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Twelve samples of cellular polymers were evaluated in the course of developing test methods for toxic materials characterization. Six samples were flexible polyurethane foams, three were rigid polyurethane foams, two were high density rigid foams, and one was a modified polyimide foam. Some effects of formulation variables are discussed.
The use of spirally wound lithium-thionyl chloride (Li-SOCl2) cells is currently limited because of their hazardous behavior. Safety hazards have ranged from mild venting of toxic materials to violent explosions and fires. These incidents may be related to both user- and manufacturer-induced causes. Many explanations have been offered to explain the unsafe behavior of the cells under operating and abuse conditions. Explanations fall into two categories: (1) thermal mechanisms, and (2) chemical mechanisms. However, it is quite difficult to separate the two. Both may be responsible for cell venting or explosion. Some safety problems encountered with these cells also may be due to design deficiencies and ineffective quality control during cell fabrication. A well-coordinated basic and applied research program is needed to develop safe Li-SOCl2 cells. Recommendations include: (1) learnig more about Li-SOL2 cell chemistry; (2) modeling cell and battery behavior; (3) optimizing cell design for safety and performance, (4) implementing quality control procedures; and (5) educating users.
Proposed process disposes of toxic organic compounds in contaminated soil or carbon beds safely and efficiently. Oxidizes toxic materials without producing such other contaminants as nitrogen oxides. Using air, fuel, catalysts, and steam, system consumes less fuel and energy than decontamination processes currently in use. Similar process regenerates carbon beds used in water-treatment plants.
The contamination control capabilities of the Reactive Bed Plasma (RBP) system is described by delineating the results of toxic chemical composition studies, aerosol filtration work, and other testing. The RBP system has demonstrated its capabilities to decompose toxic materials and process hazardous aerosols. The post-treatment requirements for the reaction products have possible solutions. Although additional work is required to meet NASA requirements, the RBP may be able to meet contamination control problems aboard the Space Station.
Time delays and limited sensory feedback of remote telerobotic systems tend to disorient teleoperators and dramatically decrease the operator's performance. To remove the effects of time delays, key components were designed and developed of a prototype forward simulation subsystem, the Global-Local Environment Telerobotic Simulator (GLETS) that buffers the operator from the remote task. GLETS totally immerses an operator in a real-time, interactive, simulated, visually updated artificial environment of the remote telerobotic site. Using GLETS, the operator will, in effect, enter into a telerobotic virtual reality and can easily form a gestalt of the virtual 'local site' that matches the operator's normal interactions with the remote site. In addition to use in space based telerobotics, GLETS, due to its extendable architecture, can also be used in other teleoperational environments such as toxic material handling, construction, and undersea exploration.
In order to develop plausible and appropriate drinking water contaminant standards for longer-term NASA space missions, such as those planned for the Space Exploration Initiative, a human health risk characterization was performed using toxicological and exposure values typical of space operations and crew. This risk characterization showed that the greatest acute waterborne health concern was from microbial infection leading to incapacitating gastrointestinal illness. Ingestion exposure pathways for toxic materials yielded de minimus acute health risks unlikely to affect SEI space missions. Risks of chronic health problems were within acceptable public health limits. Our analysis indicates that current Space Station Freedom maximum contamination levels may be unnecessarily strict. We propose alternative environmental contaminant values consistent with both acceptable short and long-term crew health safety.
Proposed wind-direction indicator read easily by distant observers. Indicator emits bright flashes of light separated by interval of time proportional to angle between true north and direction from which wind blowing. Timing of flashes indicates direction of wind. Flashes, from high-intensity stroboscopic lights seen by viewers at distances up to 5 miles or more. Also seen more easily through rain and fog. Indicator self-contained, requiring no connections to other equipment. Power demand satisfied by battery or solar power or both. Set up quickly to provide local surface-wind data for aircraft pilots during landing or hovering, for safety officers establishing hazard zones and safety corridors during handling of toxic materials, for foresters and firefighters conducting controlled burns, and for real-time wind observations during any of variety of wind-sensitive operations.
The Active Hydrazine Vapor Sampler (AHVS) was developed to detect vapors of hydrazine (HZ) and monomethylhydrazine (MMH) in air at parts-per-billion (ppb) concentration levels. The sampler consists of a commercial personal pump that draws ambient air through paper tape treated with vanillin (4-hydroxy-3-methoxybenzaldehyde). The paper tape is sandwiched in a thin cardboard housing inserted in one of the two specially designed holders to facilitate sampling. Contaminated air reacts with vanillin to develop a yellow color. The density of the color is proportional to the concentration of HZ or MMH. The AHVS can detect 10 ppb in less than 5 minutes. The sampler is easy to use, low cost, and intrinsically safe and contains no toxic material. It is most beneficial for use in locations with no laboratory capabilities for instrumentation calibration. This paper reviews the development, laboratory test, and field test of the device.
Manned space flight can be viewed as an interaction of three general elements: the human crewmember, spacecraft systems, and the environment. While the human crewmember is a crucial element in the system, certain physiological, psychological, environ- mental and spacecraft systems factors can compromise human performance in space. These factors include atmospheric pressure, physiology, uncertainties associated with space radiation, the potential for exposure to toxic materials in the closed environment, and spacecraft habitability. Health protection in space, for current and future missions, relies on a philosophy of risk reduction, which in the space program is achieved in four ways-through health maintenance, health care, design criteria, an selection and training. Emphasis is place upon prevention, through selection criteria and careful screening. Spacecraft health care systems must be absolutely reliable, and they will be automated and computerized to the maximum extent possible, but still designed with the human crewmember's capabilities in mind. The autonomy and technological sophistication of future missions will require a greater emphasis on high-level interaction between the human operator and automated systems, with effective allocation of tasks between humans and machines. Performance in space will include complex tasks during extravehicular activity (EVA) and on planetary surfaces, and knowledge of crewmembers' capability and limitations during such operations will be critical to mission success. Psychological support will become increasingly important on space missions, as crews spend long periods in remote and potentially hazardous environments. The success of future missions will depend on both individual psychological health and group cohesion and productivity, particularly as crew profiles become more heterogeneous. Thus, further human factors are needed in the area of small-group dynamics and performance.
Human exploration of space requires the interaction of three general systems: environmental health and life support systems, countermeasure systems, and medical care systems. These systems address atmospheric pressure, uncertainties associated with space radiation, the potential for exposure to toxic materials in the closed environment, spacecraft habitability, human physiology, and microgrvaity. While these interdependent systems serve the same overall goal -- the protection of the human crewmember from the hostile space environment -- each has specific essential roles. Individually and in combination the three systems should be responsive to a strategy of risk reduction, so that the scientific possibilities of exploration missions may be maximized.
NASA-Ames Research Center developed the Suitport as an advanced space suit airlock to support a Space Station suit based on the AX-5 hard suit. Several third parties proposed their own variations of the Suitport on the moon and Mars. The Suitport recently found its first practical use as a terrestrial application in the NASA-Ames Hazmat vehicle for the clean-up of hazardous and toxic materials. In the Hazmat application, the Suitport offers substantial improvements over conventional hazard suits by eliminating the necessity to decontaminate before doffing the suit.
To maximize the use of available resources provided onboard the International Space Station, the development of an efficient lighting 1 system is critical to the overall performance of the CPBF. Not only is it important to efficiently generate photon energy, but thermal loads on the CPBF Temperature and Humidity Control System must be minimized. By utilizing optical coatings designed to produce highly diffuse reflectance in the visible wavelengths while minimizing reflectance in the infrared region, the design of the fluorescent light module for the CPBF is optimized for maximum photon flux, spatial uniformity and energy efficiency. Since the Fluorescent Light Module must be fully enclosed to meet (ISS) requirements for containment of particulates and toxic materials, heat removal from the lights presented some unique design challenges. By using the Express Rack moderate C, temperature-cooling loop, heat is rejected by means of a liquid/air coolant manifold. Heat transfer to the manifold is performed by conduction using copper fins, by forced air convection using miniature fans, and by radiation using optically selective coatings that absorb in the infrared wavelengths. Using this combination of heat transfer mechanisms builds in redundancy to prevent thermal build up and premature bulb failure.
The nocturnal land breeze at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) is both operationally significant and challenging to forecast. The occurrence and timing of land breezes impact low-level winds, atmospheric stability, low temperatures, and fog development. Accurate predictions of the land breeze are critical for toxic material dispersion forecasts associated with space launch missions, since wind direction and low-level stability can change noticeably with the onset of a land breeze. This report presents a seven-year observational study of land breezes over east-central Florida from 1995 to 2001. This comprehensive analysis was enabled by the high-resolution tower observations over KSC/CCAFS. Five-minute observations of winds, temperature, and moisture along with 9 15-MHz Doppler Radar Wind Profiler data were used to analyze specific land-breeze cases, while the tower data were used to construct a composite climatology. Utilities derived from this climatology were developed to assist forecasters in determining the land-breeze occurrence, timing, and movement based on predicted meteorological conditions.
The USSR Cosmos Biosatellites are unmanned missions with durations of approximately 14 days. They are capable of carrying a wide variety of biological specimens such as cells, tissues, plants, and animals, including rodents and rhesus monkeys. The absence of a crew is an advantage with respect to the use of radioisotopes or other toxic materials and contaminants, but a disadvantage with respect to the performance of inflight procedures or repair of hardware failures. Thus, experiments hardware and procedures must be either completely automated or remotely controlled from the ground. A serious limiting factor for experiments is the amount of electrical powers available, so when possible experiments should be self-contained with their own batteries and data recording devices. Late loading is restricted to approximately 48 hours before launch and access time upon recovery is not precise since there is a ballistic reentry and the capsule must first be located and recovery vehicles dispatched to the site. Launches are quite reliable and there is a proven track record of nine previous Biosatellite flights. This paper will present data and experience from the seven previous Cosmos flights in which the US has participated as well as the key areas of consideration in planning a flight investigation aboard this Biosatellite platform.
White Sands Test Facility Core Capabilities: a) Remote Hazardous Testing of Reactive, Explosive, and Toxic Materials and Fluids; b) Hypergolic Fluids Materials and Systems Testing; c) Oxygen Materials and System Testing; d) Hypervelocity Impact Testing; e)Flight Hardware Processing; and e) Propulsion Testing. There is no impact to any drinking water well. Includes public wells and the NASA supply well. There is no public exposure. Groundwater is several hundred feet below ground. No air or surface water exposure. Plume is moving very slowly to the west. Plume Front Treatment system will stop this westward movement. NASA performs on-going monitoring. More than 200 wells and zones are routinely sampled. Approx. 850 samples are obtained monthly and analyzed for over 300 different hazardous chemicals.
NASA's White Sands Test Facility has six core environmental compliance capabilities: remote hazardous testing of reactive, explosive and toxic materials and fluids; hypergolic fluids materials and systems testing; oxygen materials and system testing; hypervelocity impact testing; flight hardware processing; and, propulsion testing. The facility's permit status and challenges are reviewed. Historic operations and practices dating from the 1960s through the early 1980s resulted in contamination of the facility's groundwater. An environmental restoration effort has been employed to protect public health and the health of the workforce. The restoration seeks to properly handle hazardous materials and waste processes; determine the nature and extent of the contamination; stop the migration of contaminated groundwater; stabilize the plume front which has been assessed as the greatest risk to public health; and, clean-up the environment to restore it to preexisting conditions. The Plume Front Treatment System is operational and seeks to stop the westward movement of the plume to protect drinking water and irrigation well. Specifically, the treatment system will extract contaminated water from the aquifer, remove chemical using the best available technology, and return (inject) the treated water back to the aquifer. The Mid-Plume Interception Treatment System also seeks to stop the migration of containment, as well as to evaluate new technologies to accelerate cleanup, such as bioremediation.
Topics covered include: Hybrid Architecture Active Wavefront Sensing and Control; Carbon-Nanotube-Based Chemical Gas Sensor; Aerogel-Positronium Technology for the Detection of Small Quantities of Organic and/or Toxic Materials; Graphene-Based Reversible Nano-Switch/Sensor Schottky Diode; Inductive Non-Contact Position Sensor; High-Temperature Surface-Acoustic-Wave Transducer; Grid-Sphere Electrodes for Contact with Ionospheric Plasma; Enabling IP Header Compression in COTS Routers via Frame Relay on a Simplex Link; Ka-Band SiGe Receiver Front-End MMIC for Transponder Applications; Robust Optimization Design Algorithm for High-Frequency TWTs; Optimal and Local Connectivity Between Neuron and Synapse Array in the Quantum Dot/Silicon Brain; Method and Circuit for In-Situ Health Monitoring of Solar Cells in Space; BGen: A UML Behavior Network Generator Tool; Platform for Post-Processing Waveform-Based NDE; Electrochemical Hydrogen Peroxide Generator; Fabrication of Single, Vertically Aligned Carbon Nanotubes in 3D Nanoscale Architectures; Process to Create High-Fidelity Lunar Dust Simulants; Lithium-Ion Electrolytes Containing Phosphorous-Based, Flame-Retardant Additives; InGaP Heterojunction Barrier Solar Cells; Straight-Pore Microfilter with Efficient Regeneration; Determining Shear Stress Distribution in a Laminate; Self-Adjusting Liquid Injectors for Combustors; Handling Qualities Prediction of an F-16XL-Based Reduced Sonic Boom Aircraft; Tele-Robotic ATHLETE Controller for Kinematics - TRACK; Three-Wheel Brush-Wheel Sampler; Heterodyne Interferometer Angle Metrology; Aligning Astronomical Telescopes via Identification of Stars; Generation of Optical Combs in a WGM Resonator from a Bichromatic Pump; Large-Format AlGaN PIN Photodiode Arrays for UV Images; Fiber-Coupled Planar Light-Wave Circuit for Seed Laser Control in High Spectral Resolution Lidar Systems; On Calculating the Zero-Gravity Surface Figure of a Mirror; Optical Modification of Casimir Forces for Improved Function of Micro- and Nano-Scale Devices; Analysis, Simulation, and Verification of Knowledge-Based, Rule-Based, and Expert Systems; Core and Off-Core Processes in Systems Engineering; Digital Reconstruction Supporting Investigation of Mishaps; and Template Matching Approach to Signal Prediction.
Ascending space vehicles are vulnerable to both natural and triggered lightning. Launches under the jurisdiction of the United States are generally subject to a set of rules called the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC) (Krider etal., 1999; Krider etal., 2006). The LLCC protect both the vehicle and the public by assuring that the launch does not take place in conditions posing a significant risk of a lightning strike to the ascending vehicle. Such a strike could destroy the vehicle and its payload, thus causing failure of the mission while releasing both toxic materials and debris. To assure safety, the LLCC are conservative and sometimes they may seriously limit the ability of the launch operator to fly as scheduled even when conditions are benign. In order to safely reduce the number of launch scrubs and delays attributable to the LLCC, the Airborne Field Mill (ABFM II) program was undertaken in 2000 - 2001. The effort was directed to collecting detailed high-quality data on the electrical, microphysical, radar and meteorological properties of thunderstorm-associated clouds. Details may be found in Dye et al., 2007. The expectation was that this additional knowledge would provide a better physical basis for the LLCC and allow them to be revised to be less restrictive while remaining at least as safe. That expectation was fulfilled, leading to significant revisions to the LLCC in 2003 and 2005. The 2005 revisions included the application of a new radar-derived quantity called the Volume Averaged Height Integrated Radar Reflectivity (VAHIRR) in the rules governing flight through anvil clouds. VAHIRR is the product of the volume averaged radar reflectivity times the radardetermined cloud thickness. The reflectivity average extends horizontally 5 km west, east, south and north of a point along the flight track and vertically from the 0 C isotherm to the top of the radar cloud. This region is defined as the "Specified Volume". See Dye et al., 2006 and Merceret et al., 2006 for a more thorough description of VAHIRR. The units are dBZ km (not dBZ per kilometer) and the threshold is 10 dBZ km. It is safe to fly through an anvil cloud for which VAHIRR is below this threshold everywhere along the flight track as long as (1) the entire cloud within 5 nmi. (9.26 km) of the flight track is colder than 0 C, (2) the points at which VAHIRR must be evaluated are at least 20 km from any active convective cores and recent lightning, and (3) the radar return is not being attenuated within the Specified Volume around those points.