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Burnup calculations for KIPT accelerator driven subcritical facility using Monte Carlo computer codes-MCB and MCNPX.

Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) of USA and Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT) of Ukraine have been collaborating on the conceptual design development of an electron accelerator driven subcritical (ADS) facility, using the KIPT electron accelerator. The neutron source of the subcritical assembly is generated from the interaction of 100 KW electron beam with a natural uranium target. The electron beam has a uniform spatial distribution and electron energy in the range of 100 to 200 MeV. The main functions of the subcritical assembly are the production of medical isotopes and the support of the Ukraine nuclear power industry. Neutron physics experiments and material structure analyses are planned using this facility. With the 100 KW electron beam power, the total thermal power of the facility is {approx}375 kW including the fission power of {approx}260 kW. The burnup of the fissile materials and the buildup of fission products reduce continuously the reactivity during the operation, which reduces the neutron flux level and consequently the facility performance. To preserve the neutron flux level during the operation, fuel assemblies should be added after long operating periods to compensate for the lost reactivity. This process requires accurate prediction of the fuel burnup, the decay behavior of the fission produces, and the introduced reactivity from adding fresh fuel assemblies. The recent developments of the Monte Carlo computer codes, the high speed capability of the computer processors, and the parallel computation techniques made it possible to perform three-dimensional detailed burnup simulations. A full detailed three-dimensional geometrical model is used for the burnup simulations with continuous energy nuclear data libraries for the transport calculations and 63-multigroup or one group cross sections libraries for the depletion calculations. Monte Carlo Computer code MCNPX and MCB are utilized for this study. MCNPX transports the electrons and the produced neutrons and photons but the current version of MCNPX doesn't support depletion/burnup calculation of the subcritical system with the generated neutron source from the target. MCB can perform neutron transport and burnup calculation for subcritical system using external neutron source, however it cannot perform electron transport calculations. To solve this problem, a hybrid procedure is developed by coupling these two computer codes. The user tally subroutine of MCNPX is developed and utilized to record the information of the each generated neutron from the photonuclear reactions resulted from the electron beam interactions. MCB reads the recorded information of each generated neutron thorough the user source subroutine. In this way, the neutron source generated by electron reactions could be utilized in MCB calculations, without the need for MCB to transport the electrons. Using the source subroutines, MCB could get the external neutron source, which is prepared by MCNPX, and perform depletion calculation for the driven subcritical facility.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

LIFE Materials: Fuel Cycle and Repository Volume 11

The fusion-fission LIFE engine concept provides a path to a sustainable energy future based on safe, carbon-free nuclear power with minimal nuclear waste. The LIFE design ultimately offers many advantages over current and proposed nuclear energy technologies, and could well lead to a true worldwide nuclear energy renaissance. When compared with existing and other proposed future nuclear reactor designs, the LIFE engine exceeds alternatives in the most important measures of proliferation resistance and waste minimization. The engine needs no refueling during its lifetime. It requires no removal of fuel or fissile material generated in the LIFE engine. It leaves no weapons-attractive material at the end of life. Although there is certainly a need for additional work, all indications are that the 'back end' of the fuel cycle does not to raise any 'showstopper' issues for LIFE. Indeed, the LIFE concept has numerous benefits: (1) Per unit of electricity generated, LIFE engines would generate 20-30 times less waste (in terms of mass of heavy metal) requiring disposal in a HLW repository than does the current once-through fuel cycle. (2) Although there may be advanced fuel cycles that can compete with LIFE's low mass flow of heavy metal, all such systems require reprocessing, with attendant proliferation concerns; LIFE engines can do this without enrichment or reprocessing. Moreover, none of the advanced fuel cycles can match the low transuranic content of LIFE waste. (3) The specific thermal power of LIFE waste is initially higher than that of spent LWR fuel. Nevertheless, this higher thermal load can be managed using appropriate engineering features during an interim storage period, and could be accommodated in a Yucca-Mountain-like repository by appropriate 'staging' of the emplacement of waste packages during the operational period of the repository. The planned ventilation rates for Yucca Mountain would be sufficient for LIFE waste to meet the thermal constraints of the repository design. (4) A simple, but arguably conservative, estimate for the dose from a repository containing 63,000 MT of spent LIFE fuel would have similar performance to the currently planned Yucca Mountain Repository. This indicates that a properly designed 'LIFE Repository' would almost certainly meet the proposed Nuclear Regulatory Commission standards for dose to individuals, even though the waste in such a repository would have produced 20-30 times more generated electricity than the reference case for Yucca Mountain. The societal risk/benefit ratio for a LIFE repository would therefore be significantly better than for currently planned repositories for LWR fuel.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Heat Management Strategy Trade Study

This Heat Management Trade Study was performed in 2008-2009 to expand on prior studies in continued efforts to analyze and evaluate options for cost-effectively managing SNF reprocessing wastes. The primary objective was to develop a simplified cost/benefit evaluation for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) reprocessing that combines the characteristics of the waste generated through reprocessing with the impacts of the waste on heating the repository. Under consideration were age of the SNF prior to reprocessing, plutonium and minor actinide (MA) separation from the spent fuel for recycle, fuel value of the recycled Pu and MA, age of the remaining spent fuel waste prior to emplacement in the repository, length of time that active ventilation is employed in the repository, and elemental concentration and heat limits for acceptable glass waste form durability. A secondary objective was to identify and qualitatively analyze remaining issues such as (a) impacts of aging SNF prior to reprocessing on the fuel value of the recovered fissile materials, and (b) impact of reprocessing on the dose risk as developed in the Yucca Mountain Total System Performance Assessment (TSPA). Results of this study can be used to evaluate different options for managing decay heat in waste streams from spent nuclear fuel.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Conceptual design of quadriso particles with europium burnable absorber in HTRS.

In High Temperature Reactors, burnable absorbers are utilized to manage the excess reactivity at the early stage of the fuel cycle. In this study QUADRISO particles are proposed to manage the initial xcess reactivity of High Temperature Reactors. The QUADRISO concept synergistically couples the decrease of the burnable poison with the decrease of the fissile materials at the fuel particle level. This echanism is set up by introducing a burnable poison layer around the fuel kernel in ordinary TRISO particles or by mixing the burnable poison with any of the TRISO coated layers. At the beginning of life, the nitial excess reactivity is small because some neutrons are absorbed in the burnable poison and they are prevented from entering the fuel kernel. At the end of life, when the absorber is almost depleted, ore eutrons stream into the fuel kernel of QUADRISO particles causing fission reactions. The mechanism has been applied to a prismatic High Temperature Reactor with europium or erbium burnable absorbers, showing a significant reduction in the initial excess reactivity of the core.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Returning HEU Fuel from the Czech Republic to Russia

In December 1999, representatives from the United States, Russian Federation, and International Atomic Energy Agency began working on a program to return Russian supplied, highly enriched, uranium fuel stored at foreign research reactors to Russia. Now, under the Global Threat Reduction Initiative’s Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program, this effort has repatriated over 800 kg of highly enriched uranium to Russia from over 10 countries. In May 2004, the “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation for the Transfer of Russian Produced Research Reactor Nuclear Fuel to the Russian Federation” was signed. This agreement provides legal authority for the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program and establishes parameters whereby eligible countries may return highly enriched uranium spent and fresh fuel assemblies and other fissile materials to Russia. On December 8, 2007, one of the largest shipments of highly enriched uranium spent nuclear fuel was successfully made from a Russian-designed nuclear research reactor in the Czech Republic to the Russian Federation. This accomplishment is the culmination of years of planning, negotiations, and hard work. The United States, Russian Federation, and the International Atomic Energy Agency have been working together. In February 2003, Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program representatives met with the Nuclear Research Institute in Rež, Czech Republic, and discussed the return of their highly enriched uranium spent nuclear fuel to the Russian Federation for reprocessing. Nearly 5 years later, the shipment was made. This article discusses the planning, preparations, coordination, and cooperation required to make this important international shipment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

THERMAL ANALYSIS OF A 9975 PACKAGE IN A FACILITY FIRE ACCIDENT

Surplus plutonium bearing materials in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex are stored in the 3013 containers that are designed to meet the requirements of the DOE standard DOE-STD-3013. The 3013 containers are in turn packaged inside 9975 packages that are designed to meet the NRC 10 CFR Part 71 regulatory requirements for transporting the Type B fissile materials across the DOE complex. The design requirements for the hypothetical accident conditions (HAC) involving a fire are given in 10 CFR 71.73. The 9975 packages are stored at the DOE Savannah River Site in the K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) facility for long term of up to 50 years. The design requirements for safe storage in KAMS facility containing multiple sources of combustible materials are far more challenging than the HAC requirements in 10 CFR 71.73. While the 10 CFR 71.73 postulates an HAC fire of 1475 F and 30 minutes duration, the facility fire calls for a fire of 1500 F and 86 duration. This paper describes a methodology and the analysis results that meet the design limits of the 9975 component and demonstrate the robustness of the 9975 package.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

TREATMENT OF GASEOUS EFFLUENTS ISSUED FROM RECYCLING – A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT PRACTICES AND PROSPECTIVE IMPROVEMENTS

The objectives of gaseous waste management for the recycling of nuclear used fuel is to reduce by best practical means (ALARA) and below regulatory limits, the quantity of activity discharged to the environment. The industrial PUREX process recovers the fissile material U(VI) and Pu(IV) to re-use them for the fabrication of new fuel elements e.g. recycling plutonium as a Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel or recycling uranium for new enrichment for Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). Meanwhile the separation of the waste (activation and fission product) is performed as a function of their pollution in order to store and avoid any potential danger and release towards the biosphere. Raffinate, that remains after the extraction step and which contains mostly all fission products and minor actinides is vitrified, the glass package being stored temporarily at the recycling plant site. Hulls and end pieces coming from PWR recycled fuel are compacted by means of a press leading to a volume reduced to 1/5th of initial volume. An organic waste treatment step will recycle the solvent, mainly tri-butyl phosphate (TBP) and some of its hydrolysis and radiolytic degradation products such as dibutyl phosphate (HDPB) and monobutyl phosphate (H2MBP). Although most scientific and technological development work focused on high level waste streams, a considerable effort is still under way in the area of intermediate and low level waste management. Current industrial practices for the treatment of gaseous effluents focusing essentially on Iodine-129 and Krypton-85 will be reviewed along with the development of novel technologies to extract, condition, and store these fission products. As an example, the current industrial practice is to discharge Kr-85, a radioactive gas, entirely to the atmosphere after dilution, but for the large recycling facilities envisioned in the near future, several techniques such as 1) cryogenic distillation and selective absorption in solvents, 2) adsorption on activated charcoal, 3) selective sorption on chemical modified zeolites, or 4) diffusion through membranes with selective permeability are potential technologies to retain the gas.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Scenarios for exercising technical approaches to verified nuclear reductions

Presidents Obama and Medvedev in April 2009 committed to a continuing process of step-by-step nuclear arms reductions beyond the new START treaty that was signed April 8, 2010 and to the eventual goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In addition, the US Nuclear Posture review released April 6, 2010 commits the US to initiate a comprehensive national research and development program to support continued progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, including expanded work on verification technologies and the development of transparency measures. It is impossible to predict the specific directions that US-RU nuclear arms reductions will take over the 5-10 years. Additional bilateral treaties could be reached requiring effective verification as indicated by statements made by the Obama administration. There could also be transparency agreements or other initiatives (unilateral, bilateral or multilateral) that require monitoring with a standard of verification lower than formal arms control, but still needing to establish confidence to domestic, bilateral and multilateral audiences that declared actions are implemented. The US Nuclear Posture Review and other statements give some indication of the kinds of actions and declarations that may need to be confirmed in a bilateral or multilateral setting. Several new elements of the nuclear arsenals could be directly limited. For example, it is likely that both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear warheads (deployed and in storage), warhead components, and aggregate stocks of such items could be accountable under a future treaty or transparency agreement. In addition, new initiatives or agreements may require the verified dismantlement of a certain number of nuclear warheads over a specified time period. Eventually procedures for confirming the elimination of nuclear warheads, components and fissile materials from military stocks will need to be established. This paper is intended to provide useful background information for establishing a conceptual approach to a five-year technical program plan for research and development of nuclear arms reductions verification and transparency technologies and procedures.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Demonstration (DEMO) of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system for tracking and monitoring of nuclear materials.

The US Department of Energy (DOE) [Environmental Management (EM), Office of Packaging and Transportation (EM-45)] Packaging Certification Program (PCP) has developed a radiofrequency identification (RFID) tracking and monitoring system for the management of nuclear materials packages during storage and transportation. The system, developed by the PCP team at Argonne National Laboratory, involves hardware modification, application software development, secured database and web server development, and irradiation experiments. In April 2008, Argonne tested key features of the RFID tracking and monitoring system in a weeklong, 1700 mile (2736 km) demonstration employing 14 empty type B fissile material drums of three designs (models 9975, 9977 and ES-3100) that have been certified for shipment by the DOE and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The demonstration successfully integrated global positioning system (GPS) technology for vehicle tracking, satellite/cellular (general packet radio service, or GPRS) technologies for wireless communication, and active RFID tags with multiple sensors (seal integrity, shock, temperature, humidity and battery status) on drums. In addition, the demonstration integrated geographic information system (GIS) technology with automatic alarm notifications of incidents and generated buffer zone reports for emergency response and management of staged incidents. The demonstration was sponsored by EM and the US National Nuclear Security Administration, with the participation of Argonne, Savannah River and Oak Ridge National Laboratories. Over 50 authorised stakeholders across the country observed the demonstration via secured Internet access. The DOE PCP and national laboratories are working on several RFID system implementation projects at selected DOE sites, as well as continuing device and systems development and widening applications beyond DOE sites and possibly beyond nuclear materials to include other radioactive materials.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Workshop introduction

The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has three subprograms that directly reduce the nuclear/radiological threat; Convert (Highly Enriched Uranium), Protect (Facilities), and Remove (Materials). The primary mission of the Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP) falls under the 'Remove' subset. The purpose of this workshop is to provide a venue for joint-technical collaboration between the OSRP and the Nuclear Radiation Safety Service (NRSS). Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative and the Soviet equivalent both promoted the spread of the paradoxical (peaceful and harmful) properties of the atom. The focus of nonproliferation efforts has been rightly dedicated to fissile materials and the threat they pose. Continued emphasis on radioactive materials must also be encouraged. An unquantifiable threat still exists in the prolific quantity of sealed radioactive sources (sources) spread worldwide. It does not appear that the momentum of the evolution in the numerous beneficial applications of radioactive sources will subside in the near future. Numerous expert studies have demonstrated the potentially devastating economic and psychological impacts of terrorist use of a radiological dispersal or emitting device. The development of such a weapon, from the acquisition of the material to the technical knowledge needed to develop and use it, is straightforward. There are many documented accounts worldwide of accidental and purposeful diversions of radioactive materials from regulatory control. The burden of securing sealed sources often falls upon the source owner, who may not have a disposal pathway once the source reaches the end of its useful life. This disposal problem is exacerbated by some source owners not having the resources to safely and compliantly store them. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) data suggests that, in the US alone, there are tens of thousands of high-activity (IAEA Category I and II) sources in thousands of devices; and there are many more tens of thousands of smaller sources scattered among thousands of other NRC licensees. As a result of the ubiquitous nature and undeterminable number of current and legacy sources, even in developed countries they can be abandoned, disposed of in a haphazard manner, lost, stolen, and/or otherwise fallout of regulatory control. Supply and demand of sources, being market based, is more or less fluid. Normative security of radioactive sources exists, but varies in each country, and is loosely implemented through non-legally binding recommendations and standards provided by International Atomic Energy Agency technical documents and cooperation and through bilateral efforts such as this workshop where we share best-practices with one another. Much of the reason for the difficulty in securing sealed sources rests in the enormous need for their beneficial applications in the medical, industrial, and agricultural sectors. Alternative technologies to replace high-risk sources continue to be explored, but very few of these alternative solutions have reached the development stage for common usage and distribution. The beneficial uses of sources must be allowed to continue; however, to minimize the potential for their misuse, current controls and regulating mechanisms must be constantly evaluated to ensure the benefits gained outweigh potential risks. From a global perspective, an evaluation and modification of requirements over the entire life cycle of sources from their manufacture to their final disposition is required. The proper removal and disposal of vulnerable disused or orphan sources is essential to maintaining a safe operating environment. One of our goals in this workshop is to share our methodologies for recovering sources and learn how they differ or are similar to the challenges faced in recovering, storing, and disposing of sources in the Republic of Georgia . The suggestions we will make are flexible in allowing for the imperfect situations and capabilities we have all encountered in source recovery efforts. We have designed a table-top exercise specifically to address your concerns about the prevention and mitigation of contaminated facilities, soil, containers, and sources. Our discussion begins with an overview and video of the OSRP along with a brief on our projects ongoing international cooperation and activities. A presentation will be given by the NRSS illustrating the successes and challenges of source management in Georgia. A brief overview will be given of selected significant cases of the intentional misuse of sources. This will be followed by two comprehensive discussions focusing on the decontamination from the facility perspective down to the issues of container and source leakage. The second day will begin with the abovementioned table-top exercise on contamination control. On the third day, a second presentation from the NRSS will open up the session.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Neutron detection and identification using ZnS:Ag/6LiF in segmented antineutrino detectors.

Antineutrino detection using inverse beta decay conversion has demonstrated capability to measure nuclear reactor power and fissile material content for nuclear safeguards. Current efforts focus on aboveground deployment scenarios, for which a successful background rejection strategy will be needed to measure the anticipated antineutrino event rates. In this submission, we report on initial studies to quantify the intrinsic capture efficiency and particle identification capabilities of a new scintillation-based segmented design that uses layers of ZnS:Ag/6LiF to capture and identify neutrons created in the inverse beta decay reaction. Laboratory efficiency measurements are consistent with MCNP5 calculations estimating 6Li neutron conversion efficiency above 50% for practical full-scale detector configurations. Neutron identification capabilities using pulse shape discrimination can be used for unit cells approaching 100 cm in length.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Management of disused plutonium sealed sources

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) Offsite Source Recovery Project (OSRP) has been recovering excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources since 1999, including more than 2,400 Plutonium (Pu)-238 sealed sources and 653 Pu-239-bearing sources that represent more than 10% of the total sources recovered by GTRI/OSRP to date. These sources have been recovered from hundreds of sites within the United States (US) and around the world. OSRP grew out of early efforts at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to recover and disposition excess Plutonium-239 (Pu-239) sealed sources that were distributed in the 1960s and 1970s under the Atoms for Peace Program, a loan-lease program that serviced 31 countries, as well as domestic users. In the conduct of these recovery operations, GTRI/OSRP has been required to solve problems related to knowledge-of-inventory, packaging and transportation of fissile and heat-source materials, transfer of ownership, storage of special nuclear material (SNM) both at US Department of Energy (DOE) facilities and commercially, and disposal. Unique issues associated with repatriation from foreign countries, including end user agreements required by some European countries and denials of shipment, will also be discussed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Status update on the NIFFTE high precision fission cross section measurement program

The Neutron Induced Fission Fragment Tracking Experiment (NIFFTE) program has been underway for nearly two years. The program's mission is to measure fission cross sections of the primary fissionable and fissile materials ({sup 235}U, {sup 239}Pu, {sup 238}U) as well as the minor actinides across energies from approximately 50 keV up to 20 MeV with an absolute uncertainty of less than one percent while investigating energy ranges from below an eV to 600 MeV. This basic nuclear physics data is being reinvestigated to support the next generation power plants and a fast burner reactor program. Uncertainties in the fast, resolved and unresolved resonance regions in plutonium and other transuranics are extremely large, dominating safety margins in the next generation nuclear power plants and power plants of today. This basic nuclear data can be used to support all aspects of the nuciear renaissance. The measurement campaign is utilizing a Time Projection Chamber or TPC as the tool to measure these cross sections to these unprecedented levels. Unlike traditional fission cross section measurements using time-of-flight and a multiple fission foil configurations in which fission cross sections in relation to that of {sup 235}U are performed, the TPC project uses time-of-flight and hydrogen as the benchmark cross section. Using the switch to hydrogen, a simple, smooth cross section that can be used which removes the uncertainties associated with the resolved and unresolved resonances in {sup 235}U.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Active interrogation using energetic protons

Energetic proton beams provide an attractive alternative when compared to electromagnetic and neutron beams for active interrogation of nuclear threats because they have large fission cross sections, long mean free paths and high penetration, and they can be manipulated with magnetic optics. We have measured time-dependent cross sections and neutron yields for delayed neutrons and gamma rays using 800 MeV and 4 GeV proton beams with a set of bare and shielded targets. The results show significant signals from both unshielded and shielded nuclear materials. Measurements of neutron energies yield suggest a signature unique to fissile material. Results are presented in this paper.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Mesoscale to plant-scale models of nuclear waste reprocessing.

Imported oil exacerabates our trade deficit and funds anti-American regimes. Nuclear Energy (NE) is a demonstrated technology with high efficiency. NE's two biggest political detriments are possible accidents and nuclear waste disposal. For NE policy, proliferation is the biggest obstacle. Nuclear waste can be reduced through reprocessing, where fuel rods are separated into various streams, some of which can be reused in reactors. Current process developed in the 1950s is dirty and expensive, U/Pu separation is the most critical. Fuel rods are sheared and dissolved in acid to extract fissile material in a centrifugal contactor. Plants have many contacts in series with other separations. We have taken a science and simulation-based approach to develop a modern reprocessing plant. Models of reprocessing plants are needed to support nuclear materials accountancy, nonproliferation, plant design, and plant scale-up.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the ongoing transformation of safeguards by the Agency.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Integrated readout of organic scintillator and ZnS:Ag/6LiF for segmented antineutrino detectors.

Antineutrino detection using inverse beta decay conversion has demonstrated the capability to measure nuclear reactor power and fissile material content for nuclear safeguards. Current efforts focus on aboveground deployment scenarios, for which highly efficient capture and identification of neutrons is needed to measure the anticipated antineutrino event rates in an elevated background environment. In this submission, we report on initial characterization of a new scintillation-based segmented design that uses layers of ZnS:Ag/{sup 6}LiF and an integrated readout technique to capture and identify neutrons created in the inverse beta decay reaction. Laboratory studies with multiple organic scintillator and ZnS:Ag/{sup 6}LiF configurations reliably identify {sup 6}Li neutron captures in 60 cm-long segments using pulse shape discrimination.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Integrated readout of organic scintillator and ZnS:Ag/6LiF for segmented antineutrino detectors.

Antineutrino detection using inverse beta decay conversion has demonstrated the capability to measure nuclear reactor power and fissile material content for nuclear safeguards. Current efforts focus on aboveground deployment scenarios, for which highly efficient capture and identification of neutrons is needed to measure the anticipated antineutrino event rates in an elevated background environment. In this submission, we report on initial characterization of a new scintillation-based segmented design that uses layers of ZnS:Ag/{sup 6}LiF and an integrated readout technique to capture and identify neutrons created in the inverse beta decay reaction. Laboratory studies with multiple organic scintillator and ZnS:Ag/{sup 6}LiF configurations reliably identify {sup 6}Li neutron captures in 60 cm-long segments using pulse shape discrimination.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗