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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2002

Laboratory for Atmospheres: Philosophy, Organization, Major Activities, and 2001 Highlights

How can we improve our ability to predict the weather? How is the Earth's climate changing? What can the atmospheres of other planets teach us about our own? The Laboratory for Atmospheres is helping to answer these and other scientific questions. The Laboratory conducts a broad theoretical and experimental research program studying all aspects of the atmospheres of the Earth and other planets, including their structural, dynamical, radiative, and chemical properties. Vigorous research is central to NASA's exploration of the frontiers of knowledge. NASA scientists play a key role in conceiving new space missions, providing mission requirements., and carrying out research to explore the behavior of planetary systems, including, notably, the Earth's. Our Laboratory's scientists also supply outside scientists with technical assistance and scientific data to further investigations not immediately addressed by NASA itself. The Laboratory for Atmospheres is a vital participant in NASA's research program. The Laboratory is part of the Earth Sciences Directorate based at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland. The Directorate itself comprises the Global Change Data Center; the Earth and Space Data Computing Division; three laboratories: the Laboratory for Atmospheres, the Laboratory for Terrestrial Physics, and the Laboratory for Hydrospheric Processes; and the Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS) in New York, New York. In this report, you will find a statement of our philosophy and a description of our role in NASA's mission. You'll also find a broad description of our research and a summary of our scientists' major accomplishments in 2001. The report also presents useful information on human resources, scientific interactions, and outreach activities with the outside community. For your convenience, we have published a version of this report on the Internet. Our Web site includes links to additional information about the Laboratory's Offices and Branches. You can find us on the World Wide Web at http://atmospheres.gsfc.nasa.gov.

Hoegy, Walter R.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Composite Overwrap Pressure Vessels: Mechanics and Stress Rupture Lifing Philosophy

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) has been conducting an independent technical assessment to address safety concerns related to the known stress rupture failure mode of filament wound pressure vessels in use on Shuttle and the International Space Station. The Shuttle's Kevlar-49 fiber overwrapped tanks are of particular concern due to their long usage and the poorly understood stress rupture process in Kevlar-49 filaments. Existing long term data show that the rupture process is a function of stress, temperature and time. However due to the presence of load sharing liners and the complex manufacturing procedures, the state of actual fiber stress in flight hardware and test articles is not clearly known. Indeed non-conservative life predictions have been made where stress rupture data and lifing procedures have ignored the contribution of the liner in favor of applied pressure as the controlling load parameter. With the aid of analytical and finite element results, this paper examines the fundamental mechanical response of composite overwrapped pressure vessels including the influence of elastic-plastic liners and degraded/creeping overwrap properties. Graphical methods are presented describing the non-linear relationship of applied pressure to Kevlar-49 fiber stress/strain during manufacturing, operations and burst loadings. These are applied to experimental measurements made on a variety of vessel systems to demonstrate the correct calibration of fiber stress as a function of pressure. Applying this analysis to the actual qualification burst data for Shuttle flight hardware revealed that the nominal fiber stress at burst was in some cases 23% lower than what had previously been used to predict stress rupture life. These results motivate a detailed discussion of the appropriate stress rupture lifing philosophy for COPVs including the correct transference of stress rupture life data between dissimilar vessels and test articles.

Thesken, John C.↗
NASA NTRS2009

NASA Standard for Models and Simulations: Philosophy and Requirements Overview

Following the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report, the NASA Administrator chartered an executive team (known as the Diaz Team) to identify those CAIB report elements with NASA-wide applicability and to develop corrective measures to address each element. One such measure was the development of a standard for the development, documentation, and operation of models and simulations. This report describes the philosophy and requirements overview of the resulting NASA Standard for Models and Simulations.

Blattnig, St3eve R.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Composite Overwrap Pressure Vessels: Mechanics and Stress Rupture Lifting Philosophy

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) has been conducting an independent technical assessment to address safety concerns related to the known stress rupture failure mode of filament wound pressure vessels in use on Shuttle and the International Space Station. The Shuttle s Kevlar-49 (DuPont) fiber overwrapped tanks are of particular concern due to their long usage and the poorly understood stress rupture process in Kevlar-49 filaments. Existing long term data show that the rupture process is a function of stress, temperature and time. However due to the presence of load sharing liners and the complex manufacturing procedures, the state of actual fiber stress in flight hardware and test articles is not clearly known. Indeed nonconservative life predictions have been made where stress rupture data and lifing procedures have ignored the contribution of the liner in favor of applied pressure as the controlling load parameter. With the aid of analytical and finite element results, this paper examines the fundamental mechanical response of composite overwrapped pressure vessels including the influence of elastic plastic liners and degraded/creeping overwrap properties. Graphical methods are presented describing the non-linear relationship of applied pressure to Kevlar-49 fiber stress/strain during manufacturing, operations and burst loadings. These are applied to experimental measurements made on a variety of vessel systems to demonstrate the correct calibration of fiber stress as a function of pressure. Applying this analysis to the actual qualification burst data for Shuttle flight hardware revealed that the nominal fiber stress at burst was in some cases 23 percent lower than what had previously been used to predict stress rupture life. These results motivate a detailed discussion of the appropriate stress rupture lifing philosophy for COPVs including the correct transference of stress rupture life data between dissimilar vessels and test articles.

Thesken, John C.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Space Vehicle Powerdown Philosophies Derived from the Space Shuttle Program

In spaceflight, electrical power is a vital but limited resource. Almost every spacecraft system, from avionics to life support systems, relies on electrical power. Since power can be limited by the generation system s performance, available consumables, solar array shading, or heat rejection capability, vehicle power management is a critical consideration in spacecraft design, mission planning, and real-time operations. The purpose of this paper is to capture the powerdown philosophies used during the Space Shuttle Program. This paper will discuss how electrical equipment is managed real-time to adjust the overall vehicle power level to ensure that systems and consumables will support changing mission objectives, as well as how electrical equipment is managed following system anomalies. We will focus on the power related impacts of anomalies in the generation systems, air and liquid cooling systems, and significant environmental events such as a fire, decrease in cabin pressure, or micrometeoroid debris strike. Additionally, considerations for executing powerdowns by crew action or by ground commands from Mission Control will be presented. General lessons learned from nearly 30 years of Space Shuttle powerdowns will be discussed, including an in depth case-study of STS-117. During this International Space Station (ISS) assembly mission, a failure of computers controlling the ISS guidance, navigation, and control system required that the Space Shuttle s maneuvering system be used to maintain attitude control. A powerdown was performed to save power generation consumables, thus extending the docked mission duration and allowing more time to resolve the issue.

Willsey, Mark↗
NASA NTRS2012

Using the Design for Demise Philosophy to Reduce Casualty Risk Due to Reentering Spacecraft

Recently the reentry of a number of vehicles has garnered public attention due to their risk of human casualty due to fragments surviving reentry. In order to minimize this risk for their vehicles, a number of NASA programs have actively sought to minimize the number of components likely to survive reentry at the end of their spacecraft's life in order to meet and/or exceed NASA safety standards for controlled and uncontrolled reentering vehicles. This philosophy, referred to as "Design for Demise" or D4D, has steadily been adopted, to at least some degree, by numerous programs. The result is that many programs are requesting evaluations of components at the early stages of vehicle design, as they strive to find ways to reduce the number surviving components while ensuring that the components meet the performance requirements of their mission. This paper will discuss some of the methods that have been employed to ensure that the consequences of the vehicle s end-of-life are considered at the beginning of the design process. In addition this paper will discuss the technical challenges overcome, as well as some of the more creative solutions which have been utilized to reduce casualty risk.

Kelley, R. L.↗
NASA NTRS2011

JPL Thermal Design Modeling Philosophy and NASA-STD-7009 Standard for Models and Simulations - A Case Study

The Standard JPL thermal engineering practice prescribes worst-case methodologies for design. In this process, environmental and key uncertain thermal parameters (e.g., thermal blanket performance, interface conductance, optical properties) are stacked in a worst case fashion to yield the most hot- or cold-biased temperature. Thus, these simulations would represent the upper and lower bounds. This, effectively, represents JPL thermal design margin philosophy. Uncertainty in the margins and the absolute temperatures is usually estimated by sensitivity analyses and/or by comparing the worst-case results with "expected" results. Applicability of the analytical model for specific design purposes along with any temperature requirement violations are documented in peer and project design review material. In 2008, NASA released NASA-STD-7009, Standard for Models and Simulations. The scope of this standard covers the development and maintenance of models, the operation of simulations, the analysis of the results, training, recommended practices, the assessment of the Modeling and Simulation (M&S) credibility, and the reporting of the M&S results. The Mars Exploration Rover (MER) project thermal control system M&S activity was chosen as a case study determining whether JPL practice is in line with the standard and to identify areas of non-compliance. This paper summarizes the results and makes recommendations regarding the application of this standard to JPL thermal M&S practices.

thermal blanket performance↗
NASA NTRS2013

NASA Standard for Models and Simulations: Philosophy and Requirements Overview

Following the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report, the NASA Administrator chartered an executive team (known as the Diaz Team) to identify those CAIB report elements with NASA-wide applicability and to develop corrective measures to address each element. One such measure was the development of a standard for the development, documentation, and operation of models and simulations. This report describes the philosophy and requirements overview of the resulting NASA Standard for Models and Simulations.

Blattnig, Steve R.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Adaptations of Guidance, Navigation and Control Verification and Validation Philosophies for Small Spacecraft

Decades of experience developing increasingly capable and more complex space-craft have resulted in a set of accepted practices and philosophies to verify and validate (V&V) guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) subsystems. Until recently, small, low-cost spacecraft have had very simple or non-existent GN&C subsystems requiring minimal or no subsystem testing. As the next generation of small spacecraft take on more challenging GN&C requirements, the GN&C community is struggling with how to scale the subsystem V&V effort to produce spacecraft approaching the reliability of flagship-class missions while staying within the reduced resources of a small satellite project. For this paper, we will examine five aspects of GN&C V&V (requirements definition, software testing and analysis, hardware component testing, integrated vehicle testing, and in-flight V&V) and compare the V&V campaign of a flagship-class mission (Mars 2020) to that of two recent, successful CubeSat missions: ASTERIA and MarCO. Experiences from the development of these CubeSats yield valuable lessons learned and guidelines for future small spacecraft designers.

Pong, Christopher M.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evolution of Hardware and Philosophy of Emergency Response Actions on the International Space Station and Future Spacecrafts

Human spaceflight is dangerous for numerous reasons. This ranges from the dynamic environment of launching on a rocket, flying in space among the thousands and thousands pieces of space debris, to the hazards of re-entry & landing, as well as being surrounded by vehicle systems containing hazardous materials or gasses. In-flight emergencies fall into four categories: Rapid Depressurization, Fire, Toxic Spill, and Medical emergency. This paper will address the first three, which fall under the responsibility of the Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) Systems flight control and engineering teams. It will review the evolution of the International Space Station’s emergency response philosophy, procedures, training, and equipment changes over the years. The International Space Station (ISS) emergency equipment has evolved over the last two decades of operations in many ways, but in some it has remained the same. The core actions the flight crew takes to ensure team safety, personal safety, vehicle safety, and equipment safety has not changed. However, the equipment and capabilities provided to them have. From early days of minimal capability when the ISS consisted of a few modules, to today’s 30,000 ft^3 vehicle with over a dozen isolatable segments. From use of positive pressure O2 masks, to the development of respirators. From a lack of procedures for a deadly ammonia leak scenario to a memorized response utilizing numerous atmosphere measurement systems. This paper will review all these various areas that fall under the umbrella of “on-board emergencies”. In addition, the comparison to the planned emergency operations on the Orion vehicle will be reviewed. The Orion vehicle differs from the ISS in that it has no isolatable volume, being approximately 2% the size of ISS, as well as not having a quick return to earth capability.

Barry Tobias↗
NASA NTRS1995

Incorporating CCSDS Telemetry Standards and Philosophy on Cassini

The Cassini project at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) is implementing a spacecraft telemetry system based on the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) packet telemetry standards. Resolving the CCSDS concepts with a Ground Data System designed to handle time-division-multiplexed telemetry and also handling constraints unique to a deep-space planetary spacecraft (such as fixed downlink opportunities, small downlink rates and requirements for on-board data storage) have resulted in spacecraft and ground system design challenges. Solving these design challenges involved adapting and extending the CCSDS telemetry standards as well as changes to the spacecraft and ground system designs. The resulting spacecraft/ground system design is an example of how new ideas and philosophies can be incorporated into existing systems and design approaches without requiring significant rework. In addition, it shows that the CCSDS telemetry standards can be successfully applied to deep-space planetary spacecraft.

CCSDS↗
NASA NTRS2019

Adaptations of guidance, navigation, and control verification and validation philosophies for small spacecraft

Decades of experience developing increasingly capable and more complex space-craft have resulted in a set of accepted practices and philosophies to verify and validate (V&V) guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) subsystems. Until recently, small, low-cost spacecraft have had very simple or non-existent GN&C subsystems requiring minimal or no subsystem testing. As the next generation of small spacecraft take on more challenging GN&C requirements, the GN&C community is struggling with how to scale the subsystem V&V effort to produce spacecraft approaching the reliability of flagship-class missions while staying within the reduced resources of a small satellite project.For this paper, we will examine five aspects of GN&C V&V (requirements definition, software testing and analysis, hardware component testing, integrated vehicle testing, and in-flight V&V) and compare the V&V campaign of a flagship-class mission (Mars 2020) to that of two recent, successful CubeSat missions: ASTERIA and MarCO. Experiences from the development of these CubeSats yield valuable lessons learned and guidelines for future small spacecraft designers.

Chen, George T.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evolution of Hardware and Philosophy of Emergency Response Actions on the International Space Station and Future Spacecrafts

Human spaceflight is dangerous for numerous reasons. This ranges from the dynamic environment of launching on a rocket, flying in space among the thousands and thousands pieces of space debris, to the hazards of re-entry & landing, as well as being surrounded by vehicle systems containing hazardous materials or gasses. In-flight emergencies fall into four categories: Rapid Depressurization, Fire, Toxic Spill, and Medical emergency. This paper will address the first three, which fall under the responsibility of the Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) Systems flight control and engineering teams. It will review the evolution of the International Space Station’s emergency response philosophy, procedures, training, and equipment changes over the years. The ISS emergency equipment has evolved over the last two decades of operations in many ways, but in some it has remained the same. The core actions the flight crew takes to ensure team safety, personal safety, vehicle safety, and equipment safety has not changed. However, the equipment and capabilities provided to them have. From early days of minimal capability when the ISS consisted of a few modules, to today’s 30,000 ft^3 vehicle with over a dozen isolatable segments. From use of Russian gas masks to positive pressure O2 masks, to the development of respirators. From a lack of procedures for a deadly ammonia leak scenario to a memorized response utilizing numerous atmosphere measurement systems. This paper will review all these various areas that fall under the umbrella of “on-board emergencies”. In addition, the comparison to the planned emergency operations on the Orion vehicle will be reviewed. The Orion vehicle differs from the ISS in that it has no isolatable volume, being approximately 2% the size of ISS, as well as not having a quick return to earth capability.

Emergency↗