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At least 541 records · Page 30

Co-op at Sandia National Laboratories (July - December 2019, Final Report)

This co-op was performed at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) within the Weapon Surety Engineering 11 Department (9435), which is a customer-focused organization that provides engineering and system analysis expertise to ensure a safe deterrent throughout the entire weapon lifecycle. Engineers in 9435 develop a deep knowledge in both component and system function to support rigorous evaluation and mitigation of potential failure modes. They operate across multiple engineering disciplines (mechanical, electrical, computer, materials and systems engineering) with opportunities to develop crossdisciplinary capability. The team supports a variety of stockpile systems and is part of the product teams during development, design and production, as well as advanced concept and exploratory efforts. 9435 engineers use their extensive component and system knowledge, as well as experimental data and modeling, to ensure products function as intended with assured safety. Members of the department learn the function of multiple components, how those components integrate within the system and apply surety principles and processes to ensure a safe, secure, reliable, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Expectation-propagation for weak radionuclide identification at radiation portal monitors

We propose a sparsity-promoting Bayesian algorithm capable of identifying radionuclide signatures from weak sources in the presence of a high radiation background. The proposed method is relevant to radiation identification for security applications. In such scenarios, the background typically consists of terrestrial, cosmic, and cosmogenic radiation that may cause false positive responses. We evaluate the new Bayesian approach using gamma-ray data and are able to identify weapons-grade plutonium, masked by naturally-occurring radioactive material (NORM), in a measurement time of a few seconds. We demonstrate this identification capability using organic scintillators (stilbene crystals and EJ-309 liquid scintillators), which do not provide direct, high-resolution, source spectroscopic information. Compared to the EJ-309 detector, the stilbene-based detector exhibits a lower identification error, on average, owing to its better energy resolution. Organic scintillators are used within radiation portal monitors to detect gamma rays emitted from conveyances crossing ports of entry. The described method is therefore applicable to radiation portal monitors deployed in the field and could improve their threat discrimination capability by minimizing “nuisance” alarms produced either by NORM-bearing materials found in shipped cargoes, such as ceramics and fertilizers, or radionuclides in recently treated nuclear medicine patients.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Total kinetic energy release in the fast-neutron-induced fission of Np 237

The total kinetic energy (TKE) release in the fast neutron-induced fission of 237Np was measured for neutron energies from En = 2.6–100 MeV at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center at the Weapons Neutron Research facility. The post-TKE release decreases nonlinearly with increasing incident neutron energy and can be represented as TKE(MeV) = (174.38 ± 0.72) – (5.11 ± 0.5821) log 10 E n for En > 1 MeV. Analysis of the fragment mass distributions indicates that the decrease in TKE with increasing E n is a consequence of the fading out of shell effects at high excitation energies (resulting in an increase of symmetric fission) and the decrease of the total kinetic energy associated with asymmetric fission with increasing E n .

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Expedited Walkdowns and Preparation of Cost Estimates for Decontamination and Demolition of Excess Facilities - 20335

Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS) is the prime contractor responsible for managing and operating Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The mission of the LLNL is to strengthen security of the United States through development and application of world-class science and technology to enhance the nation's defense, reduce the global threat from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and respond with vision, quality, integrity, and technical excellence to scientific issues of national importance. To accomplish its mission, LLNL must plan and manage its campus space and facilities to optimize use of its relatively small one-square-mile footprint. LLNL currently has numerous excess facilities that require decontamination and demolition (D and D). The LLNL Legacy Facility Program is responsible for stewardship and risk reduction programs to effectively manage these excess assets at LLNL. The Legacy Facility Program identified 10 excess facilities at LLNL that were candidates for demolition based on risks from further degradation of the facilities, potential exposure to hazardous materials, or need for removal to make way for new program facilities. The buildings range from a structure built in 1943 to serve as a US Navy drill hall during World War II, to a facility that provided neutrons to study material properties for the fusion energy program. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appropriated FY19 funding for the development of Class 3 estimates for these 10 excess facilities that would be used to develop a Program Management Plan for funding consideration. Class 3 estimates are not conceptual, nor overly detailed, but adequate to be used for budget and appropriation purposes. Using existing strategic sourcing agreements, LLNL was able to organize a team of senior subject matter experts (SMEs) with diverse technical backgrounds across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex to complete extensive process knowledge (PK) reviews and walk-downs of each excess facility and to deliver accurate and complete estimates under an expedited schedule (i.e., within eight weeks). To facilitate the expedited schedule, LLNL was fully prepared for the arrival of the JGMS team, which consisted of the following companies: J.G. Management Systems, Inc. (JGMS); Strata-G, LLC; and Michael Baker International. LLNL provided background and PK information on the excess facilities, pictures, supporting historical documentation, and radiological survey history as well as escorted access to the facilities. The JGMS team has previous experience supporting Program Management Plans for excess facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex. The team mobilized to LLNL and performed the facility walk-downs from January 22-25, 2019. Using a methodical evaluation process, expertise, and experience, the team was able to deliver walk-down draft reports and estimates to LLNL before their February 8, 2019 deadline. LLNL then in turn reviewed, completed the estimates by adding waste management costs and other LLNL costs, and delivered the estimates to NNSA by February 15, 2019. The completed final reports, including draft D and D estimates, were delivered to LLNL before their March 6, 2019 deadline. The work was successfully completed ahead of the expedited schedule required by LLNL, resulting in a commendation from the client. This paper describes how the partnership and collaboration as a fully integrated team comprised of the prime contractor, LLNS, and the JGMS team successfully met the needs of the US government, resulting in the performance of expedited site walk-downs, the development of summary evaluation reports, and the preparation of draft Class 3 estimates and preliminary schedules for the D and D of 10 excess facilities at LLNL. The efforts of the team will enable the D and D of the first excess facility in the 2020-2021 time frame. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

SpecFIDLER User Manual: Software Version 2.4.0

The Spectroscopic Field Instrument for Detection of Low Energy Radiation (SpecFIDLER) allows response teams to detect and quantify plutonium contamination on the ground. Notional scenarios include dispersion from a weapon accident, or the launch failure of a space probe containing a radioisotope thermoelectric generator. Unlike other instruments, the thin-window sodium iodide detector is sensitive to the low-energy gamma rays emitted by plutonium isotopes. The system supports both mobile survey as well as stationary sampling. This manual provides information about installing, maintaining, and troubleshooting the SpecFIDLER. The scope of this document includes the physical hardware, software for data acquisition, and algorithms for data analysis. Recent changes to the software and algorithms aim to streamline the operation of the system.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

SpecFIDLER User Manual (Software V.2.5.0)

The Spectroscopic Field Instrument for Detection of Low Energy Radiation (SpecFIDLER) allows response teams to detect and quantify plutonium contamination on the ground. Notional scenarios include dispersion from a weapon accident, or the launch failure of a space probe containing a radioisotope thermoelectric generator. Unlike other instruments, the thin-window sodium iodide detector is sensitive to the low-energy gamma rays emitted by plutonium isotopes. The system supports both mobile survey as well as stationary sampling. This manual provides information about installing, maintaining, and troubleshooting the SpecFIDLER. The scope of this document includes the physical hardware, software for data acquisition, and algorithms for data analysis. Recent changes to the software and algorithms aim to streamline the operation of the system.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

SpecFIDLER User Manual (Software V.2.6.0)

The Spectroscopic Field Instrument for Detection of Low Energy Radiation (SpecFIDLER) allows response teams to detect and quantify plutonium contamination on the ground. Notional scenarios include dispersion from a weapon accident, or the launch failure of a space probe containing a radioisotope thermoelectric generator. Unlike other instruments, the thin-window sodium iodide detector is sensitive to the low-energy gamma rays emitted by plutonium isotopes. The system supports both mobile survey as well as stationary sampling. This manual provides information about installing, maintaining, and troubleshooting the SpecFIDLER. The scope of this document includes the physical hardware, software for data acquisition, and algorithms for data analysis. Recent changes to the software and algorithms aim to streamline the operation of the system.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

SpecFIDLER User Manual (Software V.2.3.0)

The Spectroscopic Field Instrument for Detection of Low Energy Radiation (SpecFIDLER) allows response teams to detect and quantify plutonium contamination on the ground. Notional scenarios include dispersion from a weapon accident, or the launch failure of a space probe containing a radioisotope thermoelectric generator. Unlike other instruments, the thin-window sodium iodide detector is sensitive to the low-energy gamma rays emitted by plutonium isotopes. The system supports both mobile survey as well as stationary sampling. This manual provides information about installing, maintaining, and troubleshooting the SpecFIDLER. The scope of this document includes the physical hardware, software for data acquisition, and algorithms for data analysis. Recent changes to the software and algorithms aim to streamline the operation of the system.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Assessment of rare earth element fractionation in NIF implosions with radiochemically doped capsules

An ongoing experimental campaign at the National Ignition Facility (NIF) aims to measure neutron induced nuclear reaction cross–sections using radiochemically doped target capsules. Critical to this campaign is the ability to collect a representative sample of the reaction products using Solid Radiochemical Collectors (SRCs) fielded around the NIF chamber. The shot presented in this paper used a doped target capsule with a neopentane gas fill was to investigate the ratio of isotopes collected at three chamber angles. It was found that SRC samples of rare earth elements collected from NIF are representative of the ingoing dopant mix, thereby concluding that fractionation does not occur during a NIF implosion. This validates the doped capsule method for use in measuring neutron induced reaction cross-sections.

Capsule Doping↗

Weapon Material Program: FY24 Annual Report

The Weapon Material Program (WMP) framework was started in July of Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, along with other Mission Support organizations. The first year was about building the organization with the right people, identifying needs, and developing a vision for expectations. It was also a year to move forward with new equipment and technology for weapon material processes. With numerous improvements, WMP is building world-class systems for production, warehousing, and analytical testing. FY 2023 was a year of development. The WMP was a new organization defining its identity, its focus, and its mission. At the end of FY 2023, WMP evaluated its current position and its immediate needs along with its future goals. The entire organization set out on this FY 2024 journey to success. The lack of funding, staffing, and visibility dramatically impacted weapon material operations, testing, and qualifications. This neglect required numerous areas to be addressed and improvement plans to be developed and implemented. WMP processes, procedures, and overall business operations were dramatically in need of updating, revision, and formal documentation. This included all areas: technology, equipment, facility modifications/upgrades, and testing improvements. To ensure organizational improvement and forward momentum in FY 2024, WMP executed a multi-faceted strategic vision. Action items included the following: • Filling open positions with capable personnel who would contribute to a more robust organization • Establishing more formal operations and problem-solving techniques • Improving departmental procedures to align with expanding scope • Improving training • Establishing collaboration meetings with other departments/organizations • Focusing on the importance of identifying and mitigating concerns with At-Risk Materials (@RM) • Leading modernization eff orts for Blending and Packaging (B&P) We are on the verge of a transformational improvement in all of our processes in support of the mission. The following area achievements outlined in this report reflect the hard work toward achieving the goal of “being the material Subject Matter Experts in the nuclear enterprise”.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Completion document for MRT 8824 - Upgrade NIF’s gaseous radiochemistry diagnostics (RAGS) to support weapons science

This milestone highlights the successful upgrade and deployment of the Radiochemical Analysis of Gaseous Samples (RAGS) system, which delivers high-quality measurements (<20% uncertainty) of activated gaseous species from NIF implosions. These measurements are critical for supporting Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) relevant platforms, including LANL’s Double Shell and LLNL’s Pushered Single Shell campaigns. The RAGS diagnostic technique enables analysis of short-range mixing in implosions using high-Z shells, which are otherwise inaccessible to conventional x-ray diagnostic methods. By facilitating the investigation of high-Z material mixing into fusion burn, this system provides essential data for quantifying and interpreting results in high-energy density (HED) experiments. This report details the physics motivation, diagnostic fundamentals, planned and enacted upgrade work, and the quantification of uncertainty for the upgraded system.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

ILLICIT TRANSIT INTERDICTION GLOBAL ANALYSIS

This study aims to enhance the security of radioactive materials during transport by analyzing commonalities in cargo thefts conducted by non-state groups such as thieves and terrorists. This research focuses on identifying patterns and trends in the methods used to steal high-value cargo, with the goal of applying these insights to improve transport security of radioactive materials. Key questions addressed include the frequency of specific tools, techniques, and insider involvement in thefts, as well as the use of weapons, electronic jamming equipment, and specialized tools. Findings will inform security design improvements and industry practices to mitigate vulnerabilities. The study involves a comprehensive review of literature and case studies, utilizing data sources from 2018 to 2023. Articles will be selected based on their relevance to thefts of valuable cargo in transit, with a focus on incidents involving non-state actors. The methodology will include statistical and inferential analysis to identify trends, with results visualized through pie charts, frequency analyses, and terrain maps. The discussion will highlight the implications of findings and provide actionable recommendations for strengthening security measures. Limitations such as data availability and reporting inconsistencies will be acknowledged. Suggestions for future improvements will be constructed using existing case studies and expert feedback. The study’s outcomes aim to raise awareness within the industry, inform policy decisions, and enhance security protocols for radioactive material transport. Metrics for impact include the potential publication of findings, presentations at conferences to raise awareness, and the subsequent actions taken by stakeholders based on the research. By identifying trends and vulnerabilities and suggesting improvements, this research contributes to preventing the illicit use of nuclear and radiological materials.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗

Rossi-alpha measurements of fast plutonium metal assemblies using organic scintillators

The reactivity and the k-effective multiplication factor (k eff ) of a fissionable assembly are quantities of widespread interest. These values can be inferred from Rossi-alpha measurements of the prompt neutron decay constant (or the inverse:α -1 ). It has been shown that 3 He-gas proportional counter-based detection systems are insensitive to α -1 of fast assemblies (much faster than tens of microseconds). Therefore, it is of interest to investigate fast detection systems such as those based on organic scintillation detectors. In this work, an array of 12 cylindrical, 5.08 cm x 5.08 cm diameter trans-stilbene organic scintillators was used to measure five subcritical assemblies. One assembly was a sphere of approximately 4.5 kg of alpha-phase, weapons-grade plutonium (k eff = 0.773, α -1 = 11.84 ns) known as the BeRP ball encased in a thin stainless-steel clad. The other assemblies used the same encased sphere and 7.62 cm of iron, nickel, copper, or tungsten reflectors (k eff = 0.884, 0.916, 0.924, 0.939, respectively and α -1 = 36.60, 41.56, 49.60, 70.32 ns, respectively). Finally, this work (1) validates Rossi-alpha measurements with organic scintillators by demonstrating good agreement between measurements and simulations; and (2), demonstrates that organic scintillator-based systems are sensitive to α -1 on the order of 10–100 ns.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Radiological Handling and Containment Considerations in Support of an American Medical Isotope Producer

This work will discuss evaluation and design of new and modified facility level radiological containment, transfer, and handling systems in support of the United States’ American Medical Isotope Production Act. In the United States alone, Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) is used as a precursor to locally generate its decay product, technetium-99m (Tc-99m), for use in approximately 40,000 medical procedures every day to detect cancer and heart disease. Currently, however, Mo-99 is primarily produced overseas and typically requires highly enriched uranium (HEU) which is classified as weapon -usable. This poses a serious security risk to the United States and, in 2012, Congress passed the American Medical Isotope ACT which aimed to cease all Mo-99 production that requires HEU and support American based companies who have found safer production methods. Through this effort, a system was designed and developed to access irradiated material in processing hot cells for ease of material introduction and removal in the confined area. The proposed solution uses a double-door design that allows for easy access to material while also providing shielding through a mechanically manipulated carousel. A system was also designed to transport irradiated materials from target reactors to a target receipt box using a rail guide system, pneumatic motor, and lead screw drive.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Small-scale production of bespoke accelerated aging plutonium alloy

Here, this study demonstrates the 100 g scale manufacture of a plutonium alloy that ages at an accelerated rate. The resulting alloy ages six times faster than typical weapons-grade plutonium due to the addition of 238 Pu. As a major innovation, the process involved using a partial direct oxide reduction technique. This method was achieved by developing a new, complex geometry stirrer using additive manufacturing to reduce the 238Pu oxide and efficiently incorporate it into weapons-grade plutonium metal. The material was then purified by molten salt extraction and electrorefining before being alloyed with gallium. The alloy was then cold-rolled and annealed in a homogenization heat treatment. The resulting disk was characterized by metallography and differential scanning calorimetry, and the impurity content was determined using analytical chemistry techniques. The results show that a homogeneous delta phase plutonium alloy was achieved with expected microstructure and minimal impurities. This study was also successful in changing the plutonium isotopic composition by incorporating additional 238 Pu to accelerate the effects of radiation damage. This enables researchers to study long-term aging phenomena in a reduced time frame, thus avoiding the need for large-scale material production and circumventing the limitations of using naturally aged, archived plutonium.

Aging theory↗

Literature Review of Documented Persistent Secondary Uranium Sources at DOE LM Sites

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management (LM) has the responsibility to protect human health and the environment at 101 legacy uranium sites across the nation by implementing long-term surveillance and maintenance requirements. Included in these responsibilities is to provide for the safe and environmentally sound disposal, long-term stabilization, and control of uranium mill tailings in a manner that minimizes or eliminates radiation health hazards to the public at 21 Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) Title I sites; 6 UMTRCA Title II sites; and 9 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act/Resource Conservation and Recovery Act sites. These sites are former uranium mills (processing sites), or sites with wastes from processing sites encapsulated in engineered disposal cells (disposal sites), or sites where components of atomic weapons were manufactured. During site characterization, groundwater contamination was often discovered and evaluated or modeled for future movement with the inclusion of uranium sorption in the groundwater plume. Much of this original work did identify uranium processing wastes as the original contaminant source. However, more recent work has identified the existence and influence of persistent secondary uranium sources that may prevent uranium in groundwater from attenuating as quickly as initial evaluations or modeling indicated. By understanding these processes, better decisions can be made to choose the appropriate remediation and closure strategies, identify long-term surveillance and maintenance activities, and more accurately estimate life-cycle costs. The purpose of this report is to summarize the literature available on documented persistence secondary uranium sources at LM sites as part of the Applied Studies and Technology Persistent Secondary Contaminant Sources Project.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Generalized rate theory for void and bubble swelling and its application to δ -plutonium

A rate theory for void and bubble swelling is derived that allows both vacancies and self-interstitial atoms to be generated by thermal activation at all sinks. In addition, they can also be produced by displacement damage from external and internal radiation. This generalized rate theory (GRT) is applied to swelling of gallium-stabilized δ-plutonium in which α-decay causes the displacement damage. Since the helium atoms produced also become trapped in vacancies, a distinction is made between empty and occupied vacancies. The growth of helium bubbles observed by transmission electron microscopy in weapons-grade and in material enriched with Pu238 is analyzed, using different values for the formation energy of self-interstitial atoms (SIA) and two different sets of relaxation volumes for the vacancy and for the SIA. One set allows preferential capture of SIA at dislocations, while the other set gives equal preference to both vacancy and SIA. It is found that the helium bubble diameters observed are in better agreement with GRT predictions if no preferential capture occurs at dislocations. Therefore, helium bubbles in δ-plutonium will not evolve into voids. Furthermore, the helium density within the bubbles remains sufficiently high to cause thermal emission of SIA. Based on a helium density between two to three helium atoms per vacant site, the sum of formation and migration energies must be around 2.0 eV for SIA in δ-plutonium.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Design and Materials of Reference Electrodes for Radioactive Waste Tank Service – A Literature Review

The Hanford site stores approximately 55 million gallons of radioactive and chemically hazardous wastes from the production of weapons materials. The wastes are stored in 177 underground, carbon steel storage tanks, 149 of these are single shell tanks (SSTs) and 28 of these are double shell tanks (DSTs). The DSTs provide critical retrieval and interim storage before the waste is vitrified in the Waste Treatment and Isolation Plant (WTP). The DSTs have been in service for 38 to 56 years and current plans indicate that WTP operations will be completed in 2075. Thus, the tanks will need to remain in service far beyond the initial 40-year life expectancy. For life extension of the tanks, effective corrosion control practices must remain in force. This effort includes direct measurements of the extent of corrosion (e.g., ultrasonic measurements and corrosion coupons) and electrochemical processes (e.g., linear polarization measurements).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗