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NASA NTRS2013

Probing Aircraft Flight Test Hazard Mitigation for the Alternative Fuel Effects on Contrails and Cruise Emissions (ACCESS) Research Team : Appendices - Volume 2

The Alternative Fuel Effects on Contrails and Cruise Emissions (ACCESS) Project Integration Manager requested in July 2012 that the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) form a team to independently assess aircraft structural failure hazards associated with the ACCESS experiment and to identify potential flight test hazard mitigations to ensure flight safety. The ACCESS Project Integration Manager subsequently requested that the assessment scope be focused predominantly on structural failure risks to the aircraft empennage (horizontal and vertical tail). This report contains the Appendices to Volume I.

Kelly, Michael J.↗
NASA NTRS2006

NASA Crew and Cargo Launch Vehicle Development Approach Builds on Lessons from Past and Present Missions

The United States (US) Vision for Space Exploration, announced in January 2004, outlines the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) strategic goals and objectives, including retiring the Space Shuttle and replacing it with new space transportation systems for missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. The Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) that the new human-rated Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) lofts into space early next decade will initially ferry astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS) Toward the end of the next decade, a heavy-lift Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) will deliver the Earth Departure Stage (EDS) carrying the Lunar Surface Access Module (LSAM) to low-Earth orbit (LEO), where it will rendezvous with the CEV launched on the CLV and return astronauts to the Moon for the first time in over 30 years. This paper outlines how NASA is building these new space transportation systems on a foundation of legacy technical and management knowledge, using extensive experience gained from past and ongoing launch vehicle programs to maximize its design and development approach, with the objective of reducing total life cycle costs through operational efficiencies such as hardware commonality. For example, the CLV in-line configuration is composed of a 5-segment Reusable Solid Rocket Booster (RSRB), which is an upgrade of the current Space Shuttle 4- segment RSRB, and a new upper stage powered by the liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen (LOX/LH2) J-2X engine, which is an evolution of the J-2 engine that powered the Apollo Program s Saturn V second and third stages in the 1960s and 1970s. The CaLV configuration consists of a propulsion system composed of two 5-segment RSRBs and a 33- foot core stage that will provide the LOX/LED needed for five commercially available RS-68 main engines. The J-2X also will power the EDS. The Exploration Launch Projects, managed by the Exploration Launch Office located at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, is leading the design, development, testing, and operations planning for these new space transportation systems. Utilizing a foundation of heritage hardware and management lessons learned mitigates both technical and programmatic risk. Project engineers and managers work closely with the Space Shuttle Program to transition hardware, infrastructure, and workforce assets to the new launch systems, leveraging a wealth of knowledge from Shuffle operations. In addition, NASA and its industry partners have tapped into valuable Apollo databases and are applying corporate wisdom conveyed firsthand by Apollo-era veterans of America s original Moon missions. Learning from its successes and failures, NASA employs rigorous systems engineering and systems management processes and principles in a disciplined, integrated fashion to further improve the probability of mission success.

Dumbacher, Daniel L.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Human Factors in Training

Future space missions will be significantly longer than current shuttle missions and new systems will be more complex than current systems. Increasing communication delays between crews and Earth-based support means that astronauts need to be prepared to handle the unexpected on their own. As crews become more autonomous, their potential span of control and required expertise must grow to match their autonomy. It is not possible to train for every eventuality ahead of time on the ground, or to maintain trained skills across long intervals of disuse. To adequately prepare NASA personnel for these challenges, new training approaches, methodologies, and tools are required. This research project aims at developing these training capabilities. By researching established training principles, examining future needs, and by using current practices in space flight training as test beds, both in Flight Controller and Crew Medical domains, this research project is mitigating program risks and generating templates and requirements to meet future training needs. Training efforts in Fiscal Year 08 (FY08) strongly focused on crew medical training, but also began exploring how Space Flight Resource Management training for Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) Flight Controllers could be integrated with systems training for optimal Mission Control Center (MCC) operations. The Training Task addresses Program risks that lie at the intersection of the following three risks identified by the Project: (1) Risk associated with poor task design (2) Risk of error due to inadequate information (3) Risk associated with reduced safety and efficiency due to poor human factors design

Barshi, Immanuel↗
NASA NTRS2010

Human Factors in Training

Future space missions will be significantly longer than current shuttle missions and new systems will be more complex than current systems. Increasing communication delays between crews and Earth-based support means that astronauts need to be prepared to handle the unexpected on their own. As crews become more autonomous, their potential span of control and required expertise must grow to match their autonomy. It is not possible to train for every eventuality ahead of time on the ground, or to maintain trained skills across long intervals of disuse. To adequately prepare NASA personnel for these challenges, new training approaches, methodologies, and tools are required. This research project aims at developing these training capabilities. By researching established training principles, examining future needs, and by using current practices in space flight training as test beds, both in Flight Controller and Crew Medical domains, this research project is mitigating program risks and generating templates and requirements to meet future training needs. Training efforts in Fiscal Year 09 (FY09) strongly focused on crew medical training, but also began exploring how Space Flight Resource Management training for Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) Flight Controllers could be integrated with systems training for optimal Mission Control Center (MCC) operations. The Training Task addresses Program risks that lie at the intersection of the following three risks identified by the Project: 1) Risk associated with poor task design; 2) Risk of error due to inadequate information; and 3) Risk associated with reduced safety and efficiency due to poor human factors design.

Barshi, Immanuel↗
NASA NTRS2016

Assurance of Fault Management: Risk-Significant Adverse Condition Awareness

Fault Management (FM) systems are ranked high in risk-based assessment of criticality within flight software, emphasizing the importance of establishing highly competent domain expertise to provide assurance for NASA projects, especially as spaceflight systems continue to increase in complexity. Insight into specific characteristics of FM architectures seen embedded within safety- and mission-critical software systems analyzed by the NASA Independent Verification Validation (IVV) Program has been enhanced with an FM Technical Reference (TR) suite. Benefits are aimed beyond the IVV community to those that seek ways to efficiently and effectively provide software assurance to reduce the FM risk posture of NASA and other space missions. The identification of particular FM architectures, visibility, and associated IVV techniques provides a TR suite that enables greater assurance that critical software systems will adequately protect against faults and respond to adverse conditions. The role FM has with regard to overall asset protection of flight software systems is being addressed with the development of an adverse condition (AC) database encompassing flight software vulnerabilities.Identification of potential off-nominal conditions and analysis to determine how a system responds to these conditions are important aspects of hazard analysis and fault management. Understanding what ACs the mission may face, and ensuring they are prevented or addressed is the responsibility of the assurance team, which necessarily should have insight into ACs beyond those defined by the project itself. Research efforts sponsored by NASAs Office of Safety and Mission Assurance defined terminology, categorized data fields, and designed a baseline repository that centralizes and compiles a comprehensive listing of ACs and correlated data relevant across many NASA missions. This prototype tool helps projects improve analysis by tracking ACs, and allowing queries based on project, mission type, domain component, causal fault, and other key characteristics. The repository has a firm structure, initial collection of data, and an interface established for informational queries, with plans for integration within the Enterprise Architecture at NASA IVV, enabling support and accessibility across the Agency. The development of an improved workflow process for adaptive, risk-informed FM assurance is currently underway.

Software Verification & Validation↗
NASA NTRS1995

Probabilistic risk assessment of the Space Shuttle. Phase 3: A study of the potential of losing the vehicle during nominal operation, volume 1

This document is the Executive Summary of a technical report on a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of the Space Shuttle vehicle performed under the sponsorship of the Office of Space Flight of the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration. It briefly summarizes the methodology and results of the Shuttle PRA. The primary objective of this project was to support management and engineering decision-making with respect to the Shuttle program by producing (1) a quantitative probabilistic risk model of the Space Shuttle during flight, (2) a quantitative assessment of in-flight safety risk, (3) an identification and prioritization of the design and operations that principally contribute to in-flight safety risk, and (4) a mechanism for risk-based evaluation proposed modifications to the Shuttle System. Secondary objectives were to provide a vehicle for introducing and transferring PRA technology to the NASA community, and to demonstrate the value of PRA by applying it beneficially to a real program of great international importance.

Fragola, Joseph R.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Valuing Rigor in the Risk Management Process

NASA, as an organization, takes risk management (RM) seriously, and for most projects, the risk management process is exemplar. There can be challenges, though, with defining RM processes. For example, many different risk analysis methodologies are available, they can be applied with varying degrees of rigor, and they can have different value depending on how projects use them. In particular, risk analysis methodologies vary considerably in the level of quantitative detail, with more probabilistic techniques encouraged in some situations. We discussed these processes and methodologies with ten project managers (PM) at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). Our intent was not to prove with some level of statistical significance that some are more helpful than others, but rather to obtain a general understanding of how projects are identifying, and thinking, about risks. This paper describes some of the available risk processes and methodologies, and provides some insights about the benefits that can gained from their use. We provide an in-depth discussion of one quantitative methodology, Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs), and conclude with a few insights from observed best practices.

Dillon, Robin L.↗
NASA NTRS2010

The Value of Identifying and Recovering Lost GN&C Lessons Learned: Aeronautical, Spacecraft, and Launch Vehicle Examples

Within the broad aerospace community the importance of identifying, documenting and widely sharing lessons learned during system development, flight test, operational or research programs/projects is broadly acknowledged. Documenting and sharing lessons learned helps managers and engineers to minimize project risk and improve performance of their systems. Often significant lessons learned on a project fail to get captured even though they are well known 'tribal knowledge' amongst the project team members. The physical act of actually writing down and documenting these lessons learned for the next generation of NASA GN&C engineers fails to happen on some projects for various reasons. In this paper we will first review the importance of capturing lessons learned and then will discuss reasons why some lessons are not documented. A simple proven approach called 'Pause and Learn' will be highlighted as a proven low-impact method of organizational learning that could foster the timely capture of critical lessons learned. Lastly some examples of 'lost' GN&C lessons learned from the aeronautics, spacecraft and launch vehicle domains are briefly highlighted. In the context of this paper 'lost' refers to lessons that have not achieved broad visibility within the NASA-wide GN&C CoP because they are either undocumented, masked or poorly documented in the NASA Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS).

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Heritage Systems Engineering Lessons from NASA Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology systems or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced and heritage systems within the spacecraft and mission environment identifies unanticipated technical issues. Resolving these issues often results in cost overruns and schedule impacts. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that optimistic hardware/software inheritance and technology readiness assumptions caused cost and schedule growth for all five missions studied. The cost and schedule growth was not found to be the result of technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. The projects institutional inheritance and technology readiness processes appear to adequately assess technology viability and prevent technical issues from impacting the final mission success. However, the processes do not appear to identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: an inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of development experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the systemwide impacts necessary to implement an advanced technology for space flight applications. The paper summarizes the study s lessons learned in more detail and offers suggestions for improving the project s ability to identify and manage the technology and heritage risks inherent in the design solution.

Barley, Bryan↗
NASA NTRS2010

Managing the Mars Science Laboratory Thermal Vacuum Test for Safety and Success

The Mars Science Laboratory is a NASA/JPL mission to send the next generation of rover to Mars. Originally slated for launch in 2009, development problems led to a delay in the project until the next launch opportunity in 2011. Amidst the delay process, the Launch/Cruise Solar Thermal Vacuum Test was undertaken as risk reduction for the project. With varying maturity and capabilities of the flight and ground systems, undertaking the test in a safe manner presented many challenges. This paper describes the technical and management challenges and the actions undertaken that led to the ultimate safe and successful execution of the test.

Evans, Jordan P.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Heritage and Advanced Technology Systems Engineering Lessons Learned from NASA Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology systems or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced and heritage systems within the spacecraft and mission environment identifies unanticipated technical issues. Resolving these issues often results in cost overruns and schedule impacts. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that optimistic hardware/software inheritance and technology readiness assumptions caused cost and schedule growth for four of the five missions studied. The cost and schedule growth was not found to result from technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. The projects institutional inheritance and technology readiness processes appear to adequately assess technology viability and prevent technical issues from impacting the final mission success. However, the processes do not appear to identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: an inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of development experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the system-wide impacts necessary to implement an advanced technology for space flight applications. The paper summarizes the study's lessons learned in more detail and offers suggestions for improving the project's ability to identify and manage the technology and heritage risks inherent in the design solution.

Barley, Bryan↗
NASA NTRS2018

An Integrated Platform for Mission Performance: Goddard Space Flight Center's Meta Information System

Successful management of NASA Goddard Space Flight Centers portfolio of mission projects (i.e. spacecraft, spacecraft instruments / subsystems, and ground systems) depends upon numerous processes, data and information resources coming together throughout the life-cycle of the projects to enable sound decision-making, risk reduction, conformance with requirements and continual improvement. In the summer of 2012, GSFC SMA management recognized that the set of legacy data systems used to support the SMA mission and responsibilities at GSFC were not effective, integrated nor on par with best practices. Accordingly, GSFC SMA management launched a project to transform the GSFC electronic management system to create and deploy an integrated, state-of-the-market information system for process performance, data management and analytics that is currently operating in support of GSFC overall mission performance. The information system, known as Meta, provides controlled, process-based applications, integrated data management, and analytics for a robust set of integrated applications. Since the inception of the project, a lean, award-winning SMA project team has thus far designed, configured and managed the system to serve as an integrated platform for 18 applications that support key processes for GSFC and the Science Mission Directorate at NASA headquarters, such as internal Management System assessments, Supplier Assessments, Supplier Research & Analysis, Problem Reporting for in-house mission projects, On-orbit Anomaly Reporting for GSFC-operated spacecraft, GSFC Project Life-Cycle Reviews, Risk Management and Reporting, and SMA Project Team Reporting. The system has experienced steady growth in utilization with 1,917 users (NASA employees and support contractor personnel) and 44 gigabytes of data and related files managed by the system as of the end of April 2018. Overall, Meta has achieved increasing levels of process management and real-time data / information integration to enable improved process performance, richer analytics and informed decision-making. This paper will present and examine the need, goals, approach and design driving the management and operation of the Meta information system and its ongoing growth as an integrated platform for advancing NASA mission performance.

Integration↗
NASA NTRS1994

Life Sciences Centrifuge Facility assessment

This report provides an assessment of the status of the Centrifuge Facility being developed by ARC for flight on the International Space Station Alpha. The assessment includes technical status, schedules, budgets, project management, performance of facility relative to science requirements, and identifies risks and issues that need to be considered in future development activities.

Benson, Robert H.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Management of Service Projects in Support of Space Flight Research

Goal:To provide human health and performance countermeasures, knowledge, technologies, and tools to enable safe, reliable, and productive human space exploration . [HRP-47051] Specific Objectives: 1) Develop capabilities, necessary countermeasures, and technologies in support of human space exploration, focusing on mitigating the highest risks to human health and performance. 2) Define and improve human spaceflight medical, environmental, and human factors standards. 3) Develop technologies that serve to reduce medical and environmental risks, to reduce human systems resource requirements (mass, volume, power, data, etc.) and to ensure effective human-system integration across exploration systems. 4) Ensure maintenance of Agency core competencies necessary to enable risk reduction in the following areas: A. Space medicine B. Physiological and behavioral effects of long duration spaceflight on the human body C. Space environmental effects, including radiation, on human health and performance D. Space "human factors" [HRP-47051]. Service projects can form integral parts of research-based project-focused programs to provide specialized functions. Traditional/classic project management methodologies and agile approaches are not mutually exclusive paradigms. Agile strategies can be combined with traditional methods and applied in the management of service projects functioning in changing environments. Creative collaborations afford a mechanism for mitigation of constrained resource limitations.

Love, J.↗
NASA NTRS1993

(abstract) Mission Operations and Control Assurance: Flight Operations Quality Improvements

Mission Operations and Command Assurance (MO&CA), a recent addition to flight operations teams at JPL. provides a system level function to instill quality in mission operations. MO&CA's primary goal at JPL is to help improve the operational reliability for projects during flight. MO&CA tasks include early detection and correction of process design and procedural deficiencies within projects. Early detection and correction are essential during development of operational procedures and training of operational teams. MO&CA's effort focuses directly on reducing the probability of radiating incorrect commands to a spacecraft. Over the last seven years at JPL, MO&CA has become a valuable asset to JPL flight projects. JPL flight projects have benefited significantly from MO&CA's efforts to contain risk and prevent rather than rework errors. MO&CA's ability to provide direct transfer of knowledge allows new projects to benefit directly from previous and ongoing experience. Since MO&CA, like Total Quality Management (TQM), focuses on continuous improvement of processes and elimination of rework, we recommend that this effort be continued on NASA flight projects.

mission operation flight operations error detectio↗
NASA NTRS1994

Increases in Efficiency and Enhancements to the Mars Observer Non-stored Commanding Process

The Mars Observer team was, until the untimely loss of the spacecraft on August 21, 1993, performing flight operations with greater efficiency and speed than any previous JPL mission of its size. This level of through-put was made possible by a Mission Operations System which was composed of skilled personnel using sophisticated sequencing and commanding tools. During cruise flight operations, however, it was realized by the project that this commanding level was not going to be sufficient to support the activities planned for the mapping operations. The project had committed to providing the science instrument principle investigators with a much higher level of commanding during mapping. Thus, the project began taking steps to enhance the capabilities of the flight team. One mechanism used by project management was a tool available from Total Quality Management (TQM). This tool is known as a Process Action Team (PAT). The Mars Observer PAT was tasked to increase the capacity of the flight team's non-stored commanding process by fifty percent with no increase in staffing and a minimal increase in risk. The outcome of this effort was to, in fact, increase the capacity by a factor of 2.5 rather than the desired fifty percent and actually reduce risk. The majority of these improvements came from the automation of the existing command process. The results required very few changes to the existing mission operations system. Rather, the PAT was able to take advantage of automation capabilities inherent in the existing system and make changes to the existing flight team procedures. This paper will describe in detail the enhancements recommended by the PAT for the non-stored command generation process on Mars Observer. This will be contrasted with the process used by the flight team prior to implementation of these improvements. Finally, there will be a discussion of the applicability of the techniques devised by the PAT for enhancement of the non-stored command process to present and future projects.

Process↗
NASA NTRS2006

NASA Crew Launch Vehicle Approach Builds on Lessons from Past and Present Missions

The United States Vision for Space Exploration, announced in January 2004, outlines the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) strategic goals and objectives, including retiring the Space Shuttle and replacing it with a new human-rated system suitable for missions to the Moon and Mars. The Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) that the new Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) lofts into space early next decade will initially ferry astronauts to the International Space Station and be capable of carrying crews back to lunar orbit and of supporting missions to Mars orbit. NASA is using its extensive experience gained from past and ongoing launch vehicle programs to maximize the CLV system design approach, with the objective of reducing total lifecycle costs through operational efficiencies. To provide in-depth data for selecting this follow-on launch vehicle, the Exploration Systems Architecture Study was conducted during the summer of 2005, following the confirmation of the new NASA Administrator. A team of aerospace subject matter experts used technical, budget, and schedule objectives to analyze a number of potential launch systems, with a focus on human rating for exploration missions. The results showed that a variant of the Space Shuttle, utilizing the reusable Solid Rocket Booster as the first stage, along with a new upper stage that uses a derivative of the RS-25 Space Shuttle Main Engine to deliver 25 metric tons to low-Earth orbit, was the best choice to reduce the risks associated with fielding a new system in a timely manner. The CLV Project, managed by the Exploration Launch Office located at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, is leading the design, development, testing, and operation of this new human-rated system. The CLV Project works closely with the Space Shuttle Program to transition hardware, infrastructure, and workforce assets to the new launch system . leveraging a wealth of lessons learned from Shuttle operations. The CL V is being designed to reduce costs through a number of methods, ranging from validating requirements to conducting trades studies against the concept design. Innovations such as automated processing will build on lessons learned from the Shuttle, other launch systems, Department of Defense operations experience, and subscale flight tests such as the Delta Clipper-Experimental Advanced (DCXA) vehicle operations that utilized minimal touch labor, automated cryogen ic propellant loading , and an 8-hour turnaround for a cryogenic propulsion system. For the CLV, the results of hazard analyses are contributing to an integrated vehicle health monitoring system that will troubleshoot anomalies and determine which ones can be solved without human intervention. Such advances will help streamline the mission operations process for pilots and ground controllers alike. In fiscal year 2005, NASA invested approximately $4.5 billion of its $16 bill ion budget on the Space Shuttle. The ultimate goal of the CLV Project is to deliver a safe, reliable system designed to minimize lifecycle costs so that NASA's budget can be invested in missions of scientific discovery. Lessons learned from developing the CLV will be applied to the growth path for future systems, including a heavy lift launch vehicle.

Dumbacher, Daniel L.↗