Results for “risk communication” — Page 3

NASA NTRS2021

Highland Lakes Water Resources: Using NASA Earth Observations to Improve Detection Systems for Harmful Algal Events in the Highland Lakes in Central Texas

Beginning in 2019, harmful algal events in Austin, Texas, caused canine deaths in the Lady Bird Lake and Lake Travis reservoirs. These reservoirs are part of the larger Highland Lakes chain, managed by the Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA) and the City of Austin Department of Watershed Protection (CoA DWP), which fulfill municipal, commercial, and agricultural water demands. Given the recent increase in favorable algal event conditions in central Texas, the LCRA and CoA DWP partnered with NASA DEVELOP to improve algal event early-warning systems through the application of remote sensing and machine learning. An Earth observation-based algal monitoring system will assist the responsible agencies in predicting algal conditions and communicating hazards to the public. The NASA DEVELOP team utilized Landsat 8 Operational Land Imager (OLI) and Sentinel-2 Multispectral Instrument (MSI) data to produce products including chlorophyll-a concentrations, cyanobacteria detections, turbidity, and water surface temperature. Chlorophyll-a concentrations were retrieved with a pre-trained machine learning model (mixture density network) and spectral indices, while the other products were derived from spectral indices. In situ field data were used to validate and quantify uncertainties for each product. The validations show strong correlations for chlorophyll-a and water surface temperature. Time series analyses of chlorophyll-a concentrations show peaks in the severe drought years (2015 and 2016). This project's resulting products enable monitoring of environmental proxies relevant to algal event presence in the Highland Lakes chain and will ultimately support water management, decision making, and risk communication.

Kaitlynn Hietpas↗

DOE OSTI2026

Reimagining How Flood Warnings Can Inform Decision‐Making and Community Actions

Society faces increasingly severe flood hazards, intensifying demand for flood early warning systems (FEWS) that deliver accurate and actionable information. However, most existing FEWS remain prediction‐centric, treating decision‐making as a downstream consumer of hazard forecasts while offering limited support for uncertainty interpretation, risk communication, and real‐world response. This Perspective presents a vision and blueprint for a novel inland FEWS‐decision‐making (FEWS‐DM) framework that repositions decision‐making as an equal partner in the forecasting process—not a passive recipient of its outputs. The framework is built on three tightly coupled, co‐evolving thrusts: Physical Science (T1), which advances flood prediction with quantified uncertainty informed by decision relevance; Human Science (T2), which incorporates psychology, behavior, and cultural and institutional context; and Decision Science (T3), which unifies physical predictions and human factors through principled, utility‐based decision support with end‐to‐end uncertainty management. Rather than treating T1 as a solved problem, FEWS‐DM recognizes that forecast development itself must be shaped by decision needs through continuous bidirectional feedback. We identify key scientific, behavioral, and operational challenges limiting such integration and discuss the enabling role of AI, while emphasizing human‐centered design and community feedback as essential for building trust and improving flood risk management.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

NASA NTRS2000

Integration of Planetary Protection Activities

Research and activities under this grant have focused on a systematic examination and analysis of critical questions likely to impact planetary protection (PP) controls and implementation for Mars sample return missions (MSR). Four areas in the non-scientific and social realms were selected for special attention because of their importance to future mission planning and concern about critical timing or possible economic impacts on MSR mission implementation. These include: (1) questions of legal uncertainty and the decision making process, (2) public perception of risks associated with sample return, (3) risk communication and Education/Public Outreach , and (4) planetary protection implications of alternative mission architectures, for both robotic and human sample return missions. In its entirety, NAG 2-986 has encompassed three categories of activity: (1) research and analysis (Race), (2) subcontracted research (MacGregor/Decision Research), and (3) consulting services.

Race, Margaret S.↗

NASA NTRS2010

PRA in Design: Increasing Confidence in Pre-Operational Assessments of Risks (Results of a Joint NASA/NRC Workshop)

In late 2009, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) jointly organized a workshop to discuss technical issues associated with application of risk assessments to early phases of system design. The workshop, which was coordinated by the Idaho National Laboratory, involved invited presentations from a number of PRA experts in the aerospace and nuclear fields and subsequent discussion to address the following questions: (a) What technical issues limit decision-makers' confidence in PRA results, especially at a pre-operational phase of the system life cycle? (b) What is being done to address these issues'? (c) What more can be done ? The workshop resulted in participant observations and suggestions on several technical issues, including the pursuit of non-traditional approaches to risk assessment and the verification and validation of risk models. The workshop participants also identified several important non-technical issues, including risk communication with decision makers, and the integration of PRA into the overall design process.

Youngblood, Robert↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

FMEA/CIL 201

Reliability is one of many important performance parameters for aerospace systems and launch vehicles. FMEA/CIL is a powerful design-analysis and risk communication tool for improving reliability. FMEA/CIL 201 covers advanced considerations for FMEA/CIL planning and implementation.

Safety↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Application of Remote Sensing and Machine Learning to Improve Early Warning Systems for Harmful Algal Events in the Highland Lake Chain, TX

Beginning in 2019, harmful algal events have caused canine deaths in both Lady Bird Lake and Lake Travis located near Austin, Texas. These two reservoirs are part of the larger Highland Lakes chain, managed by the City of Austin Department of Watershed Protection (COA DWP) and the Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA), which fulfill municipal, commercial, and agricultural water demands. Given the recent increase in favorable environmental conditions for algal events in central Texas, NASA DEVELOP partnered with LCRA and COA DWP to improve monitoring and early detection of algal events, utilizing satellite remote sensing and machine learning. Spatially and temporally varied chlorophyll a concentrations, cyanobacteria detections, turbidity, and water surface temperature products are used as environmental proxies. Landsat 8 Operational Land Imager (OLI) and the Sentinel-2 MultiSpectral Instrument (MSI) data were used to provide a combined revisit time of up to ~3 days and < 30 m per pixel products. Chlorophyll a concentrations were estimated using a pre-trained Mixture Density Network, and cyanobacteria detection was accomplished using the Broad Wavelength Algae Index, which can differentiate algal blooms from algal proliferations (mats). In situ data were used to validate remotely sensed measurements and quantify uncertainties. Preliminary results show a good fit between the modeled output and in situ observations, suggesting that remote sensing data can be used to retrieve biogeochemical properties and/or inherent optical properties (IOPs) of water columns in these inland human-made lakes. Uncertainties were introduced from the sensitivity to atmospheric correction, inherent mismatch between satellite and sampling data, and a relatively lower signal-to-noise ratio over water. The resulting products enable near real-time monitoring of environmental proxies relevant to algal event presence in the Highland Lakes chain, and will ultimately support water management, decision making, and risk communication.

Shuyu Chang↗

NASA NTRS2021

Exploration Medical Capability Medical Scenarios

Medical systems supporting exploration class missions to cislunar space, the lunar surface, and the vicinity of Mars require an evolution in medical capability beyond that available for today’s low Earth orbit centric paradigm. Progress in developing more capable medical systems will be driven by the requirements of prolonged mission duration, increasing distance from Earth, and the realities of orbital mechanics, all necessitating a concomitant need for progressively Earth independent medical decision-making capabilities. These medical systems (which include the crewmembers) are expected to be capable of evaluating, diagnosing, treating and managing a defined list of medical conditions as well as addressing unanticipated medical conditions that may arise. The prioritized medical capabilities and associated resources needed to treat these medical conditions and support anticipated inflight medical events provide robust content that informs system designers and allows for a more complete evaluation of both medical and overall mission risk. Communication of these medical capabilities to system, vehicle, and mission designers can be enhanced using scenarios that characterize the system’s operations. Carefully considered scenarios provide the context needed to explore expected human and system interfaces, roles of ground and inflight crew (including periods of interrupted or delayed communications), identify training needs, assess data needs, etc. Mission-based scenario content varies dependent upon the needs, medical capabilities, conditions and context they are intended to illustrate. This document explicitly seeks to capture and codify those scenarios that have been useful to the Exploration Medical Capability Element of the Human Research Program in defining the enhanced medical systems required for future space exploration. It is expected that this document will continue to evolve through the refinement and characterization of current and future scenarios, respectively, as our knowledge grows, and requirements increasingly focus on Earth independent spaceflight operations.

Derek M Nusbaum↗

NASA NTRS2023

Information and Best Practices Related to NASA Nuclear Flight Safety for Space Flights Involving Space Nuclear Systems

The purpose of this handbook is to facilitate a repeatable and robust process that promotes clear and effective interfaces between activities and stakeholders focused on meeting nuclear flight safety requirements for missions utilizing space nuclear systems (SNS), within the context of NASA’s broader nuclear-related activities and interfaces. NPR 8715.26, Nuclear Flight Safety, requires that the NASA project manager “incorporate nuclear flight safety considerations starting with program or project formulation through the point at which the SNS or other radioactive material no longer has the potential to affect Earth’s biosphere.” NASA’s use of SNS inherently involves partnering with other stakeholders to conduct a range of related activities that interface with nuclear flight safety. From a categorical perspective these include: (i) meeting the authorities and licensing requirements for possession and use of nuclear material, as governed by other Federal authorities; (ii) conducting National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) activities for nuclear-enabled missions; (iii) meeting Federal nuclear launch authorization requirements; (iv) conducting radiological contingency planning activities, including those associated with international commitments; (v) performing risk communication and public outreach activities; and (vi) ensuring decommissioning and disposal strategies reflect National policies and interests. It is the intent of this handbook to promote an effective interface between nuclear flight safety and these interrelated categorical activities. In addition to activities undertaken with partnering agencies, there are individual nuclear-related activities and programs that have a nexus to nuclear flight safety, and these include: (i) applicable NASA Standing Review Boards; (ii) the US Department of Energy nuclear safety activities conducted in partnership with NASA under Memoranda of Understanding; (iii) the Department of Defense’s Range Safety activities; (iv) NASA’s general involvement in interagency and international dialogues regarding nuclear safety; (v) the NASA-administered Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Board; (vi) NASA’s program and project governance activities and nuclear-specific Technical Discipline Team activities under the Office of the Chief Engineer; and others. It is the intent of this handbook to promote effective leveraging of these additional interrelated organizational activities, as appropriate.

Donald Helton↗

NASA NTRS2019

Ensuring Flexibility and Security in SDN-Based Spacecraft Communication Networks Through Risk Assessment

Software-defined networking (SDN) has enabled elastic networking and resource distribution in cloud computing. The centralization and separation of the Control Plane also offers a high degree of network configurability and management, which can be used to mitigate and manage threats to the network. Space communication networks have historically been restricted and circuit switching in these networks has been a manual process. This study evaluates the potential role of SDN in space communication networks from a networking security standpoint. The evaluation covers the networking security needs of spacecraft missions and their associated assets. The results from the evaluation lead to a risk assessment that identifies vulnerabilities in an SDN-based communications architecture. Security challenges introduced into the network from integrating SDN are also considered. A risk register summarizes the severity of the attack outcomes, as well as occurrence likelihood. The study identifies Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks as a new threat (presently unmitigated by existing security controls) that would be prevalent in an SDN-based space communication environment. A Mininet-based emulation testbed is built to demonstrate the susceptibility of spacecraft flight software to a flooding DoS attack when on an interconnected SDN-managed network. This type of attack would be highly consequential to mission assets, and therefore SDN-based space communications would need to be resilient to such attacks. Future work will need to be performed to fully characterize DoS attack methods that can apply to the space communication scenario, as well as to devise a comprehensive DoS-resilient solution.

Baker, Dylan Z.↗

NASA NTRS2004

Towards a systems approach to risk considerations for concurrent design

This paper describes the new process used by the Project Design Center at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory for the identification, assessment and communication of risk elements throughout the lifecycle of a mission design. This process includes a software tool, 'RAP' that collects and communicates risk information between the various designers and a 'risk expert' who mediates this process. The establishment of this process is an attempt towards the systematic consideration of risk in the design decision making process. Using this process, we are able to better keep track of the risks associated with the design decisions. Furthermore, it helps us develop better risk profiles for the studies under consideration. We aim to refine and expand the current process to enable more thorough risk analysis capabilities in the future.

concurrent design↗

NASA NTRS2007

Mission Risk Reduction Regulatory Change Management

NASA Headquarters Environmental Management Division supports NASA's mission to pioneer the future in space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics research by integrating environmental considerations into programs and projects early-on, thereby proactively reducing NASA's exposure to institutional, programmatic and operational risk. As part of this effort, NASA established the Principal Center for Regulatory Risk Analysis and Communication (RRAC PC) as a resource for detecting, analyzing, and communicating environmental regulatory risks to the NASA stakeholder community. The RRAC PC focuses on detecting emerging environmental regulations and other operational change drivers that may pose risks to NASA programs and facilities, and effectively communicating the potential risks. For example, regulatory change may restrict how and where certain activities or operations may be conducted. Regulatory change can also directly affect the ability to use certain materials by mandating a production phase-out or restricting usage applications of certain materials. Regulatory change can result in significant adverse impacts to NASA programs and facilities due to NASA's stringent performance requirements for materials and components related to human-rated space vehicles. Even if a regulation does not directly affect NASA operations, U.S. and international regulations can pose program risks indirectly through requirements levied on manufacturers and vendors of components and materials. For example, manufacturers can change their formulations to comply with new regulatory requirements. Such changes can require time-consuming and costly requalification certification for use in human spaceflight programs. The RRAC PC has implemented a system for proactively managing regulatory change to minimize potential adverse impacts to NASA programs and facilities. This presentation highlights the process utilized by the RRACPC to communicate regulatory change and the associated potential risks within NASA, as well as the process for communicating and cooperating with other government agencies and industry partners, both domestic and international, to ensure mission success.

Scroggins, Sharon↗

DOE OSTI2025

Grid Communications: Digital Assurance and Supply Chain Challenges and Emerging Regulation Session Two

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem. This is Session 2 of 3 (Full Version).

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2025

Grid Communications: Cybersecurity and Supply Chain Challenges and Emerging Regulation Session Three

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem. This is Session 3 of 3 (Full Version).

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2025

Grid Communications Supply Chain & Emerging Regulation Challenges Session 1

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem.

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗

NASA NTRS2024

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Communication Delays in Cislunar Space: A Lab Study Examining Human System Integration Architecture (HSIA) and Team Risk Concerns

BACKGROUND: Communication delays are an inherent challenge of space missions to the Moon and beyond. Past research studies showed that 50+ second delays adversely affected individual well-being, team cohesion, and overall task performance (Kintz et al., 2016; Larson et al., 2019). However, there is a dearth of research on the effects of shorter delays (on the order of 4-12 seconds one-way) that may present a more immediate challenge during the upcoming Artemis missions. Even these shorter delays could make it difficult or infeasible for ground control to provide real-time support to Artemis astronauts, especially in complex and time-critical tasks such as extra-vehicular activities (EVAs). Results from studies on longer or Mars-like delays cannot be directly applied to Artemis-like delays, due to the large differences in delay magnitude and task types between these mission categories. For example, real-time oversight and guidance from ground control is impossible under Mars-like delays but may be performed under Artemis-like delays, albeit with potentially high workload and communication difficulty. Thus, a better understanding of the effects of Artemis-like communication delays on collaborative task performance is needed. Additionally, there is a need to develop reliable task paradigms that can be used in future studies on communication delays. METHODS: This project will study the effects of Artemis-like communication delays on collaborative task performance in a simulated space-to-ground team task via a lunar Gateway-like interface prototype. Teams of two astronaut-like participants - one serving as “crewmember” and one as “flight controller” - will perform a spaceflight-relevant task under six delay conditions (i.e., 0, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 seconds). Audio, video, texting, and file transfer will be delayed between the participants to mimic lunar-like communication delays. Measures related to workload, situation awareness, system usability, task performance, team cohesion, well-being, and communication strategies will be collected. These measures will be compared across delay levels, participant roles, and off-nominal and nominal tasks. Participants will be given the choice to use any combination of video and text communication in order to study preferences in interaction modality. RESEARCH AIMS: One aim is to identify a delay level or range of levels at which there may be significant decrements in individual and team-based measures. Identifying such ranges may help design novel workload management or communication countermeasures for future space missions. Also, the spaceflight-relevant research tasks and corresponding communication delay technology developed as part of this effort may be used for future studies on communication delays. Results from this work are also expected to inform study scenarios in the Human Exploration Research Analog (HERA) Campaign.

S Upasani↗

NASA NTRS1989

US computer research networks: Current and future

During the last decade, NASA LeRC's Communication Program has conducted a series of telecommunications forecasting studies to project trends and requirements and to identify critical telecommunications technologies that must be developed to meet future requirements. The Government Networks Division of Contel Federal Systems has assisted NASA in these studies, and the current study builds upon these earlier efforts. The current major thrust of the NASA Communications Program is aimed at developing the high risk, advanced, communications satellite and terminal technologies required to significantly increase the capacity of future communications systems. Also, major new technological, economic, and social-political events and trends are now shaping the communications industry of the future. Therefore, a re-examination of future telecommunications needs and requirements is necessary to enable NASA to make management decisions in its Communications Program and to ensure the proper technologies and systems are addressed. This study, through a series of Task Orders, is helping NASA define the likely communication service needs and requirements of the future and thereby ensuring that the most appropriate technology developments are pursued.

Kratochvil, D.↗