Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “safety analysis”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1987

Fault tree safety analysis of a large Li/SOCl(sub)2 spacecraft battery

The results of the safety fault tree analysis on the eight module, 576 F cell Li/SOCl2 battery on the spacecraft and in the integration and test environment prior to launch on the ground are presented. The analysis showed that with the right combination of blocking diodes, electrical fuses, thermal fuses, thermal switches, cell balance, cell vents, and battery module vents the probability of a single cell or a 72 cell module exploding can be reduced to .000001, essentially the probability due to explosion for unexplained reasons.

Uy, O. Manuel↗
NASA NTRS2017

A Framework for Reliability and Safety Analysis of Complex Space Missions

Long duration and complex mission scenarios are characteristics of NASA's human exploration of Mars, and will provide unprecedented challenges. Systems reliability and safety will become increasingly demanding and management of uncertainty will be increasingly important. NASA's current pioneering strategy recognizes and relies upon assurance of crew and asset safety. In this regard, flexibility to develop and innovate in the emergence of new design environments and methodologies, encompassing modeling of complex systems, is essential to meet the challenges.

Safety Analysis↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model-Based Engineering (REV B)

The emergence of model-based engineering is transforming design and analysis methodologies. A recognized benefit of model-based engineering is the existence of a “single source of truth” about the system that becomes the authoritative source of data and information for designers, analysts, and developers. This promotes consistency and efficiency as the design emerges and can be used to further optimize the design. Integrating System Safety Engineers to the “single source of truth” will ensure that the outputs of their assessments and analyses are relevant to the design as it evolves. Use of an integrated system model enables near immediate evaluation of a design change as well as development of operational processes for risk assessment and communication. Such models can enable efficient and timely analysis of system hazards (e.g., hazard fault tree analysis and procedure simulations) and produce complete, accurate, and more consistent products (e.g., hazard reports and safety requirement evaluations). Therefore, an agency-sponsored team at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) recently completed a System Safety Study of modeling and testing capabilities as part of a Model-Based Safety and Mission Assurance Initiative (MBSMAI). Using an existing model developed for reliability analyses, GSFC modeling and system safety experts performed system safety analysis/modeling and produced safety products. The team evaluated model-based feasibility to support System Safety Engineering, developed safety analysis modeling processes, and identified tool capability advancement/development needs. These study results indicate model-based engineering is valid and useable for System Safety Engineering for NASA if adequate modeling processes and environment are established.

NASA↗
NASA NTRS1974

A guide for performing system safety analysis

A general guide is presented for performing system safety analyses of hardware, software, operations and human elements of an aerospace program. The guide describes a progression of activities that can be effectively applied to identify hazards to personnel and equipment during all periods of system development. The general process of performing safety analyses is described; setting forth in a logical order the information and data requirements, the analytical steps, and the results. These analyses are the technical basis of a system safety program. Although the guidance established by this document cannot replace human experience and judgement, it does provide a methodical approach to the identification of hazards and evaluation of risks to the system.

Brush, J. M.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model-Based Engineering

The emergence of model-based engineering is transforming design and analysis methodologies [5]. A recognized benefit of model-based engineering is the existence of a “single source of truth” about the system that becomes the authoritative source of data and information for designers, analysts, and developers. This promotes consistency and efficiency as the design emerges and can be used to further optimize the design. Integrating System Safety Engineers to the “single source of truth” will ensure that the outputs of their assessments and analyses are relevant to the design as it evolves. Use of an integrated system model enables near immediate evaluation of a design change as well as development of operational processes for risk assessment and communication. Such models can enable efficient and timely analysis of system hazards (e.g., hazard fault tree analysis and procedure simulations) and produce complete, accurate, and more consistent products (e.g., hazard reports and safety requirement evaluations). Therefore, an agency-sponsored team at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) recently completed a System Safety Study of modeling and testing capabilities as part of a Model-Based Safety and Mission Assurance Initiative (MBSMAI). Using an existing model developed for reliability analyses [1], GSFC modeling and system safety experts performed system safety analysis/modeling and produced safety products. The team evaluated model-based feasibility to support System Safety Engineering, developed safety analysis modeling processes, and identified tool capability advancement/development needs. These study results indicate model-based engineering is valid and useable for System

NASA↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model Based Engineering

The emergence of model-based engineering is transforming design and analysis methodologies [5]. A recognized benefit of model-based engineering is the existence of a “single source of truth” about the system that becomes the authoritative source of data and information for designers, analysts, and developers. This promotes consistency and efficiency as the design emerges and can be used to further optimize the design. Integrating System Safety Engineers to the “single source of truth” will ensure that the outputs of their assessments and analyses are relevant to the design as it evolves. Use of an integrated system model enables near immediate evaluation of a design change as well as development of operational processes for risk assessment and communication. Such models can enable efficient and timely analysis of system hazards (e.g., hazard fault tree analysis and procedure simulations) and produce complete, accurate, and more consistent products (e.g., hazard reports and safety requirement evaluations). Therefore, an agency-sponsored team at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) recently completed a System Safety Study of modeling and testing capabilities as part of a Model-Based Safety and Mission Assurance Initiative (MBSMAI). Using an existing model developed for reliability analyses [1], GSFC modeling and system safety experts performed system safety analysis/modeling and produced safety products. The team evaluated model-based feasibility to support System Safety Engineering, developed safety analysis modeling processes, and identified tool capability advancement/development needs. These study results indicate model-based engineering is valid and useable for System

Model Based Engineering↗
NASA NTRS1972

In-space propellant systems safety. Volume 3: System safety analysis

The primary objective was to examine from a system safety viewpoint in-space propellant logistic elements and operations to define the potential hazards and to recommend means to reduce, eliminate or control them. A secondary objective was to conduct trade studies of specific systems or operations to determine the safest of alternate approaches.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1995

Safety analysis

We are engaged in a research program in safety-critical computing that is based on two case studies. We use these case studies to provide application-specific details of the various research issues, and as targets for evaluation of research ideas. The first case study is the Magnetic Stereotaxis System (MSS), an investigational device for performing human neurosurgery being developed in a joint effort between the Department of Physics at the University of Virginia and the Department of Neurosurgery at the University of Iowa. The system operates by manipulating a small permanent magnet (known as a 'seed') within the brain using an externally applied magnetic field. By varying the magnitude and gradient of the external magnetic field, the seed can be moved along a non-linear path and positioned at a site requiring therapy, e.g., a tumor. The magnetic field required for movement through brain tissue is extremely high, and is generated by a set of six superconducting magnets located in a housing surrounding the patient's head. The system uses two X-ray cameras positioned at right angles to detect in real time the locations of the seed and of X-ray opaque markers affixed to the patient's skull. the X-ray images are used to locate the objects of interest in a canonical frame of reference. the second case study is the University of Virginia Research Nuclear Reactor (UVAR). It is a 2 MW thermal, concrete-walled pool reactor. The system operates using 20 to 25 plate-type fuel assemblies placed on a rectangular grid plate. There are three scramable safety rods, and one non-scramable regulating rod that can be put in automatic mode. It was originally constructed in 1959 as a 1 MW system, and it was upgraded to 2 MW in 1973. Though only a research reactor rather than a power reactor, the issues raised are significant and can be related to the problems faced by full-scale reactor systems.

Knight, John C.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Integrated Safety Analysis Tiers

Commercial partnerships and organizational constraints, combined with complex systems, may lead to division of hazard analysis across organizations. This division could cause important hazards to be overlooked, causes to be missed, controls for a hazard to be incomplete, or verifications to be inefficient. Each organization s team must understand at least one level beyond the interface sufficiently enough to comprehend integrated hazards. This paper will discuss various ways to properly divide analysis among organizations. The Ares I launch vehicle integrated safety analyses effort will be utilized to illustrate an approach that addresses the key issues and concerns arising from multiple analysis responsibilities.

Shackelford, Carla↗
NASA NTRS2011

Ares I-X Malfunction Turn Range Safety Analysis

Ares I-X was the designation given to the flight test version of the Ares I rocket which was developed by NASA (also known as the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) component of the Constellation Program). The Ares I-X flight test vehicle achieved a successful flight test on October 28, 2009, from Pad LC-39B at Kennedy Space Center, Florida (KSC). As part of the flight plan approval for the test vehicle, a range safety malfunction turn analysis was performed to support the risk assessment and vehicle destruct criteria development processes. Several vehicle failure scenarios were identified which could have caused the vehicle trajectory to deviate from its normal flight path. The effects of these failures were evaluated with an Ares I-X 6 degrees-of-freedom (6-DOF) digital simulation, using the Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories Version II (POST2) simulation tool. The Ares I-X simulation analysis provided output files containing vehicle trajectory state information. These were used by other risk assessment and vehicle debris trajectory simulation tools to determine the risk to personnel and facilities in the vicinity of the launch area at KSC, and to develop the vehicle destruct criteria used by the flight test range safety officer in the event of a flight test anomaly of the vehicle. The simulation analysis approach used for this study is described, including descriptions of the failure modes which were considered and the underlying assumptions and ground rules of the study.

Beaty, J. R.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Modeling Controller Tasks for Safety Analysis

As control systems become more complex, the use of automated control has increased. At the same time, the role of the human operator has changed from primary system controller to supervisor or monitor. Safe design of the human computer interaction becomes more difficult. In this paper, we present a visual task modeling language that can be used by system designers to model human-computer interactions. The visual models can be translated into SpecTRM-RL, a blackbox specification language for modeling the automated portion of the control system. The SpecTRM-RL suite of analysis tools allow the designer to perform formal and informal safety analyses on the task model in isolation or integrated with the rest of the modeled system.

Brown, Molly↗
NASA NTRS2008

Integrated Safety Analysis Teams

Today's complex systems require understanding beyond one person s capability to comprehend. Each system requires a team to divide the system into understandable subsystems which can then be analyzed with an Integrated Hazard Analysis. The team must have both specific experiences and diversity of experience. Safety experience and system understanding are not always manifested in one individual. Group dynamics make the difference between success and failure as well as the difference between a difficult task and a rewarding experience. There are examples in the news which demonstrate the need to connect the pieces of a system into a complete picture. The Columbia disaster is now a standard example of a low consequence hazard in one part of the system; the External Tank is a catastrophic hazard cause for a companion subsystem, the Space Shuttle Orbiter. The interaction between the hardware, the manufacturing process, the handling, and the operations contributed to the problem. Each of these had analysis performed, but who constituted the team which integrated this analysis together? This paper will explore some of the methods used for dividing up a complex system; and how one integration team has analyzed the parts. How this analysis has been documented in one particular launch space vehicle case will also be discussed.

Wetherholt, Jonathan C.↗
NASA NTRS1991

COLD-SAT feasibility study safety analysis

The Cryogenic On-orbit Liquid Depot-Storage, Acquisition, and Transfer (COLD-SAT) satellite presents some unique safety issues. The feasibility study conducted at NASA-Lewis desired a systems safety program that would be involved from the initial design in order to eliminate and/or control the inherent hazards. Because of this, a hazards analysis method was needed that: (1) identified issues that needed to be addressed for a feasibility assessment; and (2) identified all potential hazards that would need to be controlled and/or eliminated during the detailed design phases. The developed analysis method is presented as well as the results generated for the COLD-SAT system.

Mchenry, Steven T.↗
NASA NTRS2002

A Radiation Safety Analysis for Lunar Lava Tubes

The purpose of this work is an assessment of the lunar lava tubes physical characteristics and an evaluation of the their actual safety features from the point of view of the ionizing radiation environment as potential habitats for future lunar exploration crews. Additional information is contained in the original extended abstract.

DeAngelis, G.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Prospective Safety Analysis and the Complex Aviation System

Fatal accident rates in commercial passenger aviation are at historic lows yet have plateaued and are not showing evidence of further safety advances. Modern aircraft accidents reflect both historic causal factors and new unexpected "Black Swan" events. The ever-increasing complexity of the aviation system, along with its associated technology and organizational relationships, provides fertile ground for fresh problems. It is important to take a proactive approach to aviation safety by working to identify novel causation mechanisms for future aviation accidents before they happen. Progress has been made in using of historic data to identify the telltale signals preceding aviation accidents and incidents, using the large repositories of discrete and continuous data on aircraft and air traffic control performance and information reported by front-line personnel. Nevertheless, the aviation community is increasingly embracing predictive approaches to aviation safety. The "prospective workshop" early assessment tool described in this paper represents an approach toward this prospective mindset-one that attempts to identify the future vectors of aviation and asks the question: "What haven't we considered in our current safety assessments?" New causation mechanisms threatening aviation safety will arise in the future because new (or revised) systems and procedures will have to be used under future contextual conditions that have not been properly anticipated. Many simulation models exist for demonstrating the safety cases of new operational concepts and technologies. However the results from such models can only be as valid as the accuracy and completeness of assumptions made about the future context in which the new operational concepts and/or technologies will be immersed. Of course that future has not happened yet. What is needed is a reasonably high-confidence description of the future operational context, capturing critical contextual characteristics that modulate both the likelihood of occurrence of hazards, and the likelihood that those hazards will lead to negative safety events. Heuristics extracted from scenarios, questionnaires, and observed trends from scanning the aviation horizon may be helpful in capturing those future changes in a way conducive to safety assessment. What is also needed is a checklist of potential sources of emerging risk that arise from organizational features that are frequently overlooked. The ultimate goal is to develop a pragmatic, workable method for using descriptions of the future aviation context, to generate valid predictions of safety risks.

prospection↗