Linearised three-phase optimal power flow for coordinated optimisation of residential solid-state power substations
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Directional locking occurs when a particle moving over a periodic substrate becomes constrained to travel along certain substrate symmetry directions. Such locking effects arise for colloids and superconducting vortices moving over ordered substrates when the direction of the external drive is varied. Here we study the directional locking of run-and-tumble active matter particles interacting with a periodic array of obstacles. In the absence of an external biasing force, we find that the active particle motion locks to various symmetry directions of the substrate when the run time between tumbles is large. The number of possible locking directions depends on the array density and on the relative sizes of the particles and the obstacles. For a square array of large obstacles, the active particle only locks to the x, y, and 45° directions, while for smaller obstacles, the number of locking angles increases. Each locking angle satisfies θ = arctan (p/q) , where p and q are integers, and the angle of motion can be measured using the ratio of the velocities or the velocity distributions in the x and y directions. When a biasing driving force is applied, the directional locking behavior is affected by the ratio of the self-propulsion force to the biasing force. For large biasing, the behavior resembles that found for directional locking in passive systems. For large obstacles under biased driving, a trapping behavior occurs that is nonmonotonic as a function of increasing run length or increasing self-propulsion force, and the trapping diminishes when the run length is sufficiently large.
To transfer large amount of power over long distances, multiterminal direct current (MTdc) system based on bipole high-voltage direct current (HVdc) technology is a viable option. However, such system results in large dc transmission loss. The same can be reduced by increasing the dc voltage level. This paper introduces a new MTdc system architecture comprising of series (for increasing dc voltage level) and parallel (for increasing dc current capability) connected HVdc converters. The new architecture is compared with the bipole MTdc architecture in terms of equipment needed and dc transmission loss. The control modifications needed for the MTdc system are identified and the performance of the developed control is verified through electromagnetic transient (EMT) simulations.
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District heating and cooling (DHC) is considered one of the most sustainable technologies to meet the heating and cooling demands of buildings in urban areas. The fifth-generation district heating and cooling (5GDHC) concept, often referred to as ambient loops, is a novel solution emerging in Europe and has become a widely discussed topic in current energy system research. 5GDHC systems operate at a temperature close to the ground and include electrically driven heat pumps and associated thermal energy storage in a building-sited energy transfer station (ETS) to satisfy user comfort. This work presents new strategies for improving the operation of these energy transfer stations by means of a model predictive control (MPC) method based on recurrent artificial neural networks. The results show that, under simple time-of-use utility rates, the advanced controller outperforms a rule-based controller for smart charging of the domestic hot water (DHW) thermal energy storage under specific boundary conditions. By exploiting the available thermal energy storage capacity, the MPC controller is capable of shifting up to 14% of the electricity consumption of the ETS from on-peak to off-peak hours. Therefore, the advanced control implemented in 5GDHC networks promotes coupling between the thermal and the electric sector, producing flexibility on the electric grid.
Systems and methods for fault detection and protection in electric power systems that evaluates electromagnetic transients caused by faults. A fault can be detected using sampled data from a first monitored point in the power system. Detection of fault transients and associated characteristics, including transient direction, can also be extracted through evaluation of sample data from other monitored points in the power system. A monitoring device can evaluate whether to trip a switching device in response to the detection of the fault and based on confirmation of an indication of detection of fault transients at the other monitored points of the power system. The determination of whether to trip or activate the switching device can also be based on other factors, including the timing of receipt of an indication of the detection of the fault transients and/or an evaluation of the characteristics of the detected transients.
Systems and methods for fault detection and protection in electric power systems that evaluates electromagnetic transients caused by faults. A fault can be detected using sampled data from a first monitored point in the power system. Detection of fault transients and associated characteristics, including transient direction, can also be extracted through evaluation of sample data from other monitored points in the power system. A monitoring device can evaluate whether to trip a switching device in response to the detection of the fault and based on confirmation of an indication of detection of fault transients at the other monitored points of the power system. The determination of whether to trip or activate the switching device can also be based on other factors, including the timing of receipt of an indication of the detection of the fault transients and/or an evaluation of the characteristics of the detected transients.
A system for detecting MITM for SCADA communication networks includes secure substation-substation communication links for providing secure and reliable paths to exchange OT data between substations for OT data consistency check; a SIB in each substation for sampling CT and PT measurements to calculate voltage magnitude and phase angle thereof; a S&C server in each substation coupled to the SIB for receiving the voltage magnitude and phase angle from the SIB and obtaining a packet carrying active power flow in transmission lines between two substations and a time stamp; an IDS server placed in a SCADA center for collecting the packet of each substation sent by the S&C server; analyzing the received packet from every adjacent substation; inspecting the payload of the received packet; and triggering an intrusion alarm to a SCADA operator when the power flow is not the same as the payload of the packets.
This report summarizes the design and pilot demonstration of a framework called Grid Guard that was created to provide increased data and device trustworthiness to electric grid devices by leveraging distributed ledger technology (DLT), specifically blockchain. Grid Guard contains a combination of core cryptographic methods such as the secure hash algorithm (SHA), and asymmetric cryptography, private permissioned blockchain, baselining configuration data, consensus algorithm (Raft) and the Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) framework. The system implements a low energy, fast, and robust enhancement to system trustworthiness within and across electric grid systems such as substations, control centers and metering infrastructures. Blockchain is a distributed database structured that provides a practically unalterable (immutable) timeline of stored transactions. By relying on hashing and the Raft consensus algorithm, if an entity tries to illegitimately alter a record at one instance of the database the other ledger nodes are not altered. They work to cross-reference each other and easily locate any incorrectly added data and remove it. The bulk raw data is stored in an off-chain storage (outside of the blockchain ledger) and a hash of this baseline data is stored in the Blockchain ledger via hashing windows of time-series and configuration data, after aggregation and filtering. The bulk off-chain data repository is then considered to be trust-anchored using the hashes stored in the blockchain. To secure the electric grid testbed devices and data, device configuration baselines were compared to those baselines that had been previously stored in the ledger. Statistical baselines for device configurations, network communication patterns, and high-speed sensor data are calculated and then stored off-chain and hashes stored in the ledger. Measurements such as three-phase voltage and current, frequency, breaker status, protection scheme settings, network configuration settings (and other device configuration artifacts) and network traffic features (packet interarrival times) are compared every minute or other selected time windows. During phase 1 of the Grid Guard DLT project different DLT technologies were studies, and an assessment was performed on DLT technology vulnerabilities, uses, and key characteristics. DLT consensus protocols were studies (e.g., RAFT, named after Reliable, Replicated, Redundant, And Fault-Tolerant). Also, cryptography, public, private and permissioned or permissionless systems were assessed. Grid Guard implements a permissioned private DLT. Consensus algorithm selection and choice of DLT implementation depended heavily on the use-case. For this use-case, parameters were selected to measure performance and existing tools for assessment. Benchmarking was performed theoretically and practically. During phase 2 hashed transactions/blocks were inserted into the ledger every second. During phase 2 of the Grid Guard DLT project, a prototype framework was developed and demonstrated for attestation of critical substation devices and data using precision timing systems that use PTP and IRIG-B protocols) on a testbed of operational devices that emulated a distribution substation, control center, and power metering infrastructure using real Operational Technology (OT). The testbed includes OT devices such as protective relays, human machine interfaces (HMI), and power meters. To determine when to collect and compare system and network baselines, an initial examination of an anomaly detection capability to identify malicious manipulation of data streams was conducted. The resulting anomaly detection was demonstrated in a set of experiments and leveraged to trigger device artifact attestation checks. Attestation checks occur against device configuration baselines when compared with the immutable blockchain-stored baselines, which provided a cryptographically supported means by which to store baselines. The electrical substation-grid testbed was created to test the Grid Guard framework. The testbed emulates the operations of a portion of a power grid and SCADA systems as closely as possible. The testbed integrates real protocols, mainly IEC 61850 standard protocols, such as the Sampled Value (SV) and the GOOSE protocols. The testbed also supports DNP3 and other layer 2 and layer 3 protocols such as Telnet, SSH, SFTP/FTP and other proprietary protocols needed to connect to industrial control system equipment. The testbed emulates real power conditions using the OpalRT hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) device which can create fault situations that cannot be easily tested on real systems. The electrical substation-grid testbed was created using real measurement, communication, and protection devices that electrical utilities commonly use.
The cybersecurity threats of power system gradually grow due to the increased sophisticated interactions between Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) networks. False data injection attack (FDIA) that aims to compromise the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) measurement and disturb the system operation is one of such cyber threats. Such attacks can potentially lead to significant operational issues at the control centers and substations, and hence, result in severe physical consequences. To avoid catastrophic failure across the power grid resulting from these attacks, it is essential to arm the OT network with real-time vulnerability assessment tools. To this end, this paper outlines various drawbacks of the Purdue architecture model to defend against cyberattacks in the OT network. Furthermore, a novel ensemble-based state prediction model is proposed to detect cybersecurity anomalies in SCADA assisted OT networks. The proposed model uses control center level generation and load forecasts, scheduled, and forced outages, power flow solutions, and the substation level historical data. The hypothesis of the proposed scheme relies on the fact that additional control center and substation data can hardly be accessed and compromised by attackers. One of the vital features of the proposed scheme is an hour-ahead prediction of the operational feasibility of the SCADA measurement range at the control center and substation in real time helps in detecting anomalies in measurements across both substation and the control center.
Reliable real-time monitoring is valuable for maintaining the operational integrity of modern electrical smart grids. Deployment of heterogeneous sensing technologies in substations has enabled high-resolution, multichannel waveform monitoring, but also introduces challenges for anomaly detection due to noise, baseline drift, and modality-dependent signal characteristics. In this work, we present a computationally efficient unsupervised method for multimodal event detection based on Rolling Root Mean Square based Event Detection (RRMSED). The method is developed using in-house, field deployed sensors collecting data at a utility substation. The sensing system comprises voltage and current sensors, triaxial accelerometers, and magnetometers, collectively capturing electrical, vibrational, and magnetic waveform measurements at high temporal resolution. RRMSED operates by extracting rolling RMS energy features and their first-order temporal differences from consecutive waveform segments for each channel and then applying channel-specific statistical thresholds learned from historical data. A persistence-based exceedance logic is employed to robustly identify transient events while suppressing impulsive noise, and to provide precise temporal localization with high resolution. The framework is designed for continuous server-side operation and can be deployed in real time without requiring complex models. Experiments on simulated waveform data with known ground truth demonstrate low false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) rates. Application to real substation data shows RRMSED to identify events that are not captured by conventional monitoring indicators including fast transient detection algorithm currently deployed in the system. These results indicate that rolling RMS based features provide an effective and practical basis for real-time multimodal event detection in smart-grid substations.
In recent years, critical infrastructure and power grids have experienced a series of cyber-attacks, leading to temporary, widespread blackouts of considerable magnitude. Since most substations are unmanned and have limited physical security protection, cyber breaches into power grid substations present a risk. Nowadays, the susceptibility of SDN architecture to cyber-attacks has exhibited a notable increase in recent years, as indicated by research findings. This suggests a growing concern regarding the potential for cybersecurity breaches within the SDN framework. In this paper, we propose a hybrid intrusion detection system (IDS)-integrated SDN architecture for detecting and preventing the injection of malicious IEC 61850-based generic object-oriented system event (GOOSE) messages in a digital substation. Additionally, this program locates the fault’s location and, as a form of mitigation, disables a certain port. Furthermore, implementation examples are demonstrated and verified using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed that mimics the functioning of a digital substation.
IEC 61850 specifies the Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) protocol as one option for low latency communication of substation-related events. Due to its strict timing requirements, GOOSE lacks any form of encryption or authentication and has only minimal integrity guarantees. These absences render the protocol vulnerable to a variety of communication anomalies, including adversarial action. In particular, an adversary with access to the substation network can launch man in the middle (MITM) attacks. We propose Alerga, a set of tools to allow operators to mitigate some of the risks of the protocol while retaining its strengths. To that end, we have developed first a GOOSE simulation pipeline including data generation, anomaly detection, alert handling, causal reasoning and data visualization components. The simulator is designed to be modular, allowing operators to swap components to better fit their network capabilities. The volume of alert traffic on a substation network threatens operators with alert fatigue. In order to combat this, we secondly present a novel form of alert aggregation and processing, offering operators a condensed view of any threats to the system. Thirdly, to facilitate the handling of these threats, our causal reasoning system traces the alerts back to their most likely cause, generating an initial hypothesis for operators to investigate.
The Flexible Resource Scheduler is a hierarchical controller that manages the distributed energy resources in a distribution substation or distribution feeder to provide a firm commitment of power flow at the substation or feeder head to be scheduled in transmission-level markets as an aggregated demand resource. It is the reference controller for the FAST-DERMS Architecture, developed in tandem with the architecture under the DOE FAST-DERMS project. It is comprised of a day-ahead stochastic optimization, which schedules substation power flow and reserves, a intra-hour MPC, which generates dispatch base points for DER, and a real-time PID controller maintaining that dispatches DER to maintain the substation power around the base points. The repository also includes a representative aggregator controller, and all of the necessary components to run a simulation using PNNL's GridAPPS-D software with the controller.