Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Safety”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 541 records · Page 30

GIF sodium fast reactor project R and D on safety and operation

The 'Safety and Operation' project is started in 2009 within the framework of Generation-IV International Forum (GIF) Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) research and development program. In the safety area, the project involves R and D activities on phenomenological model development and experimental programs, conceptual studies in support of the design of safety provisions, preliminary assessment of safety systems, framework and methods for analysis of safety architecture. In the operation area, the project involves R and D activities on fast reactors safety tests and analysis of reactor operations, feedback from decommissioning, in-service inspection technique development, under-sodium viewing and sodium chemistry. This paper presents a summary of such activities and the main achievements. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Safety-Related Activities of the IAEA for Radioactive Waste, Decommissioning and Remediation - 13473

To fulfil its mandate and serve the needs of its Member States, the IAEA is engaged in a wide range of safety-related activities pertaining to radioactive waste management, decommissioning and remediation. One of the statutory obligations of the IAEA is to establish safety standards and to provide for the application of these standards. The present paper describes recent developments in regard to the IAEA's waste safety standards, and some of the ways the IAEA makes provision for their application. The safety standards and supporting safety demonstration projects seek to establish international consensus on methodologies and approaches for dealing with particular subject areas, for example, safety assessment for radioactive waste disposal. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Critical Drivers for Safety Culture: Examining Department of Energy and U.S. Army Operational Experiences - 12382

Evaluating operational incidents can provide a window into the drivers most critical to establishing and maintaining a strong safety culture, thereby minimizing the potential project risk associated with safety incidents. By examining U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) versus U.S. Army drivers in terms of regulatory and contract requirements, programs implemented to address the requirements, and example case studies of operational events, a view of the elements most critical to making a positive influence on safety culture is presented. Four case studies are used in this evaluation; two from DOE and two from U.S. Army experiences. Although the standards guiding operations at these facilities are different, there are many similarities in the level of hazards, as well as the causes and the potential consequences of the events presented. Two of the incidents examined, one from a DOE operation and the other from a U.S. Army facility, resulted in workers receiving chemical burns. The remaining two incidents are similar in that significant conduct of operations failures occurred resulting in high-level radioactive waste (in the case of the DOE facility) or chemical agent (in the case of the Army facility) being transferred outside of engineering controls. A review of the investigation reports for all four events indicates the primary causes to be failures in work planning leading to ineffective hazard evaluation and control, lack of procedure adherence, and most importantly, lack of management oversight to effectively reinforce expectations for safe work planning and execution. DOE and Army safety programs are similar, and although there are some differences in contractual requirements, the expectations for safe performance are essentially the same. This analysis concludes that instilling a positive safety culture comes down to management leadership and engagement to (1) cultivate an environment that values a questioning attitude and (2) continually reinforce expectations for the appropriate level of rigor in work planning and procedure adherence. A review of the root causes and key contributing causes to the events indicate: - Three of the four root cause analyses cite lack of management engagement (oversight, involvement, ability to recognize issues, etc.) as a root cause to the events. - Two of the four root cause analyses cite work planning failures as a root cause to the events and all cause analyses reflect work planning failures as contributing factors to the events. - All events with the exception of the Tuba City plant shutdown indicate procedure noncompliance as a key contributor; in the case of Tuba City the procedure issues were primarily related to a lack of procedures, or a lack of sufficiently detailed procedures. - All events included discussion or suggestion of a lack of a questioning attitude, either on the part of management/supervision, work planners, or workers. This analysis suggests that the most critical drivers to safety culture are: - Management engagement, - Effective work planning and procedures, and - Procedure adherence with a questioning attitude to ensure procedural problems are identified and fixed. In high-hazard operational environments the importance of robust work planning processes and procedure adherence cannot be overstated. However, having the processes by themselves is not enough. Management must actively engage in expectation setting and ensure work planning that meets expectations for hazard analysis and control, develop a culture that encourages incident reporting and a questioning attitude, and routinely observe work performance to reinforce expectations for adherence to procedures/work control documents. In conclusion, the most critical driver to achieving a workforce culture that supports safe and effective project performance can be summarized as follows: 'Management engagement to continually reinforce expectations for work planning processes and procedure adherence in an environment that cultivates a questioning attitude'. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Consistent criticality safety approach to nuclear sites, external transport, and final disposal

A general issue and some selected topics discussed in international projects (ISO, IAEA, OECD) are presented. Long and broad experience in criticality safety is applied to find consistent safety principles for nuclear sites, external transport and final disposal. Support of standards and regulations is a main purpose. An ISO 1709 (criticality safety principles) draft proposes expansion of the scope to transport. Research on the basis for the IAEA Transport Regulations provides insights. Those Regulations are based on criticality safety principles. A general requirement for prevention of criticality during transport is combined with a prescriptive set of requirements on how to get regulatory approval. 'Confinement system' was introduced in 1996 to separate subcriticality from radioactive material containment specifications. The much older intention was to provide technical support, but not safety, for the inter-phases between sites, transport and emergency. The application has changed unintentionally and significantly. A solution is proposed. The principle for determination of a threshold fissile nuclide mass limit for fissile material is used to support acceptability of rounding a Criticality Safety Index value down to zero, similar to determination of the Transport Index. Temperature effects on nuclear properties need to be accounted for. A -40 to 800 Celsius degree temperature range outside a package applies to transport. Burnup credit benchmarks involve high temperatures (depletion) and interpretation of operating reactor measurements for typical water pools (20 to 120 C. degrees). KRITZ critical experiments between 20 and 250 Celsius degrees are currently being evaluated. (author)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The DOE Unreviewed Safety Question Process, Addressing New Information For Credible Nuclear Accidents

The Department of Energy (DOE) Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process is in use for hazardous nuclear facilities operated within the DOE nuclear complex. DOE, which is the federal nuclear safety regulator for its nuclear facilities, requires that each nuclear facility have a Documented Safety Analysis that defines the controls for each credible accident based on a detailed accident analysis. The DOE USQ process provides key mechanisms for formally identifying to the regulator potential accident analysis issues at operating nuclear facilities including those that stem from emergent or new information on hazards. The DOE USQ process provides for formal evaluation of those emergent issues and for determining the need for formal regulator (DOE) review and approval of any resulting immediate or long-term actions. Regarding the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, lessons learned on the evaluation and disposition of new information have been noted by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and the National Research Council. These organizations noted that: - when new information indicates the potential for conditions that could significantly reduce safety margins or exceed current design assumptions, a timely, formal, and comprehensive assessment of the potential for substantial consequences should be conducted, and - if the new information analysis results in substantial changes to the risk profile or could impact the function of important safety systems, then compensatory actions or countermeasures need to be established without delay. The objective of this paper is to raise awareness regarding the salient requirements and guidance of the DOE USQ process used at DOE's operating nuclear facilities that bear on handling of emergent or new information on hazards and that address the lessons learned noted above by INPO and the National Research Council. There is no analysis or intent to make any implications regarding how use of the DOE USQ process might have affected events at Fukushima. The DOE USQ process, when applied as intended at DOE nuclear facilities, addresses lessons learned identified by INPO and the National Research Council regarding use of emergent or new information on hazards. The DOE USQ process ensures a timely, formal, and comprehensive assessment of the potential for substantial consequences resulting from new information on hazards. When the new information analysis results in substantial changes to the risk profile or shows an impact to the function of important safety systems, the DOE USQ process calls for compensatory actions or countermeasures to be established in a timely manner. The DOE USQ process ensures a formal evaluation by the regulator and approval of the planned actions addressing the vulnerabilities made know by new information on hazards. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Panel Session 81: Engaging on Safety at the Work Face - Workers, Front Line Managers, and Subcontractors

This panel focuses on engaging on safety at the work face, with the people who are there every day. This panel will discuss management approaches deployed to directly engage internal and subcontracted workers that have delivered measurable improvements in safety performance and culture. The panelists will share what they did that worked and their perspectives on why. About 24 to 30 people were in attendance. All statements below are paraphrased by the panel reporter and should not be considered direct quotes by the panelists. Presentations proposed include: 1 - Engaging on Safety at the Work Face: Workers, Front Line Managers, and Subcontractors (Jan Preston, Fluor Corporation (USA)); 2 - Responsibility for Safety: Workers and Line Management Joining Together to Improve Performance (Cynthia Williams, Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (Canada)); 3 - Worker Involvement: Trust and the Processing of the Remediated Nitrate Salts (David Funk, Los Alamos National Laboratory (USA)); 4 - Safety Culture: How Employee Engagement is Transforming the Paducah Site (Myrna Espinosa Redfield, Four Rivers Nuclear Partnership (USA)); 5 - Hazard Identification and Control: Subcontractor Performance, Oversight, and Continuous Improvement (Clint Wolfley, URS/CH2M Oak Ridge - UCOR (USA)); 6 - Managing Safety Performance Through Change (Alice Doswell, Fluor (USA))

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Design and implementation of safety channels for the Idaho State University AGN-201m research reactor control console - 216

The purpose of the work described in this paper is to design, implement, and install new safety channels for the control console of the Idaho State University (ISU) AGN-201m Research Reactor. These channels will replace the current vacuum-tube driven system, which has been in operation for over 50 years at the ISU nuclear engineering laboratory. Due to the aging issues associated with this technology an entirely new control console is needed. There are 3 safety channels which serve as the monitors and safety systems for adequately shutting down the reactor should any limits be broken. These 3 safety channels work harmoniously with other systems within the new control console to ensure appropriate operation of the reactor. The safety channel replacements are composed of three complementary signal processing systems whose circuits monitor the operating parameters of the reactor. The key reactor information is shown on several independent meters corresponding to each of the three safety channels. Finally, the reactor trip points are set to correspond with the standards promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to ensure safe operation of the ISU AGN-201m Research Reactor. The interconnections between each of these systems ensure that if any Channel fails or otherwise breaks a limit the entire system will initiate a scram and the reactor will become adequately sub-critical. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Systems Safety Evaluation Based on System Thinking

Every engineer knows well and always considers about 'The local optimization makes the entire worst', and therefore well balanced design is required. Even the total safety has been assured by the safety design based on defense in depth concept, operational problem would occur by the chain of the fallacy of the defense in depth, then safety culture degradation, and finely organizational accident eventually happened. Probabilistic approach is required to the problem. We should answer to the question 'Safety Goal: How safe is safe enough?' for public acceptance. To respond to the operational problem and safety goal question, PRA, Probabilistic Risk Analysis is required. Further, Risk Communication should include comparison and selection among technical systems by risk and benefit analysis. Therefore, systems safety consideration is important based on systems thinking with considering following characteristics: - Goal-oriented- Optimization, Alternative proposals; - Global perspective- Bird's Eye; - Hierarchy- Isomorphism; - Life Cycle: Plan-Design-Construction-Use-Disposal; - Learning and Evolution. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Integrating Sudo-Kaminaga Correlation to the Safety Analysis Code PARET-ANL

The accuracy and reliability of the reactor safety analysis code are critical because the specifications of the safety systems will depend on the analytical results for initiating events that could occur to the reactor. In safety analyses for power reactors, there exist many proficient and applicable computer codes such as RELAP5, CATHARE, RETRAN, or CATHENA. For non-power research reactors, an issue arises, however, due to lacking of such specialized codes. As a result, computer codes developed for the transient analysis of power reactors need to be applied carefully after proving their applicability to a specified research reactor. The safety analysis discussed in this paper concerns the prevention of fuel damage in hypothetical accidental scenarios for the new research reactor design at National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). One fuel integrity criterion is analyzed by investigating the Minimum Critical Heat Flux Ratio (MCHFR) in the core during the accidental transients. Some previous studies develop a relationship that correlates the nominal value of the minimum CHFR with the probability of CHF occurring and causing fuel damage. Using a statistical approach, the nominal value of the MCHFR for the low-enriched uranium (LEU) reactor needs to remain above the recommended limiting value to better ensure the safety of the research reactor. The probability of no fuel failure increases as the MCHFR increases. More importantly, as long as the MCHFR remains above the recommended limiting value of 1.301, the reactor will have a 90% probability that CHF is not reached. The safety analysis program PARET, developed by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), is employed to obtain the CHFR information in this study. PARET/ANL is a digital computer programming code intended primarily for the analysis of test and research reactors that use plate-type (flat) fuel elements. This program has its own set of correlations that are used to calculate the CHFR. One of them is the Mirshak correlation, which was believed to provide the best estimation of the critical heat flux under the operating conditions of the new reactor at the time. Following the critical heat flux (CHF) experiments for vertical rectangular channels in the JRR-3 (Japan Research Reactor unit 3), the CHF calculations now use the Sudo- Kaminaga correlation. This correlation is of our interest because this method has an enhanced geometric similarity and an increased range of applicability that are more representative of the actual operating conditions of our current design, and has a more mechanistic approach [9]. Since the source code of PARET/ANL is inaccessible, a MATLAB-based utility has been written to integrate the Sudo-Kaminaga correlation as a substitute for the Mirshak correlation in the code. As a result, both the Mirshak and the Sudo-Kaminaga correlations are used to analyze the standard output from the PARET program to calculate the CHFR.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

SAFETY AT FLUOR HANFORD (B) CASE STUDY - PREPARED BY THE THUNDERBIRD SCHOOL OF GLOBAL MANAGEMENT

One year into the Hanford contract, Fluor had learned a number of hard lessons very quickly. Although the Hanford remediation contract was in many ways a new endeavor for Fluor and a different kind of contract, the organization moved quickly to increase communication with all employees, attack head-on what it considered unsafe and inappropriate safety practices, and strongly inject its own corporate cultural beliefs into the Hanford organization. It wasn't easy, and it didn't happen overnight. From the beginning, Fluor established processes and programs to drive down injury rates. For example, whereas the previous contractor's approach to injuries had been passive, Fluor took a much more aggressive approach to worker injuries. The previous contractor had established a practice of sending injured workers home with the basic directive 'to come back when you are well'. Instead of using outsourced medical assessment, Fluor internalized it and evaluated all claims aggressively. Legitimate claims were quickly settled, and management moved to identify 'repeat offenders' when it came to reportable safety incidents. In the first year of Fluor's management, reportable injuries dropped from 5.37 to 2.99 per 200,000 man-hours. Despite the drop in injury rates, the safety record at Fluor Hanford was not at a level that met either Fluor or the Department of Energy's expectations. Earlier in 1997, Fluor Hanford's proposed safety program was rejected by the DOE. The DOE was not satisfied with Fluor Hanford's proposal for various reasons, including insufficient worker involvement and a lack of accountability. With the need for change clearly established, Fluor Hanford management embarked on a decade-long mission to change the safety culture and improve safety performance. This case describes the key changes and their impact on Fluor Hanford.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Non-dimensional performance and safety parameters for heat pipes

The use of heat pipes in safety-critical systems such as nuclear microreactors dictates the development of generalized, practical, scalable performance and safety parameters. Traditional dimensional metrics, while informative, lack the universality required for comparative analysis across varying designs and operating regimes. Here, this work introduces a comprehensive set of non-dimensional parameters to characterize heat pipe performance and safety, including capillary performance, effective thermal conductivity, response time, exergetic efficiency, allowable temperature gradients, allowable rate of temperature change, priming coefficients, and factor of safety. A reference heat pipe design representative of microreactor applications was analyzed via the developed parameters using both traditional analytical models and Sockeye simulations under transient and steady-state conditions. Sodium, potassium, and water were evaluated as working fluids to demonstrate the applicability of the framework across a broad temperature range. The proposed non-dimensional parameters effectively captured key thermal-hydraulic behaviors and safety concerns, as was demonstrated via Sockeye simulations. This framework supports the development of design optimization strategies, operational protocols, and safety assurance practices for advanced reactor systems and other high-reliability applications.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

Strategy of the Joint Center for Energy Storage Research to Influence Laboratory Safety Among its Funded Researchers

In 2011, a team at Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) was preparing a proposal for a Department of Energy (DOE)-funded project that called for the creation of an “Energy Innovation Hub.” The proposal team, well engrained in Argonne's and DOE's safety culture, was also aware of the high profile university laboratory accidents from 2009 and 2010 and many other high profile research laboratory safety incidents. They knew they wanted to influence safety by setting an expectation of safe science across the Hub they proposed. In 2012, the DOE awarded Argonne the contract to create the Hub, now known as the Joint Center for Energy Research (JCESR). JCESR promptly hired and appointed a Safety Lead charged with fulfilling JCESR's vision of influencing safety across their newly created Hub. This article discusses JCESR's implementation of a strategy to influence laboratory safety among its funded researchers.

Influencing Safety↗

Impact of Active Control on Passive Safety Response Characteristics of Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors: I - Theoretical background

Here, the interaction of the active control system with passive safety behavior is investigated for sodium-cooled fast reactors. A claim often made of advanced reactors is that they are passively safe against unprotected upset events. In practice, such upset events are not analyzed in the context of the plant control system, but rather the analyses are performed without considering the normally programmed response of the control system (open-loop approach). This represents an oversimplification of the safety case. The issue of passive safety override arises since the control system commands actuators whose motions have safety consequences. Depending on the upset involving the control system ( operator error, active control system failure, or inadvertent control system override), an actuator does not necessarily go in the same direction as needed for safety. So neglecting to account for control system action during an unprotected upset is nonconservative from a safety standpoint. It is important then, during the design of the plant, to consider the potential for the control system to work against the inherent and safe regulating effects of purposefully engineered temperature feedbacks.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Safety aspects of dry spent fuel storage and spent fuel management

As with the storage of all radioactive materials, the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) must conform to safety requirements. Safety aspects like safe enclosure of radioactive materials, safe removal of decay heat, nuclear criticality safety and avoidance of unnecessary radiation exposure must be achieved throughout the storage period. The implementation of these safety requirements can be achieved by dry storage of SF and HLW in casks as well as in other systems such as dry vault storage systems or spent fuel pools, where the latter is neither a dry nor a passive system. After the events of Fukushima, the advantages of passively and inherently safe dry storage systems have become more obvious. TUV and BAM, who work as independent experts for the competent authorities, present the licensing process for sites and casks and inform about spent nuclear fuel management and issues concerning dry storage of spent nuclear fuel, based on their long experience in these fields. All safety relevant issues like safe enclosure, shielding, removal of the decay heat or behavior of cask and building under accident conditions are checked and validated with state-of-the-art methods and computer codes before the license approval. It is shown how dry storage systems can ensure the compliance with the mentioned safety criteria over a long storage period. Exemplarily, the process of licensing, erection and operation of selected German dry storage facilities is presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Impact of Testing Method on Safety Assessment of Aged Li-Ion Cells: Part II – Aged Cells Without Li Plating

Understanding the safety profile of aged Li-ion batteries is essential for developing effective battery management and hazard mitigation strategies. However, most safety assessments have focused on fresh batteries, with just a few calorimetry studies on aged batteries with metal oxide positive electrodes. This study provides a broad assessment of commercial 18650-type Li-ion batteries with NCA, NMC, and LFP positive electrodes, both uncycled and aged under conditions that promoted solid electrolyte interphase (SEI) growth as the dominant degradation mechanism. The cells underwent mechanical (nail penetration, crush), electrical (overcharge, overdischarge), and thermal (accelerating rate calorimetry) abuse tests. Safety was rated on general characteristics such as mass loss, maximum temperature, and EUCAR (European Council for Automotive R&D) hazard level, as well as characteristics specific to individual abuse tests. Generally, aged cells with SEI growth exhibited similar or improved safety compared to uncycled cells, contrasting with our previous findings on NCA cells with Li plating as the dominant aging mechanism (Part I of this series). Yet, some tests and characteristics indicated reduced aged cell safety, such as earlier triggering of mechanical failure. These results emphasize the need to examine aged battery safety across diverse empirical techniques, degradation modes, and chemistries.

Lithium-ion cells↗

Techniques to evaluate the importance of common cause degradation on reliability and safety of nuclear weapons.

As the nuclear weapon stockpile ages, there is increased concern about common degradation ultimately leading to common cause failure of multiple weapons that could significantly impact reliability or safety. Current acceptable limits for the reliability and safety of a weapon are based on upper limits on the probability of failure of an individual item, assuming that failures among items are independent. We expanded the current acceptable limits to apply to situations with common cause failure. Then, we developed a simple screening process to quickly assess the importance of observed common degradation for both reliability and safety to determine if further action is necessary. The screening process conservatively assumes that common degradation is common cause failure. For a population with between 100 and 5000 items we applied the screening process and conclude the following. In general, for a reliability requirement specified in the Military Characteristics (MCs) for a specific weapon system, common degradation is of concern if more than 100(1-x)% of the weapons are susceptible to common degradation, where x is the required reliability expressed as a fraction. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon subsystem if more than 0.1% of the population is susceptible to common degradation. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon component or overall weapon system if two or more components/weapons in the population are susceptible to degradation. Finally, we developed a technique for detailed evaluation of common degradation leading to common cause failure for situations that are determined to be of concern using the screening process. The detailed evaluation requires that best estimates of common cause and independent failure probabilities be produced. Using these techniques, observed common degradation can be evaluated for effects on reliability and safety.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

RISK-INFORMED BALANCING OF SAFETY, NONPROLIFERATION, AND ECONOMICS FOR THE SFR

A substantial barrier to the implementation of Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) technology in the short term is the perception that they would not be economically competitive with advanced light water reactors. With increased acceptance of risk-informed regulation, the opportunity exists to reduce the costs of a nuclear power plant at the design stage without applying excessive conservatism that is not needed in treating low risk events. In the report, NUREG-1860, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission describes developmental activities associated with a risk-informed, scenario-based technology neutral framework (TNF) for regulation. It provides quantitative yardsticks against which the adequacy of safety risks can be judged. We extend these concepts to treatment of proliferation risks. The objective of our project is to develop a risk-informed design process for minimizing the cost of electricity generation within constraints of adequate safety and proliferation risks. This report describes the design and use of this design optimization process within the context of reducing the capital cost and levelized cost of electricity production for a small (possibly modular) SFR. Our project provides not only an evaluation of the feasibility of a risk-informed design process but also a practical test of the applicability of the TNF to an actual advanced, non-LWR design. The report provides results of five safety related and one proliferation related case studies of innovative design alternatives. Applied to previously proposed SFR nuclear energy system concepts We find that the TNF provides a feasible initial basis for licensing new reactors. However, it is incomplete. We recommend improvements in terms of requiring acceptance standards for total safety risks, and we propose a framework for regulation of proliferation risks. We also demonstrate methods for evaluation of proliferation risks. We also suggest revisions to scenario-specific safety risk acceptance standards, particularly concerning seismic and aircraft impactrelated risks. Most importantly, within the context of the TNF historical SFR safety concerns about energetic core disruptive accidents are seen to be unimportant, but those of rare scenarios mentioned above are seen to be of dominant concern. In terms of proliferation risks the SFR energy system is seen not to be of considerably greater concern than with other nuclear power technologies, providing that highly effective safeguards are employed. We find the economic performance of proposed SFRs likely, due to the problems of using sodium as a coolant, to be inferior to those of LWRs unless they can be credited for services to improve nuclear waste disposal, nuclear fuel utilization and proliferation risk reductions. None of the design innovations investigated offers the promise to reverse this conclusion. The most promising innovation investigated is that of improving the plant's thermodynamic efficiency via use of the supercritical CO{sub 2} (rather than steam Rankine) power conversion system. We were unable to reach conclusions about the economic and proliferation risk implications of competing nuclear fuel processing methods, as available designs are too little developed to justify any such results. Overall, we find the SFR to be a promising alternative to LWRs should the conditions governing the valuation change substantially from current ones.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safety Design Strategy for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Project

In accordance with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 413.3A, “Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets,” safety must be integrated into the design process for new or major modifications to DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. The intended purpose of this requirement involves the handling of hazardous materials, both radiological and chemical, in a way that provides adequate protection to the public, workers, and the environment. Requirements provided in DOE Order 413.3A and DOE Order 420.1B, “Facility Safety,” and the expectations of DOE-STD-1189-2008, “Integration of Safety into the Design Process,” provide for identification of hazards early in the project and use of an integrated team approach to design safety into the facility. This safety design strategy provides the basic safety-in-design principles and concepts that will be used for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Project.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗