UK regulatory review of the double contingency principle in criticality safety - 14379
The UK's regulatory regime is based on Licence Conditions (LCs) attached to a Nuclear Site Licence (NSL) and is non-prescriptive in nature. The law requires licensees to reduce health and safety risks to workers and the public 'so far as is reasonability practicable' (SFAIRP), and this framework provides licensees with flexibility to achieve this. Guidance for inspectors on the assessment of nuclear safety cases has been published in Office for Nuclear Regulation's (ONR) Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs) and supporting Technical Assessment Guides (TAGs). These guidance documents have recently been reviewed in the light of the Fukushima accident. The opportunity has also been taken to reconsider the use of the Double Contingency Principle used in criticality safety cases, an approach commonly regarded as the preferred means of criticality control internationally and featured in the SAPs and TAGs. Licensees in the UK have adopted several approaches in nuclear criticality safety cases based upon a combination of deterministic and probabilistic safety cases using the Double Contingency Principle and Design Basis Analysis. ONR has developed a targeted intervention to sample a number of nuclear safety cases in order to test the adequacy of methodologies used to secure nuclear criticality safety. This paper reports the results of this intervention and considers the need to review the advice currently given by the UK nuclear regulator, including on use of the Double Contingency Principle. (authors)