being determined for the new Mission Support Contract, Fluor Hanford has had its contract extended to provide site-wide services that include security, fire protection, infrastructure, and operating the HAMMER facility. The emphasis has to be on doing work safely, delivering quality work, controlling costs, and meeting deadlines. Statistical support is provided by Fluor to the PRC, within Fluor Hanford, and to a third contractor, Washington Closure Hanford, which is tasked with cleaning up approximately 210 square miles designated as the Columbia River corridor along the outer edge of the Hanford Site. The closing months of Fluor Hanford's 12 year contract were busy, characterized by special events that capped its work as a prime cleanup contractor, transitions of work scope and personnel, and the completion numerous activities. At this time, Fluor's work and approach to safety were featured in state and national forums. A 'Blockbuster' presentation at the Washington State Governor's Industrial Safety Conference in September 2008 featured Fluor Hanford's Chief Operating Officer, a company Safety Representative, and me. Simultaneously, an award ceremony in Anaheim, Calif. recognized Fluor Hanford as the winner of the 2008 Robert W. Campbell Award. The Robert W. Campbell Award is co-sponsored by Exxon Mobil Corporation and the National Safety Council. Named after a pioneer of industrial safety, the Campbell Award recognizes organizations that demonstrate how integration of environmental, health and safety (EHS) management into business operations is a cornerstone of their corporate success. Fluor Hanford received the award for corporations with more than 1,000 employees. Campbell Award winners undergo rigorous assessments that include site visits and comprehensive evaluations of their commitment to, and implementation of, EHS practices. Award winners work with an international partnership of 21 organizations to develop case studies that illustrate their superior EHS programs and best practices, for use by top business and engineering schools worldwide. Quality methodologies in place at Fluor Hanford played a key role in the award process. Fluor Hanford's integrated use of Statistical Process Control and Pareto Charts for analyzing and displaying EHS performance were viewed favorably by the award judges.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

GLIMPSE of Future Power Grid Models

Power grid is one of the critical national infrastructures with social, economics, and national security impacts. Particularly, power distribution systems represent part of the infrastructure between power distribution substations and customers such as residential, commercial, and industrial. To address various grid modernization challenges, state-of-the-art algorithms and methodologies have been developed to deploy, operate, and expand a secure and resilient power grid. At the same time, there is a need to develop capabilities to assist power grid stakeholders to quickly get insight into the design and structure of the grid. Data visualization is a key approach to comprehend and understand complex systems such as the power grid. We present GLIMPSE Grid Layout Interface for Model Preview and System Exploration), a graph-based semantic-aware application to visualize and update distribution power grid models. The GLIMPSE can be used with standard IEEE models to search and highlight power grid objects such as generators, loads, overhead lines, etc. Additionally, it supports updating attributes and model export to integrate with GridLAB-D simulations.

Cybersecurity, power grid, visualization↗

Application for a Permit to Operate a Class III Solid Waste Disposal Site at the Nevada Test Site Area 5 Asbestiform Low-Level Solid Waste Disposal Site

The NTS solid waste disposal sites must be permitted by the state of Nevada Solid Waste Management Authority (SWMA). The SWMA for the NTS is the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Federal Facilities (NDEP/BFF). The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) as land manager (owner), and National Security Technologies (NSTec), as operator, will store, collect, process, and dispose all solid waste by means that do not create a health hazard, a public nuisance, or cause impairment of the environment. NTS disposal sites will not be included in the Nye County Solid Waste Management Plan. The NTS is located approximately 105 kilometers (km) (65 miles [mi]) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1). The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is the federal lands management authority for the NTS, and NSTec is the Management and Operations contractor. Access on and off the NTS is tightly controlled, restricted, and guarded on a 24-hour basis. The NTS has signs posted along its entire perimeter. NSTec is the operator of all solid waste disposal sites on the NTS. The Area 5 RWMS is the location of the permitted facility for the Solid Waste Disposal Site (SWDS). The Area 5 RWMS is located near the eastern edge of the NTS (Figure 2), approximately 26 km (16 mi) north of Mercury, Nevada. The Area 5 RWMS is used for the disposal of low-level waste (LLW) and mixed low-level waste. Many areas surrounding the RWMS have been used in conducting nuclear tests. A Notice of Intent to operate the disposal site as a Class III site was submitted to the state of Nevada on January 28, 1994, and was acknowledged as being received in a letter to the NNSA/NSO on August 30, 1994. Interim approval to operate a Class III SWDS for regulated asbestiform low-level waste (ALLW) was authorized on August 12, 1996 (in letter from Paul Liebendorfer to Runore Wycoff), with operations to be conducted in accordance with the ''Management Plan for the Disposal of Low-Level Waste with Regulated Asbestos Waste.'' A requirement of the authorization was that on or before October 9, 1999, a permit was required to be issued. Because of NDEP and NNSA/NSO review cycles, the final permit was issued on April 5, 2000, for the operation of the Area 5 Low-Level Waste Disposal Site, utilizing Pit 7 (P07) as the designated disposal cell. The original permit applied only to Pit 7, with a total design capacity of 5,831 cubic yards (yd{sup 3}) (157,437 cubic feet [ft{sup 3}]). NNSA/NSO is expanding the SWDS to include the adjacent Upper Cell of Pit 6 (P06), with an additional capacity of 28,037 yd{sup 3} (756,999 ft{sup 3}) (Figure 3). The proposed total capacity of ALLW in Pit 7 and P06 will be approximately 33,870 yd{sup 3} (0.9 million ft{sup 3}). The site will be used for the disposal of regulated ALLW, small quantities of low-level radioactive hydrocarbon-burdened (LLHB) media and debris, LLW, LLW that contains PCB Bulk Product Waste greater than 50 ppm that leaches at a rate of less than 10 micrograms of PCB per liter of water, and small quantities of LLHB demolition and construction waste (hereafter called permissible waste). Waste containing free liquids, or waste that is regulated as hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) or state-of-generation hazardous waste regulations, will not be accepted for disposal at the site. The only waste regulated under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) that will be accepted at the disposal site is regulated asbestos-containing materials (RACM). The term asbestiform is used throughout this document to describe this waste. Other TSCA waste (i.e., polychlorinated biphenyls [PCBs]) will not be accepted for disposal at the SWDS. The disposal site will be used as a depository of permissible waste generated both on site and off site. All generators designated by NNSA/NSO will be eligible to dispose regulated ALLW at the Asbestiform Low-Level Waste Disposal Site in accordance with the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV) 325, Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NTSWAC, current revision). Approval will be given by NNSA/NSO to generators that have successfully demonstrated through process knowledge (PK) and/or sampling and analysis that the waste is low-level, contains asbestiform material, and does not contain prohibited waste materials. Each waste stream will be approved through the Radioactive Waste Acceptance Program (RWAP), which ensures that the waste meets acceptance requirements outlined in the NTS Class III Permit and the NTSWAC.

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A Multi-Site Networked Hardware-in-Loop Platform for Evaluation of Interoperability and Distributed Intelligence at Grid-Edge

Electric power systems have experienced large increases in the number of intelligent, connected and controllable devices being deployed, leading to a high degree of distributed intelligence at the grid-edge. These devices, both utility-owned and consumer-owned, include but are not limited to: renewable generation sources, energy storage, remote switches, voltage regulators, and smart controllable loads such as electric vehicles. These new devices provide significant potential for increased operational flexibility that can be leveraged to achieve system reconfiguration, resiliency improvements, power quality improvements, and distribution system automation. However, there are two significant challenges that must be addressed before these assets can be leveraged for operations: interoperability and system level validation prior to deployment. Because of the complexity of distributed control systems, and their interactions with legacy centralized controls, a purely simulations-based approach for pre-deployment validation is not sufficient. It requires hardware-in-loop testing to emulate the operational hardware devices and evaluate their performance. Additionally, securely integrating multiple test facilities at utility operators and vendors might enable rapid scale-up of evaluation platforms, and remove the need for multiple expensive standalone installations. Presented in this paper, is the development of a multi-site evaluation platform that employs Advanced Distribution Management Systems (ADMS), distributed control devices, real-time hardware-in-loop assets, secure communication links, and protocol adapters. This platform uses standards-based approaches and open-source tools, and hence can serve as a template for other researchers and institutions to implement their multi-site evaluation frameworks for pre-deployment testing.

Essakiappan, Somasundaram↗

Security Policies for Mitigating the Risk of Load Altering Attacks on Smart Grid Systems

While demand response programs implement energy efficiency and power quality objectives, they bring potential security threats to the Smart Grid. The ability to influence load in a system enables attackers to cause system failures and impacts the quality and integrity of power delivered to customers. This paper presents a security mechanism to monitor and control load according to a set of security policies during normal system operation. The mechanism monitors, detects, and responds to load altering attacks. We examined the security requirements of Smart Grid stakeholders and constructed a set of load control policies enforced by the mechanism. We implemented a proof of concept prototype and tested it using the simulation environment. By enforcing the proposed policies in this prototype, the system is maintained in a safe state in the presence of load drop attacks.

Ryutov, Tatyana↗

Hyperspectral Sensors Final Report CRADA No. TC02173.0

This was a collaborative effort between Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC as manager and operator of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), National Security Space Operations/SRBU, to develop long-wave infrared (LWIR) hyperspectral imaging (HSI) sensors for airborne and potentially ground and space, platforms. The overarching purpose of the CRADA project was to facilitate the transfer of the necessary technology from LLNL to SAIC thereby allowing the U.S. Government to procure LWIR HSI sensors from this company. The purpose of the initial activities involving BIG GREEN sensors was to meet the customer’s delivery schedule for all of the BIG GREEN sensors. BIG GREEN is a complex and sophisticated instrument, and the requisite technology must be imparted to SAIC to allow them to successfully produce the instrument. It was expected that in the first few months of joint work, sensor models (performance, structural, thermal and optical) would be provided to SAIC. Additionally, existing drawings, assembly procedures, test procedures, test equipment definitions, software descriptions and code, and complete Bills of Material (BOM) would be provided. SAIC would analyze the models, purchase material per the BOM, create its own set of production drawings, models and procedures, and identify areas of concern or where further information transfer is required.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Hyperspectral Sensors Final Report CRADA No. TC02173.0

This was a collaborative effort between Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC as manager and operator of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), National Security Space Operations/SRBU, to develop longwave infrared (LWIR) hyperspectral imaging (HSI) sensors for airborne and potentially ground and space, platforms. LLNL has designed and developed LWIR HSI sensors since 1995. The current generation of these sensors has applications to users within the U.S. Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community. User needs are for multiple copies provided by commercial industry. To gain the most benefit from the U.S. Government’s prior investments in LWIR HSI sensors developed at LLNL, transfer of technology and know-how from LLNL HSI experts to commercial industry was needed. The overarching purpose of the CRADA project was to facilitate the transfer of the necessary technology from LLNL to SAIC thereby allowing the U.S. Government to procure LWIR HSI sensors from this company.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Optimization of the Post-Operational Phase on Two Belgian Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants: the Case of the Non-Fissile Irradiated Core Items - 20156

The current legal framework in Belgium foresees the progressive phase out of nuclear power between October 2022 (Doel 3) and December 2025 (Doel 2). Upon its definitive shutdown, each unit of the Tihange and Doel sites will enter a Post-Operational Phase (POP) and be prepared for its Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D). Prior to obtaining the D and D license, the Operator Electrabel is legally required to remove any non-fissile irradiated core items stored in the deactivation pools. The non-fissile irradiated core items consist essentially of control rods, poison rods and source thimbles as well as thimble plugs and foreign materials irradiated during operation: - Their significant content in highly radiant radionuclides (up to 6 TBq of Co-60 per kg of irradiated material) renders all existing operational waste management processes inadequate due to insufficient biological shielding; - Their high concentrations in long-lived radionuclides call for their disposal in a geological repository for which no final design nor waste acceptance criteria are expected prior to 2050. Uncertainties in the Belgian energy supply and security, however, require the Operator to be prepared for a partial nuclear phase out, where one or more units would benefit from lifetime extension while the remaining units would undergo decommissioning. The present paper aims at presenting how Electrabel, in partnership with Tractebel, addressed this challenge by maximizing the use of synergies within the respective sites as well as between both sites themselves, all the while accounting for site specificities. The most recent results and state of progress of the project will be detailed and the first lessons learned will be shared. The project has been split in multiple tasks and phased as follows: - An inventory phase aimed at mapping the contents, origin, composition and history of the non-fissile irradiated core items; - A pre-characterization phase based on neutron activation models; - A waste sorting phase aimed at separating waste forms for which an evacuation route exists from those for which such route does not exist; - A feasibility phase aimed at exploring all possible scenarios for the management of non-fissile irradiated core items and identifying the optimal feasible solution for each site; - A preparation phase (currently ongoing), developing further the optimal solution and ensuring that back-up solutions are available for any foreseeable change of context (licensing issue, modification in the nuclear phase-out program, etc.) and initiating early contacts with potential subcontractors for segmentation works and cask manufacturers, as well as the Belgian regulatory body and waste management agency. This phase also foresees the investigation of destructive and non-destructive radiological measurements to support the detailed characterization of the waste forms; - A realization phase (future work). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗