Microwave Dissolution for Post-Det Screening [Slides]
Abstract not provided.
37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
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Nuclear Forensics: Identification and Characterization of Materials Outside of Regulatory Control [Slides]
Nuclear forensics is the collection and analysis of nuclear or radiological material to support investigations into the diversion, trafficking, or illicit activities involving materials. The goal is to link nuclear or radioactive material to people, processes, events and/or locations.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Technical Bases for Consequence Analyses Using MACCS (MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System)
The use of MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS) in regulatory applications requires that input parameters used in MACCS models have a defensible and transparent technical basis. The existing technical basis for MACCS parameters was identified and updates were developed based on current data and information. The transparent way these updates are documented provides a technical basis for updating MACCS parameters with consistent application among the MACCS user community.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility Capability eXpansion (DCX) Strategy
The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility is a vital and important part of the Nation’s nuclear security enterprise. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/ NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan (SSMP) identifies DARHT as a weapons mission critical facility along with the need to modernize DARHT to support weapons modernization efforts. With more than two decades of operations, DARHT has a storied history. Conceived in the 1970s, constructed in the 1990s, and operational since 2000, DARHT has advanced from open-air hydrodynamic experiments (hydros) to foam-confined hydros, to vessel-confined hydros, and in 2022, the 75 th hydro was successfully completed. Radiography has advanced from a single-axis, single-pulse system to a dual-axis, multi-pulse capability to variable fields of view (VFV) on both accelerators. The culmination of these experiences, accomplishments, and advancements has brought us to a very important question: What do the next two decades at DARHT look like? The world is not the same place it was in the 1990s when construction at DARHT was in progress. Evolving threats, an expanding mission, and technology changes necessitate adaptation. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states that the nuclear weapons infrastructure has suffered the effects of age and underfunding with no margin for further delay in recapitalizing the physical infrastructure. To adapt, the aging facility, accelerators, vessels, and detector systems require improvements to ensure DARHT remains the Nation’s hydrodynamic data foundation for stockpile certification, safety, surety, and global security threats.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Traditional Forensic Examinations on Bulk Special Nuclear Material
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Laboratory at Quantico, Virginia is responsible for the forensic examination of radiological evidence and evidence contaminated with radioactive materials. Due to these unique hazards and the necessary specialized safety protocols, the FBI has developed a network of Partner Laboratories (PLs) across the United States of America to support conventional forensic examinations of radiological evidence and evidence contaminated with radioactive materials. In support of this, the FBI Laboratory has established the Hazardous Evidence Analysis Team (HEAT), a group of qualified forensic examiners, scientists, technicians, and photographers who can deploy to laboratories outside of the FBI Laboratory at Quantico, VA to perform conventional forensics on evidence containing/contaminated with hazardous materials. One of the FBI’s PLs, the United States Department of Energy’s Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), in Los Alamos, New Mexico, has unique facilities, personnel, and procedures to secure, safely handle, and process significant quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). While LANL’s procedures for working with SNM are well established, working with SNM under evidentiary controls is not. Close cooperation between LANL and FBI HEAT is required due to FBI policies on evidence handling, as well as the challenges associated with the exploitation and preservation of conventional forensics (fingerprints, trace evidence, and photography) on SNM evidence.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Practical Pathways: Assessing Potential Formats for Arms Control with Russia and China
Building off foundational analyses done previously at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, this paper takes on two daunting tasks - to outline the security policy objectives for future strategic arms control agreements and to provide recommendations on the potential form of such an agreement. This is the proper moment for such an undertaking. Arms control faces a doubtful future as a viable national security tool. Many proposals – either gradual modifications of existing regimes or revolutionary departures into new domains – made over the past decade no longer fit today’s security environment, one shaped by China’s massive force expansion and Russia’s war in Ukraine. With the new complexities of the two-peer environment and the complete rupture in U.S.-Russian relations, people have valid questions about arms control’s forms and functions. New thinking is needed, shaped by guidance from the past, an analysis of the impasse, a spectrum of the possible, and a realistic assessment of the feasible. If progress is to be made, either before the expiration of the New START Treaty in 2026 or during the subsequent interregnum, a concrete proposal must be agreed within the U.S. interagency and put in front of allies and negotiating partners to serve as the basis for future work.
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Environmentally Adaptive, Multiband Software-Defined-Radar for Monitoring of Item of Interest in a Dynamically Cluttered Room
High-resolution multi-frequency radars when networked together, form a robust and seamless monitoring system for high-valued items. The multi-look-direction radar network investigated by LLNL and DSI, operates at 77 GHz and 5.8GHz, and is capable of detection at centimeter resolution movement of objects of interest. This dual frequency radar (unlike optical methods) can operate under various environments with conditions such a smoke, dust, and other natural or manmade obscurations. In addition, the multiband network radar is based on low-cost FCC approved EM specifications and can be scaled with the dimensions of the room and objects under consideration by user-defined inputs. Furthermore, the underlying radar signal processing based on software-defined radar engine is adaptive to its operational environment, where operators can input the size of the facility and object of interest and the distance between the object and radar. Finally, this multi-frequency radar employs a host of change detection and machine learning algorithms to reach performance levels in terms of high probability of detection and low false alarm rates while the monitoring state of the object can be reported remotely.
42 ENGINEERING↗
UAS Live Incursion Drills Survey
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS/drones) are rapidly evolving and are considered an emerging threat by nuclear facilities throughout the world. Due to the wide range of UAS capabilities, members of the workforce and security/response force personnel need to be prepared for a variety of drone incursion situations. Tabletop exercises are helpful, but actual live exercises are often needed to evaluate the quick chain of events that might ensue during a real drone fly-in and the essential kinds of information that will help identify the type of drone and pilot. Even with drone detection equipment, the type of UAS used for incursion drills can have a major impact on detection altitude and finding the UAS in the sky. Using a variety of UAS, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Security (INS) would like to offer partners the capability of adding actual UAS into workforce and response exercises to improve overall UAS awareness as well as the procedures that capture critical steps in dealing with intruding drones.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
Erratum to: Data Fusion to Support Integrated Nuclear Detonation Detection [Slides]
The original document (LA-UR-22-29547) contained minor equation errors that approximate correct equations that couple the multi-sensor, serial system detector thresholds for a seismic Rayleigh wave detector and an acoustic energy detector. Those errors appeared on slides 62-67. This erratum associates the following slides with the erroneous slides. The numbers of the erroneous slides are marked at the upper right in small text in orange. A result of those errors over-predict the performance of the two-sensor serial network, that is, the former document provides an optimistic estimate of system performance.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
Scenario Exploration and Timeline Analysis for Advanced Reactors [Slides]
Slides created to discuss the report "Approach and Model Used to Represent a Timeline Analysis for Security Design Enhancements" (August 2022 INL/ RPT-22-68664) for an upcoming DOE security workshop. Advanced reactors will be able to use risk insights for many design aspects. We need realistic scenarios for input into the licensing basis safety-case. These scenarios must include timing and physics. We need to automate the safety-case creation as much as possible.
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
The Russian Invasion of Ukraine and Nuclear Security
You have in your hands a unique publication. Voices of Ukraine is a collection of testimonies from people working in the nuclear and radioactive source sector in Ukraine. The five texts in this extract are a preview of the full volume that will be published in early 2023. The accounts presented in this extract are very different from the newspaper articles or reports you may have read about the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the attack on and occupation of the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone and Zaporizhzhia NPP. Five people share their own stories of the personal and professional dilemmas they faced: How to endure an unending shift under enemy occupation when replacement workers weren’t permitted to relieve the staff; whether to remain in your childhood home or to flee abroad; how to support your community and country while maintaining the safe operation of nuclear sites in wartime conditions? The narratives of these individuals have far-reaching consequences for the nuclear sector in Ukraine but also far beyond it.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
FY22 Laboratory Directed Research and Development Annual Report
The Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program yields foundational scientific research and development (R&D) essential to growing SRNL’s core competencies, in alignment with SRNL’s Strategic Plan to provide long-term benefits to the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and other customers and stakeholders. Five strategic goals are outlined in SRNL’s strategic plan: 1) Provide applied science and engineering for EM’s active clean-up sites and LM’s post closure management sites; 2) Provide science-based solutions for gaps identified in nonproliferation strategic vision and support the government in actives impacting national security; 3) Lead ST&E as the central technical authority for processing tritium loaded reservoirs and support production of plutonium pits; 4) Align science and energy security programs by focusing modern modeling, simulation, and data analytics tools on materials engineering and performance applications; 5) Build a workforce for the future.
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Operational and Mission Highlights (A Monthly Summary of Top Achievements, November 2022)
On November 16, Los Alamos National Laboratory Director Thom Mason answered questions from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) at a public hearing in Santa Fe about the safety of operations at the Laboratory’s plutonium facility and the pit production mission. Mason participated on a panel along with National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Administrator Jill Hruby, Deputy NNSA Administrator James McConnell, and NNSA Los Alamos Field Office Manager Ted Wyka.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Keeping LANL at the forefront of list mode capability for safeguards and MC&A [Slides]
Neutron based detection forms key capability to enable and support international and domestic nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation missions. Key stakeholders include International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), regional safeguards inspectorates, domestic stakeholders. LANL has been historically a leader in development of Non-destructive Assay (NDA) instruments and associated data acquisition hardware and software.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
The Impact of Increased Requirements for Verification Measurements of Category III and IV Receipts
As part of the regular nuclear material accounting and control process, sites that have accountable nuclear material regularly perform measurements of the material in their possession. The expectation for the type of measurements and their frequency is set out in Department of Energy (DOE) Order 474.2, and further detailed in each site’s respective material control and accountability (MC&A) plan and associated controlling documents. The measurements of interest in this report are those performed on external (between DOE sites) transfer receipts of Category III or IV accountable materials. In 2020, a revision of DOE Order 474.2 was proposed that would significantly increase the requirement that measurements be performed upon receipt of material, and further, that those measurements be quantitative verification (rather than qualitative confirmatory) measurements. A survey was performed of DOE sites to discuss the impact on their MC&A measurements program if more rigorous verification measurements requirements for Category III and IV receipts were implemented. An assessment of nondestructive assay (NDA) measurement instruments to meet those needs was also performed. Across the board, sites indicated that personnel and budget would cause the largest impact. Sites which are qualified as Category I/II indicated a reduced impact as these sites already have the measurement capabilities and some personnel but would require the acquisition of additional measurement systems. Category III/IV sites indicated a much larger impact as these sites generally have smaller MC&A programs. A few smaller sites stated a measurement program would need to be created to handle the demand. Calorimetry, quantitative gamma spectroscopy and neutron coincidence counting systems were identified as common systems that could meet the verification measurement requirements. The other, and perhaps larger issue is the need for calibration standards for the calorimetry and neutron coincidence counting systems. It is proposed that a comparative study be performed for ISOCS and ISOTOPICS, qualification of a COTS calorimetry system be performed, and development of an AWCC system that uses a neutron generator.
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Flash Neutron Imaging [Poster]
The NNSS has extensive historical experience with high-fidelity flash neutron imaging which may be applicable to the needs of NA-22. In recent neutron imaging tests, a dense plasma focus (DPF) discharges a capacitor bank across a hydrogen-filled diode to create a flash of fusion neutrons emitted from a point, which can be used for active interrogation. Object inspection may include both radiography transmission imaging as well as emission imaging of the subject via an aperture. A scintillator screen (coupled to a low-Z converter when necessary) converts deposited energy to visible light, which is relayed through optics to an ultra-sensitive visible imager contained in a light-tight box. Flash photon imaging, utilizing bremsstrahlung emission instead of fusion neutrons, is also available and is more mature.
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FY 22 Project Name: Boots versus Bytes
IAEA has increasingly leveraged remote data transfer, amplifying the effectiveness of inspectors and analysts by allowing them to view data from Headquarters rather than requiring on-site activities. We propose that there may be even more opportunities to shift the international nuclear safeguards paradigm to remote activities through the implementation of enhanced data sharing and analysis.
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Module 6: Exercise 1: Fresh Fuel Receipt for a Nuclear Facility: Nuclear Security Controls [Slides]
This module presents an operational scenario to illustrate the NMAC functions that are recommended for nuclear security. After completing this module, participants should be able to: 1) Describe the role NMAC plays in implementing recommended nuclear security practices. 2) Discuss the coordination between other departments during a primarily NMAC operation.
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