Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “defense”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 541 records · Page 30

Design Considerations for Distributed Energy Resource Honeypots and Canaries

There are now over 2.5 million Distributed Energy Resource (DER) installations connected to the U.S. power system. These installations represent a major portion of American electricity critical infrastructure and a cyberattack on these assets in aggregate would significantly affect grid operations. Virtualized Operational Technology (OT) equipment has been shown to provide practitioners with situational awareness and better understanding of adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Deploying synthetic DER devices as honeypots and canaries would open new avenues of operational defense, threat intelligence gathering, and empower DER owners and operators with new cyber-defense mechanisms against the growing intensity and sophistication of cyberattacks on OT systems. Well-designed DER canary field deployments would deceive adversaries and provide early-warning notifications of adversary presence and malicious activities on OT networks. In this report, we present progress to design a high-fidelity DER honeypot/canary prototype in a late-start Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Compilation and Evaluation of Data from Groundwater Impounded within the U12n and U12t Tunnels, Rainier and Aqueduct Mesas, Nevada National Security Site

The Department of Defense (DOD) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management Nevada Program (EM NV) conducted routine physical and geochemical monitoring of water impounded behind impermeable structures placed within the U12n and U12t tunnels on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site [NTS]). Desert Research Institute (DRI) conducted a semiquantitative evaluation of pressure data to determine the extent to which the tunnels have been inundated and a qualitative evaluation of monitored geochemical parameters to determine if trends exist that were indicative of hydrologic and/or geochemical processes operating behind the tunnel plugs. Data were also evaluated to determine if monitored radiological parameters exceeded primary standards associated with the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) (40 C.F.R. § 141.66).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Evaluation of Degradation Mechanisms for Solid Secondary Waste Grout Waste Forms

The overall objective of this work is to provide defensibility for the long-term performance of grouted Hanford SSW streams when disposed in a near surface disposal facility, IDF, on the Hanford Site. Providing defensibly for the long-term performance of the grouted waste forms is consistent with the research and development activities identified in the Performance Assessment Maintenance Plan, (Westcott et al. 2019), that are necessary to address the assumptions made in the PA. Specifically, this work addresses two areas identified for further research and development activities in the plan: (1) “Evaluate ongoing research on transport characteristics of cementitious materials using accelerated tests to approximate the effects of aging/alteration/weathering”; and (2) “Evaluate ongoing research on microbial effects on transport processes in cementitious materials.” The assembled subject matter expert team evaluated a list of degradation mechanisms and supporting processes and provided rankings of areas where further research and development (R&D) are needed. From this assessment, high priority R&D areas include: (1) the effects of carbonation, Ca leaching, and SSW dimensional change in grout waste forms; (2) updated model representations of grouted waste forms; and (3) scaled testing demonstrations. Moderate priority items including a paper study on possible microbial influence, reoxidation rates, radionuclide/contaminant dissolution from SSW in the grout and freeze thaw behavior. Other processes evaluated were either deemed unlikely to occur, to have little impact on the SSW waste forms, or to occur at time frames beyond those considered (>10,000 years). The assessments and proposed R&D approaches are expected to support an update to the WRPS SSW roadmap.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

SPARC 3D Field Physics and Support of the Non-Axisymmetric Coil Assessment

Commonwealth Fusion Systems (CFS) is deploying SPARC, a net-energy tokamak, by 2025. A notable challenge facing all tokamak approaches to fusion energy production is maintaining a stable plasma and thereby steady energy production. “Disruptions” to plasma operation are often encountered in devices when they operate at high normalized pressure, high normalized density, or high normalized current. SPARC is unique in that it is expected to demonstrate Q>=2 in a plasma with low normalized pressure and density, but with a more modest current limit buffer sufficient to avoid disruptions. Due to both the high normalized current and high magnetic field of the SPARC design, it is expected to decrease its relative resilience to instabilities driven by non-axisymmetry in the externally applied magnetic field, termed ‘error fields’. To prevent error field driven instabilities, a primary line of defense is strict engineering tolerances in magnet fabrication and installation. A secondary line of defense is a purpose-built set of magnetic coils to correct these errors, termed error field correction coils (EFCCs). The overarching goals of this INFUSE project were to evaluate the effectiveness of the EFCCs in the SPARC design and provide guidance as to how to improve this effectiveness.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Discrete-event Simulation Process Model for the Pyrochemical Processing of Plutonium at Los Alamos National Laboratory

The pyrochemical metal production operations that occur in the Plutonium Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory perform plutonium purification with the aim to provide plutonium metal for a variety of defense- and non-defense missions within the National Nuclear Security Administration. The demands and constraints associated with the pyrochemical processing of plutonium are complex, making decision analyses challenging for program managers who require plutonium production for their mission applications. The construction of a discrete-event simulation process model is proposed to measure and report the process capacity, material throughput, equipment requirements, and dose accumulation for operators of the pyrochemical metal production operations. The process model, constructed in the ExtendSim™ software, will represent the cause-and-effect relationships between the pyrochemical processing environment and the process constraints, including criticality limitations, material control and accountability measures, chemical analysis requirements, and equipment availability. An accurate representation of the pyrochemical metal production process capacity through simulation modeling will be helpful to program managers in their efforts to forecast plutonium availability for mission applications. Furthermore, the proposed process model will be vital for future analyses that will measure the interactions between the pyrochemical metal production operations and the aqueous reprocessing operations and their ability to minimize transuranic waste disposal.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Results of Re-evaluation of FEPs Related to Implementing the ABD Glass Program

The Savannah River Site plans to reprocess defense spent nuclear fuel currently stored in their L-Basin via the Accelerated Basin Deinventory (ABD) Program. The previous plan for the L-Basin spent nuclear fuel was to dispose of it directly in the federal repository without reprocessing. Implementing the ABD Program will result in final disposal of approximately 900 fewer canisters of defense spent nuclear fuel and the production of approximately 521 more canisters of vitrified high-level waste glass with some specific differences from the planned high-level waste glass. Because the 235U in the L-Basin spent nuclear fuel is not intended to be recovered, the fissile mass loading of the vitrified high-level glass waste form to be produced must be increased above the current value of 897 g/m 3 to a maximum of 2,500 g/m 3 . Therefore, implementing the ABD Program would produce a variant of high-level waste glass—the ABD glass—that needs to be evaluated for future repository licensing, which includes both preclosure safety and postclosure performance. This report describes the approach to and summarizes the results of an evaluation of the potential effects of implementing the ABD Program at the Savannah River Site on the technical basis for future repository licensing for a generic repository that is similar to Yucca Mountain and for one that is fully generic. This evaluation includes the effects on preclosure safety analyses and postclosure performance assessment for both repository settings. The license application for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository (DOE 2008), which is serving as a framework for this evaluation, concluded that the proposed Yucca Mountain repository would meet all applicable regulatory requirements. The evaluation documented in this report found that implementing the ABD Program is not expected to change that conclusion for a generic repository similar to Yucca Mountain or for a generic repository with respect to the preclosure safety analyses. With respect to the postclosure performance of a generic repository, no concerns were identified.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Assessment of the High Flux Isotope Reactor Cybersecurity Initiative

Recent cyber-attacks on industrial control systems, and inadvertent exposure of nuclear plant systems to cyber-exploits underscore the need for plant operators to adopt and deploy cyber-security defense solutions made for industrial control systems. Of increasing concern is the fact that international cyber hackers are beginning to target critical infrastructure, and because these more modern controls systems depend on advanced use of digital systems, they are more vulnerable than ever before to cyber-attacks. Traditional cyber defense strategies and products that have been available for decades are tailored for use on IT or corporate networks but can cause interruptions and catastrophic damage when deployed on industrial control system networks. The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy established the Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN) program to provide private companies pursuing innovative nuclear energy technologies with access to the technical support necessary to move toward commercialization. One of these GAIN small business vouchers was awarded to Dragos, Inc. to enable collaboration with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to evaluate the Dragos Platform on a production nuclear reactor test bed, hence laying the path for future commercial adoption. The vision was to provide a guide for industrial operators on implementing an industrial monitoring solution and to show how these solutions can be deployed without causing safety and reliability issues. This report documents the results of the collaboration between ORNL and Dragos, Inc.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Proposed Products to Support Shelter-Evacuation Decision Making in the Event of a Nuclear Detonation

Response strategies implemented in the first few hours to days after a nuclear detonation on the US homeland may save more than 100,000 lives. Effective planning and pre-event capability development can increase the response efficacy and so the number of lives saved. During such an event, the US Department of Defense, Joint Task Force Civil Support (DoD JTF-CS) provides command and control for the DoD forces supporting civil authority response operations. Among other activities, JTF-CS expects to support FEMA as well as State and local agencies in shelter and evacuation response activities. JTF-CS currently uses a manual method to generate evacuation decision making products. This method compares the dose that would be (a) acquired remaining at a given location to that (b) acquired during evacuation along a small number of routes. In these products, evacuation may be warranted when the projected “remain” dose is greater than the “evacuate” dose. This method only provides a limited consideration of the protection buildings provide their occupants. To inform the JTF-CS nuclear detonation response, the DoD Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has tasked Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to design a set of planning and response products to support shelter-evacuation activities. This report documents these products to facilitate DTRA and JTF-CS planning efforts. To provide context, we also provide appendices that summarize US planning guidance response zones, early (<72 h) response strategies, and other key topics.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Nondestructive Assay Technical Infrastructure Program Mission and Vision

The Nondestructive Assay Program (NDAP) mission and vision is achieved by identifying and accomplishing a set of programmatic goals that correspond with eight broad technical program elements. The NDAP was created as a result of Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board Recommendation 2007-1, entitled “Safety-Related In Situ Nondestructive Assay of Radioactive Materials,” which emphasized the need to improve in situ measurements of radioactive material at US Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities. An NDAP five-year plan will define tasks to accomplish specific goals identified in the NDAP mission and vision. This mission and vision is applicable for eight technical program elements: Hardware/Software Development, Algorithm Development and Nuclear Data, Uncertainty Quantification, Nuclear Materials, Staffing, Personnel, And Training, Data Management, Requirement and Standards, and Information Preservation and Dissemination. An additional program element is technical support, which provides daily execution management support for the NDAP, site scope, and deliverable tracking via site task managers, along with technical advisement and support from the technical support group. The NDAP mission and vision provides attributes with specific goals for each program element, and some goals benefit multiple program elements. The goals and attributes defined herein are implemented via an NDAP five-year execution plan that defines site work scope, budget, and deliverables, all of which are updated annually. The NDAP is designed to benefit nondestructive assay (NDA) needs to support DOE nuclear criticality safety programs, ensuring that NDA technology is sufficiently capable of guaranteeing the safety of those who handle, store, process, or transport fissionable materials in the complex. Especially important for the NDAP is to maximize capabilities to identify, characterize, and manage in situ fissile material deposits in process equipment to ensure nuclear criticality safety at processing facilities.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Autonomous System Subversion Tactics: Prototypes and Recommended Countermeasures

One of the fielding requirements for Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (AR/SMR) is the ability to support remote and autonomous operations. Autonomous Control Systems (ACS) are found on platforms such as Autonomous Space Vehicles, Cruise Missiles, and advanced driver-assistance systems. Each of these ACS implementations depends upon a set of decision support subsystems responsible for supporting Autonomous Mission Managers (names vary based upon field and author preferences). These Autonomous Mission Managers receive inputs from system sensors (e.g., LIDAR collection from an automobile travelling down a street; transients from a nuclear reactor), and perform a set of classifications (e.g., Red Traffic Light; Small Pedestrian at 10m; Load Rejection; Single Coolant Pump Trip), and then use these classifications in combination with recommendation algorithms to achieve platform goals (e.g., Stop the Vehicle at the Traffic Light, Avoid the Small Pedestrian; Trip the Reactor to prevent a Safety Event). The design, implementation, and fielding of an ACS capability will alter the cyber-attack surface such that existing risk management plans will need to be updated to include how to protect and defend against data-science and decision-support-system attack classes. These attack classes would include protection of the design and training environments where algorithm selection and testing and training data would be obvious attack vectors. These attack classes would also require an informed set of detection and response procedures to identify anomalous behaviors and document best practices for anomaly assessment and vulnerability mitigation and remediation. Last year we published a Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for AR/SMRs along with a companion publication on Cyber Attack and Defense Use Cases. The focus of the methodology was on describing and enumerating ACS processes, components, and functions such that security engineers could: evaluate subversion options against the target; identify threat actor attributes and capabilities derived from each subversion option; and identify security controls and response countermeasures. The Use Cases document offered detailed methodology examples including an assessment of a Military Base SMR, an Autonomous System Decision Loop, and implementation of AR/SMR Machine Learning algorithms. Our proposal at the end of last year was to focus on implementation of subversion prototypes related to the last Use Case area: AR/SMR Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms. We included six attack scenarios in our Use Cases paper: a Poisoning Attack against ML functions implemented using an FPGA; a Trojaning Attack against ML classifiers exploiting the excitability of Nuclear Engineers; a Backdooring Attack against ML Training environments to ensure persistence of an attack vector; a False Positive Evasion Attack against multi-factor Access Control Systems using clever inputs; an Inference Attack against ML models by an Insider with access to the Operational environment; and an Adversarial Reprogramming Attack against a Material Access Control Video Surveillance System. At the beginning of this year these six attack scenarios were provided to our research teams at Georgia Tech and Idaho State University and each team successfully implemented a subversion attack against a ML implementation to include transient misclassifications. While this is a notable outcome from this type of research, this paper offers the reader insight into not only how to structure and execute these types of attacks, but into the thought process behind how the researcher investigated the problem space, performed initial algorithm implementation, and the trial-and-error behind arriving at the successful subversion prototypes. We include in this paper a set of associated Scenarios on how these subversion prototypes could be implemented and an initial set of guidance for AR/SMR architects, Nuclear Regulators, and Cyber Defenders to implement awareness and defense capabilities into their current operational portfolios.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Briefing Book: Office of Experimental Sciences

Key to OES science is the advancement of experimental capabilities and vibrant partnerships with other elements of NNSA’s Defense Programs. OES fosters an experimental portfolio that spans the space from small scale studies utilizing tabletop instruments through complex and dynamic high energy density; hydrodynamic; and subcritical experiments on flagship national facilities like Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE), National Ignition Facility (NIF), Z machine at Sandia National Laboratories, Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT), and the U1a Complex in Nevada. Essential to meeting the deterrence challenges that drive OES is a functional strategy for integration of OES with Defense Programs pursuits in modeling and simulation, engineering and technology maturation, and stockpile and production modernization.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Independent Technical Review of INL Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel (ASNF) Oxide Layer Radiolytic Gas Generation Resolution: Task 2

PNNL staff performed an independent technical review (ITR) of the aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) program Task 2. The objective of Task 2 is to determine G-values for the radiolytic production of gaseous molecular hydrogen (H 2 ) from the aluminum oxyhydroxide layers present on ASNF cladding. The G-values need to be defensible, bounding, but not overly conservative. As part of the ITR, the team reviewed program documents, Task 2 work plans, and results to date. In addition, the team held three separate video conferences with the program research staff to ask clarifying questions and obtain additional detail. The PNNL ITR team concludes that if the program follows the methodology and rigor outlined in the test matrices, the program will develop G-values for a defensible technical basis of extended storage of ASNF. Recommendations for improvement are given.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Enabling Cybersecurity, Situational Awareness and Resilience in Distribution Grids with High Penetration of Photovoltaics (CARE-PV) (Final Report)

Since legacy distribution systems have very limited visibility beyond the substation, high penetration of PV at the grid edge presents some unique operational challenges. One approach to address these challenges is to use information from advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and µPMUs. However, exploiting this information is impacted by a number of factors, including multi-timescale measurements, volume of data generated, communication network impairments (e.g., information loss and latency) and susceptibility to cyber-attacks. Therefore, one of the critical tasks involved in the management of a distribution grid is to develop complete situational awareness by integrating cyber-security mechanisms with state estimation strategies and leveraging this situational awareness to assure energy services at strategic locations while exploiting AMI/PV inverter/ µPMU data. This CARE-PV project addresses the fundamental challenges in situational awareness and resilience to cyber and physical vectors by exploiting the synergy between innovative modeling, estimation, data analytics, testing and validation using smart PV inverters designed at K-State and facilities at NREL. Specifically, the project involved the development, testing and validation of the following novel enabling technologies: (Thrust 1) Resilience to cyber vectors that impact data integrity was addressed via a two-level defense strategy that combines cyber intrusion detection using self-learning, cooperative smart PV inverters, and a novel moving target defense framework to combat data integrity attacks. (Thrust 2) Resilience to cyber-physical vectors that impact situational awareness by limiting data availability was addressed via novel centralized and decentralized, sparsity-based static and dynamic state estimation approaches that enhance observability even when the underlying system is unobservable. (Thrust 3) Leveraging a unique probabilistic sensitivity analysis approach accompanied by one-of-a-kind dominant influencer set computation, the vulnerability of critical infrastructure at strategic locations was evaluated so that proactive PV-based control strategies can be used to support operations under normal/outage scenarios. These CARE-PV project innovations were demonstrated on both small-scale IEEE and larger utility-scale testbeds (Thrust 4). Feedback from Industry Advisory Board members was used to formulate a commercialization pathway for a subset of CARE-PV technologies. These CARE-PV technologies will ultimately lead to reliable and secure, large-scale integration of renewable energy and mitigate the risk of energy disruption resulting from cyber incidents and other emerging threats within the energy environment.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

NDA Systems Deployed at the Savannah River Site

SRNL’s Nuclear Measurements group develops and implements equipment, methods, and techniques to rapidly provide answers to challenging measurement questions in the areas of: • Environmental Monitoring • Legacy Waste Cleanup • Defense Material •Surplus Defense Material • Customers want: • Good, Fast, Cheap –pick three • Simple

Whiteside, Tad↗

Understanding Plant Signaling Via Innovations in Probe Delivery and Imaging

The goal of this project was to develop tools for studying plant processes in living tissues. We wanted a method for introducing probes for studying plant processes such that plants could remain intact and imaged iteratively. Towards this end, we successfully optimized carbon nanofibers that we showed could deliver non-permeable signaling probes/biomolecules to plant cells. These were created on a rigid backing and also successfully transferred to a flexible backing to use with curved plant structures. We also built fiber optic microscopes that permit iterative non-destructive fluorescence or light micrographs and created protocols and devices to stabilize plant organs during imaging. These tools were developed in conjunction with research aimed understanding receptor-mediated peptide trafficking and responses relevant to plant cell growth and defense tradeoff. During this project, we designed and built two fiberoptic fluorescence microscopes; (b) designed, fabricated and validated different nanospike designs for delivering probes to plants, including the feasibility of delivering DNA constructs for expression studies; (c) developed fluorescent peptide probes (active and inactive versions of a secreted receptor ligand called phytosulfokine or PSK) and performed mobility tests after application to plants using microscopy; (d) used appropriate genetic plant backgrounds to facilitate PSK trafficking and response mechanisms; (e) determined the transcriptional changes due to PSK-induced signaling related to growth/defense tradeoff; (f) performed experiments showing the growth/defense tradeoff involves repression of specific defense components in response to PSK. This project also involved the training of two PhD students and five Masters students.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

5G Securely Energized and Resilient: Task 2 and 3 Progress Report

The 5G Securely Energized and Resilient project implemented at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory is sponsored by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense and is designed to demonstrate the successful deployment of 5G-6G (FutureG) technologies in the context of electrical microgrid scenarios. Through implementation of this project, cybersecurity researchers were able to design a platform to better understand the fundamental system architecture, limitations, and benefits of 5G systems supporting energy system requirements. Although the work for this project was developed in the context of “FutureG Advanced Component Development & Prototypes,” which is a U.S. Department of Defense effort to ensure communications system resilience in the context of military deployments, the results can also apply to communications for electrical grids in general. Several key points were established in Tasks 2 and 3 of this project that are further expanded on in the body of this document.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Final Report

This final progress report describes the development of the CANDO Software package at ThirdLaw Technologies LLC (TLT) towards a software platform that will be used by its subsidiary company ThirdLaw Molecular LLC (TLM) for the development of therapeutic Spiroligomer™ molecules. ThirdLaw Molecular LLC is 95% owned by ThirdLaw Technologies LLC. TLM is developing a new therapeutics platform based on Spiroligomer™ molecules and is currently funded by the Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DOD/DTRA W15QKN209C004). Spiroligomer™ molecules are complex, highly-preorganized macromolecules with programmable three-dimensional shapes. Spiroligomer™ molecules are currently synthesized by TLM in the form of large (>880,000 member) DNA-encoded libraries and screened against dangerous bacteria and viruses as part of the DOD/DTRA project. The CANDO software package is being developed to enable the computational design of Spiroligomer™ molecules for the development of therapeutic and diagnostic molecules. Towards this end, over the period of the grant we implemented software algorithms and a user interface within CANDO to enable the computational design of Spiroligomer™ molecules.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Towards Risk-Informed Performance-Based Emergency Planning: Review of Regulation, Guidance, and Methods

At a fundamental level, nuclear facility safety is built upon the concept of defense-in-depth (DID), which entails multiple, independent layers of protection for public health and safety. Within the DID structure, emergency preparedness (EP) is the last layer of defense and provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Over several decades, the EP regulatory framework has evolved in response to lessons learned from actual events, experience with maintaining and testing EP capabilities, and advances in a wide range of technologies. Furthering this evolution, recent developments in risk-informed performance-based (RIPB) design and licensing approaches provide an opportunity to leverage insights regarding the attributes of the specific facility and site to inform EP.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗