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DOE OSTI2023

Implementation of a System of Gamma Imagers for Measuring Plutonium Holdup

The Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project is an effort to dilute and dispose of many tonsof weapons grade plutonium. This work will take place in a shielded glovebox to protect workers fromradiological dose. Accurate measurements of the holdup, or material left behind, in the gloveboxes is im-portant for Nuclear Material Control and Accountancy, worker dose minimization, criticality safety, andprocess monitoring. Shielding around the gloveboxes presents an obstacle for the traditional GeneralizedGamma Holdup (GGH) method. The uncertainties associated with that method, at around 28%, arealso detrimental since the amount of holdup must be kept below an established limit with a high level ofconfidence.Passive gamma-ray imaging provides a more complete depiction of the distribution of radioactivematerials. Recent refinement of the method has demonstrated that quantitative information can beextracted from the images with a well-characterized system. A permanently installed system of gamma-ray imagers is currently being developed to measure plutonium holdup in the SPD gloveboxes. Thispaper will report on progress with the development of this system.This application requires that the features of current commercially available instruments from H3Dand PHDS, optimized for measurement performance in a mobile application, be translated into theconstraints of the operational environment with fixed installations. The interaction between facilityconstraints and measurement capabilities will be addressed.A series of measurements with plutonium sources in a mocked-up glovebox geometry with imagersmounted above the ceiling of the glovebox have been taken. Imager performance with respect to angularresolution, minimum measurement time for quantification, and signal-to-noise ratio with a multitudeof sources will be evaluated for those measurements. A series of prototypes of user interfaces will bepresented for display of the data to its various consumers for the purposes of Nuclear Material Controland Accountancy, worker dose minimization, criticality safety, and process monitoring.

Schmitt, Kyle↗

DOE OSTI2020

Characterizing The Mechanical Properties of Polyurethane Foams

The Department of Energy has many radioactive facilities that are on the path of deactivation and decommissioning (D and D). These facilities can sit cold and dark for many years before final disposition, and must be maintained to ensure no radiological release occurs in the interim. Improvements and additions to D and D tool sets can greatly: Save time and money, Reduce worker risk. Conventional fixatives widely used often take the form of paints or films that are not readily applicable to 3-dimensional void spaces. Foams are one promising platform that may offer solutions to a number of contaminated problem sets such as: Gloveboxes, Pipes, Tanks. SRNL is working to characterize various commercial foams that would encapsulate the interior volume of a given space and are capable of immobilizing any remaining contamination. One key performance metric of these foams is how well they will perform in an accident scenario. To this end, SRNL is researching the mechanical properties of these foams to ensure that the material can withstand the environment of application while maintaining structural integrity. ASTM standard E3191-18 served as a guiding document for this project, outlining the requirements that foaming fixatives used for the mitigation of radioactive contamination need to meet before being implemented. Objective: Quantification of the mechanical properties of 6 commercial polyurethane foams was performed using multiple ASTM standards to record measurements for: Compression testing: Flexible Foams, Force required to produce 50% compression, Rigid Foams, Compressive and apparent modulus, Point of 10% core deformation, The 'Zero Deformation' point, Compressive strength, Yield point. Tensile testing: Tensile strength, Tensile stress, Percent elongation. Experiment 1: An electromechanical compressive tester (MTS Criterion Series 43) was used to evaluate 6 foams (4 flexible, 2 rigid). Per ASTM D1621, each rigid foam was compressed at 10% of the measured thickness per minute until the sample was 13% of it's original thickness. Per ASTM D35/4, each flexible foam was pre-flexed twice to 80% original thickness at a rate of 250 mm/min, then compressed to 80% original thickness at a rate of 50 mm/min. Experiment 2: An electromechanical tensile tester (MTS Criterion Series 43) was used to evaluate 6 foams (4 flexible, 2 rigid). Per ASTM D1623, rigid foams were pulled apart at a rate of 1.27 mm/min until the sample broke. Per ASTM D35/4, flexible foams were pulled apart at a rate of 500 mm/min until the sample broke. The strongest material in both compression and tensile testing scenarios was found to be the rigid intumescent polyurethane Hilti foam. The experiments revealed that the Hilti foam in a tensile scenario had a peak stress value that was larger than the closest competitor by a factor of 2.3 and a compressive yield point that was larger than the closest competitor by a factor of 1.4, indicating that the Hilti foam is the best choice for implementation in mechanically harsh environments. The performance metrics measured can serve as a basis for future mechanical tests that would help set relevant ASTM standards (E3191) for intumescent polyurethane foams in fixating applications. Tests like surface adhesion, impact, and flame tests would serve as a better indicator as to how this material would perform in environmentally harsh scenarios often found in decommissioned nuclear facilities. Further tests of the foams' intumescent properties would also be important should these foams be implemented in environmentally harsh scenarios.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Managing Hanford's Direct Feed Low Activity Waste Program - 20002

The Office of River Protection (ORP) is responsible for the management and completion of the River Protection Project (RPP) mission, which comprises both the Hanford Site tank farms operations and the completion and operation of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Project. The RPP mission is to safely retrieve, treat, and immobilize Hanford's high-level and low-activity tank waste and close the tank farms to protect the Columbia River. The Direct-Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) Program is a major subset of the overall RPP mission, providing disposition of low-activity waste. The scope is to retrieve, treat, and immobilize the low-activity waste at the Low-Activity Waste Facility. DFLAW will begin operations no later than December 2023. The DFLAW Program overarches a suite of individual projects, activities, and infrastructure upgrades. The major projects and activities include multiple contractors under both ORP and the Richland Operations Office, underscoring the need for effective integration, coordination, and collaboration. The objectives of the DFLAW Program leadership team are to: - Effectively coordinate and integrate the projects that comprise the DFLAW Program - Manage the interfaces between the projects so that the integrated DFLAW Program is completed successfully - Ensure the DFLAW portfolio of projects operate as required without gaps or conflicts at the interfaces. DOE is accomplishing these objectives through a newly established leadership model that integrates the DOE and contractor work streams and promotes a teamwork model to enable collaborative success. Long considered one of the most formidable cleanup challenges at Hanford, the Department of Energy and its contractors are on the verge of achieving a cleanup commitment that has been decades in the making. DOE is preparing to vitrify (turn to glass) Hanford's chemical and radioactive tank waste using the DFLAW process. The Modified Consent Decree milestone for completing hot commissioning of the Hanford Site's Low- Activity Waste Facility is Dec. 31, 2023. While this milestone may seem distant under normal project management circumstances, it is a relatively short period of time for the operational and cultural transformation necessary to successfully begin treating tank waste at Hanford. Direct feed means separating the waste at a tank farm to remove the more radioactive portion (i.e., solids and cesium) so that the resulting low-activity (less radioactive) waste can be fed directly to the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant's Low-Activity Waste Facility. Starting DFLAW will require a singular, intensive leadership focus, along with a sustained, collective commitment to excellence and teamwork by the Department and its contractors. Major upgrades to Hanford's infrastructure will occur prior to startup. Supporting DFLAW operations requires significant integration between the DFLAW facilities - the Waste Treatment Plant, Hanford's tank farms, effluent treatment facilities, disposal facilities - and between all of the site contractors to achieve success. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Challenges and Solutions in Operation and Lay-Up of the Modular Caustic- Side Solvent Extraction Unit - 20078

The Modular Caustic-Side Solvent Extraction (CSSX) Unit (MCU) was designed and constructed to provide interim salt waste processing so that the Liquid Waste Disposition Program (LWDP) could continue waste removal and tank closure until start-up of the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). MCU processes Clarified Salt Solution (CSS), or salt solution (SS) that has undergone actinide removal/filtration, to produce two waste streams: the cesium laden Strip Effluent (SE), which is incorporated into glass at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), and the cesium depleted Decontaminated SS (DSS), which is incorporated into grout at the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF). MCU completed start-up in 2008 with an initial operating life of 3 years and design life of 5 years. Prior to reaching the end of the design life, multiple critical components were upgraded and/or replaced to mitigate risks associated with any delays in SWPF start-up. During the remainder of operation (until June 2019), MCU was challenged to maximize processing with minimal additional modifications to repair/improve aging infrastructure, while maintaining low levels of risk to workers and the environment. Notable challenges during the extended operating life of the facility involved both mechanical and operational issues. Two of the most significant issues were the increased frequency of Process Vessel Ventilation (PVV) High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filter change-outs and the biofouling of the SE coalescer (SEC). The major impacts of both issues were that replacement of these components 1) resulted in high exposure to workers, and 2) required substantial downtime, thus hindering achievement of processing goals. PVV HEPA filter replacements are required based on dose rate and differential pressure (dP) limits. After introducing a higher-curie feed to MCU, the operating time between change outs was reduced by approximately half. SEC replacements are required based on dP limits. After restarting from an extended outage, the operating life of the SEC was significantly reduced by more than half due to biofouling. As a result of extensive troubleshooting and process improvements, the facility was able to recover performance and extend the operating life of the PVV HEPA filters and the SEC media. Through troubleshooting both of these issues, the facility was also able to learn from prior experience and adapt in order to minimize down time and maintain throughput. Although the facility took advantage of short periods of downtime to perform nonintrusive troubleshooting and minor corrective/preventative maintenance activities, longer outages were periodically required for corrective maintenance involving process cell entry. During these outages, remote tools and specialized shield plates were employed to minimize dose to workers. Mock-ups of non-routine maintenance activities were critical to early identification of potential issues and improvements, which shortened outage duration. Consistent with the facility's operational strategy, evolutions needed for MCU layup were identified and sequenced to ensure safe conditions within the facility, meet pre-defined criteria for lay-up configuration, and protect workers, while minimizing the impact to SWPF integration. De-inventory and flushing of process areas was prioritized so that the total residual inventory was reduced as efficiently as possible. This paper discusses lessons learned and best practices from troubleshooting unique issues, performing complex maintenance activities, and implementing a layup strategy that best supports the overall system mission. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Brine Availability Test in Salt, a Heated Borehole Experiment at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, New Mexico, USA - 20233

The Brine Availability Tests in Salt is a US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy supported activity as part of the Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition Campaign where we are performing simultaneous heated and control experiments in adjacent horizontal boreholes in the WIPP Salt Disposal Investigation drifts as part of experimental Phase 1. Phase 1a of BATS, a low-cost, small spatial-scale experiment performed in order to design instrumentation and methods for further experimentation in the URL, has been completed (June 2018 - May 2019) and is described elsewhere. In coincidence with multiple physical parameters that will be measured over the duration of the experiment, we will be measuring the liquid and vapor phases of H{sub 2}O as well as its isotopic content (not measured in Phase 1a). Three different forms of water occur in natural salts: as fluid in macro scale (mm size) inclusions, as intergranular free H{sub 2}O and as H{sub 2}O incorporated in hydrous minerals. Each of these forms has potentially different stable isotope signatures and will be influenced differentially by heat induced transport and by interaction with introduced tracers. Continuous measurement of vapor phase H{sub 2}O isotopes during borehole heating will be impacted by several effects: 1) evaporation as liquid brine flows into the borehole and evaporates completely or partially into the dry N{sub 2} stream; 2) steam from dehydration of hydrous minerals, that may enter the borehole; and 3) hydrous minerals that may form in the borehole (preferentially incorporating heavier isotopes). The continuous time series collected over the course of the heating test will be combined with analyses of pre-test and post-test collected samples of test site salt to investigate the contributions of each of the three water types as H{sub 2}O is mobilized due to the effects of heating. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Excavation Volume Growth Factors at Environmental Remediation Sites - 20318

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) manages numerous environmental remediation projects in accordance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, otherwise known as CERCLA. These include projects for the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). Utilizing the CERCLA framework to address these projects requires detailed cost estimates and a significant portion of costs are associated with the volume of material to be excavated and that material's final disposition. Accordingly, understanding the expected volumes and uncertainty associated with those volumes is vital to project cost estimating. These estimates are completed at various stages of the CERCLA process, thus the project team has varying degrees of information available from which to develop these estimates depending on how far along the project is. Understanding the factors contributing to volume growth (increase in volume of material from that originally estimated) is a crucial element to determining volume and cost uncertainty. This paper presents a case study of a FUSRAP site which involves excavation and offsite disposal of contaminated soils from complex commercial, industrial, and residential properties. Original volume estimates were compared to post excavation volumes on a property by property basis. Reasons for differences are determined along with magnitude of impacts to cost estimating. For both residential and commercial property types, volume estimating factors, uncertainty considerations, and methods to account for each are discussed with emphasis on volume growth considerations. Cost estimating model input considerations are discussed with specific emphasis on accounting for volume uncertainty at the Feasibility Study (FS) phase of CERCLA. Underestimating or overestimating costs at the FS phase has repercussions under CERCLA that may impact project close out or completion schedule. Discussions presented will be helpful to both reviewers and preparers of cost estimates involving excavations. Additionally, project planners may be able to use the information to plan for volume growth contingencies. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Initial Testing of Alkaline Earth Metal Ion Absorption on Crystalline Silicotitanate - 20440

The Tank Closure Cesium Removal process at the Savannah River Site (SRS) has processed aqueous tank waste using the inorganic ion exchange media IONSIV{sup TM} R9120-Ba (which is also known as Crystalline Silicotitanate (CST)). Salt-cake in Tank 10H at SRS was dissolved and processed through filters and ion exchange columns. The primary purpose of the process is to remove Cs-137 from the aqueous waste so that it can be disposed as low level waste. It is known that this inorganic media also absorbs strontium from solution, and that strontium competes with cesium ions for absorption sites. The strontium ion is actually more strongly absorbed than the cesium ion from typical tank waste. However, strontium is typically present in low concentrations so does not normally cause a significant impact. Strontium is present as both non-radioactive isotopes and the radioactive Sr-90 isotope; with the non-radioactive isotopes being much more abundant. Although the total strontium solubility is usually much lower than cesium, some tank waste compositions can have a high enough soluble strontium concentration to decrease the cesium absorption. Relatedly, some testing at SRS suggested that another alkaline earth metal, calcium, may also absorb onto CST and may decrease cesium absorption. Barium is also an important species in treatment of tank waste, but is also usually present at low concentrations. However, after the Cs-137 is absorbed onto CST, it emits a beta particle and converts to Ba-137m, which then decays to non-radioactive Ba-137 by emission of a gamma ray. If the Ba-137m were to desorb quickly, it could impact the dose rate in down-stream equipment. In order to understand the impact of these alkaline earth metals on CST, SRNL performed testing using simulants of SRS tank waste that contain soluble barium, strontium, and calcium. Testing examined both removal of the alkaline earth metals and their impact on removal of cesium. Testing involved first developing realistic waste simulant formulations and dissolving the alkaline earth metals to high enough concentrations to potentially impact the Cs absorption. Once the formulations were developed and prepared, computer modeling was used to calculate the expected Cs absorption behavior to determine if the alkaline earth metals impact the performance. Measurements of the alkaline earth metals absorption by the media is also important for disposition of spent media because of the added radionuclide inventory from the Sr-90. These initial tests are examining the general impact and will be used to determine if further testing or measurements are needed. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 13: D and D Collaboration Between US DOE EM and NNSA (R6.3)

This panel focused on the interaction and collaboration between US Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management (DOE EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) offices and sites. Panelists with presentations: NNSA and DOE EM Collaboration on Facility Disposition (Deborah Couchman-Griswold); DOE EM and NNSA D and D Collaboration at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Diane McDaniel); Working Together to Achieve Environmental Cleanup Success in Oak Ridge (Laura Wilkerson, James Daffron); DOE-EM - NNSA (Rick Demmer)

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DOE OSTI2020

Calculating Potential Radiological Emissions for Waste Management Activities at INL - 20068

At Idaho National Laboratory (INL), work involving radionuclides is evaluated for potential emissions from a project in order to comply with the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) regulations, 40 CFR 61 Subpart H. Emission calculations are documented in an Air Permitting Applicability Determination (APAD) to analyze unmitigated and mitigated emissions and determine if an Application to Construct (ATC) or continuous monitoring is required. To calculate the unmitigated and mitigated emissions, a spreadsheet was developed to provide ease in determining potential emissions by providing the maximum operating temperature and the material being used. The spreadsheet aids in determining the potential emissions for research projects and waste management activities at Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) and other locations across the INL site. Furthermore, it can also be used for periodic confirmatory measurements (PCM) to justify low emissions. Elements that factor into the unmitigated and mitigated calculations include the amount of each radionuclide used (in curies or grams), specific activity (if amount is given in grams), the temperature the material is heated to in Celsius, the dose conversion factor which is derived from Clean Air Act Assessment Package - 1988 (CAP-88) modeling, and the number of HEPA filters used for mitigated measures. The main drivers for calculating the unmitigated emissions for a project are the amount used per radionuclide, the maximum operating temperature, and the location of the work. The maximum operating temperature determines the airborne release factor which is dependent on the physical state of the radionuclide. Prior to October 2017, if the radionuclide was heated to greater than 100 deg. C, the radionuclide was assumed to be a gas, which has the highest airborne release factor. This assumption would be overly conservative for radionuclides with high melting and boiling points, which provided a challenge to demonstrate low emissions. In October 2017, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved an alternative method for INL. This method allows the airborne release factor to be determined by using the melting point and 90% of the boiling point of the radionuclide. This methodology was included in the spreadsheet to allow unmitigated emission calculations for APADs to be completed more efficiently and effectively. Results show a reduction in time completing air emission calculations as well as lower total emissions across all facilities at INL. MFC annual emissions were reduced by 62% from the previous year and Research and Education Campus (REC) facilities were reduced by 38% due to implementation of the approved alternative method. Time spent on APADs, PCMs, and documentation for the annual NESHAP report was also reduced significantly. The spreadsheet provided in Table I provides the potential emission calculations for the 'Advanced Retrieval and Disposition Techniques for Remote Handled Mixed Low Level Waste (RH MLLW) at the Radioactive Scrap and Waste Facility (RSWF)' project. Calculations show the Potential Effective Dose Equivalent (PEDE) at RSWF to be 7.27 E-04 mrem/yr (7.27 E-09 Sv/yr) which is well below the 0.1 mrem/yr threshold. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Flammable Gas Generation and Control at the Idaho Completion Project Legacy Combustible Gas Generation - 20191

On April 11, 2018, four drums containing transuranic waste at the Idaho National Laboratory underwent over-pressurization, ejecting their lids and spreading radiological waste within a facility. An investigation has found that waste in the drums generated methane gas, which contributed to the event. Subsequent to the investigation, the potential for drums to have methane and other flammable analytes whose concentrations could approach or exceed the lower flammability limit (LFL) and the adequacy of the controls to prevent or mitigate a possible deflagration was evaluated. An extensive review of the historical records was performed to determine how many drums exceed the LFL. The historical record identified a small quantity of drums that exceeded the LFL for xylene, hydrogen, and methane. The primary codified applicable code or standard for handling drums is 29 CFR 1910.120 (j) 'Handling Drums and Containers.' It is used throughout the commercial and government sector. This code is integrated throughout the Fluor Idaho safety management programs and procedures to control the Standard Industrial Hazards (SIHs) associated with drum and container handling. Example requirements include: - Drums and containers are inspected, and their integrity assured prior to being moved. - Site operations are organized to minimize the amount of drum or container movement. - When there is a reasonable possibility of flammable atmospheres being present, material handling equipment and hand tools are of the type to prevent sources of ignition. Drums and containers under pressure, as evidenced by bulging or swelling, are not moved until the cause for excess pressure is determined and appropriate containment procedures have been implemented to protect employees from explosive relief of the drum. Drums which exceed the WIPP FGA limit have NCRs associated with them. Once a drum fails flammable gas sampling, an NCR is initiated. The NCR drives placement into NCR dense pack rows. A standing order drives placement of the FGA failures to a single planer segregation location. These drums are not allowed for further processing or shipment until the NCR has been cleared. Once in the single planer rows, follow-up FGA testing is performed by CCP. The NCR is dispositioned by follow-up sampling occurring after adequate time has been provided for the gas to diffuse through the filter assembly, or, in some cases, the drums are repackaged into additional drums to reduce the source term. To date, the ICP project has performed approximately 1.5 million drums moves without a deflagration event due to combustible gas generation. Flammable gas generation in a transuranic waste drum is not unique to the ICP but is common across the DOE complex. Based on the experience at Idaho, application of industry standards is sufficient to control the risk of drum deflagration due to drum movements. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

History of Ultrasonic Inspection of High-Level Waste Tanks at SRS - 20220

The Liquid Waste Disposition Projects (LWDP) Structural Authority and Inspection Engineering Support Group has teamed with the Materials Science and Technology Non-destructive Evaluation Group of Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to implement a comprehensive In-Service Inspection (ISI) program for the High-Level Waste (HLW) tanks in the sites tank farms. The purpose of this program is to demonstrate the structural and leak integrity of the tanks to maintain the function of waste containment throughout the desired service life. Four types of waste tanks were constructed at Savannah River Site (SRS) from 1951 thru 1981 to store radioactive nuclear waste from the separations process. The Type I, II and III are carbon steel cylindrical tanks with varying degrees of access to the side walls and very limited access to the tank bottom. The tanks contain 750,000 to 1.3 million gallons of waste and are buried or backfilled with soil. The tanks are 75'-85' in diameter and 24'-33' from tank bottom to the tank roof. Inspection of the HLW tanks is made difficult by radiation, contamination, and small access openings. Through the years these challenges have been overcome by progressive improvements to programs and equipment resulting in the sophisticated wall crawler Ultrasonic Testing (UT) technology of today. A formal inspection program was developed and put in service in 1972. UT thickness measurements were first made in 1967 and 1969 of selected waste tanks using an analog-type instrument to measure the thickness of the carbon steel walls. Routine inspections for thinning were performed from 1972-1985 and then discontinued because no thinning had been observed and this technique could not detect pitting or cracking. UT inspections resumed in 1994 using a sophisticated robotic wall crawler with UT technology capable of detecting thinning, cracking and pitting. The current program focuses on the newer Type III tanks that are used primarily for storage. The program was upgraded in 2003 to include selected regions of the tank wall, secondary wall and annulus floor on a 7 to 10-year frequency. The facility is currently in its third cycle of tank inspections. Thus far, there have been no reportable indications of service induced degradation. This result provides assurance that the chemistry control program has been effective at mitigating corrosion and that the tanks remain structurally sound even after more than 40 years of service. This paper will present the UT technology first used at SRS and the evolution to the current systems and their capabilities. Additionally, plans for equipment upgrades that will improve the extent of inspection will be discussed. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

The Use of Silver Chloride Injection in Remediation of Iodine-129 by In Situ Capture as Silver Iodide at the F-Area Seepage Basin - 20225

The Savannah River Site (SRS) produced tritium, plutonium, and special nuclear materials for national defense, medicine, and the space programs. As part of operations, the F-Area Seepage Basins operated until 1988 for the disposition of deionized acidic wastewater from the F Separations Facility. The wastewater contained dilute nitric acid and low concentrations of non-radioactive metals, and radionuclides, with the major isotopes being Cs-137, Sr-90, U-235, U-238, Pu-239, Tc-99, I-129, and tritium. The seepage basins were closed in 1988 and backfilled and capped by 1991. The groundwater emanating from beneath the closed and capped seepage basins is acidic and contains elevated levels of both chemical and radiological contaminants. Releases from the groundwater plumes sourced from the F-Area Seepage Basins have impacted the water quality of Fourmile Branch, which is a small tributary to the Savannah River, a regional water source. A large pump-and-treat system was constructed in 1997 and operated until 2003 in an attempt to capture the releases to Fourmile Branch. The system in F Area and a similar system in H Area were expensive (∼$1.3 M/month) to operate and produced large quantities of radioactive waste, with concentrations of I- 129 too high to be disposed of at the SRS. In 2004, SRS replaced pump-and-treat with a funnel and gate system that along with operation of a base injection system at the gates reduces the flux of contaminants to the wetlands adjacent to Fourmile Branch. The alkaline solution injected into the aquifer neutralizes the acidic plume and immobilizes many of the cationic constituents. However, base injection is not effective in managing the release of iodine-129, an anionic contaminant. To address iodine-129 SRS and the Savannah River National Laboratory developed an in situ technology that uses ultra-fine ground silver chloride (AgCl) as an injectable capture medium for the sequestration of iodine-129. The AgCl amendment has a very small particle size and is designed to be injected into the contaminated aquifer to capture iodine-129. Dissolved iodine-129 forms a stable and highly insoluble solid (silver iodide) upon contact with AgCl. Laboratory studies, a field scale pilot test (2009), and three deployments (2011, 2015 and 2019) of AgCl have been successfully performed at the F-Area Seepage Basins. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Co-Disposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW - 20331

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties, resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and conditions of SNF, a robust DOE Standard Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard Canister had four variations: 3.05-meter (10-foot) or 4.57-meter (15-foot) length, and 45.7-cm (18-inch) or 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository, these canisters were to be grouped with 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter high level waste (HLW) canisters in a 2.13-meter (84-inch) diameter co-disposal waste package. The smaller 45.7-cm (18-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The larger 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister would take the place of one of the five HLW canisters on the outer ring in the co-disposal waste package. No DOE Standard Canisters have been loaded. A preliminary evaluation has estimated the number of elements of a fuel type that can fit into the different sizes of the DOE Standard Canister, but no definitive loading configuration has been selected. Changing the loading configuration could impact the number of loadable DOE Standard Canisters and the number of co-disposal waste packages needed for eventual disposition. This paper conveys the ranges of DOE Standard Canisters and HLW canisters that may be produced under certain conditions. It also examines the differences in the estimated number of co-disposal waste packages produced for eventual disposal when using different loading strategies in the DOE Standard Canister for Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Peach Bottom, and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) SNF. Changing the loading configurations of ATR, Peach Bottom, and HFIR SNF slightly impacted the number of co-disposal waste packages that may be needed for ultimate disposal. The change in loading configuration was more impactful when a different canister was used, as opposed to varying the number of elements that could fit inside the same size canister. In one case, a reduction of co-disposal waste packages could be achieved by allowing mixing of short HLW canisters with long DOE Standard Canisters. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the ratio between HLW canisters and DOE Standard Canisters will drive the total number of co-disposal waste packages. If too many HLW canisters (i.e., more than five times the number of 18-inch DOE standard canisters) or DOE Standard Canisters are produced, some co-disposal waste packages may not have all positions filled. A co-disposal waste package may be filled with all HLW with no DOE Standard Canister, or a co-disposal waste package could be filled with a single DOE Standard Canister. A ratio that does not closely align to optimum could allow for the design of waste packages that hold just HLW canisters or just DOE SNF canisters. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Consequence Analysis of Residual Water in a Storage Canister - 20484

Recent observations from projects sponsored under the DOE-Nuclear Energy Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition campaign show that residual free water, well above the 0.4 gm-moles that correspond to a 3 torr rebound pressure after a 30-minute hold following prototypic drying, may remain within SNF canisters used for long-term dry storage. Specifically, experimental observations in an Integrated Research Project showed subzero temperatures and a local pocket of frozen water in a mockup fuel assembly subjected to an industry practiced drying process. In gas sampling and analysis from the High Burnup (HBU) Demonstration project, using a fully loaded and dried SNF canister, indicated presence of 100 g of residual water had remained in the canister. The effects of residual water in terms of potential adverse impacts on the condition of the SNF and the canister internals during long-term dry storage has been rigorously evaluated to address inadvertent residual water contents. The impact of residual water on the fuel and canister internals, with a focus on the oxidation of the cladding and of postulated exposed (breached-clad) fuel, were evaluated using an integrated set of time-dependent environmental conditions with semi-empirical materials oxidation models. An 'integration model,' with coupled sub-models, developed and previously used by the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analysis (CNWRA), was applied and expanded with improved sub-models for water radiolysis, and for cladding and fuel oxidations. Cladding oxidation models for various alloys were developed using the rate constants for various cladding alloys in the dry storage temperature range. A burnup-dependent fuel oxidation model was developed; it accounted for inhibition effect of fission products on fuel oxidation rates. The potential for extension of the initial breach flaw (1 mm hole) was evaluated by two separate mechanics criteria. In the first case, a critical cladding strain criterion was used. In the second case, a critical stress intensity was used to evaluate stability of a planar axial flaw postulate. A failure condition exists when a sufficient amount of fuel oxidation (at the postulated breached-clad location) causes fuel pellet swelling to load the cladding to meet a mechanics criterion for flaw extension. The integration model's results provide the following insights. The radiolysis-generated oxygen is consumed with a partitioning between the cladding and the fuel. The extent of cladding oxidation is no more than 2 μm additional consumption of the cladding metal even with 10 moles of residual water, indicating that changes in cladding conditions due to water are expected to be negligible. The conditions for cladding failure (breach opening size extension) directly correlates with the extent of fuel oxidation. Fuel oxidation significant to extend the breach could occur even with 5.5 moles of residual water. The results indicate that fuel oxidation vis-a-vis cladding oxidation is more likely under a higher radiation field, i.e., when radiolytic decomposition of the residual water occurs in few years compared to several decades, and that the conditions to cause failure are increased with fuel and cladding temperatures approaching the peak storage temperature limit of 400 deg. C. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Technology Development for Dry Storage of Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel - 20490

A candidate disposition pathway for the > 13 MTHM of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF), owned and managed by the U.S. Department of Energy, is the drying and placement of the SNF into sealed-canister dry storage, with the ASNF-in- canisters 'road-ready' for transportation to and final direct disposal in a repository waste package. Technical information gaps in fuel drying, and fuel dry storage behavior, have previously challenged the declaration of technology readiness for drying and placement of this fuel into the DOE Standard Canister design for > 50 years of safe dry storage. The principal technical information gaps included: i) characterization and thermal dehydration behavior of aluminum (oxy)hydroxide films attendant on the cladding due to film formation during reactor operation and during post-discharge up to long-term wet storage histories; and ii) G-value data to enable estimation of the radiolytic gas generation from the cladding with its (oxy)hydroxide films. Thus, the oxide films on the ASNF challenged the safety of a sealed storage canister with thermal and radiolytic decomposition of the waters on the films that can lead to corrosion, pressurization, and flammability issues. These gaps in the technical information base have largely been closed. This paper discusses the investigations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and the Savannah River National laboratory (SRNL), and outlines the pending technology development work for input to an engineering design to enable a road-ready dry storage system for ASNF. The ASNF inventory considered for road-ready dry storage is stored at the Savannah River Site (SRS) and at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) at the INL. The ASNF inventory in the SRS L Basin is from foreign and domestic research reactors (FRR and DRR), and is diverse in terms of design, irradiation, and post-reactor-discharge storage conditions; these factors yield a range of characteristics of cladding oxide films on ASNF. Mixed aluminum (oxy)hydroxide (boehmite and bayerite/gibbsite) films, non-uniform in thicknesses up to a maximum local thickness bounded by 25 μm, were observed on ASNF materials removed from wet storage in the L Basin and in non-sealed dry storage at the SRS following reactor service and a long-term (up to 40+ years) interim storage history. The ASNF inventory at INTEC, in both wet and vented dry storage, is predominantly from the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), but it also includes DRR and FRR fuel. To address a profound behavior of these films, radiolysis testing of aluminum specimens with mixed type boehmite/bayerite oxide films was performed to develop basic data on G-values for production of radiolytic hydrogen under dry storage conditions with nominal relative humidity, temperature, and cover gas. Modeling and simulation of canister internal environments with postulated inventories of oxide films provides estimation of the evolution of the conditions of the canister loaded with ASNF. Simultaneous Thermal Analysis (TGA/DSC) of hydrated oxide powders, and laboratory-scale aluminum specimens with a bayerite film (∼10 μm) using TGA methods, inform drying time/temperature conditions to be used for the ASNF. A demonstration project is recommended for Verification and Validation of the drying and storage of the ASNF. Remaining major tasks leading up to the hot demonstration include scale-up radiolysis testing and scale-up drying testing. Engineering design with the information from the technology program will establish the safety basis and enable long-term (> 50 years) dry storage compatibility with ASNF in the DOE Standard Canister pending its transportation to and disposal in a repository. This full capability would show the ASNF-in-canister storage system to be road-ready. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2024

Fabrication and Testing of DOE Standard Canister Closure Leak Test Assembly

DOE manages over 300 types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), many of which are located at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) site. Managing this large variety of SNF for storage, transportation, and disposal poses a challenge to DOE. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the DOE SNF Road-Ready Demonstration (“Road-Ready Demonstration”), which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF for “road-ready dry storage.” Road-ready dry storage is an SNF management concept in which SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters that are then placed in onsite storage in anticipation of later transport and disposition. The forward-looking goal of the Road-Ready Demonstration is to establish the foundation for a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site. In support of establishing a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site, the Road-Ready Demonstration will first package Fort St. Vrain SNF currently in dry storage at INL into several DOE Standard Canisters (DOESCs). These DOESCs will in turn be loaded into another containment similar to commercial multi-purpose canisters. This multi-purpose canister will then be compatible with a transportation or storage system, such as a storage cask for interim storage or transportation package for offsite transport. These DOESCs will remain sealed over the course of their storage, transportation, and applicable disposal functions. The closure process for the DOESC will include fuel and basket loading, welding, inspection, leak testing, and, if needed, repair. As a follow-up to previous discussions on the design of the DOE Closure Leak Test Assembly (LTA), this report describes recent fabrication and testing efforts performed at INL. DOESCs are sealed by two sequential gas tungsten arc welds, both of which are performed by remotely operated and semiautomatic welding systems. The first weld is a circumferential pipe weld that completes the assembly of the canister body and lid assembly. The second and final closure weld attaches the vent plug to the vent socket via a butt joint. After the second weld is performed, the welds are helium leak tested using an evacuated envelope technique. The LTA was designed for both remote and manual operation. This report describes the fabrication and performance testing associated with the evacuated envelope technique. INL staff designed, fabricated, and tested the LTA at INL facilities. This testing included establishing technique and system sensitivities in accordance with ASME and American National Standards Institute N14.5 requirements. Forthcoming work will cover such areas as design optimization, process and personnel qualification, and implementation in Road-Ready Demonstration operations.

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DOE OSTI2024

Drop Analysis of a Department of Energy Standard Canister Containing Fort Saint Vrain SNF– 24138

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, many of which are located at the INL site. Managing this large variety of SNF for storage, transportation, and disposal poses a challenge to DOE. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the DOE SNF Road-Ready Demonstration (“Road-Ready Demonstration”), which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF for “road-ready dry storage.” Road-ready dry storage (RRDS) is an SNF management concept in which SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters that are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later transport and disposition. The forward-looking goal of the Road-Ready Demonstration is to establish the foundation for a large-scale RRDS program at the INL site. One critical aspect of RRDS is the ability to certify the DOE Standard Canister and its associated transportation package in accordance with 10 CFR 71 for offsite transportation. Depending on the SNF type and transportation strategy, DOE Standard Canisters may be required to maintain structural integrity under hypothetical accident scenarios (e.g., drop events). The DOE Standard Canisters have been tested and analyzed under various SNF loading configurations and accident drop events in support of the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility and other DOE programs; however, no analysis has yet been completed in support of the recently initiated Road-Ready Demonstration. This paper presents preliminary results from a finite element analysis of the Ø45.7 cm × 4.6 m (Ø18 in. × 15 ft) DOE Standard Canister under the 9 m drop at 80 degrees off-vertical drop scenario considered in previous INL tests and analyses. It considers the Fort St. Vrain spent nuclear fuel loading configuration proposed for the Road-Ready Demonstration, uses updated material properties, and applies the strain-based acceptance criteria established in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code’s Section III, Division 3 rules for storage and transportation spent nuclear fuel containments. This updated analysis is compared to previous DOE Standard Canister drop analyses. Preliminary results from the updated analysis show that certain regions of the containment exceed the allowable limits during the accidental drop event. However, these regions are limited to components performing a non-structural function. While further work on this analysis will be pursued, this analysis serves as the foundation for formal calculations used to support applicable certification efforts of the RRDS system at INL.

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DOE OSTI2024

Drop Analysis of a Department of Energy Standard Canister Containing Fort Saint Vrain SNF

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