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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Planetary Protection Program Overview and Update

NASA has an integrated planetary protection strategy that leverages COSPAR Policy guide-lines, workshops, scientific consensus, partnerships and international working groups to develop policy and implementation guidelines. The Oÿce of Safety and Mission Assurance, which in-cludes NASA’s Oÿce of Planetary Protection, depends on these activities to support NASA’s missions in the assurance of crew safety and mission success while protecting the public and planetary environment from harmful contamination. This report will detail the overall planetary protection policy development perspective to sup-port NASA’s upcoming mission opportunities for exploration to include crewed Mars and sam-ple return missions. NASA continues to evolve its strategies, policies, and standards. NASA’s support in the COSPAR workshop series on Refining Planetary Protection Requirements for Crewed Missions to Mars have resulted in a NASA interim directive and paved the way for the development of NASA planetary protection roadmaps. These Agency level roadmaps address technology development and testing required to fill knowledge gaps for developing responsive policy guidelines and quantitative technical standards. In addition to workshops and tech-nology management strategies, NASA is also leveraging the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine’s Committee of Planetary Protection to serve as a source of advice on planetary protection measures. Finally, the report will include how the Oÿce of Safety and Mission Assurance is incorporating planetary protection into existing and new multi-agency partnerships.

Frank Groen↗
DOE OSTI2024

Utilities Perspective on Protection Challenges with High IBR Penetration

Utilities have seen rapid increase in Solar, Wind, and Battery Energy Storage Resources that interconnect to their electric system through Inverters. Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs) have fault current characteristics that are unlike the fault current response of traditional rotating-machine-based generators, which is well known and repeatable. IBR’s non-traditional fault current behavior is due to the IBR control scheme, which is configured to provide a clean AC output but also protect the inverter’s sensitive power electronics devices from damage, one source of which is overcurrent. This results in low fault current magnitude, low or no negative sequence current injection, the variability of sequence component currents, the variability of voltage with respect to current angles, and the lack of inertia. The control scheme also results in a fault current response that can vary between manufactures and between models of the same manufacturer. High penetration of IBRs can adversely affect the protection schemes applied in areas with high penetration of IBRs. With the proliferation of IBRs, utilities are finding out that conventional protection schemes are not adequately equipped to protect the electric systems. This is mainly because the existing protection elements and practices have been designed based on the fault current response of conventional rotating machines. In several cases, the available literature does not provide any clear solution for the issues when the protection scheme does not operate properly near IBRs. This presentation identifies various protection challenges due to IBRs that industry is facing, from the utility perspective. Instead of facing on one issue, we are looking broadly on all the challenges that system protection has experienced with high penetration of IBRs. Based on the IBR response from various utilities during real fault events and gathering perspective from different utility SMEs via questionnaire, the presentation summarizes on gathered data and internal experiences.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

A Sensitivity-driven Wide Area Protection (SWAP) Coordination Tool for High Penetration of Inverter-based Resources (IBR)

Traditionally, power system generation sources have been composed of synchronous generators, of which the fault current behavior is understood with minimal differences between generation size and types due to the physics of their construction. Present protection schemes and modeling methods are based upon these understood characteristics. Most renewable generation is composed of inverter-based resources (IBR), in which fault current is determined by switching control software and hardware limitations, each of which can vary between manufacturers and even between models of the same manufacturer. The resulting fault current is low in magnitude, low in negative-sequence current, unpredictable phase angles, and is a challenge to model. These characteristics also result in a challenge to traditional protection schemes and fault simulation software. To address several of these concerns, the project has the following goals: 1. Improve IBR models: Improve IBR models used in short circuit (SC) programs to accurately capture the response of IBRs at the bulk power system (BPS) level for fault and protection studies. 2. Develop automation tool: Develop an automation tool that allows engineers to identify protection coordination and sensitivity issues by performing SC and protection coordination studies in a high IBR-penetrated grid by applying variations to the IBR models, faults, contingencies, etc. 3. Develop schemes: Develop new protection mitigation solution schemes that complement the existing protection systems to ensure safe operation of the BPS with higher IBR penetration levels. The project team did not achieve this final goal, as the Department of Energy (DOE) stopped the project early due to changes in DOE funding priorities. The termination notice came at the beginning of the final project phase, while the team was identifying and beginning to investigate protection issues. It should be noted that the team discussed a 100% penetration scenario. However, this scenario would require the use of grid-forming IBR models that are not presently available. Since developing these models requires additional effort, the 100% penetration scenario was not pursued during this project. In the future, developing the methodology and models for the 100% scenario could benefit the industry.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Revised Planetary Protection Policy and Implementation

NASA has updated its planetary protection policy and implementation approach in response to advances in scientific understanding of solar system targets, upcoming mission opportunities for exploration and sample return, and the private sector’s emerging capability to plan missions to Earth’s Moon and Mars. In September 2021, the NASA Procedural Requirements NPR 8715.24, entitled “Planetary Protection Provisions for Robotic Extraterrestrial Missions” was released which repositions planetary protection in existing NASA mission and program management structures, introduces risk-informed decision making, expands on key roles and responsibilities for both programmatic and the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, updates the categorization process and streamlines the planetary protection documentation approval and schedule. NASA is working on a more detailed technical standard to accompany NPR 8715.24 which will include the detailed technical requirements to address organic contamination, inadvertent impact avoidance, biological control and management, end of mission disposal and restricted Earth-Return sample safety and assurance. This report to the COSPAR community will describe the current NASA planetary protection policy and its alignment with the revised COSPAR planetary protection policy. NASA’s plans for updating the supporting “Handbook for Implementing Planetary Protection Technical Requirements” and future policies for addressing planetary protection of crewed missions will also be presented.

Planetary Protection↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA's Planetary Protection Program to Assure Mission Safety and Success

NASA's planetary protection program seeks to understand and control harmful contamination of solar systems targets of exploration by terrestrial contamination and prevent harmful biological contamination of the Earth-Moon system by extraterrestrial life, should it exist. To accomplish these objective's NASA has developed a balanced safety and mission assurance strategy that leverages COSPAR Policy guidelines, workshops, scientific consensus, partnerships and international working groups to develop policy and implementation guidelines. Upcoming crewed missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as robotic missions to small solar system bodies, Europa, Titan and Mars are some of the driving activities of astrobiological interest that continue to emphasize the importance of planetary protection throughout the project life cycle.Development of a responsive and updated agency planetary protection policy has been a focus area in supporting upcoming mission opportunities for exploration to include Mars sample return and crewed mission concepts. An extensive update of this policy is underway which encompasses crewed and robotic procedural polices, a general technical requirements standard, and an implementation handbook. During this timeframe NASA has been working with the international community to develop scientific consensus, and to identify and fill in knowledge gaps for developing balanced policy guidelines, incorporation of risk informed decision making and quantitative technical standards. NASA has developed a planetary protection roadmap as a technology management strategy to track and monitor the development of each knowledge gaps. The Committee of Space Research (COSPAR) Policy on Planetary Protection and the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine's Committee of Planetary Protection are used to inform updates to the planetary protection polices and guidelines. This integrated strategy for planetary protection seeks to provide a transparent, structured approach for enabling missions, providing guidance for NASA and NASA partnered missions, and being responsive to the increased interest and activities in space exploration whilst maintaining an understanding and control of harmful contamination.

Planetary Protection↗
DOE OSTI2025

Evaluation of Cross-Protection of African Swine Fever Vaccine ASFV-G-ΔI177L Between ASFV Biotypes

Background/Objectives: Vaccine development for the prevention of ASF has been very challenging due to the extensive genetic and largely unknown antigenic diversity. Inactivated vaccines, using different inactivation methods and a variety of adjuvants, have been consistently inefficacious. Historically, animals recovering from an infection with an attenuated virus became protected from the development of a clinical disease caused by an antigenically related strain. Therefore, immunization of susceptible animals with attenuathe ted virus strains has become a common method of vaccination with the first two commercially available vaccines based on recombinant live-attenuated viruses (LAVs). An important limitation is that the efficacy of the LAV is restricted to those strains that are antigenically related and, in most cases, only provide protection against homologous strains. Due to the unknown antigenic heterogeneity among all ASFV field isolates, the development of broad-spectrum vaccines is a challenge. Besides the anecdotal data, there is not a large amount of information describing patterns of cross-protection between different ASFV strains. Methods: We evaluated the cross-protection induced by the ASFV live-attenuated vaccine ASFV-G-ΔI177L against different biotypes of ASFV and compared their genomic sequences to determine potential genetic mutations that could cause the lack of cross-protection. Results: Results presented here demonstrate different patterns of protection when ASFV-G-ΔI177L vaccinated pigs were challenged with six different ASFV field isolates belonging to different biotypes. Conclusions: The presence of cross-protection cannot be predicted solely by the classical methodology for genotyping-based B646L ORF only. Biotyping, considering the entire virus proteome, appears to be a more promising prediction tool, although additional gathering of experimental data will be necessary to fully validate it; until then, the presence of cross-protection needs to be confirmed in efficacy trials challenging vaccinated animals.

Immunology↗
NASA NTRS1951

NACA Investigations of Icing-Protection Systems for Turbojet-Engine Installations

Investigations have been made in flight and in wind tunnels to determine which components of turbojet installations are most critical in icing conditions, and to evaluate several methods of icing protection. From these studies, the requirements necessary for adequate icing protection and the consequent penalties on engine performance can be estimated. Because investigations have indicated that the compressor-inlet screen constitutes the greatest icing hazard and is difficult to protect, complete removal or retraction of the screen upon encountering an icing condition is recommended. In the absence of the screen, the inlet guide vanes of an axial-flow-type turbojet engine constitute the greatest danger to engine operation in an icing condition; a centrifugal-type engine, on the other hand, is relatively unsusceptible to icing once the screen has been removed. Of the three icing-protection systems investigated, surface heating, hot-gas bleedback, and inertia-separation inlets, only the first two offer an acceptable solution to the problem of engine icing protection. Surface heating, either by gas heating or electrical means, appears to be the most acceptable icing-protection method with regard to performance losses. Hot-gas bleedback, although causing undesirable thrust losses, offers an easy means of obtaining icing protection for some installations. The final choice of an icing-protection system depends, however, on the supply of heated gas and electrical power available and on the allowable performance and. weight penalties associated with each system.

VonGlahn, Uwe↗
NASA NTRS1993

Lightning protection technology for small general aviation composite material aircraft

An on going NASA (Small Business Innovative Research) SBIR Phase II design and development program will produce the first lightning protected, fiberglass, General Aviation aircraft that is available as a kit. The results obtained so far in development testing of typical components of the aircraft kit, such as the wing and fuselage panels indicate that the lightning protection design methodology and materials chosen are capable of protecting such small composite airframes from lightning puncture and structural damage associated with severe threat lightning strikes. The primary objective of the program has been to develop a lightening protection design for full scale test airframe and verify its adequacy with full scale laboratory testing, thus enabling production and sale of owner-built, lightning-protected, Stoddard-Hamilton Aircraft, Inc. Glasair II airplanes. A second objective has been to provide lightning protection design guidelines for the General Aviation industry, and to enable these airplanes to meet lightening protection requirements for certification of small airplanes. This paper describes the protection design approaches and development testing results obtained thus far in the program, together with design methodology which can achieve the design goals listed above. The presentation of this paper will also include results of some of the full scale verification tests, which will have been completed by the time of this conference.

Plumer, J. A.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Structural Analysis of Lightning Protection System for New Launch Vehicle

This project includes the design and specification of a lightning protection system for Launch Complex 39 B (LC39B) at Kennedy Space Center, FL in support of the Constellation Program. The purpose of the lightning protection system is to protect the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) or Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) and associated launch equipment from direct lightning strikes during launch processing and other activities prior to flight. The design includes a three-tower, overhead catenary wire system to protect the vehicle and equipment on LC39B as described in the study that preceded this design effort: KSC-DX-8234 "Study: Construct Lightning Protection System LC3 9B". The study was a collaborative effort between Reynolds, Smith, and Hills (RS&H) and ASRC Aerospace (ASRC), where ASRC was responsible for the theoretical design and risk analysis of the lightning protection system and RS&H was responsible for the development of the civil and structural components; the mechanical systems; the electrical and grounding systems; and the siting of the lightning protection system. The study determined that a triangular network of overhead catenary cables and down conductors supported by three triangular free-standing towers approximately 594 ft tall (each equipped with a man lift, ladder, electrical systems, and communications systems) would provide a level of lightning protection for the Constellation Program CLV and CaLV on Launch Pad 39B that exceeds the design requirements.

Cope, Anne↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Planetary Protection Program to Assure Mission Safety and Success

NASA’s planetary protection program seeks to understand and control harmful contamination of solar systems targets of exploration by terrestrial contamination and prevent harmful biological contamination of the Earth-Moon system by extraterrestrial life, should it exist. To accomplish these objective’s NASA has developed a balanced safety and mission assurance strategy that leverages COSPAR Policy guidelines, workshops, scientific consensus, partnerships and international working groups to develop policy and implementation guidelines. Upcoming crewed missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as robotic missions to small solar system bodies, Europa, Titan and Mars are some of the driving activities of astrobiological interest that continue to emphasize the importance of planetary protection throughout the project life cycle. Development of a responsive and updated agency planetary protection policy has been a focus area in supporting upcoming mission opportunities for exploration to include Mars sample return and crewed mission concepts. An extensive update of this policy is underway which encompasses crewed and robotic procedural polices, a general technical requirements standard, and an implementation handbook. During this timeframe NASA has been working with the international community to develop scientific consensus, and to identify and fill in knowledge gaps for developing balanced policy guidelines, incorporation of risk informed decision making and quantitative technical standards. NASA has developed a planetary protection roadmap as a technology management strategy to track and monitor the development of each knowledge gaps. The Committee of Space Research (COSPAR) Policy on Planetary Protection and the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine’s Committee of Planetary Protection are used to inform updates to the planetary protection polices and guidelines. This integrated strategy for planetary protection seeks to provide a transparent, structured approach for enabling missions, providing guidance for NASA and NASA partnered missions, and being responsive to the increased interest and activities in space exploration whilst maintaining an understanding and control of harmful contamination.

James Benardini↗
NASA NTRS2022

NASA’s Revised Planetary Protection Policy and Implementation

NASA has updated its planetary protection policy and implementation approach in response to advances in scientific understanding of solar system targets, upcoming mission opportuni-ties for exploration and sample return, and the private sector’s emerging capability to plan missions to Earth’s Moon and Mars. In September 2021, the NASA Procedural Requirements NPR 8715.24, entitled “Planetary Protection Provisions for Robotic Extraterrestrial Missions” was released which repositions planetary protection in existing NASA mission and program management structures, introduces risk-informed decision making, expands on key roles and responsibilities for both programmatic and the Oÿce of Safety and Mission Assurance, updates the categorization process and streamlines the planetary protection documentation approval and schedule. NASA is working on a more detailed technical standard to accompany NPR 8715.24 which will include the detailed technical requirements to address organic contamina-tion, inadvertent impact avoidance, biological control and management, end of mission disposal and restricted Earth-Return sample safety and assurance. This report to the COSPAR com-munity will describe the current NASA planetary protection policy and its alignment with the revised COSPAR planetary protection policy. NASA’s plans for updating the supporting “Handbook for Implementing Planetary Protection Technical Requirements” and future policies for addressing planetary protection of crewed missions will also be presented.

Elaine Seasly↗
NASA NTRS2022

NASA’s Revised Planetary Protection Policy and Implementation

NASA has updated its planetary protection policy and implementation approach in response to advances in scientific understanding of solar system targets, upcoming mission opportunities for exploration and sample return, and the private sector’s emerging capability to plan missions to Earth’s Moon and Mars. In September 2021, the NASA Procedural Requirements NPR 8715.24, entitled “Planetary Protection Provisions for Robotic Extraterrestrial Missions” was released which repositions planetary protection in existing NASA mission and program management structures, introduces risk-informed decision making, expands on key roles and responsibilities for both programmatic and the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, updates the categorization process and streamlines the planetary protection documentation approval and schedule. NASA is working on a more detailed technical standard to accompany NPR 8715.24 which will include the detailed technical requirements to address organic contamination, inadvertent impact avoidance, biological control and management, end of mission disposal and restricted Earth-Return sample safety and assurance. This report to the COSPAR community will describe the current NASA planetary protection policy and its alignment with the revised COSPAR planetary protection policy. NASA’s plans for updating the supporting “Handbook for Implementing Planetary Protection Technical Requirements” and future policies for addressing planetary protection of crewed missions will also be presented.

Elaine Seasly↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

What You Need to Know about Planetary Protection Categorization for Your Mission

Planetary protection mission categorization helps to define the risk posture for requirements definition and implementation practices on space flight projects with planetary protection considerations. NASA has recently updated it’s planetary protection policy (NPR 8715.24), and with the update comes a major change in how the planetary protection categorization process is performed for NASA missions. Previously, projects would request the NASA Planetary Protection Officer (PPO) provide a categorization letter documenting the planetary protection category assigned to the proposed mission. Under the new policy the project manager (PM) proposes the planetary protection category for their mission. Depending on the level of the category, the PPO either concurs or recommends concurrence to the Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) before forwarding to the Mission Directorate Associate Administrator (MDAA) for final approval prior to the system requirements review (SRR). But what topics must be considered for categorization? This presentation will provide key considerations for planetary protection mission categorization including the target solar system body to be explored, the trajectory to get to the target body, and the operations to be performed at the target body. Additional unique scenarios such as secondary and auxiliary payloads, encountering other solar system bodies on the way to the target body, and sample return missions will also be discussed to share lessons learned from missions that have been through the new categorization process.

Elaine Seasly↗
DOE OSTI2025

Utility Experience with Inverter Based Resource Impacts on Transmission Protection

High penetration of inverter-based resources (IBR) can adversely affect the transmission protection schemes in the area. With the proliferation of IBRs, utilities are finding out that conventional protection schemes are not adequately equipped to protect the electric systems because the existing system has been designed based on the fault current response of conventional rotating-machine-based generators. In several cases, the available literature does not provide any clear solution for the issues when the protection scheme does not operate properly near IBRs. This report identifies various protection challenges due to IBRs that industry is facing, from the utility perspective. It includes a broad review of all challenges that system protection has experienced so far with high penetration of IBRs. Key issues have been identified based on a survey of different utility protection engineers. Finally, fault event recordings are shown to demonstrate some actual cases of mis-operations of relays near IBRs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Persistence of bacterial-mediated anti-rotifer protection in preliminary outdoor cultivation trial for Microchloropsis salina

Outdoor algal cultivation systems are susceptible to a wide variety of deleterious species. In previously published studies, we observed protection using microbial consortia at laboratory scale cultures; Microchloropsis salina in the presence of microbial consortia were protected from grazing from the marine rotifer, Brachionus plicatilis. Our objective for the present work was to determine if this protection conferred by microbial consortia in controlled laboratory experiments would persist in an open, outdoor multi-liter cultivation system. We found that algal protection did persist as evidenced by the presence of fewer motile rotifers and decreased rotifer-associated egg counts for the consortia-treated outdoor cultures. Due to the low temperature and light conditions that reduced growth of the algae outdoors, we performed an indoor laboratory assay which also confirmed the persistence of algal protection. Lastly, the lower numbers of motile rotifers and fewer rotifer-associated eggs in the consortia-treated algal cultures suggests a possible protective mechanism by the consortia through interfering with the rotifer lifecycle or reproduction. Finally, these initial results support the possibility that low cost, prophylactic treatments with microbial consortia can protect algae from deleterious species in outdoor cultivation systems.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

The Systems of Radiological Protection for Ionizing and Non-Ionizing Radiation

This paper summarizes the presentations and panel discussion held at Plenary Session 1 of the 16th IRPA International Congress/69th Health Physics Society Annual Meeting, in Orlando, FL, in July 2024. Plenary Session 1 discussed the basics of the systems of radiological protection (RP) for ionizing radiation (IR) and non-ionizing radiation (NIR) and included five presentations and a panel discussion. Rodney Croft, Chair of the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP), delivered the first presentation. Croft introduced the System of RP for NIR and provided an overview of ICNIRP’s coverage and current areas of work. Werner Rühm, Chair of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), delivered the second presentation. He gave an overview of the System of RP for IR and covered the key principles of justification, optimization, and dose limitation, including the current plans of ICRP toward the envisaged revision of the System of RP. The third speaker, Sigurður Magnús Magnússon, from the International Radiation Protection Association (IRPA), provided the perspective of the RP professionals on the development of the Systems of RP for IR and NIR. Emilie van Deventer, from the World Health Organization (WHO), presented WHO’s views of both Systems of RP and discussed the relevant current activities of WHO with regard to IR and NIR. Kathryn Higley, President of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP), delivered the final presentation. Higley outlined the history of NCRP, the differences between ICRP and NCRP, and discussed the role of the NCRP in the System of RP, including NCRP’s role to analyze mechanisms of interaction of NIR with biological systems, including humans. The session concluded with a fruitful panel discussion, where the audience had the opportunity to ask the five invited speakers questions.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Cathodic Protection Modeling for Hanford Underground Double-Shell Tank Farms

Hanford stores millions of gallons of radioactive and chemically hazardous waste from the production of weapon materials in tank farms consisting of underground carbon-steel storage tanks surrounded by reinforced concrete. Six of these Hanford tank farms use double-shell storage tanks (DSTs). The DST farms were constructed from 1968 to 1986 with a planned 40–50 year design life, so some are already operating beyond their initial life expectancy. Ultrasonic testing (UT) has indicated significant thinning on the bottom of the secondary (outer) liner of these tanks, believed to arise from groundwater intrusion driving concrete side corrosion. There is no direct access to the steel/concrete interface between the tank and the concrete pad, making it difficult to apply a chemical-based mitigation strategy or to conduct repairs, but cathodic protection (CP) is a possible method to inhibit further concrete-side corrosion. Hanford already uses CP to protect below grade steel piping within the tank farms and connected to the tanks, but this system was not designed to protect the tank bottoms. CP design must account for the structures surrounding the DSTs, including the steel reinforcing bars (rebar) within the concrete pad and vault, various process lines, and the existing CP system. In this study, finite element analysis (FEA) modeling was carried out to simulate CP protection of 1) a single tank and CP anode to develop options for modeling the rebar and to compare to a simpler circuit model and 2) the entire Hanford AN tank farm as a representative example consisting of seven tanks, associated piping, and both existing and new CP anodes. Both circuit and FEA models predict that significant protective current could be delivered to the bottoms of the tanks with the addition of tank-protection anodes below the depth of the tanks. Simulations with only the existing pipe-protection anodes active confirmed that only a very small current to the tank bottoms is predicted under present conditions. Multiple simplified representations of the dome and wall rebar were tested to reduce the computational complexity of the tank-farm simulations, resulting in modeling the rebar as edge elements with a prescribed effective circumference that matches the real rebar surface area. The geometry of the rebar is also simplified into horizontal hoops around the tank walls and radial rebar over the dome with increased effective circumference to retain the target surface area. This simplification was found to greatly reduce the complexity and solution time of the models without large changes in current distributions, especially to the tank bottom. A range of values were tested for model parameters such as soil and concrete resistivities and polarization resistance to investigate their impact on the current and electric potential distributions. Depending on the parameters used, FEA simulations predict some risk of overprotection, particularly on the piping system; since overprotection can also lead to surface damage associated with hydrogen gas generation at the interface (e.g. hydrogen embrittlement or damage to coatings), this needs to be considered when refining the design of the new CP system. Comparison between the FEA models and the circuit model representation demonstrated that the circuit model could not match the predicted FEA current distribution, even when using the exact same surface areas. This discrepancy appeared to be at least partly attributable to the impact of the relative positions of the tank components and anodes to each other and to the ground surface. The FEA model accounts for the relative positions since it solves the governing equations in three dimensions, but the circuit model cannot account for the positioning. In particular, the circuit model underpredicts the current to the tank bottom and overpredicts the current to the dome compared to FEA for the baseline geometry. The FEA models omitted the electrically isolated rebar in the bottom concrete slab. However, a circuit based stray current model estimated that only 2.1% of the total current through the slab would stray into the rebar, corresponding to ~0.21 A for a target current density of 2 mA/ft2 to the tank bottom. The estimated corrosion driven by this amount of stray current is predicted to yield a lifetime of >400 years for the minimum rebar diameter, assuming an acceptable cross-section area loss of 10%.

d'Entremont, Anna [Savannah River National Laborat↗
NASA NTRS1972

Thermal protection optimization for the space shuttle.

This paper discusses optimal entry trajectories for the space shuttle that minimize the weight of an entry thermal protection system. The analysis was made using mathematical models of two types of thermal protection systems that were under consideration for the space shuttle: a metallic thermal protection system, and a reusable surface insulation thermal protection system. Optimal entries were generated using maximum orbiter nose temperature as a parameter. Thermal protection system weights were computed for both fixed and variable angles of attack using three-dimensional entry trajectories. Results indicated that variable angle-of-attack entries require less thermal protection system weight than entries at a constant angle of attack (35 deg) for both systems considered. Results also showed that 95 to 99 per cent of the thermal protection system weight requirement resulted from flight regimes in which the flow was still laminar.

Garcia, F., Jr.↗