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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 541 records · Page 30

Mark-18A Cold Runs

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is tasked by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to recover highly valued isotopes from irradiated Mark-18A (Mk-18A) targets. The Savannah River Site (SRS) has sixty-five Mk-18A targets available for the recovery of the high valued materials. The sixty-five Mk-18A targets are currently stored in the L-Area Basin and will be removed one at a time and individually transported to SRNL. Upon receipt at SRNL, the Mk-18A target material will be removed from the confinement, dissolved, chemically separated, and calcined to a stable oxide. The flowsheet is designed to recover the plutonium as well as the trivalent actinides. The remaining unrecovered material will be discarded to the high activity drain (HAD) system in SRNL. A specially designed cask was procured for transport of the targets from L-Area to SRNL. Once received at SRNL, the targets will be loaded into the back of Cell 7 and resized as they enter the cell. The resized targets (1/4 lengths) will then be processed one at a time through the following processes: caustic dissolution and filtration; acidic dissolution and filtration, Reillex anion exchange, diglycolamide (DGA) cation exchange; and DGA calcination. This processing will result in two product streams. The first is an aqueous plutonium solution which will be removed from the shielded cells and taken to a glovebox for further purification and conversion to an oxide. The second is a calcined oxide containing the Am and Cm as well as other lanthanide fission products which will be removed from the shielded cells using a bagless transfer system. Both materials will be packaged for shipment to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). All equipment to carry out this process was designed, procured or fabricated, and installed in a mock-up facility (716-4A) at SRS to allow for simulation testing in a non-radioactive area. This equipment was then dismantled and transferred from 716-4A to 773-A and installed in the SRNL Shielded Cells. After installation in the shielded cells facility testing was performed using water followed by surrogates and cold chemicals. Issues were identified during these evaluations, including equipment issues as well as technical challenges. Many of the issues were rectified during performance of the cold runs, and the remaining have a resolution identified. Table ES-1 provides a summary of all issues identified during the cold run operations, as well as the status and identified resolutions to outstanding issues.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Macromolecules & Manufacturing Science

Outline • SRNL Overview • Mission overview • Polymers enabling the mission • R&D Highlights • Polymers in radiation environments • Tooling in shielded cells • Packaging for nuclear material shipments • Polymers supporting tank waste remediation • Ref electrode • Epoxy and polymer grout • Polymers for fusion energy • Deuterium labelling • Polymers for additive manufacturing • Coalescence and blends: experimental and predictive • Process modelling and sorting through big data (peregrine and latticeJ)

Chatham, Camden [Savannah River National Laborator↗

Custom Equipment Development for Processing of Surplus Plutonium

Facilities and Material • Location: Savannah River Site K-Area, South Carolina • Plutonium designated as surplus is blended with adulterant material, re-packaged and shipped to WIPP in New Mexico • Currently one operational glovebox for downblending, facility modifications and construction of three additional glovebox lines in progress • Current operations are highly manual requiring full PPE and reader/worker steps

Krementz, Daniel [Savannah River National Laborato↗

MPACT Safeguards Modeling: FY25 Update

Sandia National Laboratories develops and maintains several open-source software packages to support material accountancy analyses. This includes the Material Accountancy Performance Indicator Toolkit (MAPIT), the Fissile Facility Flow Modeler (F3M) and the Separation and Safeguards Performance Model Library (SSPM-L). MAPIT is responsible for performing statistical safeguards analyses on bulk and itemized data from nuclear fuel cycle facilities and can operate on real or synthetic data. MAPIT is the only open-source software for such analyses. F3M is a library of modules, built in MATLAB Simulink, that contain pre made blocks to represent different generic fuel cycle processes. These blocks can be used together in a modular fashion to represent and simulate nuclear fuel cycle processes with the goal of improving facility-level accountancy during the design phase. F3M is also an open-source library. Finally, the SSPM-L library is a series of completed models built from F3M. The library includes facility models such as a generic PUREX facility and a fuel fabrication facility. The SSPM-L library is not open source, but is available to collaborators with a relevant use case. These tools include modeling and simulation pipelines to simulate nuclear fuel cycle facilities and the underlying software needed to simulate measurement uncertainty and perform statistical analyses. Together, these tools can perform end-to-end nuclear material accountancy analyses. This report documents the various improvements made to these tools in FY25. Specifically, we added new statistical test, new statistical modeling capabilities, new fuel cycle facility models, and launched a new open-source model component library.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Apollo experience report: Food systems

Development, delivery, and use of food systems in support of the Apollo 7 to 14 missions are discussed. Changes in design criteria for this unique program as mission requirements varied are traced from the baseline system that was established before the completion of the Gemini Program. Problems and progress in subsystem management, material selection, food packaging, development of new food items, menu design, and food-consumption methods under zero-gravity conditions are described. The effectiveness of various approaches in meeting food system objectives of providing flight crews with safe, nutritious, easy to prepare, and highly acceptable foods is considered. Nutritional quality and adequacy in maintaining crew health are discussed in relation to the establishment of nutritional criteria for future missions. Technological advances that have resulted from the design of separate food systems for the command module, the lunar module, The Mobile Quarantine Facility, and the Lunar Receiving Laboratory are presented for application to future manned spacecraft and to unique populations in earthbound situations.

Smith, M. C., Jr.↗

Standardized strapdown inertial component modularity study, volume 2

To obtain cost effective strapdown navigation, guidance and stabilization systems to meet anticipated future needs a standardized modularized strapdown system concept is proposed. Three performance classes, high, medium and low, are suggested to meet the range of applications. Candidate inertial instruments are selected and analyzed for interface compatibility. Electronic packaging and processing, materials and thermal considerations applying to the three classes are discussed and recommendations advanced. Opportunities for automatic fault detection and redundancy are presented. The smallest gyro and accelerometer modules are projected as requiring a volume of 26 cubic inches and 23.6 cubic inches, respectively. Corresponding power dissipation is projected as 5 watts, and 2.6 watts respectively.

Feldman, J.↗

Space processing viewed by a scientist-astronaut

An account is given of NASA astronaut T. G. Wang's 1985 experiences with Spacelab-borne containerless processing experiment equipment handling and experimental management. The mission in question was marred by the initial malfunction of the zero-gravity materials-processing experiment package; Wang's first task was accordingly to attempt repairs, and led to his living inside the experiment package for 2.5 days in order to operate the system as well as possible, on a 16-hr workday basis, with the assistance of two other astronauts.

Wang, Taylor G.↗

Coast Guard Firefighting Module

NASA and the U.S. Coast Guard are jointly developing a lightweight, helicopter-transportable, completely self-contained firefighting module for combating shipboard and dockside fires. The project draws upon NASA technology in high-capacity rocket engine pumps, lightweight materials and compact packaging.

Source record↗

Space Flight LiDARs, Navigation & Science Instrument Implementations: Lasers, Optoelectronics, Integrated Photonics, Fiber Optic Subsystems and Components

For the past 25 years, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Goddard Space Flight Center's Photonics Group in the Engineering Directorate has been substantially contributing to the flight design, development, production, testing and integration of many science and navigational instruments. The Moon to Mars initiative will rely heavily upon utilizing commercial technologies for instrumentation with aggressive schedule deadlines. The group has an extensive background in screening, qualifying, development and integration of commercial components for spaceflight applications. By remaining adaptable and employing a rigorous approach to component and instrument development, they have forged and fostered relationships with industry partners. They have been willing to communicate lessons learned in packaging, part construction, materials selection, testing, and other facets of the design and production process critical to implementation for high-reliability systems. As a result, this successful collaboration with industry vendors and component suppliers has enabled a history of mission success from the Moon to Mars (and beyond) while balancing cost, schedule, and risk postures. In cases where no commercial components exist, the group works closely with other teams at Goddard Space Flight Center and other NASA field centers to fabricate and produce flight hardware for science, remote sensing, and navigation applications. Summarized here is the last ten years of instrumentation development lessons learned and data collected from the subsystems down to the optoelectronic component level.

Detectors↗

Photonics for Space Flight Instruments

For the past 25 years, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Goddard Space Flight Center’s Photonics Group in the Engineering Directorate has been substantially contributing to the flight design, development, production, testing and integration of many science and navigational instruments. The group has an extensive background in screening, qualifying, development and integration of commercial components for spaceflight applications. They have been willing to communicate lessons learned in packaging, part construction, materials selection, testing, and other facets of the design and production process critical to implementation for high-reliability systems. Summarized here is the last ten years of instrumentation development lessons learned and data collected from the subsystems down to the optoelectronic component level.

Spaceflight↗

History and Status of DOE’s Standardized Canister

[Poster] The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) currently in its possession, as well as SNF that will come into its possession in the future. DOE will rely upon the standardized canister to confine radionuclides and precluding the moderator in order to ensure safe, long-term management and disposition of SNF in its possession. This strategy helps minimize characterization costs (i.e., funds and exposure) and other technical challenges associated with the traditional approach of relying on fuel-specific properties to demonstrate compliance with the regulator. The use of the standardized canister offers the following benefits: • The standardized canister design is complete. It has been tested under a variety of drop and accident scenarios and was subsequently licensed under 10 CFR 72 as a storage system as part of the Foster Wheeler Environmental Corporation (FWENC) Facility. It is also part of the license submittal for Yucca Mountain. • There is high confidence that the standardized canister design can be stored within commercially-available storage casks and licensed as part of a transportation-system package. • A robust standardized canister simplifies accident analyses and does not rely on characterization of the contained waste. This simplifies safety analysis, provides a greater level of confidence with stakeholders and reduces cost and risk. • A common design for the associated packaging, closure, and loadout facilities results in significant savings. • The DOE standardized canister would simplify design efforts, procurement, and fabrication. • Standardizing handling activities and associated training, procedures, equipment, and tooling leads to enhanced safety and surety of operations. The standardized canister is the preferred package for these materials. It withstood scrutiny by the Yucca Mountain Repository License Application, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, an American Society of Mechanical Engineers peer review, and the FWENC storage license application. This evaluation summarizes and documents the status of the design and rationale for the DOE standardized canister, and outlines remaining needs before deployment. In addition, it discusses the factors that have the potential to influence storage, transportation, and disposal of DOE SNF.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

History and Status of DOE’s Standardized Canister – 19657

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. The DOE standardized canister will be relied upon to confine radionuclides and preclude moderator in order to ensure safe, long-term management and disposition of DOE SNF. This strategy offers an avenue for avoiding the characterization costs (i.e. funds and exposure) and other technical challenges associated with the traditional approach of relying on fuel-specific properties as the basis for demonstrating compliance with the regulator. The use of the standardized canister offers the following benefits: • The standardized canister design is complete. It has been tested under a variety of drop and accident scenarios and was subsequently licensed under 10 CFR 72 as a storage system as part of the FWENC Facility. It is also part of the license submittal for Yucca Mountain. • There is high confidence that the standardized canister design can be stored within commercially available storage casks and licensed as part of a transportation-system package. • The robustness of the standardized canister simplifies accident analyses and does not rely on characterization of the contained waste. This simplifies safety analysis, provides a greater level of confidence with stake holders and reduces cost and risk. • Significant savings result from a common design for the associated packaging, closure, and loadout facilities. • Design efforts, procurement, and fabrication are simplified • Safety and surety of operations are enhanced by standardizing handling activities and associated training, procedures, equipment, and tooling. The standardized canister is the preferred package for these materials and has withstood scrutiny by the Yucca Mountain Repository License Application, the NRC’s Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, an American Society of Mechanical Engineers peer review, and the Foster Wheeler Environmental Corporation storage license application. This evaluation summarizes and documents the status of the design and rationale for the DOE standardized canister and outlines the remaining needs to allow deployment. In addition, it discusses the factors that have the potential to influence storage, transportation, and disposal of DOE SNF.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A New Safeguards Technique for Spent Fuel Verification in Dry Storage by Using He-4 Detectors - 18262

It is demanded to find key issues and critical paths for verifying and monitoring a spent nuclear fuel cask or storage with a purpose of non-proliferation of nuclear weapon. However, unfortunately there are no reliable methods to verify the containment in a spent nuclear fuel cask or storage. Therefore, research and development (R and D) has been continuously required to develop new and alternative technologies for searching and verifying undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and facilities. Therefore, the present authors have developed a new safeguards technique of passively scanning a spent fuel cask or storage using pressurized He-4 scintillation neutron detectors. A new approach is to quickly verify content in a spent nuclear fuel cask or presence of all special nuclear materials in unknown packages by comparing experimental and computational results. For that, the present authors have developed a new algorithm and user-interface coupled ORIGEN-ARP and MCNP codes, and the prototype safeguards apparatus employing the array of He-4 fast neutron detectors has been designed, built, and tested. The feasibility test of this new apparatus has been performed with Cf-252 neutron sources and the laboratory scale model cask, minimized by a factor of ten compared to the actual dimension of a KN-21 cask. This technique has several advantages over current methods based on neutron and gamma detection; (1) incident neutron energy information is preserved, (2) disturbance of gamma-ray is excellently rejected (discriminated), and (3) much higher neutron counts and operational cost and space-effectiveness are expected since no moderator is required for fast neutrons. The final goal of this study will (1) conduct a prototype instrument and employ it to monitor a nuclear spent fuel cask or storage at a commercial nuclear power reactor facilities, (2) use spectral-specific measurement data to show proof of concept for measurable data successfully converted to quantifiable signatures, such as diversion/removal of fuel, and maintenance of fuel and cask integrity of fuel, and (3) develop a cask imaging capability. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Status of French regulation regulations concerning nuclear criticality safety - 14585

Hitherto, in France, licensees used to demonstrate compliance with Fundamental Safety Rule I.3.c. This Rule sets out the principles for demonstrating Nuclear Criticality Safety in all nuclear facilities (excluding reactors). Although there is a good level of consensus between the licensees and the Regulator, this Rule is now somewhat dated (it came into force in 1984) and does not cover all aspects. The French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) used the 2006 Law on Transparency and Nuclear Safety as the catalyst for a thorough revision and updating of its regulatory documentation. Thus, in 2010, ASN decided to set up a 'criticality working group' involving ASN, the licensees (AREVA, CEA, EDF...) and the Technical Safety Organization (IRSN). This group was tasked with drafting a regulatory text (a 'resolution') and a criticality guide. The objectives were to update Rule I.3.c, clearly defining the scope for reactors and transport packages of fissile material, to further develop areas not covered in the existing rule and to take account of the feedback and lessons learned from past events. Thus, this paper presents the status of French regulations concerning Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS). Firstly, it focuses on the existing Rule I.3.c and then explains how this will be modified by the forthcoming improvements to the resolution and the criticality guide. It in particular addresses the scope of the new regulations (concerning reactors and the transport of fissile material), how the principle of defence in depth is to be applied to criticality safety, the double contingency principle, control modes, the reference fissile medium, the organization, the role of the Criticality Engineer, admissibility criteria, validation, etc. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

FY24 progress report on A709 mechanical properties data development and A709 thermal aging status

The report provides the status of the creep, fatigue, and creep-fatigue testing to date conducted at Idaho National Laboratory to generate the data package. This data package evaluates the material performance from three commercial heats to support the Alloy 709 qualification in American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 5. First procured heat was manufactured by G.O. Carlson with heat number 58776. Second and third heats were fabricated by ATI Specialty Rolled Products with heat numbers 529900 and 530843, respectively. A series of creep and cyclic specimens were fabricated from these three heats and tests were performed. A list of finished, ongoing, and planned test are presented for creep, fatigue, and creep-fatigue tests. Cyclic properties of three commercial heats are compared.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

FY24 progress report on A709 mechanical properties data development and A709 thermal aging status

The report provides the status of the creep, fatigue, and creep-fatigue testing to date conducted at Idaho National Laboratory to generate the data package. This data package evaluates the material performance from three commercial heats to support the Alloy 709 qualification in American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 5. First procured heat was manufactured by G.O. Carlson with heat number 58776. Second and third heats were fabricated by ATI Specialty Rolled Products with heat numbers 529900 and 530843, respectively. A series of creep and cyclic specimens were fabricated from these three heats and tests were performed. A list of finished, ongoing, and planned test are presented for creep, fatigue, and creep-fatigue tests. Cyclic properties of three commercial heats are compared.

36 - MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Standards and Guidelines for the Design of Trunnions of RAM Transport Packages - 17365

Trunnion systems of packages for the transport of radioactive materials have to guarantee the safe handling of package during crane operations (lifting, tilting) and to secure package tie down to the transport vehicle, if the trunnions are used as attachment points during transport. The design of trunnions is based on IAEA Regulations SSR-6, the supporting Advisory Material SSG-26 and further appropriate technical standards and/or guidelines. For package approval procedures in Germany the guideline BAM-GGR 012 has to be applied. If a package is handled inside a german nuclear power plant, the standard KTA 3905 has to be fulfilled additionally. In this paper the requirements of KTA 3905 [4] concerning the trunnion systems as load attaching points (LAP) are discussed in connection with the recommendations in the guideline BAM-GGR 012 [3]. This guideline is prepared at BAM Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing for analysis and assessment of bolted lid and trunnion systems of Type B(U) transport packages. The quality assurance questions concerning trunnion systems are discussed as well. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Examination of 3013 Containers Baseline Surface Features

The Surveillance and Monitoring Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) was tasked with evaluating the baseline features of 3013 containers. This baseline is to be used as a basis for comparison for 3013 containers that had been packaged with corrosive plutonium materials. The LANL team evaluated an unwelded container, an unused welded container, and a welded container that had held plutonium metal without any corrosive impurities. These three containers had features with depths no larger than 6 µm and had similar depth distributions. The features observed in the baseline containers were all shallower than those seen in containers packaged with corrosive plutonium materials. This work establishes workflows for feature identification and measurement, as well as establishment of baseline data for future comparison with corroded containers.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗