SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
The purpose of this presentation is to describe key features of the streamlined systems engineering approach for two in-house NASA projects, the Morpheus lander (2010-2014) and Orion’s Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2) Crew Module and Separation Ring (CSR) project.
Rovers are a vital component of NASA's strategy for manned and unmanned exploration of space. For the past five years, the Intelligent Mechanisms Group at the NASA Ames Research Center has conducted a vigorous program of field testing of rovers from both technology and science team productivity perspective. In this talk, I will give an overview of the the last two years of the test program, focusing on tests conducted in the Painted Desert of Arizona, the Atacama desert in Chile, and on IMG participation in the Mars Pathfinder mission. An overview of autonomy, manipulation, and user interface technologies developed in response to these missions will be presented, and lesson's learned in these missions and their impact on future flight missions will be presented. I will close with some perspectives on how the testing program has affected current rover systems.
The use of integral solutions to the acoustic analogy-based Ffowcs Williams-Hawkings (FW-H) formulation is the defacto industrial and academic approach for assessing far-field acoustic behavior from airframe noise simulations. The methodology utilizes time-accurate flow variables obtained at arbitrary data surfaces to determine far-field spectra. The solid surface approach, where the time history of pressure is recorded on the surface of the aircraft, is generally preferred. Permeable surfaces, where pressure and velocity are recorded on a user-defined surface enclosing the aircraft, are also used. This paper seeks to share some of the valuable lessons we learned over the past several years on the limitations of the FW-H formulation and best practices for its successful application. We show results for various configurations comprising isolated landing gears, a business jet, a large commercial transport, and a generic low boom supersonic prototype, all at landing conditions. We demonstrate that the solid FW-H approach has significant accuracy limitations for most realistic cases and that the permeable FW-H approach may also fail in specific scenarios, requiring additional costly steps to extract the correct far-field noise spectra. Suggested guidelines for proper FW-H calculations are also given.
This presentation describes the planning and executing of large scale sonic-boom acoustics tests as a part of LBFD testing with the goal to give the future teams the road-map for how to efficiently and effectively plan and execute these types of tests.
Milestones in the learning process during development of spaceflight capability for different NASA missions are traced from the initial launch of the Mercury escape rocket to the advent of the Shuttle. A detached heat shield on the first manned Mercury orbital flight led to a decision for reentry with retrorockets attached, a situation which demonstrated a need for on-line communications with the spacecraft construction engineers. The Gemini program served to develop EVA techniques and docking procedures essential for the Apollo missions. Apollo 8 circled the moon after only one manned test flight of the equipment due to the success of the first flight. Lunar landing simulation training exposed the astronauts to situations beyond the human ability to respond. The training was justified when computer overload required the pilot to retake manual control of some spacecraft functions during the successful first lunar landing. All lessons previously learned were used to safely return the damaged Apollo 13 to earth. The Skylab missions provided an opportunity to maintain rotating teams of flight controllers on a 24-hr/day basis for periods of months. Finally, the six-year hiatus of U.S. manned space activities between the end of the Skylab missions and the first Shuttle flight provided time for incorporating previous lessons into new procedures, training strategies, and data resources.
After several decades of human spaceflight, the community of space-faring nations has accumulated a diverse and sometimes harrowing history of toxicological events that have plagued human space endeavors almost from the very beginning. Lessons have been learned in ground-based test beds and others were discovered the hard way - when human lives were at stake in space. From such lessons one can build a risk-management framework for toxicological events to minimize the probability of a harmful exposure, while recognizing that we cannot foresee all events. Space toxicologists have learned that relatively harmless compounds can be converted by air revitalization systems into compounds that cause serious harm to the crew. Our toxic risk management strategy now includes an assessment of the fate of any compound that might be released into the atmosphere. Propellants are highly toxic compounds, yet we have not always been able to thoroughly isolate the crew from exposure to these toxicants. Leakage of fluids from systems has resulted in hazardous conditions at times, and the behavior of such compounds inside a spacecraft has taught us how to manage potentially harmful escapes should they occur. Potential combustion events are an ever-present threat to the wellbeing of the crew. Such events have been sufficiently common that we have learned that one cannot judge the health threat of a given fire by the magnitude of the event. Management of such risks demands monitoring of combustion products. In the category of unpredictable toxic events, if one assumes that fires are predictable, we can place experience with toxic microbial metabolites, upsets during repair operations, and discharges from filters that have accumulated a substantial load of pollutants in their absorption beds. Management of such events requires a broad-spectrum, real-time analytical capability to discern the identity and concentrations of pollutants if they enter the atmosphere. Adverse events are an integral part of any human activity, and the spacefaring community must learn as much as possible from mistakes and near misses.
This paper discusses the fundamentals of architecting a major human spaceflight program and the lessons that can be learned from Constellation. Constellation is/was NASA's program to implement a new generation of human exploration missions to the moon and beyond. It is/was a tightly-coupled program where a unique set of architectural challenges can be seen and evaluated to better understand how architecting of such systems can be improved upon in the future. While the specific issues discussed in this paper derive from the current Constellation architecture they share threads with previously-crewed systems including Apollo and Shuttle and are likely to be common to any human exploration system or system of significant technical and programmatic complexity.
The goal of this effort was to identify innovative strategies, approaches, and methods that have enabled researchers to continue doing meaningful human subjects research during the COVID-19 pandemic. Many organizations and recent literature primarily focus on efforts for future research in a post-COVID environment. Additionally, there have been no systematic efforts across the agency or broader human factors community to coordinate or share strategies. Therefore, the focus was on acquiring knowledge gained by researchers from experiences during COVID that could be valuable to continue human-subjects research under existing restrictions.
The Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF) was launched in August, 2003, and renamed to the Spitzer Space Telescope in 2004. Two years of observing the universe in the wavelength range from 3 to 180 microns has yielded enormous scientific discoveries. Since this magnificent observatory has a limited lifetime, maximizing science viewing efficiency (ie, maximizing time spent executing activities directly related to science observations) was the key operational objective. The strategy employed for maximizing science viewing efficiency was to optimize spacecraft flexibility, adaptability, and use of observation time. The selected approach involved implementation of a multi-engine sequencing architecture coupled with nondeterministic spacecraft and science execution times. This approach, though effective, added much complexity to uplink operations and sequence development. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) manages Spitzer s operations. As part of the uplink process, Spitzer s Mission Sequence Team (MST) was tasked with processing observatory inputs from the Spitzer Science Center (SSC) into efficiently integrated, constraint-checked, and modeled review and command products which accommodated the complexity of non-deterministic spacecraft and science event executions without increasing operations costs. The MST developed processes, scripts, and participated in the adaptation of multi-mission core software to enable rapid processing of complex sequences. The MST was also tasked with developing a Downlink Keyword File (DKF) which could instruct Deep Space Network (DSN) stations on how and when to configure themselves to receive Spitzer science data. As MST and uplink operations developed, important lessons were learned that should be applied to future missions, especially those missions which employ command-intensive operations via a multi-engine sequence architecture.
Calibration and testing of the instruments on the Integrated Science Instrument Module (ISIM) of the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is being performed by the use of a cryogenic, full-field, optical simulator that was constructed for this purpose. The Pupil Select Mechanism (PSM) assembly is one of several mechanisms and optical elements that compose the Optical Telescope Element SIMulator, or OSIM. The PSM allows for several optical elements to be inserted into the optical plane of OSIM, introducing a variety of aberrations, distortions, obscurations, and other calibration states into the pupil plane. The following discussion focuses on the details of the design evolution, analysis, build, and test of this mechanism along with the challenges associated with creating a sub arc-minute positioning mechanism operating in an extreme cryogenic environment. In addition, difficult challenges in the control system design will be discussed including the incorporation of closed-loop feedback control into a system that was designed to operate in an open-loop fashion.
This presentation provides a status of the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) effort to increase foundational knowledge of Product Development Leads (PDLs) in schedule and cost management including earned value management (EVM). In 2012, GSFC’s Engineering and Technology Directorate (ETD) implemented an in-house training program to prepare PDLs for managing the technical, cost, schedule, and risk aspects of spaceflight systems to meet their subsystem commitments. Developed in-house, the PDL training program provides an integrated approach to requirements development, risk, schedule and cost management, EVM, performance tracking, and other areas. The program has been held twice yearly since its inception with 531 participating and 451 completing the curriculum. In 2017, the program won the Robert H. Goddard award for Quality and Process Improvement. Program development and evolution were presented in the 2018 NASA Schedule and Cost Symposium. The presentation was so well received that this year we focus on one workshop within the program: Schedule and Cost Development, including EVM. We examine the on-going logic modeling process and how participant and stakeholder data influence workshop content and design, and how the disciplines of schedule and cost contribute to mission success. In this presentation we refresh you on how the approach integrates lecture, small group discussion, estimating, case study exercises, and problem solving. We update you on the data collected from participants and stakeholders, and we discuss how we use these data to measure training effectiveness. Specific topics include: • How the logic model is used as the backbone for continuous program improvement, • How feedback influences implementation and curriculum updates, • How data collection and analysis inform workshop content and development, including participant discoveries of EVM data, • How including the resource analyst and planner in the product development team supports project success.
The Orion (CEV) thermal protection system (TPS) advanced development project (ADP) was initiated in late 2006 to reduce developmental risk by significant investment in multiple heat shield architectural solutions that can meet the needs both the Low Earth orbit (LEO) and Lunar return missions. At the same time, the CEV TPS ADP was also charged with developing a preliminary design for the heat shield to meet the PDR requirement and at the time of the PDR, transfer the design to Lockheed- Martin, the prime contractor. We reported on the developmental activities of the first 18 months at the IPPW5 in Bordeaux, France, last summer. In June 08, at the time of the IPPW6, the CEV TPS ADP would have nearly completed the preparation for the Orion PDR and would be close to the original three-year mark. We plan to report on the progress at the Atlanta workshop. In the past year, Orion TPS ADP investment in TPS Technology, especially in PICA ablative Heat-shield design, development, testing and engineering (DDTE) has paid off in enabling MSL mission to switch from SLA 561 V heat shield to PICA heat shield. CEV TPS ADP considered SLA 561 V as a candidate for LEO missions and our testing identified failure modes in SLA and as a result, we dropped SLA for further evaluation. This close synergy between two projects is a highly visible example of how investment in technology areas can and does benefit multiple missions. In addition, CEV TPS ADP has been able to revive the Apollo ablative system namely AVCOAT honeycomb architecture as an alternate to the baseline PICA architecture and we plan to report the progress we have made in AVCOAT. CEV TPS ADP has invested considerable resources in developing analytical models for PICA and AVCOAT, material property measurements that is essential to the design of the heat-shield, in arcjet testing, in understanding the differences between different arc jet facilities, namely NASA Ames, NASA JSC and Air Force's AEDC, and in Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE), and in integration of and manufacturing heat shield as a system. The capabilities of the two heat shield systems including failure modes via testing and analysis, once established, can serve the Probe Community and future mission designers to inner and outer planetary exploration very well. For example, missions to Venus, Mars and Titan can use either one of the system by selecting the mission design parameters that utilizes the full characteristics of these system to make use of system efficiency that will result in reduced heat shield mass, system robustness that will enhance mission success and cost. We plan to present significant progresses of the past three years and highlight the significant contributions CEV TPS ADP Project has made to advance the state of the art in Thermal Protection System technology that has and will continue to benefit future entry probe missions.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
According to BMDO, the Clementine mission achieved many of its technology objectives during its flight to the Moon in early 1994 but, because of a software error, was unable to test the autonomous tracking of a cold target. The preliminary analyses of the returned lunar data suggest that valuable scientific measurements were made on several important topics but that COMPLEX's highest-priority objectives for lunar science were not achieved. This is not surprising given that the rationale for Clementine was technological rather than scientific. COMPLEX lists below a few of the lessons that may be learned from Clementine. Although the Clementine mission was not conceived as a NASA science mission exactly like those planned for the Discovery program, many operational aspects of the two are similar. It is therefore worthwhile to understand the strengths and faults of the Clementine approach. Some elements of the Clementine operation that led to the mission's success include the following: (1) The mission's achievements were the responsibility of a single organization and its manager, which made that organization and that individual accountable for the final outcome; (2) The sponsor adopted a hands-off approach and set a minimum number of reviews (three); (3) The sponsor accepted a reasonable amount of risk and allowed the project team to make the trade-offs necessary to minimize the mission's risks while still accomplishing all its primary objectives; and (4) The development schedule was brief and the agreed-on funding (and funding profile) was adhered to. Among the operational shortcomings of Clementine were the following: (1) An overly ambitious schedule and a slightly lean budget (meaning insufficient time for software development and testing, and leading ultimately to human exhaustion); and (2) No support for data calibration, reduction, and analysis. The principal lesson to be learned in this category is that any benefits from the constructive application of higher risk for lower cost and faster schedule will be lost if the schedule does not allow adequate time for the development of all essential systems or makes no allowance for human frailties. Another lesson to be drawn is that despite its limitations, if judged strictly as a science mission, Clementine attested that significant scientific information can be gathered during a technology-demonstration mission. In the current era of limited funds, when science missions will be infrequent, the opportunity to fly scientific instruments aboard missions whose objectives might be other than science must be seized and, indeed, encouraged. During such opportunities it would be inexcusable to do second-class science. Thus the scientific community must be actively involved in such projects from their initiation.
STGT (Second TDRSS Ground Terminal) is currently halfway through the System Integration Test phase (Level 4 Testing). To date, many software architecture and Ada language issues have been encountered and solved. This paper, which is the transcript of a presentation at the 3 Dec. meeting, attempts to define these lessons plus others learned regarding software project management and risk management issues, training, performance, reuse, and reliability. Observations are included regarding the use of particular Ada coding constructs, software architecture trade-offs during the prototyping, development and testing stages of the project, and dangers inherent in parallel or concurrent systems, software, hardware, and operations engineering.
Previously, we defined a blackbox formal system modeling language called RSML (Requirements State Machine Language). The language was developed over several years while specifying the system requirements for a collision avoidance system for commercial passenger aircraft. During the language development, we received continual feedback and evaluation by FAA employees and industry representatives, which helped us to produce a specification language that is easily learned and used by application experts. Since the completion of the PSML project, we have continued our research on specification languages. This research is part of a larger effort to investigate the more general problem of providing tools to assist in developing embedded systems. Our latest experimental toolset is called SpecTRM (Specification Tools and Requirements Methodology), and the formal specification language is SpecTRM-RL (SpecTRM Requirements Language). This paper describes what we have learned from our use of RSML and how those lessons were applied to the design of SpecTRM-RL. We discuss our goals for SpecTRM-RL and the design features that support each of these goals.
Honeywell Systems and Research Center developed and demonstrated an active 35 GHz Radar Imaging system as part of the FAA/USAF/Industry sponsored Synthetic Vision System Technology Demonstration (SVSTD) Program. The objectives of this presentation are to provide a general overview of flight test results, a system level perspective that encompasses the efforts of the SVSTD and Augmented VIsual Display (AVID) programs, and more importantly, provide the AVID workshop participants with Honeywell's perspective on the lessons that were learned from the SVS flight tests. One objective of the SVSTD program was to explore several known system issues concerning radar imaging technology. The program ultimately resolved some of these issues, left others open, and in fact created several new concerns. In some instances, the interested community has drawn improper conclusions from the program by globally attributing implementation specific issues to radar imaging technology in general. The motivation for this presentation is therefore to provide AVID researchers with a better understanding of the issues that truly remain open, and to identify the perceived issues that are either resolved or were specific to Honeywell's implementation.
The Deep Impact mission to comet Tempel-1 produced some of the more spectacular science results ever collected by a spacecraft. On July 4, 2005 the Deep Impact Flyby vehicle observed the Deep Impact Impactor vehicle's collision with the comet. 24 hours earlier the Flyby vehicle released the Impactor vehicle into the path of comet Tempel-1. The process to command the spacecraft was a challenge to the entire flight operations team. This paper presents an overview of the process used prepare command products for uplink and the lessons that were learned from this process.