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Microbiome dynamics in the congregate environment of U.S. Army Infantry training

Within military training and operational environments, individuals from diverse backgrounds share common spaces, follow structured routines and diets, and engage in physically demanding tasks. While there has been interest in leveraging microbiome features to predict and improve military health and performance, the longitudinal convergence of microbiomes in such constrained environments has not been established. To assess the degree of microbiome convergence, we performed shotgun metagenomic sequencing on swab samples from a military trainee cohort. Samples were taken across four different body sites, three timepoints, and two spatially distinct platoons. We observed evidence of convergence in one platoon, whereby similarity in microbiome composition increased over time, with numerous differentially abundant species. We found no indication of strain transfer between individuals, suggesting that convergence was influenced by external environmental factors, diet, and lifestyle. Microbial shifts observed in the convergence process included a decrease in fungal species, such as Malassezia restricta in nasal cavities, and a decrease in Prevotella species at inguinal regions across time. Shifts in multiple Corynebacterium species were also observed with varying magnitudes depending on the body site. Overall, we provide preliminary evidence of convergence of host microbial communities in military-associated environments that were distinguishable using shotgun metagenomic sequencing approaches. The data presented here on microbiome convergence, dynamics, and stability may inform risk-based mitigation in congregate military settings facilitating development of targeted microbial, dietary, or other interventions to optimize health and performance of military populations.

Biological and medical sciences↗

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL Radiological Response Training Range

This assessment uses screening level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Radiological Response Training Range (RRTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface-soil impacts were calculated with the computer program Mixing-Cell Model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for a period of 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL National Security Test Range

This assessment uses screening level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at two locations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) National Security Test Range (NSTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface soil impacts were calculated with the computer program Mixing-Cell Model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files, are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Probabilistic risk-based Area of Review (AoR) determination for a deep-saline carbon storage site

Regulatory oversight of a geologic carbon sequestration (GCS) project relies on iterative estimations, throughout the project lifetime, of the area where increased risks to underground sources of drinking water (USDWs) may occur due to injection of CO2. This area, referred to as Area of Review (AoR), is typically delineated by predicting the migration of fluid between the reservoir and the lowermost USDW via an open wellbore using predictions from physics-based reservoir simulators. The inherent uncertainty in input parameters used in reservoir modeling therefore affects the accuracy of determining the AoR for a project. Furthermore, the standard analytical approaches for calculating a critical pressure to delineate the risk area yield an infinite AoR for cases where the injection reservoir is overpressured relative to the USDW. A methodology is presented in this paper to better characterize the risk to USDWs while accounting for the uncertainty in reservoir modeling, with an application to a permitted GCS project with an overpressured injection formation, FutureGen 2.0. The methodology is demonstrated using the National Risk Assessment Partnership’s open-source integrated assessment model (NRAP-Open-IAM) to develop a probabilistic estimate of impact risk to USDW quality. CO2 and pressure predictions from the reservoir modeling conducted using the STOMP-CO2 simulator for the FutureGen 2.0 site are used in a NRAP-Open-IAM model with reservoir, wellbore, and aquifer components to: (1) assess the extent of potential leakage into the USDW for the predicted reservoir pressure conditions; (2) evaluate the extent of potential impact using “no-net-degradation” thresholds; and (3) account for uncertainty in reservoir permeabilities.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Developing and Implementing Risk-Based Research Safety at Argonne National Laboratory

Facilities operated by the US Department of Energy (DOE) are required to have extensive worker safety and health programs by regulation. Here we describe how Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) has implemented the DOE requirements to bring the Laboratory’s multidisciplinary research risk to an acceptable level to safely execute ANL’s mission to perform cutting-edge research.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Cost- and Risk-Based Seismic Design Optimization of Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems

Seismic analysis, design, and qualification of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) is a significant contributor to the capital cost of a nuclear power plant. To reduce capital costs of advanced nuclear power plants and make commercial nuclear energy more competitive, innovations are needed in their structural design and construction, and not just in the reactor core and associated systems. Seismic isolation has been identified as an important cost-cutting technology that enables standardization of equipment across various sites. This paper develops and demonstrates a cost- and risk-based seismic design optimization of a representative safety system in a nuclear power plant with the dual goals of minimizing overnight capital cost and meeting safety goals. The design optimization can also include component seismic isolation, in which case, the optimized design includes a set of equipment that needs to be seismically isolated to minimize capital cost. The open-source codes MASTODON and Dakota are used for seismic probabilistic risk assessment and design optimization, respectively. A generic nuclear facility with a safety system comprising SSCs that are common to nuclear power plants is considered for the demonstration of the design optimization and is assumed to be located at the Idaho National Laboratory site. Generic costs and seismic design cost functions are assumed for the SSCs of the safety system. The sum of the costs of the SSCs is minimized in the optimization process, while the risk of failure of the safety system is provided as a constraint. Furthermore, results show that the optimization process reduces capital costs significantly while automatically prioritizing the safety of SSCs that contribute most to the risk of the safety system.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Recommended Practices for Managing Induced Seismicity Risk Associated with Geologic Carbon Storage

The geologic storage of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) is one method to help reduce or eliminate atmospheric CO 2 emissions. The sequestered CO 2 is originally captured from the atmosphere or from a stationary industrial source and subsequently injected into a deep subsurface porous rock formation. To facilitate the successful deployment of field scale carbon storage projects, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is developing tools and protocols for defensible, science-based frameworks to quantify and mitigate risks associated with the long-term storage of CO 2 . This protocol specifically addresses the risk of induced seismicity due to injection in a geologic carbon storage (GCS) site. This integrated and risk-based protocol is a product of the U.S. DOE Fossil Energy’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP), a multi-year collaborative research effort of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). These recommended practices describe a set of 7 steps to evaluate, manage, communicate, and mitigate the risk of induced seismicity at GCS sites. The base methodology of the recommended practices follows a framework similar to the Protocol for Addressing Induced Seismicity Associated with Enhanced Geothermal Systems (Majer et al., 2012), developed for the Geothermal Technology Office of the U.S. DOE. These recommended practices present a framework to systematically assess the induced seismicity risk and quantify the associated uncertainties. These recommendations are based on current research and are sufficiently general to allow for modification and application to a variety of different types of sites. The substance of the recommended practices contained herein includes both technical and non-technical issues, and covers all operational stages of the GCS project lifecycle. They start at the preliminary risk assessment phase, continue through site assessment and characterization, include best practice communication and seismic monitoring plan methodologies, discuss the evaluation and mitigation of seismic hazard and risk, and closes with an exploration of operational management plans, which conclude when the induced seismicity risk abates back to background level. The focus of these recommendations is on actively managing the risks associated with induced seismicity by developing an actionable risk management plan that starts at the project proposal stage and continues through site closure through an iterative assessment and improvement process. The audience of this document is expected to include all interested stakeholders (e.g., operators, project developers, regulators, and the general public) and is expressly written to be accessible to this broad range of partners. This document is intended to disseminate knowledge gained through recent advances in the science of induced seismicity hazard and risk assessments, to provide updates based on recent experience gained by similar corollary injection-induced seismicity cases, and most importantly to establish a uniform framework to carry out a successful induced seismicity risk management plan for carbon storage projects in the future. These recommendations do not directly address any domestic or international regulations or standards. A complementary NRAP report makes recommendations for the assessment and management of environmental subsurface risks associated with unwanted fluid migration at GCS sites (Thomas et al., 2021) and should be referred to in order to address those additional GCS site risks.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Recommended Practices for Managing Induced Seismicity Risk Associated with Geologic Carbon Storage

The geologic storage of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) is one method to help reduce or eliminate atmospheric CO 2 emissions. The sequestered CO 2 is originally captured from the atmosphere or from a stationary industrial source and subsequently injected into a deep subsurface porous rock formation. To facilitate the successful deployment of field scale carbon storage projects, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is developing tools and protocols for defensible, science-based frameworks to quantify and mitigate risks associated with the long-term storage of CO 2 . This protocol specifically addresses the risk of induced seismicity due to injection in a geologic carbon storage (GCS) site. This integrated and risk-based protocol is a product of the U.S. DOE Fossil Energy’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP), a multi-year collaborative research effort of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). These recommended practices describe a set of 7 steps to evaluate, manage, communicate, and mitigate the risk of induced seismicity at GCS sites. The base methodology of the recommended practices follows a framework similar to the $\textit{Protocol for Addressing Induced Seismicity Associated with Enhanced Geothermal Systems}$ (Majer et al., 2012), developed for the Geothermal Technology Office of the U.S. DOE. These recommended practices present a framework to systematically assess the induced seismicity risk and quantify the associated uncertainties. These recommendations are based on current research and are sufficiently general to allow for modification and application to a variety of different types of sites. The substance of the recommended practices contained herein includes both technical and non-technical issues, and covers all operational stages of the GCS project lifecycle. They start at the preliminary risk assessment phase, continue through site assessment and characterization, include best practice communication and seismic monitoring plan methodologies, discuss the evaluation and mitigation of seismic hazard and risk, and closes with an exploration of operational management plans, which conclude when the induced seismicity risk abates back to background level. The focus of these recommendations is on actively managing the risks associated with induced seismicity by developing an actionable risk management plan that starts at the project proposal stage and continues through site closure through an iterative assessment and improvement process. The audience of this document is expected to include all interested stakeholders (e.g., operators, project developers, regulators, and the general public) and is expressly written to be accessible to this broad range of partners. This document is intended to disseminate knowledge gained through recent advances in the science of induced seismicity hazard and risk assessments, to provide updates based on recent experience gained by similar corollary injection-induced seismicity cases, and most importantly to establish a uniform framework to carry out a successful induced seismicity risk management plan for carbon storage projects in the future. These recommendations do not directly address any domestic or international regulations or standards. A complementary NRAP report makes recommendations for the assessment and management of environmental subsurface risks associated with unwanted fluid migration at GCS sites (Thomas et al., 2021) and should be referred to in order to address those additional GCS site risks

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

NRAP Recommended Practices for Containment Assurance and Leakage Risk Quantification

This report presents recommendations for quantitatively assessing and managing leakage risk and effective containment assurance at geologic carbon storage (GCS) sites, amidst uncertainty in site characteristics and performance. These recommended practices are a product of the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP)—a multi-year collaborative research effort of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, National Energy Technology Laboratory, and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. These recommended practices are organized as a set of conceptual workflows that correspond with the stages of the GCS project lifecycle. They consider aspects of site characterization, quantification of potential leakage, assessing the spatial extent of potential environmental impacts, optimizing monitoring design for detection of potential leakage, evaluation of concordance between monitored and forecasted reservoir response, assessing conformance with expected/accepted performance, and determination of the timeline over which risk of impactful leakage can be expected to abate. These conceptual workflows are intended to aid stakeholders in making risk management decisions at GCS sites and to support development of sound, risk-based justifications for characterizing the subsurface, defining area of potential leakage impact, designing site monitoring plans, selecting leakage risk management/mitigation alternatives, and estimating site closure timelines.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

PipeSight: A High-Performance Computing Platform for Pipeline Integrity Management

The Phase I feasibility study completed as part of this project has led to a number of innovative technologies being developed and has laid the foundation for a successful Phase II effort to commercialize a platform for managing the integrity of pipelines for the damage mechanisms of the new, hybrid-energy based economy. To ground the development efforts and direction of the project, an extensive market research and customer discovery effort was undertaken early in Phase I. Through this effort, a number of pipeline owners and operators were interviewed, and the following key findings were discovered about the pipeline industry: • Small pipeline operators do not have the central engineering groups necessary to perform their own independent analysis of inspection data, but instead rely on summarized tally sheets provided to them by inspection service providers. • The time it takes to go from an inspection to a completed engineering assessment, even for small segments of pipeline, can take anywhere from 30-120 days. During this delay, critical threats can (and have been known to) cause failures. • Uncertainty is often not accounted for in the assessment of pipeline integrity. The tally sheets provided by third-party service providers are almost always deterministic in nature, identifying threats that present a concern only to the current (not the future) integrity of the pipeline. • It is uncommon to apply the latest technologies to perform advanced assessments of damaged pipelines. There is a desire to use more advanced analysis capabilities to assess threats. Many pipeline operators indicated that they would often excavate a pipeline to perform an inspection and find that the damage was not as bad as they anticipated, thus using limited resources unnecessarily. Companies are not consistent in their use of inspection data to determine corrosion rates, and those that do only calculate deterministic corrosion rates. • The industry has prominently relied on time-based inspections but has recently started to transition to risk-based inspections. However, there appears to be no uniform guidance on how to do so while properly accounting for all sources of uncertainty. • Companies are not storing inspection data in a manner that allows for the ready determination of temporal trends. • Predictive maintenance principles and practices are beginning to be used by early adopters • Some pipelines are being re-purposed to transport different process fluids than they were designed for, e.g., H 2 and CO 2 rich process streams to serve the new hybrid-energy based economy, which are presenting new integrity concerns for the existing pipeline network that crisscrosses the United States. As a result of these discoveries, we were able to target the development efforts in Phase I to best serve the needs of the industry. In Phase I, we developed a way to correlate multiple large-scale scans of the pipeline to determine a probabilistic corrosion rate that accounts for all sources of error and uncertainty in the inspection process. This probabilistic corrosion rate can be used to predict the future thickness distribution of the pipe wall. We demonstrate how this analysis may be performed in an analytical fashion and has been implemented in such a manner that it can be readily distributed using GPU computing through integration of the Kokkos programming model. We also make a very novel extension of the analytical corrosion rate model to Bayesian Networks (an explainable AI technique) that can account for non-parametric distributions of corrosion rates. With the predictions made above for the probabilistic corrosion rate and corresponding future distribution of the pipe wall thickness, we can assess the integrity of the pipeline through the use of a probabilistic engineering assessment. We developed a novel screening data analysis approach that can rapidly identify ‘hotspots’ (local thin areas) where the integrity of the pipeline is a concern. Once more, we implemented this screening approach in C++ to leverage GPU computing via the Kokkos programming model. After the critical hotspots are identified, we developed a program that can automatically generate an advanced finite element model of the damaged regions. Since the number of damaged regions that require advanced analysis can number in the thousands, we integrated an open-source container-native workflow engine for orchestrating parallel jobs on the cloud. Initially, these advanced numerical models were only designed to account for loading due to internal pressure. However, in a slight pivot from the initial Phase I proposal, we developed a complete pipe stress analysis program (called Simflex) which can simulate the complete pipeline and its response to thermal expansion, pressure, thermal bowing, weight, wind, earthquake, support displacement, support friction and external forces. This pipe stress analysis program was written generically, to handle any piping system, but contains the features needed to model long pipelines (i.e., it incorporates a model for soil mechanics and can account for the nonlinear boundary conditions necessary to simulate long underground pipelines). This pipe stress analysis program can simulate any segment of the pipeline (simple or complex) under any set of conditions and loads, to determine the supplemental loads (axial forces and bending moments) at the location of damage. This enables the most accurate state of stress to be accounted for in the pipeline, which can prove critical when evaluating the integrity of a damaged region. In the process of developing the technologies to perform the integrity assessment of the pipeline, we also extended one of the industry standard approaches for performing the assessment of local thin areas that extend more in the circumferential direction than the longitudinal direction of the pipeline. This approach was presented to the API 579-1/AS ME FFS-1 steering committee in November 2021 for consideration in the next edition of the industry standard for Fitness-For-Service (expected to be released in 2023). To help pipeline operators make decisions with the results on any integrity assessment, we developed a new approach to the life-cycle management of pipelines which uses a Bayesian Decision Network. The network is designed to help pipeline operators plan and prioritize inspection activities and ultimately make smarter, more cost-effective decisions. The Bayesian approach accounts for all sources of uncertainty and carries them through to the final optimal decisions, providing a probabilistic framework for optimizing inspection intervals. The proof-of-concept networks developed in the feasibility study are complete, verified, and are focused on a subset of the pipeline. To expand this novel approach to the scale necessary for an entire network of pipelines in Phase II, we will leverage the DOE-funded Bengi solver for industrial-scale decision making with Bayesian Networks [22]. Once implemented, we will be able to provide the pipeline industry with a much-needed tool for optimal inspection planning using truly explainable artificial intelligence (XAI). To handle all of these advanced capabilities into a cloud-based platform, the architecture of the Equity Engineering Cloud (EEC) was extended to include Argo Workflows, a framework capable of distributing and managing a massive number of jobs that consume their own resources, such that thousands of serial finite element simulations can be run in parallel. As part of this substantial undertaking, we also integrated Argo Continuous Delivery (CD) into the EEC, to aid with the rapid prototyping and iterations that will be imperative to the success of the PipeSight platform’s Agile development process in Phase II. As part of the pipe stress analysis program, we also developed a custom visualizer that leverages the DOE-funded VTK visualization library. We added custom contouring capabilities and a means for interacting visually with both the inputs and outputs of the pipe stress analysis program. We also developed routines for automating the post-processing of the finite element simulations to determine if any failure criteria are met and to visualize the deformations, stresses and strains in ParaView using the exodus II file format (a subset of netCDF).

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Risk-based System Upgrade Planning for AOT-IC [Capstone Project]

The Accelerator Operations and Technology Instrumentation and Controls Group (AOT IC) at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) has established a comprehensive risk-based system upgrade planning strategy which has been utilized as a tool to prioritize system upgrade projects for the past several years. A challenge with the current system is that the group often lacks the data to quantify the probability and impact of system failures, so the group often relies instead on qualitative risk assessments as well as evaluations of a potential upgrade project’s alignment with group strategy and vision to prioritize projects. A proposed framework to enable quantitative risk probability and impact assessments has been developed and tested on three pilot systems chosen to broadly represent the types and conditions of equipment used by the group. The proposed framework incorporates availability data gathered from the LANSCE control room logbooks and the LANSCE work control system, as well as a system health evaluation which is conducted from a variety of resources to assess the probability of equipment failure. The impact of system failure is viewed from the perspective of impact on mission and schedule, where spares status, system documentation status, and the functional distribution of deployed systems are used to quantify these impacts.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Plant Disease Detection Technology Assessment

Visual inspections by US Customs and Border Protection agriculture specialists have identified approximately 20,000 regulated, quarantined pests each year in agricultural products entering the United States. Most of these pests identified in the Agriculture Quarantine and Inspection (AQI) program are insects. Many pathogens are difficult to detect in agricultural products, particularly in early stages of infection. New technologies can help to detect plant pathogens and the diseases that they cause. This technology assessment was performed for the US Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) through the Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense (FAV-D) program to identify emerging technologies that could address this hard problem. These emerging technologies differ in their diagnostic sensitivities and specificities, as well as in their measurement time and training requirements. New instruments that detect volatile organic compounds characteristic of plant disease or pathogens could provide a less invasive inspection method. Dogs, which can successfully detect many concealed agricultural products, have also been trained to detect some plant pests and pathogens. Simple immunological tests offer sensitive and specific detection of many pathogens at the point of use. Advanced imaging methods that use AI to sort fruits and vegetables and recognize anomalies at high speeds could be used in cooperation with exporters to improve food quality and reduce pests. Advances in nucleic acid–based detection methods that have become gold standards for confirmatory diagnostics are now making those methods available for faster, point-of-use detection. These new methods should be developed in the context of AQI operational requirements, which apply risk-based sampling protocols to protect agriculture and facilitate commerce and passenger transit.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

NORTH DAKOTA CARBONSAFE PHASE III: SITE CHARACTERIZATION AND PERMITTING OF GEOLOGIC STORAGE OF CARBON DIOXIDE

The Energy & Environmental Research Center (EERC), in partnership with Minnkota Power Cooperative Inc. (Minnkota), SLB, and Computer Modelling Group Ltd. (CMG), supported wide-scale deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS) as part of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Energy Technology Laboratory Carbon Storage Assurance Facility Enterprise (CarbonSAFE) Initiative Phase III. This phase included the acquisition, analysis, and development of information to fully characterize two storage complexes to demonstrate viable storage resources for commercial volumes of CO2 (defined by DOE as a minimum of 50 million tonnes [MMt] of CO2 within a 30-year period) (National Energy Technology Laboratory, 2024). Phase III also involved the preparation, submission, and approval of North Dakota underground injection control (UIC) Class VI storage facility permits (SFPs)—required precursors to applications for Class VI injection well permits. The presumed viability of commercial-scale CCS, situated adjacent to Minnkota’s Milton R. Young Station (MRYS), is validated by Minnkota’s continued pursuit of Project Tundra—an initiative to build the world’s largest lignite-based CCS project in central North Dakota (www.projecttundrand.com). Project Tundra comprises two scopes of work, Tundra Capture (installation of postcombustion CO2 capture at MRYS) and Tundra SGS (secure geologic storage). The efforts of North Dakota CarbonSAFE Phase III, Site Characterization and Permitting, supported Tundra SGS. Extensive site-specific characterization activities included a successful multimeasurement geophysical approach and drilling a stratigraphic test well (J-ROC 1, subsequently renamed Liberty-1) adjacent to MRYS. Core collection and analyses, downhole testing and fluid sampling, and geophysical logging were performed on J-ROC 1 and on a nearby stratigraphic test well (known as J-LOC 1), which was drilled, cored, and tested under a complementary project funded by the North Dakota Lignite Research Program. The injection tests performed on J-LOC 1 positively impacted the CarbonSAFE project, resulting in fewer proposed injection wells and significant construction, operations, and monitoring cost savings. The characterization data collected and analyses performed were integrated into geologic models, and successive numerical simulations were run to determine CO2 plume extent and subsurface pressure buildup associated with the planned CO2 injection rate of nearly 4 MMt per year. The latter doubles the CarbonSAFE Initiative goal with an estimated 100 MMt of CO2 stored in 20 years. Application of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) method for estimating the Class VI Rule area of review (AOR) to the overpressurized Broom Creek Formation inspired an alternative method of calculation, called risk-based AOR delineation. This peer-reviewed method was applied for the first time during the storage facility-permitting process. The two SFP applications submitted in 2021 successfully resulted in North Dakota Industrial Commission (NDIC) orders in 2022 authorizing the creation of the storage facility areas and amalgamation of pore space as well as establishing financial responsibility requirements. After approval of the SFPs, Minnkota filed in 2022 applications for permits to reenter the J-ROC 1 well and to drill two new wells—all with the intended purpose to become Class VI injection wells. To establish eligibility under the Internal Revenue Code for Section 45Q tax incentives, a monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) plan was prepared and submitted by Minnkota to EPA in 2022, resulting in the first such plan approved in North Dakota. Also in 2022, under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Minnkota prepared and submitted an environmental information volume (EIV) describing the proposed CCS project and associated potential environmental impacts. Based on the EIV, DOE determined that the proposed construction project required an environmental assessment, and Minnkota submitted the first draft in 2023 and a revised draft in 2024. Both submissions were followed by a public comment period. Subsequently, DOE issued a finding of no significant impact (FONSI) on September 13, 2024. A successful outreach program, strongly based in the production, presentation, and dissemination of informational material, fostered an environment to aid stakeholders in making informed decisions regarding the planned project. Opportunities for public input were provided at various steps along the way, including at county planning and zoning meetings, before and during the SFP administrative hearing, and during environmental assessment public comment periods. In addition, land/pore space owners and mineral owners had various points of contact, including granting access rights, securing pore space leasing, and mineral owner notifications. Based upon the successful storage facility permitting issued by NDIC, approval of the MRV plan by EPA, and receipt of a FONSI under the NEPA, Minnkota is continuing its pursuit of Project Tundra. In December 2023, the Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations under its Carbon Capture Demonstrations Projects Program announced funding for the capture system (Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, 2023) and a proposal for CarbonSAFE Phase IV: Construction funding was submitted in March 2024 for the storage project. A go/no-go decision to proceed with construction and operations in the Broom Creek Formation is anticipated in 2024. References National Energy Technology Laboratory, CarbonSafe Initiative, https://netl.doe.gov/carbon-management/carbon-storage/carbonsafe (accessed August 2024). Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, 2023, OCED selects three projects in CA, ND, and TX to reduce harmful carbon pollution, create new economic opportunities, and advance carbon reducing technologies, December, www.energy.gov/oced/articles/oced-selects-three-projects-ca-nd-and-tx-reduce-harmful-carbon-pollution-create-new (accessed August 2024).

Peck, Wesley↗

The Cybersecurity Value-at-Risk Framework: Informing Cybersecurity Decisions

The Cybersecurity Value-at-Risk Framework is a tool that can be used by hydropower plant manager to make more educated cybersecurity investments. Users can take a self guided assessment allowing the tools to generate risk, impact and cybersecurity scores and be given risk-based recommendations to enhance decision-making.

CVF↗