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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

A hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed for cyber-physical energy systems in smart commercial buildings

In recent years, there has been a growing trend toward the development of smart buildings that rely on cyber-physical systems (CPS) to optimize occupant comfort, safety, and energy efficiency. To ensure the reliable and efficient operation of CPS with designed control strategies, it is important to evaluate their performance under various scenarios before deploying them in the real world. This is where a Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed designed for studying sensor and control-related studies in smart buildings can be highly valuable. With the growing threat of cyber-attacks and physical faults targeting smart buildings, it is essential to ensure the security of building operations. A HIL testbed can emulate cyber-attack and physical fault scenarios, allowing researchers to develop and test threat detection and mitigation algorithms. This enables researchers to identify potential issues and optimize the algorithms in a safe and controlled environment before they are deployed in real-world settings, reducing the risk of failures that can negatively impact occupant comfort, safety, and energy efficiency. Therefore, this paper developed a HIL testbed designed for cyber-physical energy systems (e.g. buildings automation system (BAS)) in smart commercial buildings. The HIL testbed is comprised of a real-time building and Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) emulator using Modelica-based dynamic models, a set of BAS controllers, and a BAS computer server. The data generation capability of the HIL testbed is demonstrated by tracking normal and faulty operating data in the BAS, as well as monitoring detailed network traffic in the local BAS network. Here, this study further demonstrates the HIL testbed’s capability by conducting case studies on real-time physical fault and cyber-attack experiments using a Department of Energy (DOE) prototype commercial building. It is anticipated that the fully functional HIL testbed will be utilized for a variety of sensor and control-related studies, including but not limited to testing, developing, validating of different HVAC control strategies, fault detection & diagnosis, energy monitoring and analysis, cyber security study, etc.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2023

Indoor Occupancy Sensing via Networked Nodes (2012–2022): A Review

In the past decade, different sensing mechanisms and algorithms have been developed to detect or estimate indoor occupancy. One of the most recent advancements is using networked sensor nodes to create a more comprehensive occupancy detection system where multiple sensors can identify human presence within more expansive areas while delivering enhanced accuracy compared to a system that relies on stand-alone sensor nodes. The present work reviews the studies from 2012 to 2022 that use networked sensor nodes to detect indoor occupancy, focusing on PIR-based sensors. Methods are compared based on pivotal ADPs that play a significant role in selecting an occupancy detection system for applications such as Health and Safety or occupant comfort. These parameters include accuracy, information requirement, maximum sensor failure and minimum observation rate, and feasible detection area. We briefly describe the overview of occupancy detection criteria used by each study and introduce a metric called “sensor node deployment density” through our analysis. This metric captures the strength of network-level data filtering and fusion algorithms found in the literature. It is hinged on the fact that a robust occupancy estimation algorithm requires a minimal number of nodes to estimate occupancy. This review only focuses on the occupancy estimation models for networked sensor nodes. It thus provides a standardized insight into networked nodes’ occupancy sensing pipelines, which employ data fusion strategies, network-level machine learning algorithms, and occupancy estimation algorithms. This review thus helps determine the suitability of the reviewed methods to a standard set of application areas by analyzing their gaps.

Emad-Ud-Din, Muhammad (ORCID:0000000279515538)↗
DOE OSTI1991

Pressure Safety Training (Rev. 8)

This is the workbook for the Pressure Safety Training Course. It is intended as a reference manual and guide for all work with pressurized liquids or gases. This workbook contains basic references to make work with pressure safer. It is intended to supplement classroom instruction, rather than serve as a definitive text on pressure. Earlier versions of the manual were intended specifically for training at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This revision is a generic version intended for training at all DOE facilities. The information in the Standards chapter is from the LLNL Health and Safety Manual. It is included here as a convenient reference and guide for developing similar standards at your own facility.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 117: Panel: Operational Excellence Through a Strong Safety Culture (R9.1)

This panel focused on the what the Department of Energy (DOE) and its contractors are doing to promote safety and excellence. The Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) is crucial, but additional support provided by the Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG), DOE, and environmental, safety, and health (ES and H) professionals in the field are equally imperative. The panelists discussed the importance of sharing lessons learned as well as are developing performance metrics to track operational and safety successes. This panel focused on current trends in building a strong operational safety culture and will include results from recent national workshops. Safety culture is the foundation of strong operational performance. Panel discussion included best practices from industry, DOE, and US NRC and also review tools being used to measure and evaluate safety culture programs. Panelists with presentations: Strong Safety Culture Promotes Operational Excellence (Kliss McNeel, Patricia Hughes); Safety Culture (Patricia Allen); DOE Safety Culture Improvement (Julie Goeckner); Supporting Safety Culture on the Front Line (Jan Preston); Interdependence of Safety Culture and Organizational Performance (Rizwan Shah)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Lessons Learned from Hanford's Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project - 20509

In 2019, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) completed structurally stabilizing the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Plant (Purex) waste storage Tunnel 2 with engineered grout. This action significantly reduced risk to Hanford workers, the surrounding community and environment by preventing future collapse of the tunnel and possible release of radioactive materials. Decades of plutonium production at the Purex facility required construction of two large underground tunnels for storage of highly contaminated plutonium processing equipment that had failed during the operation of Purex and other facilities across the Hanford Site. Following the partial collapse of Purex Tunnel 1 on May 9, 2017, DOE and CHPRC took immediate action to safely stabilize the collapsed section of the tunnel. The hole in the tunnel was filled the next day as a temporary stabilization measure, and no contamination was detected as a result of the partial collapse of the tunnel. Workers then stabilized Tunnel 1 in its entirety by filling with engineered grout, which also encapsulated the radioactive equipment and railcars within the tunnel. Grouting eliminated the risk of further collapse and stabilized the tunnel contents, all while not precluding future remedial actions or final closure decisions. While conducting an integrity analysis of Tunnel 1 by using construction drawings, photos and other historical documents, project teams also analyzed the much larger Purex Tunnel 2. The analysis found Tunnel 2 did not meet current codes for structural integrity, and it may not be able to bear the weight of the soil above the tunnel. Therefore, it was determined that Tunnel 2 was also at risk of collapse. DoE's independent panel of experts determined grouting to be the best choice for stabilizing Tunnel 2 because it provides the highest level of stability and protection, and does not preclude future remedial actions. DOE authorized CHPRC to commence work and the Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project was launched in December of 2017. The paper will discuss the process of recognizing the following critical aspects and risks associated with stabilizing Tunnel 2, and the actions taken by the project team to mitigate these risks, including: - Tunnel investigation and data collection to assist with future remediation; - On-site batching and mock-ups to provide the large quantity of grout required for stabilizing the tunnel; - Workforce involvement and innovative actions that mitigated the project's most significant potential hazards, including traffic control; - Project team high level of execution translated into successful project execution. Sharing lessons learned from this critical risk-reduction effort can enhance the safety and efficiency of other complex and hazardous projects across the DOE complex. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

On the Road to Achieving Safety Excellence at the Idaho Cleanup Project: The Initial Challenges, Solutions, and Positive Results of Striving to be the Best and Safest in the DOE Complex - 20518

When Fluor Idaho, LLC (Fluor Idaho) assumed the Idaho Cleanup Project Core contract (ICP Core) in mid-2016, it inherited the successful multi-faceted, employee-owned safety programs of two prior contractors supporting cleanup operations at the Idaho National Laboratory Site. Fluor Idaho incorporated the best of both safety programs along with Fluor Corporate's 106-year legacy of safety initiatives and successes. Fluor Idaho integrated the separate programs and cultures under a One Fluor approach - one project, one mission, One Fluor. Job changes, management changes, and procedures, processes, and system changes presented multiple challenges. Those challenges combined with the severe Winter of 2016/2017 resulted in numerous slips, trips, and falls first aids and reportable injuries. The road to safety excellence started off bumpy and stayed that way for some time. Since then, Fluor Idaho has successfully implemented several key initiatives including employee engagement; management engagement and time in the field; communications improvements; safety culture sustainment; injury/illness prevention; organizational learning; and DOE Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) readiness and preparation. Management became more engaged by making more workplace visits and increasing their supervision of 'life critical work' or complex activities. Additional training became mandatory for first-line supervisors and front-line workers. Most recently, Fluor Idaho increased its injury and illness prevention initiatives extensively. In the last year, things have turned around in a dramatic way. This shift is directly attributable to the significant number of initiatives launched in late 2017 and 2018. These initiatives addressed safety performance in the five key areas of the DOE VPP and promoted sustainability of the company's safety culture. The five key areas are: management leadership, employee involvement, work-site analysis, hazard prevention and control, and safety and health training. Employees and managers alike recommitted to making safety the highest value. The result of this laser-like focus on safety and accident and injury prevention is that injuries and first aids are a fraction of what they were. During FY 2019, employees worked more than 4.2 million hours without a serious injury or lost work-day and 1 million hours without a recordable injury. Fluor Idaho is proud of its safety trend. The company invested significant resources in improving its safety record, and that investment is paying off. Other contractors in the DOE Complex can learn and benefit from this discussion of the challenges Fluor Idaho faced, as well as its innovative safety initiatives that are producing results that are being recognized by our U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) customer. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Hanford Immobilized Low-Activity Waste Transportation System Testing Results - 20043

The immobilized low-activity waste (ILAW) transportation system is a first-of-a-kind system that is being designed and tested to transport ILAW glass-filled containers from Hanford's Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Low-Activity Waste (LAW) Facility to the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) burial trench for permanent disposal. A prototype design and fabrication of one transport trailer and four engineered ILAW pallets was completed in mid-2018. Prototype qualification testing to verify adequacy of the design was completed in 2019 by Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) and affiliate ATKINS SNC-Lavalin Group. Prototype testing was completed to advance design maturation across all operational and facility interfaces, and under adverse environmental and operating conditions, including thermal assessment of the system at peak projected temperatures. Test design, observation, and feedback was well represented and supported by all ILAW Transportation System interfacing organizations: WTP constructor Bechtel National, Inc.; IDF operator CH2M (CHPRC); transportation contractor Mission Support Alliance (MSA); the U. S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office (DOE/RL) and Office of River Protection (DOE/ORP); and Washington State Department of Ecology. This paper presents the results of prototype qualification testing and opportunities for design improvements based on testing. Changes to the final design as a result of prototype testing include improvements in safety, ergonomics, operational flexibility, and As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA) applications. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Accelerating Nuclear Facility Mission Completion Through an Improved Chemical Hazard Control Strategy - 20460

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 129: Perspectives (US and Non-US) on the Use of Risk and Dose Assessment Tools (R9.3)

This panel focused on various dose and risk assessment tools for assessments, Deactivation and Decommissioning, remediation, and closure of sites of chemical and radioactive wastes. Representatives from the US government agencies, non-US countries and their representative regulatory bodies or authorities, as well as performance/risk assessment practitioners compared and contrasted the various guidance from regulatory agencies and authorities on how tools such as the Preliminary Remediation Goals (PRG) calculator, the Dose Compliance Concentrations (DCC) calculator, and Residual Radioactivity (RESRAD) should be used in support of analyses and decisions for environmental cleanup activities. Panelists with presentations: Cumulative Impact Evaluation: Innovative Tools for Evaluation of Groundwater Protection (Alaa Aly); Superfund Evaluation Process for Alternative Risk and Dose Models (with Focus on EPA and DOE Tools) (Stuart Walker); NRC Staff Perspective on Risk-Informed Approach and Reasonable Safety Assurance in D and D and LLW (Rateb (Boby) Abu Eid)

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DOE OSTI2021

Optimizing Ventilation Using Low-Cost Sensors to Improve Health, Safety, and Energy Efficiency

Air is the primary carrier of hazards within a space, whether it be hazardous byproducts of laboratory research activities or airborne pathogens. As a result, building ventilation is a primary defense against unseen airborne hazards. Critical laboratory facilities require effective mitigation of exposure to research-related, airborne hazards, providing a proving ground for effective ventilation strategies that optimize safety of occupants and reduce energy use. The heart of smart laboratory building operation is dynamic, analytics-based ventilation, which requires an in-depth intimate knowledge of building environmental conditions achieved through contaminant-detection systems. Unfortunately, currently many contaminant-detection solutions are expensive, elaborate systems that raise barriers for building managers. Through the successful deployment of a novel low-cost, modular sensor technology, we have developed a demand-control ventilation protocol effective in improving safety and reducing energy in critical laboratory environments. In this article, we will highlight best practices and lessons learned through this deployment that can be applied beyond laboratories. This article describes a low-cost sensor to support providing a safe, healthy building environment and reduce energy use through effective and efficient ventilation.

dynamic management of indoor air quality↗
DOE OSTI2021

Optimizing Ventilation Using Low-Cost Sensors to Improve Health, Safety, and Energy Efficiency

Air is the primary carrier of hazards within a space, whether it be hazardous bi-products of research activities or airborne pathogens. As a result, building ventilation is the primary defense against unseen airborne hazards. Critical laboratory facilities already demand the need for effective mitigation of exposure to research-related, airborne hazards, providing a proving ground for effective ventilation strategies that optimize safety of occupants and reduce energy use. The heart of smart laboratory building operation is dynamic, analytics-based ventilation, which requires an intimate knowledge of building environmental conditions achieved through contaminant-detection systems. Unfortunately, currently available contaminant-detection solutions are expensive, elaborate systems that raise barriers for building managers on a limited budget. Through the successful deployment of a novel low-cost, modular sensor technology, we have developed a demand-control ventilation protocol effective in improving safety and reducing energy in the critical laboratory environment. In this session, we will highlight best practices and lessons learned through this deployment that can be applied beyond laboratories without breaking the bank. This paper describes a low-cost solution for providing a safe, healthy building environment and reducing energy use through effective, efficient ventilation.

ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 132: Risk-Informed Approach for Decision Making in WM, D and D and SNF Management: Reasonable Assurance for Safety

Mr. Larry Camper organized a panel of experts to discuss approaches to better make risk-informed decisions in waste management, decommissioning, and the management of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). The audience heard the perspectives from four panelists that addressed issues ranging from the technical basis used to make risk-informed decisions to for developing cleanup criteria and promulgating regulations and safety standards both domestically and abroad. A summary of each of the presentations given by the panelists is provided herein. This WMS BOD featured panel focused on the Risk-Informed Approach for Decision Making in WM, D and D and SNF Management and the Reasonable Assurance for Safety. The panelists addressed and discussed with the audience different approaches used for decision-making, summarizing ongoing probabilistic vs. deterministic approaches, including IAEA graded approach, and discussed policies/approaches to achieve reasonable assurance for safety rather than using absolute assurance. Panelists with presentations: Risk-Informed Decision Making - More than a Motto? (Paul Black); NRC Staff Perspective on Risk-Informed Approach and Reasonable Safety Assurance in D and D and LLW (Rateb (Boby) Abu Eid); Risk-Informed Decision-Making and Illustrative National Academies Studies (Charles Ferguson); IAEA's Revised Safety Guidance on Remediation (Michelle Roberts); NDA Radioactive Waste Strategy - A Risk Informed Approach (James McKinney)

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DOE OSTI2020

Robotic Assisted Non-Destructive Testing (NDT)

Mission Statement: Concrete wall characterization for structural integrity evaluation of H-Canyon exhaust tunnel using a remote controlled robotic arm with a NDT Concrete Instrument. Challenges: Rough and Curved Surfaces, Remote location. The UR5 is a collaborative robotic arm capable of: Payload: 11 lbs (5 kg), Reach: 33.5 in (850 mm), Footprint: 5.87 in (149 mm) diameter, Weight: 45.4 Ibs (20.6 kg). The force torque sensor reacts to a set value inputted by the user that can be utilized for sensitive products. This allows the UR5 to react to surfaces using the built-in function to search for a wall and orient itself normal to that plane. The Proceq Pundit 250 array is a nondestructive device that the user applies against a concrete wall and scans using ultrasonic transducers. The back wall and other defects can be show through the touchscreen. A fixture to hold the Proceq Pundit 250 array onto the UR5 robotic arm was designed and 3D printed. It includes openings for easy access to the buttons from the Pundit array as well as a reinforced structural design. The scan from the Pundit array can show the back-wall, rebars, and other defects to assist in determining the structural integrity. In order to scan, a program was made to search for the wall first. 1. The UR5 robotic arm will go to the desired location away from the wall. 2. It will then search for the wall by moving towards it slowly. 3. After contact, the force applied will slowly but steadily increase to a preset value inputted by the user. 4. The force torque sensor will use those values and communicate with the UR5 by adjusting the arm to become normal to the wall. 5. The arm will then apply force to push back the transducers on the Pundit array to avoid gaps. 6. It will then prompt the user to collect data and wait until finished. The UR5 teach pendant allows the user to program the robot to perform automated and repeatable tasks. It includes a free drive mode which allows the user to move the arm to a desired position by hand. The user can also apply restricted planes which include either stopped or slower motion to ensure safety. The concrete sample being tested includes rebars and different grades of surface roughness to understand the readings from the Proceq Pundit 250 array. Desired concrete samples are currently being fabricated that will simulate the terrain being tested.

3D PRINTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Spent Nuclear Fuel Exploratory Roadmaps - 20054

The U.S. Department of Energy manages nearly 2,500 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) resulting from several decades of research, testing, and production reactors [DOE 1995]. This SNF is managed at the DOE Hanford Site in Washington State (Hanford), Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and Savannah River Site in South Carolina (SRS). From 1995 to 2004, the Department of Energy (DOE) made several key programmatic decisions, supported by appropriate documentation in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) for the management of SNF [DOE 1995]. These decisions have provided an overarching framework for SNF management, as well as site-specific and SNF-related management decisions for the past two decades. In the years since these decisions were made, with the notable exception of the successful drying and packaging of the production reactor fuel at Hanford, a majority of the decisions have been largely unimplemented. Also, since these decisions were made, a number of changes that bear on considerations relative to the path forward have occurred. A SNF Exploratory Road map activity, identified reasonable alternate pathways for DoE's inventory of SNF. Three fundamental pathways were identified in this activity for the long-term management and disposition of DOE SNF: Direct Disposal Pathway, Existing Processing Pathway and Alternate Processing Pathway. Further actions would be required (e.g., evaluation of NEPA analysis, technology maturity evaluations, refinement of cost and risks, benefits and advantages relative to other alternate paths) to define and inform many key decisions that will result in the selection of the disposition pathways that are most beneficial to the US Government in dispositioning DoE's SNF inventory. DOE is currently managing all SNF safely; however, the age of DOE-owned SNF and facilities for storing and processing SNF, coupled with the uncertainty of the storage duration, necessitates decisions and actions to ensure that the infrastructure will be in place to ensure continued safe and effective long-term management and eventual disposal. The identification of reasonable alternate pathways took these considerations into account in an effort to proactively manage conditions that could challenge the safety of storing and managing DOE SNF over the time periods now contemplated and also to ensure that flexibility is preserved to ensure that the DOE SNF remains compatible with final disposition pathways when they become available. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

CSA, the French LILW Disposal Facility: Taking Stock of the 30 years' Operating Experience - 20009

French Andra's currently operational LILW repository, Aube disposal facility, is almost 30 years old. From the beginning, the repository has benefited from the lessons learned from the first disposal facility, the CSM. It has nevertheless continued to evolve, to improve and to adapt, seeking to gain in efficiency, safety and cost optimization. This is a look at what has changed at the CSA since 1992 - and the effect these changes had on its operating practices, construction principles and the entire management organization. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Origins and Contents of the Waste Specifications: the Example of the French LLW-SL Disposal Facility - 20016

The waste specifications published by Andra for its surface disposal facilities for Low and Intermediate, Short-Lived waste (CSA) are primarily defined to ensure the safe disposal of waste, both in the short and long term, spanning from disposal operations to hundreds of years after closure, when the man-made safety barriers have long disappeared into dust. The paper presents the methodology used at Andra to derive the CSA waste specifications, also known as Waste Acceptance Criteria, their contents, and the process in place to verify compliance of the waste with the specifications. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Using FLAC{sup R} Modeling Software to Analyze the Stability of a LLRW Disposal Facility - 20031

Waste Control Specialists (WCS) wished to amend its existing LLRW disposal license such that it might use gravel aggregate instead of concrete as backfill around large component (LC) parts from decommissioned nuclear reactors. A classical mechanics evaluation of the strength of the LCs was presented to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), demonstrating that the LCs had adequate capacity to withstand the loads within the facilities, and that concrete was unnecessary for structural support. TCEQ requested that additional analyses of the LCs within the facilities be performed using FLAC{sup R} finite difference modeling software. Because FLAC{sup R} has the capability of modeling the support provided by the lateral earth pressures, the factors of safety against failure for the LCs increased. TCEQ found the FLAC{sup R} analyses presented in this report to be satisfactory, and granted WCS' license amendment request. This work demonstrates that FLAC{sup R} may be used advantageously to more accurately represent the complexities of the physical situation being modeled. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Sludge Removal: Success and Partnership with T Plant - 20510

U.S. DOE contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) has safely and efficiently managed the removal of highly radioactive sludge from the 105-K West Reactor fuel storage basin (105- KW Basin) near the Columbia River. In mid-September 2019, sludge retrieval was completed after 21 storage containers were safely loaded with highly radioactive sludge and transported approximately 13 miles from the 105-KW Basin to T Plant, located in the 200 West Area on the Central Plateau of the Hanford Site. Sludge removal represents the last major source term reduction necessary before the K West Reactor and fuel storage basin can transition to closure activities in preparation for final deactivation and demolition. The technical complexity of the sludge retrieval process, coupled with the challenging physical and radiological characteristics of the waste, necessitated a methodical and deliberate approach using unique design and operational solutions to safely conduct the work. This challenge was further complicated by the need to plan and conduct the work in two separate facilities, each subject to the controls and requirements of its own nuclear facility safety basis. The project overcame these challenges through creating an integrated team that actively engaged, communicated and coordinated each phase of the project to ensure successful completion. This paper will cover how these key elements of the Sludge Removal Project led to its success: - Integrating project planning and management; - Lessons learned from design and construction; - Preparing for a successful campaign (lessons learned from testing and start-up); - Lessons learned from operating in two separate facilities, transporting sludge containers on the Hanford Site and ensuring compliance with a range of regulatory and safety basis requirements. The establishment of an integrated group spanning two facilities and multiple organizations created a team capable of overcoming the challenges necessary to successfully plan and execute the sludge retrieval mission. Sharing lessons learned from this successful project can enhance the ability of teams across the DOE complex to successfully plan and execute complex projects. (authors)

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