Verification of a Practical Hardware Security Architecture Through Static Information Flow Analysis
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Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere was heightened from Airports to the communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APTs) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated and secured state in a launch control system environment. FISMA is a law that is mandated by the government to follow when government agencies secure networks and devices. My role on this project is to ensure network devices and systems are in compliance with NIST, as outlined in FISMA. I will achieve this by providing assistance with security plan documentation and collection, system hardware and software inventory, malicious code and malware scanning and configuration of network devices i.e. routers and IDSsIPSs. In addition I will be completing security assessments on software and hardware, vulnerability assessments and reporting, conducting patch management and risk assessments. A guideline that will help with compliance with NIST is the SANS Top 20 Critical Controls. SANS Top 20 Critical Controls as well as numerous security tools, security software and the conduction of research will be used to successfully complete the tasks given to me. This will ensure compliance with FISMA and NIST, secure systems and a secured network. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, policies and procedures.
This Handbook sets forth in two parts the following information for the guidance of users of the NASA Management Directives System. Part A is a master list of management directives in force as of March 31, 1993. Chapter 1 contains introductory informative material on how to use this Handbook. Chapter 2 is a complete master list of Agencywide management directives, describing each directive by type, number, effective date, expiration date, title, and organization code of the office responsible for the directive. Chapter 3 includes a consolidated numerical list of all delegations of authority and a breakdown of such delegation by the office or installation to which special authority is assigned. Chapter 4 sets forth a consolidated list of all NASA Handbooks (NHB's) and important footnotes covering the control and ordering of such documents. Chapter 5 is a consolidated list of NASA management directives applicable to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Chapter 6 is a consolidated list of NASA management directives published in the Code of Federal Regulations. Complementary manuals to the NASA Management Directives System are described in Chapter 7. Part B is the index to NASA management directives in force as of March 31, 1993. This part contains an in-depth alphabetical index to all NASA management directives other than Handbooks. NHB's 1610.6, 'NASA Personnel Security Handbook,' 1620.3, 'NASA Physical Security Handbook,' 1640.4, 'NASA Information Security Program,' 1900.1, 'Standards of Conduct for NASA Employees,' 5103.6, 'Source Evaluation Board Handbook,' and 7400.1, 'Budget Administration Manual,' are indexed in-depth. All other NHB's are indexed by titles only.
Software technologies relevant to workstation executives are discussed. Evaluations of problems, potential or otherwise, seen with IBM's Workstation Executive (WEX) 2.5 preliminary design and applicable portions of the 2.5 critical design are presented. Diverse graphics requirements of the Johnson Space Center's Mission Control Center Upgrade (MCCU) are also discussed. The key is to use tools that are portable, compatible with the X window system, and best suited to the requirements of the associated application. This will include a User Interface Language (UIL), an interactive display builder, and a graphic plotting/modeling system. Work sheets are provided for POSIX 1003.4 real-time extensions and the requirements for the Center's automated information systems security plan, referred to as POSIX 1003.6, are discussed.
The Space based Operations Grid is intended to integrate the "high end" network services and compute resources that a remote payload investigator needs. This includes integrating and enhancing existing services such as access to telemetry, payload commanding, payload planning and internet voice distribution as well as the addition of services such as video conferencing, collaborative design, modeling or visualization, text messaging, application sharing, and access to existing compute or data grids. Grid technology addresses some of the greatest challenges and opportunities presented by the current trends in technology, i.e. how to take advantage of ever increasing bandwidth, how to manage virtual organizations and how to deal with the increasing threats to information technology security. We will discuss the pros and cons of using grid technology in space-based operations and share current plans for the prototype. It is hoped that early on the prototype can incorporate many of the existing as well as future services that are discussed in the first paragraph above to cooperating International Space Station Principle Investigators both nationally and internationally.
As communication and networking technologies advance, networks will become highly complex and heterogeneous, interconnecting different network domains. There is a need to provide user authentication and data protection in order to further facilitate critical mission operations, especially in the tactical and mission-critical net-centric networking environment. The Autonomous Information Unit (AIU) technology was designed to provide the fine-grain data access and user control in a net-centric system-testing environment to meet these objectives. The AIU is a fundamental capability designed to enable fine-grain data access and user control in the cross-domain networking environments, where an AIU is composed of the mission data, metadata, and policy. An AIU provides a mechanism to establish trust among deployed AIUs based on recombining shared secrets, authentication and verify users with a username, X.509 certificate, enclave information, and classification level. AIU achieves data protection through (1) splitting data into multiple information pieces using the Shamir's secret sharing algorithm, (2) encrypting each individual information piece using military-grade AES-256 encryption, and (3) randomizing the position of the encrypted data based on the unbiased and memory efficient in-place Fisher-Yates shuffle method. Therefore, it becomes virtually impossible for attackers to compromise data since attackers need to obtain all distributed information as well as the encryption key and the random seeds to properly arrange the data. In addition, since policy can be associated with data in the AIU, different user access and data control strategies can be included. The AIU technology can greatly enhance information assurance and security management in the bandwidth-limited and ad hoc net-centric environments. In addition, AIU technology can be applicable to general complex network domains and applications where distributed user authentication and data protection are necessary. AIU achieves fine-grain data access and user control, reducing the security risk significantly, simplifying the complexity of various security operations, and providing the high information assurance across different network domains.
This paper is focused on automated classification of software bug reports to security and non-security related, using both supervised and unsupervised approaches. For both approaches, three types of feature vectors are used. For supervised learning, we experiment with multiple learning algorithms and training sets with different sizes. Furthermore, we propose a novel unsupervised approach based on anomaly detection. The evaluated is based on three NASA datasets. The results show that supervised classification is affected more by the learning algorithms than by feature vectors and using only 25% of the data for training provides as good results as if 90% of data are used for training. Both supervised and unsupervised learning can be used for identification of security bug reports; the former slightly outperforms the latter at the expense of labeling the testing set. In general, the performance differs across datasets, mainly due to the different amounts of security related information.
The primary purpose of the Aerospace Computer Security Conference was to bring together people and organizations which have a common interest in protecting intellectual property generated in space. Operational concerns are discussed, taking into account security implications of the space station information system, Space Shuttle security policies and programs, potential uses of probabilistic risk assessment techniques for space station development, key considerations in contingency planning for secure space flight ground control centers, a systematic method for evaluating security requirements compliance, and security engineering of secure ground stations. Subjects related to security technologies are also explored, giving attention to processing requirements of secure C3/I and battle management systems and the development of the Gemini trusted multiple microcomputer base, the Restricted Access Processor system as a security guard designed to protect classified information, and observations on local area network security.
Information Technology (IT) Security Risk Management is a critical task in the organization, which must protect its resources and data against the loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. As systems become more complex and diverse, and more vulnerabilities are discovered while attacks from intrusions and malicious content increase, it is becoming increasingly difficult to manage IT security. This paper describes an approach to address IT security risk through risk management and mitigation in both the institution and in the project life cycle.
Molecular biology provides the ability to implement forms of information and network security completely outside the bounds of legacy security protocols and algorithms. This paper addresses an approach which instantiates the power of gene expression for security. Molecular biology provides a rich source of gene expression and regulation mechanisms, which can be adopted to use in the information and electronic communication domains. Conventional security protocols are becoming increasingly vulnerable due to more intensive, highly capable attacks on the underlying mathematics of cryptography. Security protocols are being undermined by social engineering and substandard implementations by IT (Information Technology) organizations. Molecular biology can provide countermeasures to these weak points with the current security approaches. Future advances in instruments for analyzing assays will also enable this protocol to advance from one of cryptographic algorithms to an integrated system of cryptographic algorithms and real-time assays of gene expression products.
Molecular biology provides the ability to implement forms of information and network security completely outside the bounds of legacy security protocols and algorithms. This paper addresses an approach which instantiates the power of gene expression for security. Molecular biology provides a rich source of gene expression and regulation mechanisms, which can be adopted to use in the information and electronic communication domains. Conventional security protocols are becoming increasingly vulnerable due to more intensive, highly capable attacks on the underlying mathematics of cryptography. Security protocols are being undermined by social engineering and substandard implementations by IT organizations. Molecular biology can provide countermeasures to these weak points with the current security approaches. Future advances in instruments for analyzing assays will also enable this protocol to advance from one of cryptographic algorithms to an integrated system of cryptographic algorithms and real-time expression and assay of gene expression products.
As technology and security measures improve, hackers keep looking for new techniques and vulnerabilities that allow them to gain access to sensitive data. This includes but is not limited to: user accounts, personal information, databases, operating systems, developmental and testing systems, and operational systems. A hacker is an individual that uses technology such as computers, tablets, and phones for unauthorized access to data. As technology becomes more robust at preventing known attacks, new vulnerabilities always exists. These vulnerabilities usually go unnoticed by developers and could potentially be exploited by an attacker. To prevent hackers from stealing sensitive and potentially harmful information, we must protect our systems and data against these criminals by developing new methods to mitigate the damage caused by these vulnerabilities and prevent them from occurring in the first place. An excellent way to discover how hackers compromise systems is by identifying and analyzing existing vulnerabilities and patching them. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is one of the many federal agencies that operates under a constant threat by hackers. NASA puts a tremendous amount of effort to maintain and improve their security measures, protect critical systems, and secure sensitive information from attackers who would attempt to use it against our nation's interests.
The number and diversity of databases available to users continues to increase dramatically. Currently, the trend is towards decentralized, client server architectures that (on the surface) are less expensive to acquire, operate, and maintain than information architectures based on centralized, monolithic mainframes. The database query support processor (QSP) effort evaluates the performance of a network level, heterogeneous database access capability. Air Force Material Command's Rome Laboratory has developed an approach, based on ANSI standard X3.138 - 1988, 'The Information Resource Dictionary System (IRDS)' to seamless access to heterogeneous databases based on extensions to data dictionary technology. To successfully query a decentralized information system, users must know what data are available from which source, or have the knowledge and system privileges necessary to find out this information. Privacy and security considerations prohibit free and open access to every information system in every network. Even in completely open systems, time required to locate relevant data (in systems of any appreciable size) would be better spent analyzing the data, assuming the original question was not forgotten. Extensions to data dictionary technology have the potential to more fully automate the search and retrieval for relevant data in a decentralized environment. Substantial amounts of time and money could be saved by not having to teach users what data resides in which systems and how to access each of those systems. Information describing data and how to get it could be removed from the application and placed in a dedicated repository where it belongs. The result simplified applications that are less brittle and less expensive to build and maintain. Software technology providing the required functionality is off the shelf. The key difficulty is in defining the metadata required to support the process. The database query support processor effort will provide quantitative data on the amount of effort required to implement an extended data dictionary at the network level, add new systems, adapt to changing user needs, and provide sound estimates on operations and maintenance costs and savings.
This Summer, I worked as a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Internships and Fellowships (NIF) intern under my mentor, Jill Giles within the Software Engineering Branch. Within this project, I worked alongside the Cyber Security branch to identify a list of Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) software to analyze, research, and gain insight about potential vulnerabilities within the software that could become a threat of attack. After identifying the list of COTS software, my team and I used Microsoft Excel to create a worksheet to easily organize and design a questionnaire about the software. Security reports weregiven to us to identify the software used on the machines in the firing rooms. With these reports, we created a script that would populate the database with the software information to identify potential security weaknesses of COTS software.The goal of the project was to produce a final report, summarizing the most vulnerable launch control system servers and configurations and document vulnerabilities, residual risk, likelihood, and consequence. This project is important for the Cyber Security and Information Technology branches because it will identify security weaknesses and help to mitigate risk. From the Spaceport Command and Control System Security Assessor Project, I learned how to properly identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities within software and how to mitigate the risks within the software. This project also taught me how to create databases using scripts and input files.
In this paper, we introduce a new fine-grain distributed information protection mechanism which can self-protect, self-discover, self-organize, and self-manage. In our approach, we decompose data into smaller pieces and provide individualized protection. We also provide a policy control mechanism to allow 'smart' access control and context based re-assembly of the decomposed data. By combining smart policy with individually protected data, we are able to provide better protection of sensitive information and achieve more flexible access during emergency conditions. As a result, this new fine-grain protection mechanism can enable us to achieve better solutions for problems such as distributed information protection and identity theft.
My job title is IT Security support for the Spaceport Command & Control System Development. As a cyber‐security analyst it is my job to ensure NASA's information stays safe from cyber threats, such as, viruses, malware and denial-of-service attacks by establishing and enforcing system access controls. Security is very important in the world of technology and it is used everywhere from personal computers to giant networks ran by Government agencies worldwide. Without constant monitoring analysis, businesses, public organizations and government agencies are vulnerable to potential harmful infiltration of their computer information system. It is my responsibility to ensure authorized access by examining improper access, reporting violations, revoke access, monitor information request by new programming and recommend improvements. My department oversees the Launch Control System and networks. An audit will be conducted for the LCS based on compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) and The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). I recently finished analyzing the SANS top 20 critical controls to give cost effective recommendations on various software and hardware products for compliance. Upon my completion of this internship, I will have successfully completed my duties as well as gain knowledge that will be helpful to my career in the future as a Cyber Security Analyst.
This informational paper discusses the risk assessment process conducted to analyze Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) architectures for integrating civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS). The assessment employs the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management framework to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to these architectures and recommends corresponding mitigating security controls. This process builds upon earlier work performed by RTCA Special Committee (SC) 203 and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to roadmap the risk assessment methodology and to identify categories of information security risks that pose a significant impact to aeronautical communications systems. A description of the deviations from the typical process is described in regards to this aeronautical communications system. Due to the sensitive nature of the information, data resulting from the risk assessment pertaining to threats, vulnerabilities, and risks is beyond the scope of this paper