Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Planetary Protection”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 541 records · Page 30

Stratosphere Conditions Inactivate Bacterial Endospores from a Mars Spacecraft Assembly Facility

Every spacecraft sent to Mars is allowed to land viable microbial bioburden, including hardy endospore-forming bacteria resistant to environmental extremes. Earth's stratosphere is severely cold, dry, irradiated, and oligotrophic; it can be used as a stand-in location for predicting how stowaway microbes might respond to the Martian surface. We launched E-MIST, a high-altitude NASA balloon payload on 10 October 2015 carrying known quantities of viable Bacillus pumilus SAFR-032 (4.07?×?10(7) spores per sample), a radiation-tolerant strain collected from a spacecraft assembly facility. The payload spent 8?h at ~31?km above sea level, exposing bacterial spores to the stratosphere. We found that within 120 and 240?min, spore viability was significantly reduced by 2 and 4 orders of magnitude, respectively. By 480?min, <0.001% of spores carried to the stratosphere remained viable. Our balloon flight results predict that most terrestrial bacteria would be inactivated within the first sol on Mars if contaminated spacecraft surfaces receive direct sunlight. Unfortunately, an instrument malfunction prevented the acquisition of UV light measurements during our balloon mission. To make up for the absence of radiometer data, we calculated a stratosphere UV model and conducted ground tests with a 271.1?nm UVC light source (0.5 W/m(2)), observing a similarly rapid inactivation rate when using a lower number of contaminants (640 spores per sample). The starting concentration of spores and microconfiguration on hardware surfaces appeared to influence survivability outcomes in both experiments. With the relatively few spores that survived the stratosphere, we performed a resequencing analysis and identified three single nucleotide polymorphisms compared to unexposed controls. It is therefore plausible that bacteria enduring radiation-rich environments (e.g., Earth's upper atmosphere, interplanetary space, or the surface of Mars) may be pushed in evolutionarily consequential directions.

Planetary protection↗

Center Innovation Fund: JSC CIF Characterize Human Forward Contamination

Let's face it: wherever we go, we will inevitably carry along the little critters that live in and on us. Conventional wisdom has long held that it's unlikely those critters could survive the space environment, but in 2007 microscopic animals called Tardigrades survived exposure to space and in 2008 Cyanobacteria lived for 548 days outside the International Space Station (ISS). But what about the organisms we might reasonably expect a crewed spacecraft to leak or vent? Do we even know what they are? How long might our tiny hitch-hikers survive in close proximity to a warm spacecraft that periodically leaks/vents water or oxygen-and how might they mutate with long-duration exposure? Unlike the Mars rovers that we cleaned once and sent on their way, crew members will provide a constantly regenerating contaminant source. Are we prepared to certify that we can meet forward contamination protocols as we search for life at new destinations?

planetary protection↗

Stratosphere Conditions Inactivate Bacterial Endospores from a Mars Spacecraft Assembly Facility

Every spacecraft sent to Mars is allowed to land viable microbial bioburden, including hardy endospore-forming bacteria resistant to environmental extremes. Earth’s stratosphere is severely cold, dry, irradiated and oligotrophic; it can be used as a stand-in location for predicting how stowaway microbes might respond to the Martian surface. We launched E-MIST, a high altitude NASA balloon payload on 10 Oct 2015 carrying known quantities of viable Bacillus pumilus SAFR-032 (4.07 x107 spores per sample), a radiation-tolerant strain collected from a spacecraft assembly facility. The payload spent 8 hours at ~32 km above sea level exposing bacterial spores to the stratosphere. We found that within 120 and 240 min, spore viability was significantly reduced by 2 and 4 orders of magnitude, respectively. By 480 min, < 0.001% of spores carried to the stratosphere remained viable. Our balloon flight results predict that most terrestrial bacteria would be inactivated within the first Sol on Mars if contaminated spacecraft surfaces receive direct sunlight. Unfortunately, an instrument malfunction prevented the acquisition of ultraviolet (UV) light measurements during our balloon mission. To make up for the absence of radiometer data, we calculated a stratosphere UV model and also conducted ground tests with a 271.1 nm UVC light source (0.5 W/m2), observing a similarly rapid inactivation rate when using a lower number of contaminants (640 spores per sample). The starting concentration of spores and micro-configuration on hardware surfaces appeared to influence survivability outcomes in both experiments. With the relatively few spores that survived the stratosphere, we performed a re-sequencing analysis and identified 3 single nucleotide polymorphisms compared to unexposed controls. It is therefore plausible that bacteria enduring radiation-rich environments (e.g., Earth’s upper atmosphere, interplanetary space, or the surface of Mars) may be pushed in evolutionarily consequential directions.

Mars↗

Restricted by A Historical Review of Strategies and Organization for Restricted Earth Return of Samples from NASA Planetary Missions

Return of samples from the Moon via the Apollo 11, 12 and 14 missions represented NASA's first attempts into conducting what is now known as Restricted Earth Return. When Apollo returned samples from the moon, there were few of the agencies, legal and organizational structures that exist now. A half a century later, the U.S system has seen changes in legal and organizational structures with the appearance of different agencies and legal requirements. During the Apollo era, U.S. legal and organizational structures, assessed threats to the Earth’s biosphere with a priority towards the risks of effects from extraterrestrial pathogens on humans, though the guiding document, the Baylor Protocol, also considered animal and plant models. This presentation focuses on a review of two main questions: Did the return of samples from the Moon happen at a “sweet spot” in time, where the number of requirements and conservatism was commensurate with the scientific knowns and unknowns? Could the emphasis of risk mitigation on human pathogens during the return of extraterrestrial samples be more about human solipsism, leaving us with a blind spot to sources of pathogens, such as fungi, which could lead to an impact to our biosphere, and we humans, via our food chains and agricultural pathways?

planetary protection↗

A Review of Existing Policies Affecting the Jettison of Waste in Low Earth Orbit and Deep Space

The management of waste generated onboard spacecraft during future long-duration deep-space missions will require different solutions from those currently implemented on the International Space Station which consist exclusively of collecting, storing, and returning the waste to Earth. Alternative options for managing spacecraft waste are to process it for recycling and recovery of resources, and to jettison it overboard in a solid form (such as a compacted tile) or in a gaseous form after torrefaction or other trash-to-gas technologies. The waste generated during a deep-space mission is derived mainly from spacecraft logistics supplies, food and beverage residues, personal or scientific items used by the crew, human metabolic waste, and unused spare components. Uncontained and unprocessed trash is a potential health hazard and a habitat volume liability, which makes onboard long-term storage an inefficient and non-optimal option. However, the jettison of solid, processed waste appears to be an effective solution for crewed deep-space missions, leading not only to volume reduction and habitat safening, but also to considerable mass savings in the spacecraft’s propulsion system. However, the disposal of trash overboard also creates a navigation hazard for spacecraft and the potential risk of contamination of planetary bodies, interfering with the search for life. This paper investigates the requirements covered by existing policies that could affect the jettison concept of operations and system design.

Jettison↗

Mars Sample Return – An Overview of the Capture, Containment and Return System

The Mars Sample Return campaign aims at bringing back soil, rock and atmospheric samples from Mars to Earth to answer key questions about Mars’ biological evolution by means of four missions. The first one, Mars 2020, landed on the red planet on February 18, 2021 and has to date collected a number of samples through the Perseverance rover. The three subsequent missions will recover the sample tubes, launch them into Mars orbit and transport them back to Earth. These missions are currently in the planning and design stages of development and represent an international effort comprising NASA, ESA and many industry partners. The work presented here provides an overview of the current design and concept of operations of the NASA-provided Capture, Containment, and Return System (CCRS), which is the payload of the ESA-provided Earth Return Orbiter (ERO). ERO will rendezvous with the orbiting samples and CCRS will capture them, contain them and robotically insert them into a capsule that will return the samples to Earth, the Earth Entry System (EES). Three days before arrival on Earth, CCRS will release the EES, which will fly through space, enter Earth’s atmosphere, descend on a well-defined trajectory and safely land at the Utah Test and Training Range. The decision to implement Mars Sample Return will not be finalized until NASA’s completion of the National Environmental Policy Act process. This document is being made available for information purposes only.

Mars Sample Return↗

The Faraday Effect Tracker of Coronal and Heliospheric Structure (FETCH) Instrument

There continue to be open questions regarding the solar wind and coronal mass ejections (CMEs). For example: how do magnetic fields within CMEs and corotating/stream interaction regions (CIRs/SIRs) evolve in the inner heliosphere? What is the radially distributed magnetic profile of shock-driving CMEs? What is the internal magnetic structure of CMEs that cause magnetic storms? It is clear that these questions involve the magnetic configurations of solar wind and transient interplanetary plasma structures, for which we have limited knowledge. In order to better understand the origin of the magnetic field variability in steady-state structures and transient events, it is necessary to probe the magnetic field in Earth-directed structures/disturbances. This is the goal of the Multiview Observatory for Solar Terrestrial Science (MOST) mission (Gopalswamy et al., 2022). For MOST to answer the aforementioned questions, we propose the instrument concept of the Faraday Effect Tracker of Coronal and Heliospheric structures (FETCH), a simultaneous quad-line-of-sight polarization radio remote-sensing instrument. With FETCH, spacecraft radio beams passing through the Sun–Earth line offer the possibility of obtaining information of plasma conditions via analysis of radio propagation effects such as Faraday rotation and wave dispersion, which provide information of the magnetic field and total electron content (TEC). This is the goal of the FETCH instrument, one of ten instruments proposed to be hosted on the MOST mission. The MOST mission will provide an unprecedented opportunity to achieve NASA’s heliophysics science goal to “explore and characterize the physical processes in the space environment from the Sun” (Gopalswamy et al., 2022).

Solar corona↗

Isolation, Identification, and Characterization of MSFC Cleanroom Microbes

Microorganisms can have significant impacts on the success of NASA’s missions, including the integrity of materials, the reliability of scientific results, and crew health. Robust cleaning and sterilization protocols are currently in place in NASA’s facilities, but microbial contamination is unavoidable and its impact on NASA’s missions and science must be minimized. Stringent cleaning and sterilization protocols are currently utilized by NASA, but many projects and materials have constraints on available sterilization procedures. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to be informed of: 1) what specific microorganisms are present, 2) how they may impact mission objectives, and 3) how to mitigate them.

Planetary Protection↗

Microbes in Deep Space

Explore the source record for details and available documents.

microbiology↗

The Contaminant Footprint of Landed Spacecraft: Toward an Inventory and Modelling Framework

All spacecraft generate and carry contaminants, i.e., unwanted and potentially harmful material. When a spacecraft lands and operates in vacuum, as onto Earth’s Moon, it introduces contaminants into its environment that may compromise mission science objectives and engineering performance. Contamination may degrade sites of unique value to planetary science or in situ resource utilization. This presentation will identify and compare source terms and transport vectors for contaminants – in particular, organic material – generated by landed spacecraft. An integrated modeling framework for the organic contamination footprint of spacecraft missions will be described and presented.

Gas Dynamics↗