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41 records · Page 3

Core Optimization of a Deep-Burn Pebble Bed Reactor

Achieving a high fuel burnup in the Deep-Burn (DB) pebble bed reactor design, while remaining within the limits for fuel temperature, power peaking and temperature reactivity feedback, is challenging. The high content of Pu and Minor Actinides in the Deep-Burn fuel significantly impacts the thermal neutron energy spectrum as compared to a ’standard’ UO2 fueled core. This can result in power and temperature peaking in the pebble bed core in locally thermalized regions near the graphite reflectors. Furthermore, the interplay of the Pu resonances of the neutron absorption cross sections at low-lying energies can lead to a positive temperature reactivity coefficient for the graphite moderator at certain operating conditions. The DB concept focuses on the destruction of spent fuel transuranics in TRISO coated particle fueled gas-cooled reactors with the aim of a fractional fuel burnup of 60-70% in fissions per initial metal atom (FIMA), using a single-pass, multi in-core fuel (re)cycling scheme. In principle, the DB pebble bed concept employs the same reactor designs as the present low enriched uranium core designs, i.e. the 400 MWth Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR-400). A Pu and Minor Actinide fueled PBMR-400 design serves as the starting point for a core optimization study. The fuel temperature, power peak, temperature reactivity coefficients, and burnup capabilities of the modified designs are analyzed with the PEBBED code. A code-to-code coupling with the PASTA code allows for the analysis of the TRISO fuel performance for both normal and Loss Of Forced Cooling conditions. An improved core design is sought, maximizing the fuel discharge burnup, while retaining negative temperature reactivity feedback coefficients for the entire temperature range and avoiding high fuel temperatures (fuel failure probabilities).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Bounding the Chemistry Conditions in the HM Solvent Extraction Process Criticality Safety Analyses

An approach new to the H-Canyon facility criticality safety analysis has been performed using highly detailed models of the H-Modified (HM) process mixer settlers. The HM process uses tributyl phosphate (TBP) in organic n-paraffin to extract and purify uranium from used nuclear fuel. This occurs in two cycles of counter-current solvent extraction. The aqueous stream is a weak to moderate nitric acid and the feed stock is an aqueous stream. The first Cycle, consisting of two 16-stage banks (A and B-Banks) and one 12-stage bank (C-Bank), is a three step process that separates uranium from the fuel matrix, fission products, and most of the transuranic actinide content. The first Cycle aqueous product is concentrated, adjusted for acidity and fed to the second Cycle. The second Cycle, consisting of one 16-stage bank (D-Bank) and one 12-stage bank (E-Bank), is a two-step process that further purifies the uranium and removes to a great extent remaining actinides and fission products Each stage of the mixer settler banks is modeled as three unique compositions: the mixer as a combined composition of aqueous and organic components and the settler one aqueous and one organic component. This work addresses what is believed to be normal, credible abnormal, and beyond credible abnormal conditions for a particular postulated series of process parameter upsets. The level of detail and the source for the stage-wise compositions are both new and unique to criticality safety analyses of the HM process. Initial work was presented in Ref. 1 and has since been refined. A predictive chemistry model for flowsheet development has been used to solve the solvent extraction equations for the prescribed conditions and the output of that model was then transformed into compositions for each mixture in each stage. The remaining question upon which to achieve consensus is if the approach was appropriately conservative by concluding the chemistry is appropriately bounded. Computational modeling for criticality calculations was performed using KENO-VI in the SCALE 6.1 code package. Computational modeling of the chemistry was performed using the SEPHIS Modification 4 code.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Description of Transmutation Library for Fuel Cycle System Analyses

This report documents the Transmutation Library that is used in Fuel Cycle System Analyses. This version replaces the 2008 version.[Piet2008] The Transmutation Library has the following objectives: • Assemble past and future transmutation cases for system analyses. • For each case, assemble descriptive information such as where the case was documented, the purpose of the calculation, the codes used, source of feed material, transmutation parameters, and the name of files that contain raw or source data. • Group chemical elements so that masses in separation and waste processes as calculated in dynamic simulations or spreadsheets reflect current thinking of those processes. For example, the CsSr waste form option actually includes all Group 1A and 2A elements. • Provide mass fractions at input (charge) and output (discharge) for each case. • Eliminate the need for either “fission product other” or “actinide other” while conserving mass. Assessments of waste and separation cannot use “fission product other” or “actinide other” as their chemical behavior is undefined. • Catalog other isotope-specific information in one place, e.g., heat and dose conversion factors for individual isotopes. • Describe the correlations for how input and output compositions change as a function of UOX burnup (for LWR UOX fuel) or fast reactor (FR) transuranic (TRU) conversion ratio (CR) for either FR-metal or FR-oxide. This document therefore includes the following sections: • Explanation of the data set information, i.e., the data that describes each case. In no case are all of the data presented in the Library included in previous documents. In assembling the Library, we return to raw data files to extract the case and isotopic data, into the specified format. • Explanation of which isotopes and elements are tracked. For example, the transition metals are tracked via the following: two Zr isotopes, Zr-other, Tc99, Tc-other, two Mo-Ru-Rh-Pd isotopes, Mo-Ru-Rh-Pd-other, four other specific TM isotopes, and TM-other. Mo-Ru-Rh-Pd are separated because their content constrains the loading of waste in glass, so we have to know the mass of those elements independent of others. • Rules for collapsing long lists of isotopes (~1000) to the 81 items in the library. For each tracked isotope, we define which short-lived isotopes’ mass (at t=0) is included with the mass of the tracked isotope at t=0, which short-lived radioactive progeny must be accounted for when the tracked isotope decays, and to which of the other 80 items the mass of the tracked isotope goes when it decays. • Explanation of where raw data files can be found on the fuel cycle data portal. • Explanation of generic cross section sets • Explanation of isotope-specific parameters such as heat and dose conversion factors • Explanation of the LWR UOX burnup and FR TRU CR correlations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Processing Plan for Potentially Reactive/Ignitable Remote Handled Transuranic Waste at the Idaho Cleanup Project - 12090

Remote Handle Transuranic (RH-TRU) Waste generated at Argonne National Laboratory - East, from the examination of irradiated and un-irradiated fuel pins and other reactor materials requires a detailed processing plan to ensure reactive/ignitable material is absent to meet WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria prior to shipping and disposal. The Idaho Cleanup Project (ICP) approach to repackaging Lot 2 waste and how we ensure prohibited materials are not present in waste intended for disposal at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 'WIPP' uses an Argon Repackaging Station (ARS), which provides an inert gas blanket. Opening of the Lot 2 containers under an argon gas blanket is proposed to be completed in the ARS. The ARS is an interim transition repackaging station that provides a mitigation technique to reduce the chances of a reoccurrence of a thermal event prior to rendering the waste 'Safe'. The consequences, should another thermal event be encountered, (which is likely) is to package the waste, apply the reactive and or ignitable codes to the container, and store until the future treatment permit and process are available. This is the same disposition that the two earlier containers in the 'Thermal Events' were assigned. By performing the initial handling under an inert gas blanket, the waste can sorted and segregate the fines and add the Met-L-X to minimize risk before it is exposed to air. The 1-gal cans that are inside the ANL-E canister will be removed and each can is moved to the ARS for repackaging. In the ARS, the 1-gal can is opened in the inerted environment. The contained waste is sorted, weighed, and visually examined for non compliant items such as unvented aerosol cans and liquids. The contents of the paint cans are transferred into a sieve and manipulated to allow the fines, if any, to be separated into the tray below. The fines are weighed and then blended with a minimum 5:1 mix of Met-L-X. Other debris materials found are segregated from the cans into containers for later packaging. Recoverable fissile waste material (Fuel and fuel-like pieces) suspected of containing sodium bonded pieces) are segregated and will remain in the sieve or transferred to a similar immersion basket in the ARS. The fuel like pieces will be placed into a container with sufficient water to cover the recoverable fissile waste. If a 'reactive characteristic' is present the operator will be able to observe the formation of 'violent' hydrogen gas bubbles. When sodium bonded fuel-like pieces are placed in water the expected reaction is a non-violent reaction that does not meet the definition of reactivity. It is expected that there will be a visible small stream of bubbles present if there is any sodium-bonded fuel-like piece placed in the water. The test will be completed when there is no reaction or the expected reaction is observed..At that point, the fuel like pieces complete the processing cycle in preparation for characterization and shipment to WIPP. If a violent reaction occurs, the fuel-like pieces will be removed from the water, split into the required fissile material content, placed into a screened basket in a 1 gallon drum and drummed out of the hot cell with appropriate RCRA codes applied and placed into storage until sodium treatment is available. These 'violent' reactions will be evidenced by gas bubbles being evolved at the specimen surface where sodium metal is present. The operators will be trained to determine if the reaction is 'violent' or 'mild'. If a 'violent' reaction occurs, the sieve will be immediately removed from the water, placed in a 1 gallon paint can, canned in the argon cover gas and removed from the hot cell to await a future treatment. If the reaction is 'mild', the sieve will then be removed from the water; the material weighed for final packaging and allowed to dry by air exposure. Lot 2 waste cans can be opened, sorted, processed, and weighed while mitigating the potential of thermal events that could occur prior to exposing to air. Exposure to air is a WIPP compliance step demonstrating the absence of reactive or ignitable characteristics. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development, Testing and Validation of a Waste Assay System for the Measurement and Characterisation of Active Spent Fuel Element Debris From UK Magnox Reactors - 12533

This paper describes the development, testing and validation of a waste measurement instrument for characterising active remote handled radioactive waste arising from the operation of Magnox reactors in the United Kingdom. Following operation in UK Magnox gas cooled reactors and a subsequent period of cooling, parts of the magnesium-aluminium alloy cladding were removed from spent fuel and the uranium fuel rods with the remaining cladding were removed to Sellafield for treatment. The resultant Magnox based spent fuel element debris (FED), which constitutes active intermediate level waste (ILW) has been stored in concrete vaults at the reactor sites. As part of the decommissioning of the FED vaults the FED must be removed, measured and characterised and placed in intermediate storage containers. The present system was developed for use at the Trawsfynydd nuclear power station (NPS), which is in the decommissioning phase, but the approach is potentially applicable to FED characterisation at all of the Magnox reactors. The measurement system consists of a heavily shielded and collimated high purity Germanium (HPGe) detector with electromechanical cooling and a high count-rate preamplifier and digital multichannel pulse height analyser. The HPGe based detector system is controlled by a software code, which stores the measurement result and allows a comprehensive analysis of the measured FED data. Fuel element debris is removed from the vault and placed on a tray to a uniform depth of typically 10 cm for measurement. The tray is positioned approximately 1.2 meters above the detector which views the FED through a tungsten collimator with an inverted pyramid shape. At other Magnox sites the positions may be reversed with the shielded and collimated HPGe detector located above the tray on which the FED is measured. A comprehensive Monte Carlo modelling and analysis of the measurement process has been performed in order to optimise the measurement geometry and eliminate interferences from radioactive sources and FED in the immediate vicinity of the measurement position. The detector system has been calibrated and high activity radioactive sources of Cs-137, Co-60 and Na-22 have been used to validate the measurement process. The data acquisition and analysis software code has been tested and validated in keeping with the software quality assurance requirements of both ISO:9001-2008 - TICK-IT in the UK and NQA-1. The measurement and analysis system has been comprehensively tested with high activity sources, is flexible and may be applicable to a wide range of remote handled radioactive waste measurement applications. It is due to be installed at Trawsfynydd NPS later this year. This paper describes the Waste Tray Assay System (WTAS) that has been developed for the measurement of Magnox FED waste. The WTAS has been tested with a range of radioactive sources and its operation has been simulated with benchmarked MCNP Monte Carlo calculations. The measurement software has been validated as has the operation of the system for a range of strong radioactive sources. A system based on the design is due for installation and operation in 2012. The system has application to the measurement of Magnox Fuel Element Debris (FED) waste at other Magnox reactor sites. The major design objective of the WTAS that has been achieved is the ability of the assay system to determine the content of Cs-137, and in turn to enable the fissile burden to be assessed using a radionuclide fingerprint, in the presence of higher and highly variable quantities of Co-60, typically from nimonic springs. The approach can be used in other Magnox FED waste configurations where the detector is located above the FED waste sorting tray and where the collimation is fixed below the detector and at a distance above the tray. In this case, which has also been investigated, there are different shielding problems and mechanical support issues. The extensive use of MCNP Monte Carlo modelling to simulate the geometry of the sorting cell and the distribution of radioactive sources has helped to ensure that all of the detector shielding requirements are addressed and suitable Cs-137 and Co-60 discrimination can be achieved. The WTAS in its present form or in other configurations has relevance to the measurement of other active ILW and highly active RH waste. Examples include high activity RH LLW and RH TRU (Transuranic) waste as defined in the United States arising from both commercial nuclear and Department of Energy (DOE) operations. The analysis is able to analyse a range of radionuclides beyong those expected in the Magnox FED cases. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗