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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2026

Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) Licensing and Permitting [Slides]

This presentation provides an overview of the licensing, permitting, and regulatory frameworks governing Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) across multiple international contexts. It outlines foundational permitting considerations - including safety standards, siting requirements, regulatory and environmental obligations, and interconnection processes - alongside typical pathways for installation, approval, and inspection. The presentation summarizes key technical standards such as NFPA 855 and IEEE guidelines, and emphasizes best practices for safe and effective deployment. A series of detailed case studies from South Africa, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Costa Rica, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic illustrates how different countries structure approval authority, evaluate environmental impacts, and integrate BESS into national grid systems. The deck concludes with insights on emerging challenges, including evolving regulatory frameworks, financial viability, and the need for pricing mechanisms that accurately value storage services.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2018

The Role of Technical Guidance and Analysis Tools in Remedy Decisions, Implementation, and Closure - 18307

Selection, design, and implementation of environmental remedies are conducted under regulatory frameworks that define the activities, communication, and documentation requirements for the remediation process. However, there are site situations that are not well described in the basic regulatory frameworks, and technical guidance and analysis tools can help facilitate remedy decisions and actions. An example where technical guidance and analysis tools are helpful is in the transition from pump-and-treat (P and T) remediation to monitored natural attenuation (MNA). Standard MNA regulatory guidance does not account for a plume initially controlled by P and T hydraulic conditions rather than natural-gradient conditions. For instance, MNA guidance discusses demonstrating plume stability as a means to evaluate the suitability of MNA. However, plume stability under long-term natural gradient conditions cannot be directly demonstrated while the plume is being contained by a P and T system. Thus, additional guidance is needed to describe other measures that can be used to support transition from P and T to MNA. As an additional example, standard MNA regulatory guidance is not written to provide suitable information for application to vadose-zone contamination; discussion and examples in the regulatory guidance are predominantly for groundwater. Use of contaminant transport assessments is an important component of vadose-zone remedy decisions where technical guidance and analysis tools can facilitate these decisions. For volatile compounds, the assessment may need to also consider flux to the surface and constraints associated with vapor intrusion. Recent technical guidance and associated analysis tools provide sites with approaches to support remedy decisions for the above conditions. In particular, these recent approaches target developing and implementing P and T and soil vapor extraction remediation exit strategies and facilitating assessment and implementation of remedies for coupled vadose-zone/groundwater contamination. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Regulatory Risk Reduction for Advanced Reactor Technologies – FY2016 Status and Work Plan Summary

Millions of public and private sector dollars have been invested over recent decades to realize greater efficiency, reliability, and the inherent and passive safety offered by advanced nuclear reactor technologies. However, a major challenge in experiencing those benefits resides in the existing U.S. regulatory framework. This framework governs all commercial nuclear plant construction, operations, and safety issues and is highly large light water reactor (LWR) technology centric. The framework must be modernized to effectively deal with non-LWR advanced designs if those designs are to become part of the U.S energy supply. The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Advanced Reactor Technologies (ART) Regulatory Risk Reduction (RRR) initiative, managed by the Regulatory Affairs Department at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), is establishing a capability that can systematically retire extraneous licensing risks associated with regulatory framework incompatibilities. This capability proposes to rely heavily on the perspectives of the affected regulated community (i.e., commercial advanced reactor designers/vendors and prospective owner/operators) yet remain tuned to assuring public safety and acceptability by regulators responsible for license issuance. The extent to which broad industry perspectives are being incorporated into the proposed framework makes this initiative unique and of potential benefit to all future domestic non-LWR applicants

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2016

Toward a Safety Risk-Based Classification of Unmanned Aircraft

There is a trend of growing interest and demand for greater access of unmanned aircraft (UA) to the National Airspace System (NAS) as the ongoing development of UA technology has created the potential for significant economic benefits. However, the lack of a comprehensive and efficient UA regulatory framework has constrained the number and kinds of UA operations that can be performed. This report presents initial results of a study aimed at defining a safety-risk-based UA classification as a plausible basis for a regulatory framework for UA operating in the NAS. Much of the study up to this point has been at a conceptual high level. The report includes a survey of contextual topics, analysis of safety risk considerations, and initial recommendations for a risk-based approach to safe UA operations in the NAS. The next phase of the study will develop and leverage deeper clarity and insight into practical engineering and regulatory considerations for ensuring that UA operations have an acceptable level of safety.

Torres-Pomales, Wilfredo↗
NASA NTRS2006

Unmanned Aircraft Hazards and their Implications for Regulation

Use of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) has been characterized as the next great step forward in the evolution of civil aviation. Indeed, UASs are in limited civil use in the United States today, and many believe that the time is rapidly approaching when they will move into the commercial marketplace, too. To make this a reality, a number of challenges must be overcome to develop the necessary regulatory framework for assuring safe operation of this special class of aircraft. This paper discusses some of what must be done to establish that framework. In particular, we examine hazards specific to the design, operation, and flight crew of UASs, and discuss implications of these hazards for existing policy and guidance. Understanding unique characteristics of UASs that pose new hazards is essential to developing a cogent argument, and the corresponding regulatory framework, for safely integrating these aircraft into civil airspace.

Hayhurst, Kelly J.↗
DOE OSTI2019

The CNSC's Inspector Training and Qualification Program and its Importance to the Nuclear Industry - 19370

Trained, qualified, and designated staff at the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) conduct inspections of licensed nuclear sites as a method of compliance verification. This paper will describe the unique and comprehensive qualification process for CNSC inspectors, known as the Inspector Training and Qualification Program (ITQP). The ITQP includes service-line-specific training that is unique to each inspection group within the CNSC, dependent on the facility/industry type. The training requirements specific to staff in the Wastes and Decommissioning Division and its impact on safety at waste management sites across Canada will be discussed. This paper will specifically identify the importance of CNSC inspector training and detail how the unique training program requirements enable the CNSC to better identify and encourage compliance among nuclear waste and decommissioning sites in Canada. CNSC inspectors are designated under section 29 of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSCA), and the powers of inspectors are outlined in section 32 of the NSCA. Having trained, qualified, and designated inspectors is paramount for both the CNSC and the nuclear industry. For the CNSC, this ensures that staff in the field are aware of potential hazards and how to mitigate such hazards (if applicable), that staff understand the regulatory framework and how to measure compliance against it, and that staff consistently apply CNSC values across the nuclear industry. For the industry, this ensures that staff present at nuclear facilities are knowledgeable and professional, that inspections are conducted in a consistent manner, and that any compliance actions issued are measurable and defendable against the regulatory framework. The CNSC's ITQP incorporates both theoretical (in-class and online) and practical training, and is broken down into six categories: mandatory training for all new employees; core training; service-line-specific training; on-the-job training; CNSC regulations training; and, recommended additional training. This paper will discuss in detail the specific aspects of each of these categories, the importance of each category including the difference between knowledge and skills acquired in theoretical versus hands-on training, and how CNSC staff in designated inspector positions (inspectors-in-training) progress through the program. The complete list of core training and service-line-specific training for inspectors in the Wastes and Decommissioning Division, including re-qualification requirements, will be explored throughout the paper. It is further important that CNSC designated inspectors undergo continuous learning to ensure that their skills remain up to date, as well as to ensure that inspectors requalify at defined intervals to enable the maintenance of the core knowledge and skills with which the determination of the person's qualification was based. The steps involved in this requalification process, as well as the importance of continuous learning and the maintenance of skills and knowledge will be further discussed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

A structural description of the evolution of stakeholders and risk communication in the Department of Energy's defense nuclear facilities: Historical perspective, major stakeholders, and external events

Regulators and policymakers are routinely challenged with explaining complex concepts concerning risk. Part of the challenge is helping external and internal stakeholders to understand the context behind risk-related information and decisions. Here, this paper will describe the historical evolution of the safety and regulatory framework for an important category in the nuclear industry—defense nuclear facilities owned and operated by the US Department of Energy. In parallel with describing this evolution, three major events which occurred external to the complex of defense nuclear facilities will be summarized, and their impact on the maturation of the Department's safety and regulatory framework will be discussed. Finally, integrated with these two threads of discussion will be a chronicle of the changing set of involved organizations and the expanding set of external stakeholders involved in risk decisions—and therefore, the risk communications ecosystem surrounding defense nuclear facilities. It will be noted that this system was once describable as a classic “iron triangle,” but now has progressed to a complex network of federal and state organizations, numerous congressional committees, and expanding sets of external stakeholders. It is hoped that a comprehensive discussion of the context of risk assessment in the defense nuclear facilities complex—addressing historical insights, organizational evolution, and the maturing structure of regulation—will provide enhanced opportunities for building trust and understanding in this complex environment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2017

Radioactive Waste Management in a Treatability and Optimisation Perspective - 17527

In order to meet recycling criteria or to fulfil Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) for disposal there are many different management concepts for radioactive waste that can be applied. Which concept or set of concepts to use to optimize waste management depends on several factors, among them, the regulatory framework for recycling, the availability of a disposal facility and the acceptance criteria for disposal. The required pre-treatment and other pre-disposal activities should be carefully analyzed for each of the disposal options, as they are significant contributors to the total cost for managing the waste. Waste Acceptance Criteria are living documents that should be updated when regulatory framework changes as well as when new treatment methods and new packaging and barrier systems develop. Each waste treatment facility, has its own specific limitations and therefore its own WAC/CFA (conditions for acceptance), which depends both on the plant design and national legislation. Many waste owners, countries or licensees, have their preferred, and in some cases well established, waste routes for certain waste streams. In some countries, the full chain from waste treatment through to disposal of radioactive waste is in place, whilst other countries still are in the process of establishing their repository program. The worst case scenario for any licensee or waste owner is waste which is not possible to qualify for disposal. This can be due to poor or degraded waste containers, unspecified content in waste packages, or wastes that are not suitable for disposal in their current form. Such deficiencies result in expensive actions related to waste retrieval, new characterisation and/or costly investigations. The EDF Group has a fleet of waste treatment facilities and has, for decades, provided waste treatment services to domestic and international customers. This paper will discuss important waste owner considerations and EDF experiences related to the optimization of the waste management process. This will be from both a treatment and an end-state perspective. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

From Dealing with Legacy Waste to Avoiding It - 17432

When dealing with radioactive waste management and its regulation, there are various national approaches. At the same time there is a growing tendency towards consideration of fundamental principles and standards thus forming the underlying basics in detailing the customized regulatory framework for specific applications. Dealing with legacy waste poses some particular problems as at the time of its production current safety principles were sometimes not well established. Considering today's standards this frequently requires remedial actions. Usually, this involves considerable effort and cost as well as radiation exposure for the involved personnel. Resolving legacy waste related problems not only benefits from an established regulatory framework but allows conclusions on how deal with legacy waste problems in general. The most important lessons learned from such operations might be how to prevent the production of legacy waste in the first place, thus avoiding further problems. By reflecting on practical applications from a number of countries the presentation is set to carve out the crucial recommendations from internationally recognized standards that give a substantial dividend in terms of not only time and budget but most of all safety and radiation exposure when properly implemented. The scope of the examples given ranges from dealing with legacy waste to avoiding it and includes recommendations towards essential features of best practice as seen from the perspective of an independent expert organization. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

CCUS Perspectives: Assessing Historical Contexts, Current Realities, and Future Prospects

CCUS technologies are crucial solutions for mitigating climate change by reducing CO2 emissions from industrial operations and energy sectors. This review critically examines the current state of CCUS technologies, and highlights advancements, challenges, regulatory frameworks, and future directions. It comprehensively analyzes carbon capture methods, such as pre-combustion, post-combustion, and oxy-fuel combustion capture, while comparing their efficiencies and limitations. The review also explores carbon utilization techniques, such as direct and indirect utilization, emphasizing their potential applications and technological constraints. Additionally, it assesses various carbon storage methods, focusing on geological, ocean, and mineralization storage, and discusses their capacity, feasibility, and environmental implications. The study reviews the policy and regulatory frameworks, economic viability, market trends, and environmental sustainability of CCUS. By identifying research gaps and recommending future research priorities, this review aims to guide the development of more efficient/effective, and cost-effective CCUS technology, ensuring their role in a sustaining low-carbon future. This review provides a forward-looking perspective, a critical and interdisciplinary analysis that assesses the current state of CCUS technologies, and further provides a roadmap for future development.

Energy & Fuels↗
DOE OSTI2024

Soil Desiccation Treatability Testing at BC Waste Disposal Cribs

During Hanford’s production period, low-level waste products generated from chemical processing of uranium fuel rods were discharged directly to the ground through a system of cribs and trenches located in the 200-BC-1 Operable Unit (OU). The site consists of 6 cribs and 20 trenches that received more than 117,000 m3 of radioactive liquid waste discharged to the soil. These unlined infiltration galleries held volumes of liquid waste while it seeped into the ground, with the understanding that the 100 m (330 ft) thick vadose zone in the area would effectively capture the effluent and prevent groundwater impacts. A conceptual model showing the operation of cribs and trenches is shown in Figure 1. Data show effluent from the 26 cribs and trenches containing about 410 curies of Technetium-99 (Tc-99) is primarily located between 30 m and 70 m (98 ft and 230 ft) depth (Corbin et al., 2005; Ward et al., 2004). Despite no evidence indicating that the contamination has reached the groundwater at BC cribs and trenches, the mobility of Tc-99 had been demonstrated in laboratory tests and was recognized as a threat to groundwater at the site. Using data from numerical models, laboratory analyses, field investigations, and information on historical discharges, the EPA and Ecology identified Tc-99 and U contamination of the vadose zone as a remediation priority. The U.S. DOE was notified by EPA and Ecology regarding risks associated with Tc-99 contamination in a letter requesting development of a strategy for improved methods to understand the nature and extent of vadose zone contamination, specifically Tc-99, and to develop remedial options for addressing such contamination. To develop the appropriate technology for characterizing, remediating, and monitoring the deep vadose zone Tc-99 contamination, the U.S. DOE worked with the EPA and Ecology to create a Treatability Test Plan under a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) for the Hanford 200 Areas. Under this RI/FS, it was determined that a treatability test for soil desiccation should be carried out as it was identified as a promising in-situ treatment technology for mitigating risks posed by Tc-99 contamination to the groundwater table. The BC Cribs and Trenches site was identified as a representative site for Tc-99 and U contamination and selected for the soil desiccation treatability test. In this chapter, we summarize the overlying regulatory framework of RI/FS and treatability tests and illustrate how development and experimentation supported the evaluation of selected remedies. We briefly discuss the RI/FS for the 200 Areas of the Hanford Site and focus on the soil desiccation treatability testing performed at the BC cribs and trenches site under the Deep Vadose Zone Treatability Test Plan for the Hanford Central Plateau (DVZ-TT). The DVZ-TT is one component of the remedial investigation/feasibility study for the Hanford 200 Areas and represents the underlying regulatory framework that drives site operations towards records of decision and site closure.

Mangel, Adam R.↗
DOE OSTI2019

The Challenges of Repository Operation in an Existing Mine - 19339

A generally accepted principle related to long term management of radioactive waste/ spent fuel is the isolation in a geological repository. In Germany, the disposal operation of low-level waste (LLW) and intermediate-level waste (ILW) started in the Asse II mine in 1967 and in the former German Democratic Republic in the Morsleben repository in 1971. After the German reunification, the responsibility for the existing sites changed several times until the Bundesgesellschaft fuer Endlagerung (BGE) became new license holder for both sites in 2017. The BGE is responsible to carry out the operative tasks of searching for a high-level waste (HLW) repository, the planning and construction of the Konrad repository for the emplacement of low- and intermediate-level waste (LILW), the operation of the Asse II mine including the retrieval of the emplaced waste, and the preparation for the closure of the Morsleben repository. Nevertheless, the challenges of repository operation in an existing mine have not changed in all these years, as the regulatory framework is mainly written for Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) and is difficult to adapt for a repository mine. In particular, conditions in a mine are substantially different from 'clean' above-ground nuclear installations. Dust due to mining activities, relatively high temperatures, and a corrosive atmosphere in a salt mine might be present. Therefore, the usability of the repository for several decades during the different operational phases, i.e. planning, construction, emplacement, and closure, can only be ensured by continuous maintenance. Furthermore, the atomic law is applicable for above-ground facilities and the mining law for mines of every description. The difficulty of geological repositories is to ensure that both laws are going to be applied above and below ground with no regulatory framework tailored especially for such sites. A special case is the Asse II mine where the mining law was applied from the very beginning, before the atomic law needed to be established later on and now requires the retrieval of the radioactive waste before decommissioning. In this presentation, similarities and differences in the legal framework of the repositories in the responsibility of BGE and some operational experiences throughout the years are described. This applies to the radiation protection regime, the excavation ratio, the host rock stability and the backfilling concepts of the mining areas. Further challenges arise from the demonstration of long term safety according to the state-of-the-art of science and technology for either existing repositories/ mines or those under construction or planned. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Evaluating Probability of Containment Effectiveness at a GCS Sites using integrated assessment modeling approach with Bayesian decision Networks

Improved scientific and engineering understanding of the behavior of geologic CO2 storage together with established regulatory framework and incentive structures raise the prospects for accelerated, large-scale deployment of this greenhouse gas emissions reduction approach. Incentive structures call for the establishment of appropriate verification and accounting approaches to support claims of the integrity of a geologic storage complex and to justify taking credit for long-term storage. In this study, we present a framework for assessing the probability of containment effectiveness over the lifetime of a geologic carbon storage site (e.g., after 70 years of injection and post-injection site performance) using forward stochastic model realizations based on site characterization data and using a monitoring-informed Bayesian network based on hypothetical detectability from surface seismic surveys over the site injection and post-injection phases. The National Risk Assessment Partnership’s open-source Integrated Assessment Model (NRAP-Open-IAM) was utilized to develop an ensemble of 10,000 a priori stochastic forecasts of CO2 containment. Those simulations were used to train the Bayesian network model to estimate the prior probabilities of the CO2 leakage mass into overlying, monitorable aquifers considering the uncertainties in the reservoir properties, permeability of potentially leaky wells and the overlying aquifers. The conditional probabilities in the Bayesian network were either learned from the NRAP-Open-IAM simulations or derived from the predefined detection thresholds for the monitoring method. Observations obtained from monitoring, over time during the site operation phases were then used to generate updated posterior probabilities of containment (and any loss from containment) in the Bayesian network by propagating the prior probabilities through the conditional probabilities. We demonstrate how to construct and use the Bayesian network for verifying the long-term storage complex effectiveness informed by monitoring based on the NRAP-Open-IAM simulations previously developed for the FutureGen 2.0 site. This approach may have relevance for stake holders to demonstrate secure geologic storage, provide a defensible, probabilistic approach to claim credit for geologic storage, and to estimate the likelihood that any fraction of the claimed credit may need to be refunded to the creditor based on available monitoring information.

Bayesian network, Risk assessment, Monitoring, car↗
DOE OSTI2017

Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Capability. An Inspector's Handbook. Draft Report

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) current fire protection regulatory framework was initiated in response to a cable fire that occurred at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station in 1975. Following the issuance of several guidance documents, in 1981 the Commission codified deterministic requirements to provide reasonable assurance that fire would not jeopardize reactor safety (10 CFR 50.48 "Fire Protection" and Appendix R to 10 CFR 50). Since then, the results of plant operating experience, NRC inspection activities and cable fire testing programs have served to clarify the application of these requirements. In 2004, the NRC amended 10 CFR Part 50.48 to add a new subsection, 10 CFR 50.48(c), that endorses, with exceptions, the National Fire Protection Association's 805, "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants — 2001 Edition," as a voluntary alternative for demonstrating compliance with Appendix R. To date, approximately half of all operating plants have transitioned to a risk-informed approach under 10 CFR 50.48(c). Regardless of the selected approach, each operating nuclear power plant should establish a comprehensive fire protection program that includes features needed to minimize the likelihood and consequence of firesl. To achieve this objective, fire protection programs integrate the NRC's long-held safety concept of defense-in-depth (DID) by providing multiple barriers against potentially unacceptable consequences of fire. To minimize the frequency and size of fires, the first lines of defense include controls for fire prevention, such as controlling combustibles and ignition sources and fire mitigation features, such as fire detection and suppression systems. In the unlikely event that a fire should start and continue to grow in spite of these features, appropriate fire protection features, such as fire-rated barriers are provided as necessary to ensure the accomplishment of essential shutdown functions. This handbook was specifically developed for NRC inspectors that may be assigned to perform elements of Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05T, "Fire Protection (Triennial)," including, (a) "Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities," (e) "Alternative Shutdown Capability," and (f) "Circuit Analyses." Thus, the document concentrates solely on the final element of defense-in-depth— ensuring reactor safety will not be compromised in the event of a serious fire. In addition to describing how the NRC's regulatory framework has evolved since the Browns Ferry Fire, the handbook illustrates the content and scope of various analyses typically referenced in a plant's fire protection licensing basis and includes techniques and insights for assessing the plant's conformance to those criteria.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Integrated Commercial Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) Prefeasibility Study at Rock Springs Uplift, Wyoming (Final Report)

To establish the potential of safe, long-term commercial-scale carbon capture & storage (CCS) in southwestern Wyoming, the University of Wyoming formed a CCS coordination team (CCT) to complete a Phase I CarbonSAFE pre-feasibility study adjacent to the region’s largest coal-fired power plant, the Jim Bridger Plant (JBP). The study’s primary objective was to evaluate the potential of storing 50+ million metric tons of anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) in stacked reservoirs over a period of 25 years. In addition, this integrated study evaluated related aspects of carbon capture utilization & storage (CCUS) at the study site, including: (1) the CO 2 character of post-combustion flue gas from JBP and the technical capacity for retrofitting proven commercial-scale CO 2 capture technology relative to CO 2 source character and technological constraints; (2) utilization of the existing CO 2 pipeline network in the immediate vicinity of JBP for enhanced oil recovery (CO 2 -EOR) and utilizing that network as part of a regional hub for CO 2 storage from other anthropogenic sources; (3) assessment of the challenges and benefits of meeting all of CarbonSAFE programmatic Phase I goals relative to Wyoming’s carbon management regulatory framework; and (4) assessment of the community and environmental factors that may impact CCS at JBP. With respect to storage, we analyzed the potential of stacked Mesozoic reservoirs at the study site, focusing on the Entrada and Nugget sandstones. The reservoir response to injection simulations varied greatly between formations, though they both were capable of CO 2 storage. The Entrada Sandstone is relative thin (~40’) and heterogeneous; storage using one injection and production well was limited to 1.2 Mt over 25 years at the study site. The Nugget Sandstone is much thicker (> 400’) and generally homogeneous; storage using one injection and production well approached 15.0 Mt over 25 years; this scenario suggests that the storage potential in the Nugget Sandstone is close to the estimated P90 calculation of 9.6 Mt/mi 2 as models indicate a storage potential of 8.3 Mt/mi 2 at saturation. Both reservoirs’ storage capacity benefited greatly from coupling an injection well with an offset production well; total storage capacity increased and reservoir pressure stayed below critical thresholds. This indicates that implementing a pressure management strategy at the study site would optimize storage and decrease risk. Seals associated with the targeted reservoirs were shown to be capable of retaining the potential storage volumes, and the site benefits from multiple seal redundancies (i.e. > 7,000’ of seal formations). Furthermore, assessment of different reservoir variables (e.g., fluid composition, pressure, etc.) indicates all reservoirs at the study site are isolated. Storage assessments from Mesozoic reservoirs were coupled with simulations from the site’s Paleozoic reservoirs (the Weber Sandstone and Madison Limestone), which were the focus of previous study. The fully integrated stacked reservoir pre-feasibility studies suggest that the Nugget and Madison formations alone could safely store 50 million metric tons of CO 2 within the study site. Furthermore, both formations are true saline reservoirs near JBP, making them ideal target reservoirs for CO 2 sequestration. Analysis of Wyoming’s laws and regulations confirm that the State has a favorable policy environment for CCS/CCUS. The project’s economic models estimated that the following revenues collectively are sufficient to finance the project over its lifespan if CO 2 utilization is coupled with CCS via the following strategies: (1) sales of CO 2 for EOR (approximately $69 million/year); (2) use of CO 2 tax credits such as amended §45Q and §48A (approximately $484 million total); and (3) sales of low-carbon electricity and marketable carbon offset/credits into carbon-constrained markets (approximately $11-$17 million/year) to West Coast consumers. These revenue estimates are broadly consistent with other studies that concluded arbitrage in JBP retail electricity sales between California and Wyoming could help to support the cost of deploying CCS at JBP. The models also indicate that maintaining a successful business case for long-term CCS -- wherein associated capture, transportation and operational costs are fully addressed at JBP -- is reliant on numerous external factors that complicate predictions. This study suggests that this site meets the CarbonSAFE program’s requirements of being able to feasibly store 50+ million metric tons of CO 2 over 25 years within the site’s stacked reservoirs, especially if coupled with pressure management strategies. This study suggests that the Nugget Sandstone and the Madison Limestone are two of the best reservoirs in the State with respect to overall storage capacity. In addition, the site’s proximity to existing CO 2 transportation networks, CO 2 -EOR opportunities, ability to sell to markets that value low-carbon electricity, Wyoming’s existing carbon regulatory framework, and a public that is well-educated with respect to energy markets and issues collectively increase the potential for implementing commercial-scale CCS adjacent to the JBP. With respect to the available technical and non-technical site data, and the reservoir quality at the study site, we suggest that this site is capable of moving directly into Phase III of the CarbonSAFE program.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗
DOE OSTI2019

Communicating Technical Information: Different Approaches for Different Audiences - 19399

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), Canada's independent nuclear regulator, has a 70- year history of regulating nuclear safety in Canada. Part of the CNSC's mandate is to disseminate objective scientific, technical and regulatory information to the public. The CNSC prides itself on being transparent with the public, and openly sharing scientific, technical and regulatory information on its regulatory activities with stakeholders. We value the public's feedback, and have a robust public participation program to allow for public involvement in the CNSC's activities. However, different audiences have different needs based on their level of technical knowledge and expertise. The CNSC's experience with stakeholder interactions has demonstrated the need to balance the dissemination of technical information through different communication platforms, in order to satisfy the needs of various intended audiences. This paper will focus on the radioactive waste management communications methods that the CNSC has implemented for two distinct audiences: 1. Audiences with little or no technical background: Communications with this audience requires techniques to make highly technical concepts more understandable. The focus is on educating about matters related to radioactive waste management, and informing about the safety aspects behind the regulation of radioactive waste. 2. Audiences with previous knowledge and experience with nuclear matters: Communications with this audience requires techniques to ensure that as much technical information and data as possible is available to inform stakeholders. The focus is on giving access to studies, research and raw data, in order to allow this audience to inform themselves, and potentially bring new perspectives to the CNSC's attention that could be used in regulatory oversight activities. In its capacity to disseminate scientific and technical information to the public as required by legislation, the CNSC holds a unique position compared with other Canadian regulatory bodies. The CNSC is one of the only Canadian regulators which: - Has a public hearing process which enables the public and Indigenous groups to express their issues and concerns directly to the decision-maker (the Commission) - Publishes regular regulatory oversight reports (report card on industry) that assess the safety performance of all its licensees - Publishes responses to all public comments received during consultation periods in our environmental assessment processes as well as our regulatory framework processes, including draft regulatory documents, discussions papers and proposed regulations - Has an independent environmental monitoring program, allowing the public access to environmental data. The program also seeks public and Indigenous input with respect to proposed environmental sampling campaigns, including suggestions on the samples to be taken and sampling locations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Applicability of the Milestones Approach to Deployments of Transportable Nuclear Power Plants (TNPPs)

Transportable nuclear power plants (TNPPs) can provide potential benefits to countries embarking on nuclear programs, offering reduced infrastructure requirements, shorter timeframes for implementation, cost savings and greater deployment flexibility than larger conventional reactors. However, the deployment of a TNPP in a Host State comes with the obligation to establish sufficient regulatory, institutional, and technical infrastructure, which, among others, includes a legal and regulatory framework and a competent regulatory body to implement a State’s safeguards obligations. This paper considers how the unique technical and deployment features of TNPPs may affect the process of preparing for and implementing safeguards in nuclear newcomer countries. Evaluating this issue through the lens of the IAEA’s Milestones Approach, this paper discusses some potential implications arising from the shortening of some milestones phases due to reduced construction or licensing time for TNPPs, and the need for increased cooperation between Host States and Supplier States in preparing for and meeting certain safeguards obligations. These considerations are potentially relevant to various stakeholders: newcomer States considering TNPP deployment; the States and companies that supply such reactors; as well as organizations that support international safeguards capacity building.

Siserman-Gray, Ioana-Cristina↗